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Increasingly, researchers are associating the exponential growth in worldwide share repurchases with 
a desire by executives to increase the share price (and possibly the earnings per share figure). 
Increasing the share price financially benefits executives if they have been granted share-based 
remuneration. Executive share-based remuneration inherently increases in value as the share price 
increases. Moreover, the vesting of executive share-based remuneration is most often conditional 
upon the share price or earnings per share, or both, reaching a certain pre-determined target.  
The statistical relationship between variables measuring share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration has been studied in other countries. In developed countries, a positive relationship has 
been found between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration – pointing to the 
possibility that executives could possibly be utilising share repurchases to increase the value of their 
own share-based remuneration. Prior to the present study, this ethical dilemma had not been 
researched in South Africa, mainly owing to the lack of comprehensive data on both share repurchases 
and executive share-based remuneration (no public financial database keeps comprehensive record 
thereof). However, it is critical that this matter is addressed in South Africa, given the high levels of 
income-inequality existing here – which makes this research important from a social justice point of 
view. To bridge this knowledge gap, the research aim of the present study was to determine the 
relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration for South African 
listed companies during the 2002–2017 period. 
Data on both share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration were collected by using the 
IRESS financial database and the information disclosed in companies’ annual financial statements. In 
the process, a comprehensive database on both variables of interest was constructed – the first major 
contribution of the present study. To reach the aim of the present study, regression analyses which 
statistically quantified the relationship between the two variables were executed. As was expected, 
based on the findings of previous studies in other countries, a positive relationship was found between 
share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration (especially as measured by the number of 
instruments exercised during the year). This finding provides evidence that South African executives 
may be executing share repurchases in a bid to increase the value of their own share-based 
remuneration, rather than to maximise long-term shareholder value. To counteract this possibility, 
regulators should require improved disclosure of share repurchases, as well as the potential effect 




It was also found that a large, and increasing, percentage of general (open market) share repurchases 
is not announced. This leads to a lack of transparency regarding share repurchase activity in South 
Africa and could increase the risk of executives primarily using share repurchases to enrich themselves. 
It is recommended that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange requires all share repurchase activity to be 
announced in real time, in line with other global stock exchanges. This will improve the transparency 









Navorsers assosieer toenemend die eksponensiële groei in wêreldwye aandeelterugkope met ŉ poging 
deur uitvoerende direkteure om die aandeelprys (en moontlik die verdienste per aandeel syfer) te 
verbeter. ŉ Toename in die aandeelprys is finansieel voordelig vir direkteure indien hulle vergoed word 
by wyse van aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding. Die inherente waarde van direkteure se 
aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding verhoog namate die aandeelprys toeneem. Hiernaas is die vestiging 
van direkteure se aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding dikwels onderhewig aan bepalings dat die 
aandeelprys of verdienste per aandeel, of beide, ŉ sekere voorafbepaalde teiken moet bereik.  
Die statistiese verwantskap tussen veranderlikes wat aandeelterugkope en aandeelgebaseerde 
vergoeding bepaal, is reeds in ander lande bestudeer. In ontwikkelde lande, is ŉ positiewe verwantskap 
tussen aandeelterugkope en aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding gevind – wat beklemtoon dat direkteure 
moontlik aandeelterugkope gebruik om die waarde van hul eie aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding te 
verhoog. Voor die teenswoordige studie, is hierdie etiese dilemma nog nie in Suid-Afrika bestudeer 
nie, meestal as gevolg van ŉ gebrek aan omvattende publieke data oor beide die aandeelterugkope en 
die aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding van uitvoerende direkteure (geen finansiële databasis bevat 
omvattende inligting daaroor nie). Maar, dit is krities dat hierdie saak aangespreek word in Suid-Afrika, 
gegewe die hoë vlakke van inkomste-ongelykheid wat hier heers – wat hierdie navorsing belangrik 
maak vanuit ŉ sosiale geregtigheidsperspektief. Om hierdie kennisgaping aan te spreek, is die 
navorsingsdoelwit van die huidige studie om die verwantskap tussen aandeelterugkope en die 
aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding van uitvoerende direkteure te bepaal vir genoteerde Suid-Afrikaanse 
maatskappye gedurende die 2002–2017 periode. 
Data rakende beide aandeelterugkope en aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding is versamel met behulp van 
die IRESS finansiële databasis en die openbaarmaking soos verskaf in die finansiële jaarstate van 
maatskappye. In die proses is ŉ omvattende databasis oor beide veranderlikes van belang opgestel – 
die eerste beduidende bydrae van die huidige studie. Om die navorsingsdoelwit van die huidige studie 
te bereik, is ŉ aantal regressie ontledings gedoen ten einde die statistiese verwantskap tussen die twee 
veranderlikes te kwantifiseer. Soos verwag, gebaseer op vorige studies in ander lande, is ŉ positiewe 
verwantskap gevind tussen aandeelterugkope en die aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding van uitvoerende 
direkteure (veral in terme van die aantal instrumente uitgeoefen gedurende die jaar). Hierdie 
bevinding verskaf getuienis wat aandui dat Suid-Afrikaanse uitvoerende direkteure moontlik 
aandeelterugkope uitvoer in ŉ poging om die waarde van hul eie aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding te 
verhoog, eerder as die lang-termyn aandeelhouerswaarde te maksimeer. Om hierdie moontlikheid 
teen te werk, word aanbeveel dat reguleerders verbeterde openbaarmaking in die finansiële jaarstate 
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of geïntegreerde verslag aangaande aandeelterugkope en die potensiële effek wat dit op 
aandeelgebaseerde vergoeding het, behoort te vereis.  
Daar is ook bevind dat ŉ groot, en steeds toenemende, persentasie van algemene (ope-mark) 
aandeelterugkope nie aangekondig word nie. Dit lei tot ŉ gebrek aan deursigtigheid met betrekking 
tot aandeelterugkope in Suid-Afrika en kan die risiko verhoog dat uitvoerende direkteure 
aandeelterugkope misbruik om hulself te verryk. Dit word gevolglik aanbeveel dat die Johannesburgse 
Effektebeurs van maatskappye vereis om alle aandeelterugkope onmiddellik aan te kondig, in lyn net 
oorsese aandelebeurse. Sodanige maatreël sal die deursigtigheid van aandeelterugkope verbeter en 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Worldwide, share repurchases are increasingly used. Share repurchases occur when a company buys 
back its own previously issued shares. The popularity of the practice, as well as the financial impact of 
the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, have led to questions being asked about the real motivation 
behind share repurchases and whether companies should be re-investing excess cash in internal 
growth and innovation rather than paying it out to shareholders (Lazonick, 2014; Wesson, Bruwer, & 
Hamman, 2015). Although bona fide business reasons for implementing share repurchases could exist 
(Dittmar, 2000; Lazonick, 2014, pp. 50–52; Wesson et al., 2015, p. 43), they can also be used to increase 
artificially both the share price and the earnings per share (EPS) (Lazonick, 2014, p. 51; Wesson et al., 
2015, p. 43). More specifically, in the absence of proper regulation and disclosure, share repurchases 
could be used by executive directors (hereafter called executives) to increase the value of their share-
based remuneration and extract rents from the company (Lazonick, 2014; Wesson, Smit, Kidd, & 
Hamman, 2018). 
Share repurchases by South African listed companies were legalised in 1999 and increased 
exponentially in the years 2005 to 2009 (Wesson et al., 2015), but seem to have decreased since the 
global financial crisis (Buitendag, 2018). South Africa is a developing country, with low economic 
growth, high unemployment and extreme income inequality (Wesson et al., 2018, p. 181). Although 
South Africa is an emerging economy, it has certain features that are not typically observed in emerging 
economies (Wesson et al., 2018, p. 181). One of these features is a sophisticated stock exchange: the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) has been rated as one of the best stock exchanges in the world 
(based on the effectiveness of its regulation and supervision), according to PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC, 2015, p. 4). However, the JSE’s disclosure requirements relating to share repurchases lag behind 
those of other countries. In many countries that allow repurchases, companies have to announce all 
repurchase activities (either immediately or quarterly in arrears) (Kim, Schremper, & Varaiya, 2005, p. 
36). In South Africa, listed companies are required to announce all specific repurchases on the JSE’s 
Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) before they occur, but general (open market) repurchases only 
need to be announced when three per cent of outstanding shares have been repurchased (JSE, 2017a).  
Wesson (2015), in a study that spanned 1999–2009, found that only about half of South African general 
share repurchases were announced on SENS – and many of these announcements are made 
subsequent to the event (not in real time, i.e. at the actual time of transacting). On 14 January 2013 
an additional JSE requirement was added: companies were required to disclose their share 
repurchases in their annual reports (i.e. number of shares repurchased and the average price at which 
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bought back). This is an improvement, but still does not provide real-time information (Massie, Collier, 
& Crotty, 2014, pp. 39–40), as is provided by stock exchange announcements in other countries. As 
share repurchases could be employed by executives to artificially increase the value of their own 
(share-based) remuneration (Massie et al., 2014, p. 36), JSE investors need to know, in real time, when 
listed companies engage in share repurchases.  
Share-based remuneration can be defined as awards made to employees (e.g. executives) where the 
value of the award depends on the share price of the company (or a company in the group) (Lazonick, 
2014; Massie et al., 2014, p. 6). The vesting of share-based remuneration is often contingent upon the 
meeting of performance targets (linked to, for example, the share price or the EPS figure of the 
company). Examples of share-based remuneration include share options, share appreciation rights, 
restricted shares and performance shares.  
The main reasoning behind share-based remuneration is that it aligns the interests of executives and 
shareholders and can help in overcoming the agency problem (a conflict of interest arising where one 
party is expected to act in another’s best interests, e.g. between a company’s executives and 
shareholders) while increasing shareholder value (Lazonick, 2014; Massie et al., 2014, p. 6). In theory, 
share-based remuneration could be effective in this regard, but only if an increase in share price is the 
most important indicator of the long-term success of the company, and if any manipulation of the 
share price by executives can be avoided by regulation (Peng & Röell, 2008). Some detractors have 
mentioned that share-based remuneration might actually exacerbate the agency problem by 
incentivising executives to increase their own remuneration by increasing the share price over the 
short-term (sometimes through financial manipulation of the earnings figure and/or the number of 
shares in issue), rather than working towards the long-term success of the company (Massie et al., 
2014, p. 6).  
In the South African environment, executive remuneration is often criticised as excessive (Viviers, 
Mans-Kemp, Kallis, & Mckenzie, 2019). The share-based remuneration paid to executives has the 
potential of exacerbating this problem (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). Since 2002, the Second King 
Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa (King II) has required that the remuneration of each 
executive needs to be disclosed (on an individual basis) in companies’ annual financial statements, 
according to the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA, 2002), but the disclosures relating to 
share-based remuneration seem inconsistent and incomplete (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). Users of 
financial statements are still largely uninformed as to the exact nature and quantum of share-based 
remuneration actually received by executives (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). The IRESS financial 
database offers some information regarding share-based remuneration, but is incomplete, especially 
prior to 2006 (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). Furthermore, the available data have not allowed 
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stakeholders to determine whether a relationship exists between share repurchases and executive 
share-based remuneration.  
Given the lack of regulation and inadequate disclosure of details in SENS about share repurchases, 
South African shareholders are unaware of the timing and extent of share repurchases 
announcements. Moreover, they are uninformed about how share repurchases interact with executive 
share-based remuneration. This study aims to address this knowledge gap by gathering data on both 
share repurchases by companies and executive share-based remuneration (primarily by analysing 
financial statements, as no other sources are available) and by comparing the two data sets to 
determine their interaction.  
The results of the present study could benefit shareholders, regulators, non-executive directors serving 
on the remuneration committees of JSE-listed companies, business ethics educators and future 
researchers. Shareholders will gain a fuller understanding of both the quantum of share repurchases 
and the characteristics of executive share-based remuneration in South Africa, and especially how the 
two relate to each other. Shareholders will be alerted to the possibility that executives could be 
enriching themselves through share repurchases – which will equip shareholders for shareholder 
activism with the information whereby they could demand disclosure in the integrated report 
regarding the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration. 
Regulators, such as the JSE, should constantly evaluate whether their requirements constitute best 
practice. As such, the JSE could employ the findings of the present study as rationale in support of 
drafting stricter announcement regulations relating to general share repurchases in South Africa. 
Corporate governance regulations, such as the King Reports, could include the obligatory disclosure of 
the effect that share repurchases have had on the value of executive remuneration.  
Non-executive directors serving on remuneration committees of JSE-listed companies are responsible 
for determining the size and composition of executives' remuneration packages. The characteristics of 
executive share-based remuneration identified in the present study could inform best practice that 
those serving on the remuneration committee could consider when formulating executive 
remuneration policies and implementing these policies. Furthermore, business ethics educators and 
organisations promoting business ethics in the country could integrate some of the findings into case 
studies and other teaching materials. Finally, knowledge of the full quantum of share repurchases and 
the characteristics of executive share-based remuneration will allow future researchers to study the 
interaction of both share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration with other variables 
of interest.  
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1.2 RESEARCH AIM, PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS 
1.2.1 Research aim and problem 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between share repurchases and 
executive share-based remuneration in South Africa in order to gain an understanding of whether 
additional regulation and disclosure about the timing of share repurchases, and their effect on 
executive share-based remuneration, might be warranted.  
The research problem addressed by this study therefore was as follows: In South Africa the link 
between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration has not been established. This 
lack of information, coupled with the slack SENS announcement rules relating to general share 
repurchases, could create a loophole for executives to enrich themselves using share repurchases 
(Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020a). Earlier studies undertaken in other countries have associated a positive 
statistical relationship between variables measuring share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration with a short-term outlook and the possibility of self-enrichment by executives (Edmans, 
Fang, & Huang, 2018). 
1.2.2 Research questions 
To achieve the research aim and address the research problem, three main research questions (or 
steps) were developed pertaining to South African listed companies over the period 2002–2017: 
• Research question 1: What was the extent of share repurchase activity? 
• Research question 2: What were the characteristics of executive share-based remuneration? 
• Research question 3: What was the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-
based remuneration? 
To determine the extent of share repurchase activity (Research question 1), a number of research sub-
questions were developed pertaining to South African listed companies and the targeted time period 
of this research. These were: 
• Sub-question 1.1: Which companies engaged in share repurchases? 
• Sub-question 1.2: What was the total quantum (number and value) of shares repurchased?  
• Sub-question 1.3: What percentage of share repurchases was associated with each of the 
repurchasing entities (i.e the holding company repurchasing from third parties; the holding 
company repurchasing treasury shares; and subsidiaries)?  
• Sub-question 1.4: What percentage of share repurchases was associated with each of the 
repurchase types (i.e. general repurchases; pro rata specific repurchases; specific repurchases 
where the holding company repurchases treasury shares; and other specific repurchases)? 
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• Sub-question 1.5: What percentage of share repurchases was announced and not announced via 
the JSE’s SENS (transparency)?  
• Sub-question 1.6: Compared to the 2000–2009 period, was there a difference in the post-2009 
share repurchase activity (in respect of number of companies; quantum of shares repurchased; 
preferred repurchasing entity; preferred repurchase type; and percentage of repurchases that 
were announced)? 
The answer to sub-question 1.1 allowed further comparison between the decision to repurchase and 
the characteristics of executive share-based remuneration, when addressing Research question 3 (see 
sub-questions 3.1 to 3.3). Sub-question 1.2 focused on both the number and the value of shares 
repurchased. Although only the value of share repurchases was used to address Research question 3 
(see sub-questions 3.4 to 3.6 below), it was necessary to first collect complete and accurate data on 
the number of shares repurchased, before attaching rand values to the share repurchases. Sub-
questions 1.3 to 1.5 allowed for the categorisation of share repurchase value – which enabled more 
in-depth analysis in addressing Research question 3. Sub-question 1.6 allowed a comparison of share 
repurchase activity after the global financial crisis (which is largely unknown) to that of 2000–2009, 
which was reported by Wesson (2015). 
To address Research question 2 and determine the characteristics of executive share-based 
remuneration, a number of research sub-questions were drawn up: 
• Sub-question 2.1: What value was attached to executive share-based remuneration in relation to 
the value of other executive remuneration? 
• Sub-question 2.2: What trends were noted over the 2002–2017 period in terms of the type of 
schemes being granted to executives? 
• Sub-question 2.3: What vesting conditions were attached to executive share-based remuneration? 
• Sub-question 2.4: How many share-based instruments were associated with executive share-based 
remuneration? 
Only the answers to sub-questions 2.3 and 2.4 were later employed to address Research question 3. 
However, the remainder of the sub-questions were necessary to provide context and to enable the 
development of a comprehensive database on executive share-based remuneration.  
To answer Research question 3, several research sub-questions were posed and investigated: 
• Sub-question 3.1: What is the relationship between the decision to repurchase and the number of 
share-based instruments held by executives at the reporting date? 
• Sub-question 3.2: What is the relationship between the decision to repurchase and the number of 
share-based instruments exercised by executives during the reporting period? 
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• Sub-question 3.3: What is the relationship between the decision to repurchase and the use of 
performance conditions that are linked to share price, total shareholder return and/or earnings 
per share? 
• Sub-question 3.4: What is the relationship between repurchase value and the number of share-
based instruments held by executives at the reporting date? 
• Sub-question 3.5: What is the relationship between repurchase value and the number of share-
based instruments exercised by executives during the reporting period? 
• Sub-question 3.6: What is the relationship between repurchase value and the use of performance 
conditions that are linked to share price, total shareholder return and/or earnings per share? 
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.3.1 Research methodology 
Data on both share repurchases (Research question 1) and executive share-based remuneration 
(Research question 2) were collected, and appropriate regression models were employed to study the 
relationship between the two variables (Research question 3). The overall research methodology, as 
well as the varying research methods applied in addressing the three research questions, are detailed 
in Chapter 3. To facilitate the development of reliable, valid and effective research methods, a pilot 
study was conducted prior to finalising the research methods and the research population (further 
details are provided in Section 3.2.1). Three peer-reviewed papers were published from the pilot study 
(Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, 2018b, 2020a). 
1.3.2 Research population of the study 
Wesson (2015) compiled the first comprehensive database of share repurchase activity in South Africa 
for the period 1999–2009, for all JSE-listed companies (except those in the Basic Materials and 
Financial industries). Subsequent research in the Basic Materials and Financial industries showed that 
these industries have less repurchase activity (Fortuin, 2015; Vermeulen, 2014), possibly as a result of 
legislation that specifically applies to mines and banks. With this as background (and since the 
methodology applied by Wesson (2015) was used in this study to capture share repurchase activity), a 
decision was made to continue with the Wesson (2015) research population. This choice has the added 
benefit that share repurchase activity of most of the companies in the research population would 
already be available for the 1999–2009 period. Thus, for most of the companies, only the share 
repurchase activity for the period starting 2010 had to be collected.  
The population was therefore determined as including all companies: 




• that had been listed for at least three years during the 2002–2017 period; 
• that had the JSE as primary listing; and 
• that had listed ordinary and/or N-class shares. 
Companies were only included in the population if they had been listed for at least three years (i.e. 
they had three years of annual reports available) during the target period. It is not common for a 
company to be listed for fewer than three years, and studying the share repurchases of companies for 
fewer than three years does not allow proper reconciling of the number of shares involved (as 
information from future years’ financial statements is often used to understand prior years’ share 
repurchases). Moreover, given that many share-based schemes have long vesting periods (typically 
three or more years), it is important to study an extensive period of time for any valid conclusions to 
be drawn (Avallone, Quagli, & Ramassa, 2014). The three-year rule had also been applied by Wesson 
(2015).  
The target period, for which information on share repurchase activity and share-based remuneration 
was collected for the companies in the research population, was 2002–2017. When a specific year (e.g. 
2002) is mentioned in the present study, it is important to note that this year refers to the financial 
year of companies which ended in that specific calendar year (e.g. 2002 might be the financial year 
ended 31 March 2002, or 30 June 2002, or 31 December 2002, depending on the specific company). 
The starting date of 2002 was chosen to coincide with the requirement to disclose executive 
remuneration on an individual basis in annual financial statements (as this was required by King II from 
2002 onwards) (IoDSA, 2002). Information on the share-based remuneration of individual executives 
is not available prior to 2002.  
Delisted companies were included up to their delisting date, to avoid survivorship bias. Companies that 
had a secondary listing on the JSE adhered to the announcement rules of the exchange where they 
had a primary listing and not the JSE’s rules, and were therefore not included in the population.  
Data on share repurchases were gathered per company per year, for each company and year as 
explained in the paragraphs above. Data on share-based remuneration were then gathered per 
executive, for all executives employed by specific companies during specific years (named the ‘per-
executive database on share-based remuneration’). The information on this database was then 
condensed to a per-company format (the ‘per-company year database on share-based remuneration’) 
to enable a comparison of the share repurchase data. 
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1.3.3 Limitations of the study 
Although appropriate measures were applied to ensure the capturing of complete and accurate data 
regarding share repurchases and share-based remuneration, some minor problems (such as 
incomplete and ambiguous annual financial statement disclosure) were encountered. These problems, 
and how they were addressed, are detailed in Chapter 3. Incomplete and ambiguous annual financial 
statement disclosures may have affected the completeness and reliability of the data collected on both 
share repurchases and share-based remuneration.  
As part of the present study, the relationship between share repurchases and the exercise of executive 
share-based remuneration was studied (research sub-questions 3.2 and 3.5). In this study, the 
assumption was that share repurchases occurred before the exercise date of the share-based 
instruments. The reason for this was that the share repurchases were associated with an attempt to 
improve the share price and EPS, thus enhancing the value realised on the exercise of the share-based 
remuneration (which then occurred subsequent to the share repurchase). However, the exact date 
when share repurchases were executed and executives exercised their share-based remuneration was 
usually not known in the South African environment (owing to the announcement rules relating to 
general repurchases and inconsistent annual financial statement disclosure relating to executive share-
based remuneration). When collecting share repurchase data in South Africa, it was therefore not 
possible to confirm whether a share repurchase preceded the exercise of the share-based 
remuneration; it was only known that both occurred in the same financial year.  
Although most of the companies on the JSE Main Board were included in the population, the results 
of the study cannot be generalised to all companies on the JSE, as the companies in the Basic Materials 
and Financial industries were not included in the research population.  
1.4 MERIT OF THE RESEARCH AND THE PROPOSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCIENCE 
The first merit of the present study and proposed contribution to science, is the creation of a database 
containing previously unavailable financial data on both share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration, which can be used in future research (Wesson, 2015, p. 6). While some would contest 
that creating and maintaining a financial database is best left to commercial providers, such as IRESS 
and Bloomberg, it is argued that specialist financial accounting knowledge is required to accurately 
create a database on share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration in the South African 
context. Neither SENS announcements nor publicly available financial databases contain 
comprehensive information regarding share repurchase activity, and thus the rand value spent on 
share repurchases by JSE-listed entities was unknown for the period 2010–2017. The present study 
addressed this data shortage. Furthermore, the characteristics of the executive share-based 
remuneration of JSE-listed companies were not readily available in a per-company format, nor 
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collected in a comprehensive and accurate database. The data gathered in this study fill this knowledge 
gap for the period 2002–2017.  
Having data available on both share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration in South 
Africa enabled the determination of the relationship between the two variables. The demonstration 
of a positive relationship between these variables may point to the possibility that South African 
executives are artificially increasing the value of their own share-based remuneration through share 
repurchases. Given the rather slack announcement rules relating to South African listed companies, 
the finding of a positive relationship will support the drafting of improved announcement rules by the 
JSE. Some recommendations are offered as to how these announcement rules could look, based on 
the best practices observed in other countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US) 
and developing countries. Reporting the results of the study to the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors and the JSE would serve a constructive 
purpose. The second contribution of the study is therefore foreseen to provide information to 
regulators in order to enable the development of effective and appropriate regulations regarding share 
repurchases, and its possible effect on executive share-based remuneration. 
The supposition that the present study makes a contribution to the field is confirmed by peer-reviewed 
papers that were published from the pilot study (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, 2018b, 2020a) and 
based on dissertation itself (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020b). To the best of the knowledge of the 
researcher, prior to the commencement of the present study, no research on the relationship between 
share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration has been done in South Africa, or in any 
other developing country. Studies in developed countries have pointed out that such a relationship 
can exist. It is therefore important to understand whether such a relationship also holds true in South 
Africa, especially since the announcement rules regarding share repurchases are less strict in South 
Africa than in developed countries. 
1.5 BRIEF CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the research aim, questions and objectives, and indicates in which 
chapter of the study each question/objective is addressed. A brief outline of each chapter is provided 
below. 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
A thorough literature review is done by considering individually each of the three main aspects of the 
study (share repurchases, executive share-based remuneration and the link between the two). Firstly, 
theoretical perspectives are provided on share repurchases, giving reasons why companies engage in 
share repurchases and the risks involved. The regulation of share repurchases in South Africa is 
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detailed and compared to regulation in the global environment. Furthermore, previous studies on 
share repurchases in South Africa, as well as in other countries, are discussed. 
Secondly, share-based remuneration is considered through a theoretical lens, based on the agency and 
rent extraction theories. Common share-based schemes are discussed, as well as the accounting and 
regulation of share-based remuneration. Previous local and global studies detailing share-based 
remuneration are considered. Lastly, the possible relationship between share repurchases and share-
based remuneration is discussed based on papers published across the world, as well as the theoretical 
perspective provided by the rent extraction theory. 
Chapter 3: Research methodology 
The overall research methodology followed to address the aim of the study is provided and 
substantiated. In addition, the techniques employed in addressing each of the research questions are 
discussed. 
Chapter 4: Results relating to share repurchases 
The results relating to research question 1 are presented and discussed. The chapter deals with the 
share repurchase activity of the population over the period 2002–2017. Furthermore, this chapter 
specifically compares the share repurchase activity prior to 2010, as reported by Wesson (2015), and 
the share repurchase activity from 2010 onwards. 
Chapter 5: Results relating to share-based remuneration of executives 
Chapter 5 addresses the results relating to Research question 2. The chapter deals specifically with the 
share-based remuneration characteristics of the research population for the period 2002–2017. 
Chapter 6: Results relating to the relationship between share repurchases and share-based 
remuneration paid to executives  
The results relating to Research question 3 are discussed. The chapter addresses the relationship 
between share repurchases and share-based remuneration over the period 2002–2017. 
Chapter 7: Summary and conclusion  
A summary of the study is provided and a conclusion is reached on whether there is empirical evidence 
of a relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration in South Africa 
over the period studied. Practical implications of the findings are discussed and changes and additions 




RESEARCH AIM  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  CHAPTER 
     
Aim: To investigate the 
relationship between share 
repurchases and executive 
share-based remuneration 
in South Africa to establish 
whether additional 
regulations and disclosure 
rules about the timing of 
share repurchases, and their 
effect on executive share-
based remuneration, might 
be warranted.  
 Research question 1: What was the extent of share repurchase activity in South African listed companies?  4 
    
 
Research question 2: What were the characteristics of 
executive share-based remuneration in South African 
listed companies? 
 5 
    
 
Research question 3: What was the relationship 
between share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration in South African listed companies? 
 6 
Figure 1.1. An overview of the flow of the present study  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Globally, researchers are increasingly questioning whether the rise in share repurchase activity is 
linked to executive share-based remuneration (Geiler & Renneboog, 2016; Lazonick, 2014). Share 
repurchases can increase both the share price and the EPS figure (Wesson et al., 2018), and can thus 
be used to facilitate the vesting of executive share-based remuneration (which often hinges on 
performance conditions linked to share price and/or EPS) (Lazonick, 2014; Young & Yang, 2011). An 
increase in the share price (which could be brought about by a share repurchase) also inherently 
increases the value that executives realise from share-based remuneration.  
In South Africa, the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration 
has not been studied. As is the case globally, South African executives of listed entities are increasingly 
remunerated through share-based awards, and the usage of performance vesting conditions based on 
both the share price and the EPS figure are common (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). Share repurchase 
activity is less transparent in South Africa than globally, owing to the fact that general (open market) 
repurchases only need to be announced once more than three per cent of the outstanding shares have 
been repurchased. As such, many general share repurchases are never announced via SENS 
(Vermeulen, 2014). Share repurchases should be disclosed in annual financial statements, but such 
disclosure is after the fact, and is not always comprehensive or clear (Wesson, 2015). Shareholders and 
other company stakeholders are thus unaware of much of the share repurchase activity by South 
African listed companies, which provides ample opportunity for misuse by executives, should they wish 
to do so.  
The lack of transparency increases the urgency of establishing whether a link exists between share 
repurchases and executive share-based remuneration in South Africa. The literature review considers 
the aspects mentioned separately and then jointly, addressing first share repurchases, secondly 
executive share-based remuneration, and finally the possible link between the two. 
2.2 SHARE REPURCHASES 
A share repurchase (often referred to as a share buy-back or treasury shares) is when a company 
repurchases shares that it previously issued (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020b, p. 465). A repurchase can 
be affected in several ways: by the company itself, or via other entities controlled by the company 
(such as subsidiaries or share trusts). Globally there are three types of share repurchases (Vermeulen, 
2014, p. 3; Wesson et al., 2015, pp. 44–46), namely: 
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• Open market or auction repurchases (referred to in South Africa as repurchases under general 
authority or general repurchases): where the shares are bought back on the open market at the 
current market price – and not pro rata from all shareholders or from specific shareholders. This 
will generally raise the demand for the company’s shares and is by far the most common method 
used to repurchase shares globally. The number of shares repurchased can be decided on before 
the repurchase, but not from whom the shares are repurchased nor the repurchase price (the price 
is based on the prevailing market price). 
• Tender offer repurchases (referred to in South Africa as repurchases under specific authority or 
specific repurchases, sub-type: pro rata offer): where all current shareholders can have their 
shares bought back. In tender offers, the price at which the shares will be repurchased is 
predetermined, as is the window period during which the shares can be repurchased, but the 
shareholders must choose to take up the offer. In South Africa all tender offers are pro rata (i.e. 
are offered in equal numbers to all shareholders).  
• Private offer repurchases (referred to in South Africa as repurchases under specific authority or 
specific repurchases, sub-type: other specific offers): where a specific targeted group of 
shareholders’ shares are bought back. In private offers, the counterparty from whom the shares 
will be repurchased, the price and the repurchase date or period are predetermined.  
2.2.1 Share repurchase activity globally 
A share repurchase is a relatively new phenomenon. Before the 1980s, most countries applied the 
concept of ‘capital maintenance’ (Visser, 2014, p. 6). In the US share repurchases became more 
prominent from 1981 onwards (when certain restrictions were removed) (Dittmar, 2008, p. 27). Share 
repurchases were legalised in the UK in 1981 and by several other European countries in the 1990s, 
while in South Africa (and many other developing countries) they were only legalised by the late 1990s 
or early 2000s (Dhanani, 2016, p. 333; Wesson et al., 2015, p. 43). During the last two decades (2000–
2020), however, share repurchases have become an established practice in most countries and are 
often used by listed companies globally. The amounts spent on share repurchases worldwide have 
escalated steeply since 2000, with some commentators viewing the upward trend relating to share 
repurchases in a positive light and some viewing it in a negative light (Mbawa, 2018, p. 15). 
The US is the most studied locality in respect of share repurchases, and also the country where the 
overwhelming majority of worldwide share repurchases (based on value) occurs (Wesson et al., 2015, 
p.43). From the 1980s there has been a drastic increase in the amounts spent on share repurchases in 
the US (Wesson et al., 2015, p.43). Share repurchases have become so widespread and contentious in 
the US, that they have even been addressed in several politicians’ political manifestos for the 2020 US 
election (Tully, 2019). Several US politicians (on both sides of the ideological fence) consider the 
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amounts being spent on share repurchases in the US as excessive and have proposed stricter rules for 
when and how US companies should be allowed to engage in share repurchases (Tully, 2019). The 
problems listed by the politicians were also identified by Lazonick (2014), who stated that the massive 
amounts spent on share repurchases would ultimately decrease companies’ investment in research 
and development, new projects, and human capital. A further risk is that – since share repurchases 
lead to an increase in share price and EPS – they may unfairly increase executive share-based 
remuneration (Lazonick, 2014).  
Both academic studies and the popular media have reported on the large amounts being spent on 
share repurchases in the US (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2018; Asness, Hazelkorn, & Richardson, 
2017; Birstingl, 2016; Lazonick, 2014; Yardeni, Abbott, & Quintana, 2019). In a report detailing the 
quarterly share repurchase activity for Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 companies during 2005–2015, 
Birstingl (2016) showed that the number of companies engaging in share repurchases and the value of 
share repurchases grew substantially during 2005–2007. The global financial crisis brought a sharp 
decline in repurchase activity, with the post-crisis period showing a rise to pre-crisis (2005–2007) levels 
by 2015 (Birstingl, 2016; Yardeni et al., 2019, p. 3). By 2018, share repurchases (in value terms) had 
risen to their highest level yet (Yardeni et al., 2019, p. 3). After the financial crisis (from 2010 onwards) 
the net issuances of shares (gross value of shares issued minus gross value spent on share repurchases) 
on the S&P 500 had constantly been negative and had become increasingly negative annually (Yardeni 
et al., 2019, p. 7). 
When considering the amounts spent on share repurchases in comparison to the free cash flow of 
companies, the picture became even clearer. Before the global financial crisis, the average S&P 500 
company was spending more on share repurchases than they had available as free cash flow (before 
dividends) (Birstingl, 2016), meaning that they had to borrow funds to execute share repurchases 
(Mbawa, 2018, pp. 9–10). During the financial crisis, the share repurchase to free cash flow (before 
dividends) ratio had dropped, but had increased to more than 50 per cent by 2015 (Birstingl, 2016). If 
one compares S&P 500 companies’ share repurchase activity to net income, a similar picture emerges. 
Just before the financial crisis, the amounts spent on share repurchases totalled approximately 100 
per cent of net income (Birstingl, 2016). With net income plummeting during the global financial crisis, 
share repurchases reached a level of over 140 per cent of net income. Just after the financial crisis, as 
net income picked up again, the percentage dropped to less than 30 per cent, but increased to the 
point where share repurchases were almost 70 per cent of net income by 2015 (Birstingl, 2016). During 
2016, share repurchases as a percentage of operating earnings increased to more than 100 per cent, 
while being at just below 100 per cent in 2018 (Yardeni et al., 2019, p. 10). 
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Although no other country comes close to the US in terms of money invested in share repurchases, 
companies in developed countries like those in Western Europe (including the UK) and Japan are 
increasingly employing share repurchases (Manconi, Peyer, & Vermaelen, 2018). Sakinç (2017) studied 
the share repurchase behaviour of Western European companies indexed on the S&P 350, between 
2000 and 2015. A comparison between the US and Western Europe of the per-company average value 
spent on share repurchases can be seen in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1. Share repurchase value: Comparing the US and Western Europe (Sakinç, 2017) 
Similar to the US case, share repurchases in Western Europe increased prior to the global financial 
crisis, and decreased during the crisis (2008–2009). However, contrary to the situation in the US, share 
repurchases in Western Europe showed only a moderate increase after the financial crisis – and 
between 2010 and 2015 share repurchase activity was relatively stable (the increasing trend noticed 
prior to the crisis is absent). What is important to realise, however, is that the companies included in 
the US S&P 500 and Europe S&P 350 are predominantly large companies. As such, the averages shown 
in Figure 2.1 provide an indication of the share repurchase trends relating only to the larger listed 
companies in the US and Europe. Large companies are more likely to execute share repurchases and 
more likely to spend large amounts on share repurchases (Burns, McTier, & Minnick, 2015; De Cesari 
& Ozkan, 2015; Geiler & Renneboog, 2016), and thus the average is expected to be substantially lower 
when one includes smaller companies as well. 
Japan was a relatively late entrant to the share repurchases environment as it only legalised share 
repurchases in 1994, but then allowed share repurchases only in specific circumstances (for example, 
to offset share options exercised by employees or to affect business combinations) (Franks et al., 2018, 
p. 8). Unrestricted share repurchases have only been allowed in Japan since 2001 (Franks et al., 2018, 
p. 8). While most share repurchases in the US and Western Europe are executed in the open market, 
the majority of Japanese share repurchases did not occur in the open market, but were done to 
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establish and maintain control in the hands of certain shareholders (using a quasi-tender offer with a 
very short notice period, aimed at benefitting specific shareholders) (Franks et al., 2018, p. 3).  
More than 50 per cent of the companies listed on the premium section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
executed share repurchases during the 2002–2014 period, with the average company repurchasing 
approximately seven per cent of their outstanding shares during this period (0.53% per year) (Franks 
et al., 2018, p. 1, 10). In most of the years (2002–2014), the average repurchases were between 0.3 
per cent and 0.6 per cent of outstanding shares per year, but the years hereafter saw substantially 
higher levels of repurchases: 2002 (0.81%), 2003 (0.7%), 2007 (0.66%), 2008 (0.98%) (Franks et al., 
2018, p. 43). More shares were repurchased just after the share repurchase restrictions were lifted in 
2002 and 2003 and during the global financial crisis, which is contrary to the pattern observed in the 
US and Western Europe where share repurchase activity decreased during the financial crisis (Franks 
et al., 2018). Franks et al. (2018, pp. 10–11) mentioned two possible reasons for the spike in share 
repurchases during the global financial crisis: the desire of companies to increase a share price they 
believed to be undervalued or depressed, and the increase in shareholder activism just before and 
during the financial crisis relative to the post-crisis period.  
Share repurchase activity in developing countries is substantially lower than in the US, Western Europe 
and Japan (Wesson et al., 2018, p. 181). Manconi et al. (2018) found that Brazil, China and India each 
delivered less than one per cent of the global number of repurchase announcements during 1998–
2008, while Malaysia’s announcements represented 1.5 per cent of the global number. South Africa 
was excluded from the Manconi et al. (2018) study, but Wesson et al. (2018, p. 181) estimated that 
South African announcements would equate to 1.1 per cent of the global number (which still 
understates actual repurchases because announcements are only required once 3% of a company’s 
total outstanding shares have been reacquired). Although the repurchase activity in developing 
countries is small in comparison to the US and Western Europe, the relative effect thereof could still 
be significant.  
In conclusion, it is informative to understand the effect that share repurchases have on the global 
equity market (the value of all shares listed on all stock exchanges in the world), which can be viewed 
in Figure 2.2. Just before the global financial crisis, large amounts were spent on share repurchases 
causing the net issuances of equity (the value of new shares issued minus the value of shares 
repurchased) to become sharply negative (Wigglesworth, 2018). During and just after the global 
financial crisis, this situation reversed itself as less share repurchases occurred, but companies still 
issued shares. From 2012 to 2018, however, the net issuances of equity were constantly negative 
(Wigglesworth, 2018). During 2018, the 12-month trailing value of net issuances (as a percentage of 
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market capitalisation) decreased to its lowest level yet, with the percentage falling at the fastest rate 
in 20 years (Wigglesworth, 2018). 
 
Figure 2.2. A global perspective: Net share issuances as percentage of market capitalisation 
(Wigglesworth, 2018) 
2.2.2 The potentially harmful effects of excessive share repurchasing 
Share repurchases have become commonplace globally, but need to be regulated and monitored given 
the impact they can have on the economic well-being of a company, its shareholders and the country 
as a whole. A share repurchase is a financial and capital management tool available to companies, 
through which per-share figures such as EPS and the share price can be affected in the short-term 
(Wesson et al., 2018). The popularity of share repurchases might be a result of the (recently 
popularised) idea that a company should seek to maximise shareholder value first and foremost 
(Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). However, the idea of shareholder value maximisation often ignores the 
legitimate interests of other stakeholders in the company, such as the government (focused on 
taxation), employees (interested in job security and equitable pay), suppliers (who desire long-term 
relationships) and clients (wanting to receive affordable and innovative goods and services) (Lazonick, 
2014). Furthermore, the rights of all shareholders should also be considered – and not all shareholders 
necessarily favour share repurchases. 
Whether or not a company maximises shareholder value is often measured using the total shareholder 
return (TSR) metric, which comprises the increase in share price plus dividends paid to shareholders, 
expressed as a percentage of the share price at the beginning of the period (Steenkamp & Wesson, 
2018a, p. 50, 67). Both TSR and EPS are commonly used to measure the well-being of a company from 
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the perspective of institutional investors, and the metrics are often reported and monitored on a 
quarterly basis (Lazonick, 2014). When the short-term TSR or EPS decreases or does not meet pre-
determined targets, a company is judged to be struggling, and the market may impose a substantial 
penalty in terms of share price (Hribar, Jenkins, & Johnson, 2006, p. 6). Given this short-termism then 
ruling the equity markets, executives might resort to actions resulting in positive movements in the 
share price and EPS in the short-term (such as share repurchases), while sacrificing the long-term 
health of the company (i.e. engage in share repurchases to increase the share price and EPS without 
having a bona fide business reason to engage in share repurchases) (Wesson et al., 2018). 
As share repurchases could increase both the share price and the EPS figure, it could also increase the 
value of executive share-based remuneration. The vesting of share-based awards is most often linked 
to share price, TSR and/or EPS targets. Furthermore, the value of share-based awards inherently 
increases as the share price increases. Therefore, there is a risk that share repurchases are used to 
extract rents (undue compensation) by executives, in the absence of proper regulation and disclosure 
(Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020a). The beneficiaries of share repurchases are, in general, the richest 
households in an economy (including those of executives) and institutional investors such as hedge 
funds (Lazonick, 2015, p. 4) because they share in the payout from the repurchases and/or the increase 
in the share price. The losing parties are employees (who are both the most vulnerable at times of 
restructuring and the least likely to benefit financially from share repurchases) and consumers (who 
do not experience lower product costs as companies rather spend money on innovation and capital 
investment) (Almeida, Fos, & Kronlund, 2016; Lazonick, 2015, p. 2). As such, excessive repurchasing of 
shares can have the effect of increasing income inequality. South Africa’s income inequality is extreme, 
causing severe social problems and pressure on government spending (Hundenborn, Woolard, & 
Jellema, 2019), making it crucial that share repurchase activity is monitored effectively. This will be 
expanded on in Section 2.4.3. 
The net income and cash flow that a company generates can either be returned to shareholders (via 
share repurchases and dividends) or retained in the company to fund future growth (through research 
and development, training of employees and capital expenditure) (Almeida et al., 2016, p. 20). To 
support the economic growth of both a company and the country, it is essential that sufficient earnings 
be retained in the company. Excessive share repurchasing, however, could negate this. Bhargava 
(2013) found that companies which spend more money on share repurchases invest less in research 
and development, as well as in long-term investment instruments. In the US specifically, companies 
have been increasing distributions to shareholders (through share repurchases and dividends) and 
decreasing capital expenditure (in future investments) between 2003 and 2013 (PwC, 2016). However, 
this aspect might not be a concern in South Africa. Looking at the 2000–2009 period, Wesson and 
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Botha (2019) found no evidence of a negative relationship between share repurchases and company 
investment decisions. 
In summary, share repurchases not done for bona fide business reasons (like excessive share 
repurchasing) could have a negative long-term effect on the financial health of a company; could lead 
to decreased investment in innovation and future projects (disadvantaging consumers); and could 
allow executives to extract rents from the company they work for and so increase income inequality. 
In addition, excessive repurchasing of shares could negatively affect job creation and job security, and 
forestall skills development and wage increases. The next section will discuss the bona fide business 
reasons for engaging in share repurchases. 
2.2.3 Reasons for engaging in share repurchases 
Academics and practitioners alike have identified the following as possible business reasons for 
engaging in share repurchases (Abraham et al., 2018; Dittmar, 2000; Lazonick, 2014; Nel, 2018; Wesson 
et al., 2015, 2018): 
• Share repurchases indicate that directors believe the company to be undervalued (that the share 
price does not reflect the future earnings potential) and companies then ‘invest in themselves’. 
The share repurchase announcement signals to the market that the company is undervalued, and 
a subsequent increase in share price is most often noted. This is called the undervaluation theory 
or signalling theory in respect of share repurchases. 
• A mature company may have excess cash and no profitable projects to invest in. It may therefore 
choose to return the excess cash to the shareholders through share repurchases. This is referred 
to as the free cash flow theory. 
• Share repurchases are a flexible method of making a distribution to shareholders as share 
repurchases are not expected to be recurring (as is expected of a dividend). Furthermore, share 
repurchases might be a more tax-beneficial reward method for certain types of shareholders. The 
replacement of dividends with share repurchases is proposed by the dividend substitution theory. 
• Share repurchases can make up for the dilution in EPS that occurs when employees and executives 
are remunerated with shares or exercise share options (when additional shares are issued for no 
consideration). The EPS figure could increase since the weighted average number of shares 
(denominator of EPS calculation) decreases when a share repurchase takes place. This is referred 
to as the offsetting theory. 
• When share repurchases occur, the debt/equity ratio of the company is affected (repurchases can 
be used to change it to a desired level). 
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• Specific repurchases (private offers) can be used to buy back shares from certain specified 
shareholders; to concentrate the voting rights in the hands of fewer shareholders; to ease the 
company’s administration; and to decrease the pressure to meet short-term targets. In a similar 
fashion, share repurchases decrease the chances of a hostile takeover by concentrating ownership 
on block shareholders and corporate insiders, and can even be employed to enable the 
privatisation of a company. 
The reasons mentioned in the first two bullets, namely undervaluation and having surplus cash 
available, remain the most important building blocks of a sensible share repurchases strategy 
according to Warren Buffet (Wesson, 2015, p. 39). The first four bullets above showcase the most 
prominent theories regarding the determinants of share repurchases and the findings of previous 
research regarding these theories will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
2.2.3.1 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory (also called undervaluation theory or the information-signalling hypothesis) is the 
most common motivation attached to share repurchases by academics (Wesson, Muller, & Ward, 
2014, p. 59). Signalling theory rests on the information asymmetry that exists between corporate 
insiders (such as executives and managers) and the general stock market participants. Corporate 
insiders have access to more (private) information regarding a company’s future earnings potential 
(and are thus better equipped to value a company), and might feel that the stock market is 
undervaluing the company’s share at a given time (Wesson, 2015, p. 40). In such a case, managers 
could express their optimism regarding their company’s future by announcing (and engaging in) share 
repurchases. The repurchasing of shares, in this sense, represents a company stating that it cannot 
find a better investment than itself (Wesson, 2015, p. 40). The premise behind a share repurchase 
announcement is that it conveys (or signals) management’s perception of undervaluation to the 
market. If the market then believes this signal, market participants would start buying more of the 
company’s shares, driving up the share price.  
This proposed undervaluation, signalled through repurchase announcements and a subsequent 
increase in share price, has been studied in various countries and over different time periods. 
Vermaelen (1981), author of one of the seminal works on signalling theory, found an abnormal 
increase in share price (increases in excess of normal market movements) of approximately three per 
cent after share repurchase announcements. In studies on signalling theory, the focus was initially on 
a short-term increase in the share price, but Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995, p. 183) 
proposed that studying the share price reaction over the short-term, would not bring the full effect of 
the share repurchase to the fore. Thus Ikenberry et al. (1995) developed the underreaction hypothesis 
to supplement signalling theory: this proposed that the market had initially met the repurchase 
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announcement with scepticism (hence the marginal 3% increase, or underreaction, shown in 
Vermaelen’s 1981 study) and that the full share price adjustment would only be apparent if one 
considered a longer time frame after the repurchase announcement. Ikenberry et al. (1995) found that 
the abnormal return for their sample of companies increased from two per cent after one year to 12 
per cent after four years. Growth shares (with low book-to-market ratios) showed negative abnormal 
returns, while value shares (with high book-to-market ratios, a possible sign of undervaluation) showed 
larger than average abnormal returns (5% after one year, and 45% after four years). These findings, 
regarding potentially undervalued shares, showed a higher percentage of abnormal returns and 
supported signalling theory in general, but also pointed to the fact that not all companies that engage 
in repurchases are in fact undervalued.  
Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2010) proposed than some companies might be sending false signals 
(i.e. announcing a share repurchase when the company is not really undervalued) when under pressure 
in terms of share price and EPS, in the hope of improving the share price. They found empirical support 
for this idea, showing initial positive share returns that did not last in the long-term (confirming the 
findings of Ikenberry et al. (1995) that growth companies attain long-term negative abnormal returns 
after a share repurchase announcement). As stated by Liu and Swanson (2016, p. 78), multiple factors 
(centring on the improvement of the share price) might be at work simultaneously and cause 
companies to announce repurchases and/or actually repurchase shares, making it difficult to isolate 
each factor. When shares are repurchased on the open market, this can increase the share price 
because of the demand being created for the company’s shares. Share repurchases could increase EPS, 
which may in turn boost the company’s share price based on positive market reaction. For potentially 
overvalued companies, Liu and Swanson (2016) found evidence of ‘price support’ occurring through 
share repurchases . 
Replication-type studies using the methodologies of either Vermaelen (1981) or Ikenberry et al. (1995) 
are common in the US as well as globally, but results have been mixed. Fu and Huang (2016) studied 
US share repurchase announcements from 1984 to 2012 and found that share repurchase 
announcements had positive abnormal returns until 2002, the period covered by the Vermaelen (1981) 
and Ikenberry et al. (1995) studies, whereafter they did not. This might be a result of the market 
growing increasingly sceptical regarding share repurchases (as false signalling increased) or abnormal 
share returns might rather have become associated with actual share repurchases. It has been pointed 
out that the results of replication-type studies are greatly influenced by the way share repurchase 
events are measured (Banyi, Dyl, & Kahle, 2008, p. 462). In the US, many initial studies employed share 
repurchase announcements as the trigger date to study post-date abnormal returns, but such 
announcements are merely indicative of companies’ intentions to repurchase (companies do not 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
22 
necessarily repurchase shares after announcing their intention to do so) (Wesson, 2015, p. 43). Yook 
(2010, p. 330) found that only companies that actually repurchased shares in the year after announcing 
their intention to do so, showed significant abnormal returns, but that those who did not repurchase 
shares subsequent to the announcement, did not experience abnormal returns. This could be one of 
the reasons why previous studies (utilising share repurchase announcements) have shown mixed 
results. Yook (2010, p. 330) also found that companies that infrequently announced share repurchases 
showed larger abnormal returns (as their signalling of undervaluation was more believable by the 
market). Contrary to Ikenberry et al. (1995), Yook (2010) did not find larger abnormal returns for 
companies with a higher book-to-market value. It seemed as if all companies that acted on their share 
repurchase announcements experienced similar abnormal returns. 
Studies from outside the US tend to examine signalling theory using actual share repurchases, as daily 
or weekly data regarding actual share repurchases are freely available (Wesson, 2015, p. 45) (in the 
US, only quarterly data on actually executed share repurchases are available). Again, some studies 
found evidence in support of signalling theory, while others did not. Findings also differ between 
countries (possibly owing to different regulatory environments). Lee, Diro Ejara, and Gleason (2010) 
found that German companies experienced positive abnormal returns of between three per cent and 
four per cent (in the short-term) after share repurchases, while returns in Italy and the UK were smaller 
(less than 2% and less than 1%, respectively). Companies in France did not show any significant 
abnormal returns in the short-term (Lee et al., 2010). In a study on daily share repurchases done in 
Greece, two different motives were proposed for share repurchases under different conditions – both 
based on the upward trend in share price following a share repurchase. Drousia, Episcopos, and 
Leledakis (2019) found support for the signalling (undervaluation) theory for small companies and 
those with high book-to-market ratios, while large companies and those with low book-to-market 
ratios seemed to engage in share repurchases purely for price support (following a period of declining 
share prices).  
Some replication-type studies have also been done in emerging economies. Most of the studies 
conducted in emerging economies confirmed the existence of abnormal returns after share repurchase 
announcements. For example, Wang, Lin, Fung, and Chen (2013) found short-term and long-term 
positive abnormal returns in a study of Taiwanese companies from 2000 to 2010.  
The premise of the present study rested largely on the fact that share repurchases can cause an 
increase in the share price, as to cause an increase in the value of executive share-based remuneration 
(also in South Africa). General share repurchases, whether announced or not, are expected to increase 
the demand for the company’s share, and thus increase the share price. In addition, signalling is 
expected to play a role. Figure 2.3 shows the abnormal returns found by Wesson (2015) in relation to 
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the four different repurchase types in South Africa for the period 1999–2009. The repurchase types 
will be discussed in more depth in Section 2.2.4.2. 
 
Figure 2.3. Abnormal returns experienced in South Africa relating to the various share repurchase 
types (Wesson, 2015, p. 148) 
From Figure 2.3, it can be deduced that announcements of general (open market) repurchases and 
other specific repurchases (private offers) led to the highest abnormal returns (Wesson et al., 2014; 
Wesson, Muller, & Ward, 2017). These returns were at their maximum approximately two years after 
the announcement dates (Wesson et al., 2014, 2017), but were also substantial within the first year 
after the announcement (Figure 2.3). Within six months after the announcement, general share 
repurchases led to abnormal returns exceeding 10 per cent (reaching 20% approximately 300 days 
after the announcement date). Pro rata repurchases were not associated with substantial long-term 
abnormal returns (which is understandable as this offer was made to all shareholders) (Figure 2.3). The 
repurchase of treasury shares by the holding company, being intragroup repurchases, only led to 
substantial abnormal returns from the second year after repurchase announcement onwards and 
never reached the level of the abnormal returns generated by general and other specific repurchases 
(Figure 2.3). 
The abnormal returns following share repurchase announcements, especially for general (open 































































































































(i.e. that share repurchases lead to an increase in share price). However, not all companies that engage 
in share repurchases are undervalued. Some companies might be overvalued and still experience a 
stabilising effect on their share price (Liu & Swanson, 2016). Shares are often repurchased in bull 
markets (when prices are high) and not only when prices are low (bear market) – which contradicts 
the reasoning that directors buy only undervalued shares (Lazonick, 2014). This can be seen when 
considering US repurchase behaviour, where repurchases increased during the bull market before the 
global financial crisis, decreased during the crisis, and have increased again as share prices rose after 
the crisis (Birstingl, 2016). The reason why share repurchases decreased during the global financial 
crisis might, however, be found in the free cash flow theory, which will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2.3.2 Free cash flow theory 
The second most commonly cited reason for share repurchases, which centres on a necessary 
prerequisite to execute the share repurchase, is the availability of free cash flow. When a company 
makes a profit in a specific year and has available cash flow, it should first seek to invest the cash in 
profitable projects (Jensen, 1986, p. 323). After investing in profitable projects, excess cash can then 
either be retained in the company for future contingencies, or be redistributed to the shareholders 
through dividends and share repurchases (Dittmar, 2000, p. 334). If a company keeps excessive 
amounts of cash on hand, this would equate to ‘empire-building’ and be open to potential abuse by 
executives (Dhanani, 2016, p. 5). Therefore, those companies with more free cash flow (cash flow after 
investment in new projects, and research and development) would be expected to repurchase more 
shares. Previous studies have reported a positive relationship between free cash flow and share 
repurchases (Dittmar, 2000; Stephens & Weisbach, 1998), and free cash flow is commonly used as 
control variable in studying the relationship between share repurchases and other variables (Geiler & 
Renneboog, 2016; Kahle, 2002; Liljeblom & Pasternack, 2006). Studies testing stakeholders’ 
perceptions have also established a clear link between share repurchases and returning excess cash to 
investors (Brav, Graham, Harvey, & Michaely, 2005; Dhanani, 2016, p. 16).  
Recently, because of the large amounts being spent on share repurchases (especially in developed 
countries such as the US and UK), stakeholders have become apprehensive that companies might be 
distributing too much cash to shareholders, and retaining too little to fund research and development, 
investment in new projects, and developing human capital (Schneider & Kohlmeyer, 2015, p. 65). Free 
cash flow, as defined, should be the cash available after all profitable projects have been attempted 
and many are concerned that executives are not exploring all possible investment opportunities, but 
rather spend money on share repurchases to increase the share price and EPS and in the process their 
own remuneration (Lazonick, 2014). Mature companies with experienced staff are ideally situated to 
innovate and develop new products, at a lower cost than start-up companies (Lazonick, 2014). Invested 
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funds can bring forth many years of returns, whereas share repurchases only achieve a once-off 
increase in the share price and EPS figures. 
Previous studies have found a negative relationship between investment and share repurchases, but 
the question is: which causes which? Are companies not able to find profitable projects and hence 
decrease investment, or do they have excess cash and then choose to redistribute this as share 
repurchases? Or do executives want to increase share repurchases to improve the share price and EPS, 
and in the process their own remuneration, and then decrease investment to fund the share 
repurchases? Almeida et al. (2016) studied this conundrum, and found that share repurchases done 
explicitly to reach an EPS target (where the EPS target would not have been met in the absence of the 
share repurchase) led to decreased capital investment, research and development spending, and 
decreased employment statistics in the year following the repurchase. It would seem that share 
repurchases that do not occur for conventional reasons (such as to signal undervaluation and distribute 
excess free cash) might lead to decreased future investment, research and development, and 
employment.  
2.2.3.3 Dividend substitution theory 
Theoretically, several other factors may affect the choice between dividends and share repurchases as 
a method of distributing free cash flow: shareholder characteristics and preferences; the percentage 
of shares owned by management; whether the proposed distribution is large or small; outstanding 
options and other share-based remuneration held by management; and whether the company’s share 
was deemed to be undervalued before the distribution (Caudill, Hudson, Marshall, & Roumantzi, 2006; 
Wesson et al., 2018, pp. 182–183). However, in recent years share repurchase activity has increased 
at a much faster rate than dividends have, making share repurchases the prominent method of 
distributing resources to shareholders globally (Wesson et al., 2018, pp. 180–181).  
Grullon and Michaely (2002) proposed that share repurchases have started to replace increases in 
dividends, i.e. where in previous years a company would have increased dividends as a result of excess 
free cash flow or to signal undervaluation, they now prefer to return cash via share repurchases 
(instead of raising dividends). Since the market reacts negatively to a company decreasing its 
dividends, companies prefer not to increase dividend levels as this creates a constructive obligation to 
maintain the higher level of dividends (Andriosopoulos & Hoque, 2013, p. 66). Companies thus tend to 
keep their dividend levels constant, while considering, and increasingly implementing, the 
repurchasing of shares as a more flexible form of payout (Brav et al., 2005; Jagannathan, Stephens, & 
Weisbach, 2000). It would, however, appear that share repurchases are not replacing special dividends 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 2000), but that share repurchases are more generally being used as 
a replacement for increases in regular dividends, especially where the cash flows are transitory in 
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nature – for example, where the cash flow is earned from non-operating activities, such as the sale of 
a capital asset (Jagannathan et al., 2000). Jagannathan et al. (2000) also mentioned that share 
repurchases are highly sensitive to the business cycle of a country and tend to increase during an 
upswing in the business cycle. However, increased share repurchases could be counteracted by 
increased capital expenditure during such an upswing in the business cycle.   
Executives with large numbers of outstanding share options and other share-based remuneration will 
prefer share repurchases over dividends (Geiler & Renneboog, 2016). One of the primary reasons for 
this preference, centres on the dilution that occurs in the price of a share after dividends are paid (the 
ex-dividend price is lower than the cum-dividend price) (Jolls, 1998). If one ignores the signalling effect 
of announcing both increased dividends and share repurchases, then paying dividends will decrease 
the share price while repurchases will not affect the share price (Jolls, 1998) (although the supply and 
demand effect of open market share repurchases can also increase the share price). Thus, the fair value 
of a share option would diminish as the dividends expected to be paid before the vesting date increase 
(Fenn & Liang, 2001), but share repurchases do not affect the fair value of a share option. 
When considering dividends versus share repurchases as methods of returning resources to 
shareholders, it can be argued that dividends are a more legitimate payout method as it rewards 
shareholders for holding shares and benefits all shareholders equally (Lazonick, 2014). Share 
repurchases increase the share price to the advantage of the remaining shareholders (but to the 
relative disadvantage of the shareholders who sold their shares to the company), who will only realise 
the benefit of the increasing share price if they sell their shares – effectively rewarding shareholders 
for selling their shares and not holding them (Lazonick, 2014).  
2.2.3.4 Offsetting of share-based remuneration issued to employees 
Another reason cited for choosing to repurchase shares is to offset the EPS dilution that occurs when 
employees are issued shares (or exercise share options) as part of their remuneration packages (as the 
denominator of the EPS calculation will increase when the shares are issued to employees, which will 
automatically decrease EPS) (Kahle, 2002; Schneider & Kohlmeyer, 2015, p. 66). Although this 
reasoning makes business sense, the number of shares issued to employees as remuneration is usually 
much lower than the number of shares repurchased and this cannot (on its own) explain the rise in 
share repurchases in the US (Lazonick, 2014). In the South African environment during the 2002–2017 
target period, however, listed companies often issued shares to qualifying employees in black 
economic empowerment (BEE) schemes. Such schemes could be facilitated by share repurchases, and 
thus increase share repurchase activity in the South African context. However, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) requires listed companies to forewarn users of the company’s 
financial statements about the decrease in EPS that will occur when employee share-based 
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remuneration is exercised - through the disclosure of the diluted EPS figure (IASB, 2017a). 
Furthermore, granting share-based remuneration to employees should ideally incentivise them to 
work harder, and increase earnings, so that the dilutive effect on long-term EPS would be negligible by 
the time that the share-based remuneration vests (Lazonick, 2014).  
 A share repurchase does not automatically increase EPS (although some managers believe it to do so) 
(Brav et al., 2005, p. 515). EPS is calculated by dividing the earnings (profit after taxation attributable 
to ordinary shareholders) for a certain period by the time-weighted number of shares outstanding 
during that period (IASB, 2017a). Given that the number of shares repurchased is time-weighted before 
being deducted from the ‘number of shares outstanding during the year’ denominator of the EPS 
calculation, the effect of a repurchase on EPS is zero if it occurs at the end of the reporting period. If 
share repurchase occurs during a reporting period, its effect depends on where the cash for the 
repurchase was sourced. If the money had to be borrowed, then the interest on the borrowing would 
decrease the earnings-numerator of the EPS calculation, while the number of shares would also 
decrease, which would lead to either a decrease or an increase in EPS, depending on the number of 
shares repurchased and the interest expense. When the cash used for the repurchase is extracted from 
cash balances or projects, then the earnings would decrease as a result of the interest income or return 
on investment forfeited, while the number of shares will decrease. Thus a share repurchase would only 
increase EPS (termed an accretive share repurchase) if the funds utilised for the repurchase would 
otherwise not earn the company’s current cost of capital or if the funds utilised could be borrowed at 
less than the cost of capital (Brav et al., 2005, p. 515). 
The previous two paragraphs consider the relationship between share repurchases and EPS dilution 
owing to employee share-based remuneration being exercised. However, the relationship between 
share repurchases and share-based remuneration could be viewed from another angle, namely the 
positive effect of share repurchases on share price. Many studies have postulated that executive share-
based remuneration may indeed incentivise executives to engage in share repurchases, as such share 
repurchases could increase the share price and consequently the executives’ own share-based 
remuneration (Balachandran, Chalmers, & Haman, 2008; Lazonick, 2014).  
2.2.3.5 Conclusion on business reasons for engaging in share repurchases 
Share repurchases are legal in almost all countries in the world and companies are provided with the 
opportunity to signal undervaluation and distribute free cash flow in a flexible manner. Share 
repurchases are used extensively in many parts of the world. Although many business justifications 
exist for executing share repurchases, executives might also use them for manipulative purposes, 
namely to increase EPS and the share price to reach short-term targets and increase their own 
remuneration. As such, it is imperative that share repurchase activity should be monitored by 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
28 
shareholders and other stakeholders. In most countries, this monitoring is possible because all share 
repurchases are announced on the relevant stock exchange as they occur, or periodically in arrears. 
However, as will be discussed in the next section, the regulation and disclosure requirements regarding 
share repurchases in South Africa do not allow effective monitoring, and might be providing executives 
with even greater leeway to increase share price and EPS artificially, should they wish to do so. 
2.2.4 The regulation and taxation of share repurchases in South Africa 
In South Africa, share repurchases were legalised in 1999 with the issuance of the Corporate Laws 
Amendment Act 24 of 1999 (CLAA) (Republic of South Africa, 1999) which, for the first time, allowed 
share repurchases as an alternative to dividends (Siddle, 2006; Visser, 2014). Before 1999 South African 
companies had to maintain their issued capital (the so-called ‘capital maintenance’ rule) (Wesson, 
2015, p. 9).  
Several regulatory frameworks governed share repurchases by South African listed companies during 
the period 2002–2017 (which is the target period of the present study). These include the CLAA 
(Republic of South Africa, 1999), the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Republic of South Africa, 2008), the 
JSE Listing Requirements and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) – which either 
stipulated specific requirements before a share repurchase could take place, or certain post-date 
disclosures (Wesson, 2015, p. 9).  
2.2.4.1 Repurchasing entities allowed 
As from 1 July 1999 the CLAA allowed two types of entities to repurchase shares of the holding 
company, namely the holding company itself and subsidiary companies (subsidiaries). As per section 
85(8) of the act, where the company itself repurchased shares, such shares were to be cancelled and 
reverted to authorised share capital (Republic of South Africa, 1999). Section 89 of the CLAA allowed 
subsidiaries to repurchase up to 10 per cent (in total, for all subsidiaries) of the shares issued by the 
holding company (Republic of South Africa, 1999). Shares repurchased by the subsidiaries would not 
be cancelled, but would instead be seen as treasury shares (Republic of South Africa, 1999) and held 
to be re-sold to the holding company or others; used in business combinations; or issued to employees 
at a later date.  
When considering the holding company’s separate financial statements, the shares repurchased by 
subsidiaries are seen as issued, but when consolidated accounts are prepared, the shares repurchased 
by subsidiaries are seen as repurchased in the group, and need to be deducted from the issued share 
capital in the group (Wesson, 2015, p. 10). As such, the number of shares in issue recorded in the 
annual financial statement of the holding company and the separate group financial statement could 
differ (when subsidiaries have repurchased shares in the holding company). An example of this is 
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provided by Bester, Hamman, Brummer, Wesson, and Steyn-Bruwer (2008, p.52) and is based on a 
holding company which has issued 100 shares. Suppose the holding company repurchases six shares, 
while five are repurchased by subsidiaries: the holding company would cancel the six shares it 
repurchases, leaving the holding company with 94 issued shares in its separate financial statements. 
The number of shares in issuance in the group financial statements would, however, be 89 (the 94 
minus the 5 repurchased and still held by subsidiaries).  
It is important to note that, globally, subsidiaries are usually not allowed to own shares in the holding 
company (Wesson, 2015, p. 29). If subsidiaries are not allowed to repurchase shares in the holding 
company, then there could be no difference between the number of shares issued by the holding 
company and the group (as could be the case in South Africa). However, in many other jurisdictions, 
the holding company itself can repurchase its shares and then either cancel the shares or retain the 
shares as treasury shares (Wesson, 2015, p. 29). The South African environment, therefore, differs 
from the global one in respect of the entities that can be employed for repurchasing purposes.  
In South Africa, share trusts controlled by the holding company can also own shares in the holding 
company. Such shares are then used to settle the share option and other incentive schemes operated 
by the group. In terms of IFRS, such shares are treated as treasury shares and eliminated on 
consolidation (IASB, 2017b). However, shares bought by share trusts are not share repurchases as 
defined by the JSE Listing Requirements, and do not need to be announced via SENS (Wesson et al., 
2015, p.45). For this reason, share trusts were not included as a repurchasing entity for the purposes 
of the present study. 
Three repurchasing entities can be identified in the unique South African regulatory environment, 
namely the holding company repurchasing from third parties; the holding company repurchasing 
treasury shares; and subsidiaries (Wesson, 2015, p. 95). Wesson (2015, p. 96) studied JSE-listed 
companies (excluding those in the Basic Materials and Financial industries) and found that subsidiaries 
were the preferred repurchasing entity in the period 1999–2009. The preference for subsidiary 
repurchases was affirmed by Vermeulen (2014, p. 9) in relation to the Mining sector during 1999–2010 
when considering those companies that had primary listings on the JSE and Fortuin (2015, p. 76) in 
relation to the Banking and Financial Services Sectors during 1999–2014. The preference to repurchase 
shares using subsidiaries as vehicle was probably a result of the greater flexibility provided by shares 
held by subsidiaries (such shares were not cancelled but were available for business combinations or 
issuing to employees) and favourable taxation treatment (discussed in Section 2.2.4.6) (Wesson et al., 
2015, p. 45).  
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2.2.4.2 Repurchase types allowed 
Share repurchases by South African listed companies are either general repurchases (i.e. executed on 
the open market at the ruling market price) or specific repurchases (i.e. of a specified number of shares 
from specific shareholders at a specified price) (Vermeulen, 2014, p. 3). The JSE Listing Requirements 
sub-divides specific repurchases into pro rata offers and other specific offers (Wesson, 2015, p. 12). 
Pro rata offers are offered to all existing shareholders in the same proportion (pro rata) while other 
specific offers are made to specifically named shareholders (Section 5.69) (JSE, 2017a). 
Contrary to global trends, general (open market) share repurchases were not the preferred type of 
repurchase of listed companies (Wesson, 2015, p. 97). Based on the rand value employed, specific 
repurchases represented more than 57 per cent of all share repurchases during the 1999–2009 period 
in a study considering all JSE-listed companies excluding the Basic Materials and Financial industries 
(Wesson, 2015, p. 97). The preference for specific repurchases was also found in the Mining sector, 
where more than 61% of all share repurchases by companies with primary listings on the JSE were 
specific repurchases (Vermeulen, 2014, p. 8). In the Banking and Financial Services Sectors more than 
46 per cent of share repurchases were specific repurchases (Fortuin, 2015, p. 78).  
The preference for specific repurchases resulted from a repurchasing entity unique to the South 
African environment being employed, namely the holding company repurchasing treasury shares 
(Wesson, 2015, p. 98). The holding company could start to repurchase shares from subsidiaries 
(specific counterparties) when the 10 per cent threshold was reached (i.e. maximum number of shares 
had been repurchased by subsidiaries), or when the group no longer required the treasury shares for 
future projects. 
As a large portion of specific repurchases are represented by the holding company repurchasing 
treasury shares, this type of repurchase can be designated as a separate category of specific 
repurchases (Wesson et al., 2015). Thus four repurchase types can be identified in South Africa, namely 
general repurchases; pro rata specific repurchases; specific repurchases: holding company 
repurchasing treasury shares; and other specific repurchases (Wesson, 2015). 
2.2.4.3 Requirements before share repurchases can occur 
Under the requirements of the CLAA, which became effective from 1 July 1999 until 30 April 2011, 
share repurchases (both those under general and under specific authority) could be done if allowed by 
the articles of the company, if the company was solvent and liquid after the repurchase, and if the 
repurchase was approved via special resolution by shareholders (section 85) (Republic of South Africa, 
1999). For share repurchases under general authority, such a resolution could be granted at the annual 
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general meeting (AGM), but was then only valid until the next AGM (section 85(3)) (Republic of South 
Africa, 1999). 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (effective from 1 May 2011) upheld most of the requirements for 
affecting a share repurchase as contained in the CLAA, but amended the persons authorised to affect 
a share repurchase as follows: the board of directors are authorised to approve the repurchase (as 
opposed to the CLAA requiring shareholder approval) (Republic of South Africa, 2008; Vermeulen, 
2014). However, as per section 48(8) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a special resolution by 
shareholders is still required should the shares be acquired from a director, prescribed officer or a 
person related to a director or prescribed officer (Republic of South Africa, 2008). Furthermore, the 
JSE Listing Requirements still require shareholder approval for most share repurchases done by listed 
companies, and the stricter rule should then be followed by listed companies executing share 
repurchases. The JSE Listing Requirements prescribes the following (JSE, 2017a): 
• Share repurchases (excluding pro rata repurchases) should be approved by means of 75 per cent 
shareholder vote (essentially similar to a special resolution) (sections 5.67(B), 5.69(b) and 5.72(c)).  
• A general approval granted at the AGM is only valid for 15 months, or until the next AGM (sections 
5.67(B)(b) and 5.72(c)). For general repurchases, no more than 20 per cent of a class of shares may 
be bought back during one financial year (section 5.68).  
It is standard practice for companies to request, at the AGM, the general approval of shareholders for 
directors to repurchase a set percentage of the shares outstanding (Wesson, 2015, p. 12). Shareholders 
usually provide this approval annually. However, there is no binding obligation on the board to then 
execute any or all of the share repurchases authorised (Wesson, 2015, p. 12). On the other hand, the 
approval granted by shareholders for a specific repurchase is a binding agreement to repurchase the 
shares (Vermeulen, 2014, p. 3). 
During September 2018, a draft Companies Amendment Bill (Republic of South Africa, 2018) was 
circulated for comment. The draft amendments had not yet been promulgated at the time of writing 
this dissertation. The Amendment Bill proposed that all companies should obtain shareholder approval 
by means of a special resolution for share repurchases, except if those share repurchases are pro rata 
from all shareholders or occur “in the ordinary course of business on a stock exchange” (Republic of 
South Africa, 2018). The meaning of “in the ordinary course of business on a stock exchange” is not 
clear, as it could refer to all share repurchases executed by listed companies, or only general 
repurchases executed by listed companies. Either way, this amendment would not affect the listed 
companies studied in the present study, as the JSE Listing Requirements are stricter (or require the 
same) and would still apply. However, the amendments would change the authorisation required for 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
specific repurchases (other than pro rata specific repurchases) by a South African non-listed company 
from board approval to shareholder approval. 
Globally, either board or shareholder approval is required for a company to execute a share repurchase 
(Kim et al., 2005). Given that the South African approval process requires shareholder approval (the 
stricter option), the approval process in South Africa seems to provide adequate protection of 
shareholders’ interest. However, it is critical that shareholders should be able to monitor the actual 
general share repurchases executed by directors (after the shareholders have granted general 
authority for such repurchases at the AGM). In the next section the announcement of actual executed 
share repurchases on the JSE will be discussed. It is here that the South African regulatory system may 
be failing shareholders. 
2.2.4.4 Announcement of share repurchases on SENS 
According to the JSE Listing Requirements, specific repurchases should be announced via SENS as soon 
as the terms have been agreed upon (the announcement should indicate the name of the shareholder 
from whom the shares will be repurchased, the amount to be paid and the number of shares 
repurchased) (section 11.25) and after the announcement such repurchases should then be executed 
unless exceptional circumstances arise (JSE, 2017a). As such, all specific repurchases should be 
announced before they occur, providing adequate information to enable monitoring. The possibly 
inadequate disclosure rules arise in relation to general share repurchases, as described in the next 
paragraph. 
General repurchases only need to be announced once more than three per cent of the outstanding 
shares of that class have been bought back cumulatively (section 11.27) (JSE, 2017a). The requirements 
regarding general repurchases are more lenient and easier to comply with, but lead to some share 
repurchases (i.e. those that amount to less than 3% cumulatively) never being reported via SENS 
(Wesson, 2015, p. 12). Moreover, there is some inconsistency in the application of the rule: some 
companies interpret it as “more than three per cent per year”, and some see it as a cumulative rule, 
not limited to a specific year (the latter being the official view of the JSE) (Wesson, 2015, p. 12). Under 
the three per cent rule, SENS announcements do not provide a comprehensive record of all general 
share repurchases affected by listed companies. In addition, stakeholders are not aware of exactly 
when general share repurchases occur, as those that are announced are announced after the fact 
(even years after the event).  
The current announcement rules in South Africa differ from those employed by most other countries 
with sophisticated stock exchanges, where daily, weekly, monthly or quarterly announcements 
relating to the actual number and value of shares repurchased are the norm (Kim et al., 2005, p. 36; 
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Wesson, 2015, p. 30). Because of the JSE’s announcement rules, information about actual general 
share repurchases are not readily available in real time in South Africa. 
To summarise, all general repurchases (if the threshold of 3% or more has been reached) and all 
specific repurchases executed by South African listed companies need to be announced via SENS. 
There is presently no requirement to announce (via SENS) where less than three per cent of 
outstanding shares are repurchased through a general repurchase (Wesson, 2015, p. 45). Previous 
South African studies all reported high levels of unannounced general share repurchases 
(unannounced general repurchases exceeding 40% of those actually executed) (Fortuin, 2015, p. 81; 
Vermeulen, 2014, p. 10; Wesson, 2015, p. 101). Unannounced specific repurchases mainly pertained 
to intragroup share repurchases, when the holding company repurchased treasury shares (Wesson, 
2015, p. 102). 
2.2.4.5 Disclosure requirements pertaining to annual financial statements 
Listed entities in South Africa have to apply IFRS in their annual financial statements. IFRS do not have 
specific disclosure requirements regarding share repurchases (Wesson et al., 2015, p. 45), given that it 
caters for a wide international audience that might not require the information if it has already been 
provided by stock exchange announcements. In South Africa, however, such disclosures are deemed 
essential in financial statements so that the full quantum of shares repurchased can be determined, as 
not all share repurchases are announced via SENS.  
Disclosure requirements about share capital in general are contained in IAS 1 Presentation of financial 
statements (IASB, 2017c) and IAS 32 Financial instruments – Presentation (IASB, 2017b). IAS 1 
paragraph 79(a) requires that a company (or group) discloses “a reconciliation of the number of shares 
outstanding at the beginning and at the end of the period” (IASB, 2017c). As IFRS is applicable in both 
the group annual financial statements and the holding company’s separate annual financial statements 
(which are often published together as one set of financials), this reconciliation should be done for 
both the group’s number of shares (after deducting shares held by subsidiaries and consolidated share 
trusts) and the company’s number of shares (before shares held by subsidiaries and consolidated share 
trusts are deducted) (Wesson, 2015, p. 15).  
IAS 1, additionally, requires disclosure of the “shares in the entity held by the entity or by subsidiaries 
or associates” (IASB, 2017c). In South Africa shares repurchased by the holding company itself are 
cancelled and, as such, the entity itself cannot hold (treasury) shares (Wesson, 2015, p. 15). However, 
in South Africa subsidiaries and share trusts can repurchase and then hold (treasury) shares in the 
holding company (Wesson, 2015, p. 15). IAS 32, paragraphs 33 and 34, reaffirm that treasury shares 
should be deducted from equity and the amount of treasury shares held by subsidiaries (and share 
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trusts) should be disclosed separately either on the statement of financial position itself or in the notes 
thereto (IASB, 2017b). Wesson (2015, p. 15) commented that, in the South African environment, 
companies should disclose both the number of treasury shares held and the rand value involved. 
However, many South African companies do not disclose treasury shares comprehensively. 
South African companies interpret the requirements of IAS 1 and IAS 32 relating to reconciliations of 
number of shares outstanding for group and company, as well as amounts (both in number and value) 
of treasury shares held by subsidiaries and share trusts, inconsistently owing to the fact that IFRS do 
not cater for the South African regulatory environment (Wesson, 2015, pp. 15–17): 
• Some companies disclose only a reconciliation of the number of shares outstanding for the 
company, and not for the group as well. 
• Some companies disclose only the rand value of treasury shares held, and not the number as well. 
The movement in treasury shares is not always disclosed, and some companies do not separate 
the treasury shares held by share trusts and subsidiaries. 
The annual financial statement disclosure requirements contained in the JSE Listing Requirements 
complement the IFRS requirements. Section 3.43 of the JSE Listing Requirements prescribes an analysis 
of the non-public shareholders (defined in section 4.25), who own the shares in the company at a given 
reporting date (referred to as the shareholder spread) (JSE, 2017a). Share trusts are explicitly described 
as non-public shareholders (in section 4.25), but it is unclear whether subsidiaries of the holding 
company would qualify as non-public (Wesson, 2015, p. 21). Most companies disclose the number of 
shares held by subsidiaries as either ‘treasury shares’, ‘own holdings’ or by giving the subsidiaries’ 
names under the non-public section of the shareholder spread (Wesson, 2015, pp. 20–23). The 
shareholder spread should also provide the identity of any person owning more than five per cent of 
the company’s shares (section 8.63(e)) (JSE, 2017a). 
In response to comments that disclosure regarding share repurchases by listed companies is 
insufficient, the JSE added an additional annual financial statement disclosure requirement to its JSE 
Listing Requirements, called section 8.63(o) (Wesson, 2015, p. 24). Effective from 14 January 2013, 
South African listed companies should disclose in their financial statements, for share repurchases in 
the reporting period, the number of shares repurchased (distinguishing between those shares that 
were cancelled, i.e. repurchased by the holding company, and those held as treasury shares, i.e. 
repurchased by subsidiaries) and average price paid (JSE, 2017a). However, Mawere (2016) and 
Buitendag (2018) reported that compliance with the requirements of section 8.63(o) is relatively low 
in practice. Section 8.63(o) was amended, effective December 2017, to ensure that it is clear that the 
number of shares repurchased by subsidiaries during the reporting period is to be disclosed, and not 
only the number of shares held by subsidiaries at the reporting date (JSE, 2017b, p. 28) 
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2.2.4.6  The taxation of share repurchases in South Africa 
During the period under review (2002–2017), two major changes took place in South African taxation 
legislation regarding the treatment of share repurchases (in the hands of the entity executing the share 
repurchase). Firstly, the definition of what constitutes a ‘dividend’ was amended on 1 January 2011, 
and general repurchases then no longer qualified as a dividend (Nel, 2018, p. 75). Secondly, secondary 
taxation on companies (STC) had been levied on all ‘dividends’ paid by companies (including those 
share repurchases that qualified as a dividend) before 1 April 2012, when this levy was replaced by a 
dividends tax on the beneficial shareholder (Nel, 2018, p. 75).  
Since the introduction of dividends tax (1 April 2012), share repurchases executed by all repurchasing 
entities (and both general and specific repurchases) have had no tax effect for the repurchasing entity 
– as the beneficial owner of the share was possibly liable for tax (Nel, 2018, p. 76). Even before 1 April 
2012, share repurchases executed by subsidiaries had no tax effect for the subsidiary as such 
repurchases were never defined as dividends (and never attracted STC) (Fortuin, 2015, p. 17). The fact 
that subsidiaries were never liable for tax on share repurchases probably added to their popularity as 
repurchasing entity, especially before 1 April 2012. With this as background, it is important to consider 
the tax effect that both general and specific repurchases executed by the holding company had prior 
to 1 April 2012. 
Before 1 January 2011, both general and specific repurchases executed by the holding company were 
seen as a dividend, and the holding company had to pay STC on the value exceeding the nominal value 
of the shares repurchased (Fortuin, 2015, p. 17). When the holding company repurchased treasury 
shares from the subsidiaries this repurchase was exempt from STC before 1 October 2007, but 
attracted STC from that date onwards (Wesson et al., 2015, p. 45).  
From 1 January 2011, the dividend definition was amended to exclude general repurchases (i.e. 
repurchases executed in the open market) (Fortuin, 2015, p. 18). From this date, the holding company 
was no longer liable for STC on general share repurchases, as the beneficial shareholder (who sold 
shares) was already liable for tax (Nel, 2018, p. 76). The beneficial shareholder selling shares on the 
open market would not know that the holding company itself was repurchasing them, and would pay 
tax on the gain realised (Nel, 2018, p. 76). If the holding company was then also liable for tax, the same 
transaction would have been taxed in the hands of both parties.  
Specific repurchases qualified as dividends before the 1 January 2011 amendments, and could 
potentially still qualify as a dividend after the amendments (depending on whether the value of the 
share repurchase exceeded the contributed tax capital) (Nel, 2018, p. 76). A holding company 
executing a specific repurchase constituting a dividend was liable for STC until 30 March 2012; from 1 
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April 2012 the beneficial shareholder was liable for dividends tax on the amount received as a 
consequence of the share repurchase (Nel, 2018, p. 76).  
To summarise, subsidiary repurchases before 1 January 2011 were the most tax-beneficial (no tax was 
payable by the repurchaser). Both specific and general repurchases executed by the holding company 
were liable for STC before 1 January 2011 (except when treasury shares were repurchased, which were 
exempt before 1 October 2007). Between 1 January 2011 and 30 March 2012, only specific repurchases 
executed by the holding company could attract STC (while subsidiary repurchases and general 
repurchases executed by the holding company did not). Since 1 April 2012, share repurchases have not 
had a tax effect for the person affecting the repurchase (instead the beneficial owner might be liable 
for tax). The aforementioned tax changes could affect both the preferred repurchasing entity and the 
preferred repurchase type in the period under review. 
2.2.5 Previous studies on share repurchases in South Africa 
In a study by Massie et al. (2014, p. 44), the authors pointed out: 
“By 2009 it was apparent that share repurchasing was a significant part of corporate activity 
in South Africa. Despite this and despite the fact that institutional shareholders tend to vote 
overwhelmingly in support of share buy-backs, there has been very little research done on the 
reasons for, and implications of, share buy-backs by listed companies in South Africa.”  
After share repurchases were legalised in South Africa in 1999, the initial research regarding South 
African share repurchases only considered share repurchases announced via SENS – and, as such, 
ignored general repurchases which amounted to less than three per cent of outstanding shares (Bester 
et al., 2008; Bhana, 2007; Daly, 2002). Both the Daly and Bhana studies examined short periods of time 
(1999–2001 and 2000–2003, respectively) and excluded specific repurchases. 
Bester, Wesson, and Hamman (2010) noted that it would be incomplete to concentrate solely on 
announced share repurchases, as this would severely understate the importance of the phenomenon. 
The first comprehensive study which evaluated both announced and unannounced share repurchases 
for the majority of the JSE Main Board listed companies (excluding those in the Basic Materials and 
Financial industries) was Wesson (2015). As the SENS announcements did not provide a comprehensive 
record of all share repurchases executed, Wesson (2015) hand-collected share repurchase data from 
the annual financial statements of the companies. A comprehensive database on share repurchases 





Rand value spent on total, announced and unannounced share repurchases 2000–2009 (Wesson, 
2015, p. 103) 






 R R R 
2000  2 681 648 478 2 461 253 199 220 395 279 
2001  2 969 991 036 1 986 147 611 983 843 425 
2002  4 322 450 445 2 788 921 874 1 533 528 571 
2003  3 718 359 573 1 660 634 995 2 057 724 578 
2004  2 938 399 471 1 780 001 249 1 158 398 222 
2005  12 183 006 110 7 868 060 566 4 314 945 544 
2006  20 108 963 794 11 926 850 407 8 182 113 387 
2007  25 804 509 767 23 931 637 047 1 872 872 720 
2008  21 659 223 717 18 588 614 496 3 070 609 221 
2009  40 499 959 367 34 238 566 317 6 261 393 050 
Total 136 886 511 758 107 230 687 761 29 655 823 997 
Percentage  100.00% 78.34% 21.66% 
 
Concerning the period 1999–2009, for all JSE-listed companies excluding the Basic Materials and 
Financial industries, Wesson et al. (2015, pp. 88–90) found that: 
• Just over half (51%) of companies in the sample had repurchased shares during the period. 
• There was a general upward trend in the value of repurchases over the years from 2000 to 2009, 
with 2009 having had the largest repurchase value. 
• A few companies contributed the bulk of the share repurchase value, being mainly those 
companies with larger market capitalisations. However, smaller companies also engaged in 
repurchases and constituted the largest number of repurchasers. 
• Four large companies were responsible for more than 50 per cent of the value repurchased: Sasol 
Limited (R38 billion – 28%); MTN Group Limited (R21 billion – 16%); Remgro Limited and Netcare 
Limited (each more than 5%). 
• The value of dividend payout exceeded the rand amount spent on share repurchases (dividends 




As discussed above, Wesson (2015) compiled a comprehensive database for South African share 
repurchases by scrutinising companies’ annual financial statements for the period 1999–2009. This 
database, however, had to be updated from 2010 onwards to investigate the post-global financial crisis 
period, and to ascertain the effect of major taxation changes on the quantum of share repurchases in 
South Africa. Buitendag (2018) evaluated the post-crisis share repurchase behaviour of 30 JSE-listed 
companies included in the Wesson (2015) study, but the post-crisis repurchase activity for the majority 
of the companies listed on the JSE has yet to be established. The companies in the Buitendag (2018) 
study were those which most actively repurchased shares in the Wesson (2015) study, and were 
studied for the period 2010–2015 (Buitendag, 2018). It was found that fewer shares were repurchased 
by the sampled companies after the financial crisis (during the 2010–2015 period) than before and 
during the crisis (Buitendag, 2018). 
Subsequent to the Wesson study, three studies have been done which focused on share repurchases 
in the Mining (Vermeulen, 2014) and Banking and Financial Services (Fortuin, 2015; Mbawa, 2018) 
sectors respectively, as these JSE sectors had been excluded by Wesson (2015). The three studies have 
shown that share repurchase activity in the Basic Materials and Financial industries is less pronounced 
than in the remainder of the JSE (Fortuin, 2015; Mbawa, 2018; Vermeulen, 2014).  
Vermeulen (2014) studied share repurchases in the Mining sector during 1999–2010. Similar to 
Wesson (2015), share repurchases in the Mining sector became more prevalent in the latter years 
(2006 to 2008) and 20 per cent (based on rand value) of the share repurchases (executed by companies 
with primary listings on the JSE) were not announced via SENS (Vermeulen, 2014). However, 
Vermeulen (2014) found that the companies in the Mining sector spent less on share repurchases in 
the period 2009–2010 (during and just after the global financial crisis). Companies in the Mining sector 
were severely affected by the global financial crisis and might have experienced a decrease in free cash 
flow, resulting in fewer share repurchases. 
Fortuin (2015) investigated share repurchase activity in the Banking and Financial Services sectors of 
the JSE during 1999–2014. General repurchases were the preferred repurchase type employed and a 
substantial portion (72% if based on rand value) of the general repurchases was not announced on 
SENS (Fortuin, 2015). In the Banking sector there was a spike in repurchase value during 2006, with 
post-financial crisis share repurchases being minimal, except for the repurchasing of treasury shares 
by the holding company (Fortuin, 2015, p. 48). In the Financial Services sector, there was minimal share 
repurchases during and after the global financial crisis, while the activity was more pronounced during 
2001–2007 (Fortuin, 2015, p. 60).  
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Mbawa (2018) studied share repurchases executed by companies listed in the real estate investment 
trusts and investment instruments sectors of the JSE during 1999–2017. Share repurchase activity 
(based on rand value) was quite volatile during the period: a once-off spike occurred in 2004, with a 
substantial increase during the period 2007–2008 (just before and during the start of the global 
financial crisis) followed by a slump during 2009–2012 (Mbawa, 2018, p. 52). During 2013–2016 the 
average amounts spent on share repurchases reached its highest levels yet, with almost half the 
repurchase value during the period 1999–2017 being spent in 2016 (Mbawa, 2018, p. 52). The sudden 
increase during 2016 should caution stakeholders that share repurchase activity should be closely 
monitored – especially in the period following the global financial crisis. However, the share 
repurchase trends after the global financial crisis still needs to be ascertained for companies outside 
the Financial Industry. 
2.2.6 Conclusion 
Share repurchase activity in the US and Western Europe increased drastically prior to the global 
financial crisis, but then decreased during the crisis. After the financial crisis, by 2015, share repurchase 
activity in the US had again increased to its pre-crisis levels. In Western Europe only a moderate 
increase occurred in 2010, after the financial crisis, with share repurchase activity being relatively 
stable between 2010 and 2015 (no increasing trend was noticed after the crisis). In Japan, share 
repurchase activity was high during the global financial crisis, possibly to extend price support in times 
of share prices falling. 
Share repurchases are associated with undervaluation (where undervalued companies would signal 
optimism about their future earnings potential to the market by announcing or executing a share 
repurchase) and is often done when a company has excess free cash flow. However, share repurchases 
can be used by executives to influence key metrics (the share price and EPS) and increase the value of 
executive share-based remuneration (leading to self-enrichment). Increased share repurchases could 
also decrease a company’s internal investment (in human resources and the development of 
innovative products or services). A such, stakeholders should actively monitor share repurchase 
activity. 
In South Africa, however, active monitoring of all share repurchase activity is not possible. Specific 
repurchases have to be announced on SENS before they occur, but general (open market) repurchases 
only need to be announced once three per cent of the outstanding shares have been repurchased. 
Therefore, stakeholders are not aware of almost half of the general repurchases that occur in the South 
African environment. As such, a comprehensive picture of South African share repurchases activity can 
only be obtained by hand-collecting this information from annual financial statements. This has been 
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done for most JSE-listed companies up to the year 2009, but comprehensive data on post-financial 
crisis share repurchase activity was not available prior to the present study. 
2.3 SHARE-BASED REMUNERATION OF EXECUTIVES 
The share-based remuneration of executives has increased in usage and complexity in the last two 
decades, both globally and in South Africa (PwC, 2015; PwC, 2019). Initially, share options were mainly 
used, but were superseded by share appreciation rights (SARs) and more recently contingent shares 
(Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). In Section 2.3, executive share-based remuneration and the financial 
theories underpinning it will be discussed. The types of share-based incentives, their accounting 
treatment and measurement, as well as global trends and previous studies regarding executive share-
based remuneration, will be examined. Finally, the regulation and disclosure requirements of 
executive share-based remuneration in South Africa, as well as previous South African studies dealing 
with executive share-based remuneration, will be considered. 
2.3.1  Executive remuneration in general 
Remuneration of executives of listed companies has become a topic of interest to shareholders, 
regulatory authorities and other stakeholders, as well as the general public (Rankin, 2010, p. 241). The 
popular media have often criticised executive remuneration for being excessive and, more recently, 
for not being sufficiently linked to the financial performance of the company (Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 
2018, p. 155, 160; Padia & Callaghan, 2020, p.1) – issues which were accentuated by the global financial 
crisis and corporate scandals (Padia & Callaghan, 2020, p. 1; Rankin, 2010, p. 242). In South Africa, 
these issues have been aggravated by the high wage inequality between the remuneration earned by 
executives and the remuneration of other employees (Collier, Idensohn, & Adkins, 2010; Viviers, 2015). 
On the other hand, however, remuneration could be employed as an incentive to focus executives’ 
attention on the maximising of shareholders’ value (Goergen & Renneboog, 2011, p. 1069) and 
increasing company performance (Murphy & Jensen, 1990). Effective remuneration of executives can 
increase company performance, leading to the creation of new jobs and the improvement of the 
overall South African economic situation (Steyn, 2015, p. 1). As such, ensuring that the executives of 
South African listed companies are appropriately remunerated has become important in many 
respects. 
Executive remuneration consists of short-term and long-term payments, and usually contains a 
mixture of guaranteed and variable compensation (Goergen & Renneboog, 2011, pp. 1069–1070; PwC, 
2019). Guaranteed pay is usually fully short-term (payable within a year of the date that the services 
have been rendered) and consists of salary, medical aid and pension contributions, allowances and 
other non-monetary benefits (e.g. free housing) (Steyn, 2015, p. 19; Urson, 2016, p. 27). As the name 
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suggests, guaranteed pay is not conditional and will be paid irrespective of the performance of the 
executive.  
Variable pay, in contrast, is contingent upon the satisfaction of some performance condition (such as 
the revenue figure, EPS, or share price reaching a certain level). Variable pay can be divided between 
short-term incentives (which are usually paid annually and called bonuses) and long-term incentives 
(Steyn, 2015, p. 18). Short-term incentives are usually paid in cash, whereas long-term incentives are 
either paid in cash or in the company’s own equity instruments. Long-term incentives are commonly 
share-based payments (SBPs) – i.e. the value of the payment depends on the change (increase) in the 
share price of the company (Urson, 2016, p. 27). Share-based remuneration of executives takes on a 
variety of forms, including share options, SARs and contingent shares (see more detail in 2.3.3). Share-
based remuneration is seen as long-term as it usually vests (becomes payable) after a period of 
between three and five years (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p. 60).  
2.3.2 Financial theories underpinning executive remuneration 
Theories regarding executive remuneration were initially grounded in the agency theory. The agency 
theory centres on the division between ownership (shareholders) and control (managers and 
especially executives) in a company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because of this division there is a need 
to govern and, in addition, incentivise executives to ensure that they act in the best interest of the 
shareholders. Firstly, corporate governance should ensure that executives that do not act ethically are 
identified and that corrective measures are taken; this will reduce agency risk (Dorff, 2005, p. 257). 
Secondly, agency theory has led to the development of financial incentives (and especially share-based 
remuneration) as an attempt to align the interests of shareholders and executives and so mitigate 
agency problems (Pepper & Gore, 2014). Under the agency theory, share options are expected to 
stimulate risky behaviour in otherwise risk-averse executives, and so reduce agency costs and increase 
company value (Martin, Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 2013, p. 451). A definitive link between company 
performance and executive pay is proposed by the agency theory (Urson, 2016, p. 12). 
The optimal contracting theory builds on the agency theory. It proposes that the executive labour 
market is akin to other labour markets, where the most qualified person is appointed and arms-length 
remuneration is then decided upon (Dorff, 2005, p. 261). Under optimal contracting, the executive 
remuneration packages seen in practice, provide effective incentives to executives (and so reduce 
agency risk), as the packages are developed by neutral boards (which include independent directors) 
(Dorff, 2005, p. 258). Appropriate structuring of the remuneration packages is done by choosing 
optimal proportions of guaranteed pay, short-term variable pay and long-term variable pay, as well as 
by employing appropriate performance vesting conditions to ensure alignment between shareholders 
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and executives’ interests and to maximise shareholder value (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Steyn & 
Cairney, 2016). 
Opposing the optimal contracting theory is the managerial power theory. The managerial power 
theory centres on the assumption that certain executives (because of characteristics of the executive 
or the internal structure of the company) can influence their own pay, and that this will lead to an 
extraction of rents (payments exceeding the optimal level) from the company (Bebchuk et al., 2002), 
especially by using share-based remuneration (Avallone et al., 2014). This will lead to remuneration 
contracts being ineffective in mitigating agency costs as they are not at arms-length, and emphasises 
the importance of corporate governance in enforcing pay-for-performance (Bebchuk et al., 2002). 
Where the managerial power theory is at work, one should not expect to find a link between company 
performance and executive remuneration (Urson, 2016, p. 13). 
In an attempt to better explain and comment on executive remuneration, other financial theories 
(which differ from each other and from the original agency theory) have been developed over the 
years. These include labour market theory, tournament theory and stewardship theory. Labour market 
theory emphasises the supply and demand of qualified executives and the remuneration required to 
attract the best individual for the position (Chalmers, Koh, & Stapledon, 2006). It argues that chief 
executive officer (CEO) pay is high because a limited number of people are willing and able to fulfil the 
role (Dorff, 2005, p. 262). The tournament theory is similar, and pivots on the fact that the executive 
has won the tournament and is remunerated for the job-level attained within the company (Bebchuk 
et al., 2002, p. 843). Tournament theory can also be used to explain pay differentials between 
employees at various levels within a company (e.g. CEO versus other executives or the average worker) 
(Ntim, Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2015). Both labour market theory and tournament theory are 
influenced by the fact that companies often benchmark their executive compensation against that of 
a peer group in the market (Steyn, 2015, pp. 15–16).  
Stewardship theory differs substantially from agency theory (McConvill, 2006), in that it proposes that 
executives are more selfless than assumed by agency theory and rather see themselves as stewards of 
the company, being innately desirous of acting in the best interest of the company (Sun, Zhao, & Yang, 
2010). According to this view, executives should not be incentivised as this would change their focus 
from the overall long-term success of the company to certain short-term perspectives (McConvill, 
2006). Recently, some have proposed that agency theory needs to be adapted into a behavioural 
agency theory (which combines agency theory and some aspects of stewardship theory) (Martin et al., 
2013). Behavioural agency theory proposes that share-based remuneration might be a sub-optimal 
motivator as executives are loss-averse and risk-averse, and dislike inequality (Pepper & Gore, 2015). 
Share-based remuneration is therefore of reduced value to the executives (relative to the actual 
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market value of share-based remuneration) (Pepper & Gore, 2014). Behavioural agency theory 
proposes a balanced mix between intrinsic and extrinsic motivators, as well as an emphasis on the 
performance of the individual executive rather than on that of the company (Pepper & Gore, 2015). 
Under the behavioural agency model, newly granted share options have the effect of stimulating risk-
taking, but previously granted options (now close to vesting date) reduce risk-taking (Martin et al., 
2013). 
Another theory to consider is institutional theory which incorporates environment-specific factors 
when examining executive remuneration (Sahakiants & Festing, 2019). The economy, regulation, 
disclosure requirements, current practice, taxation and accounting rules could influence executive 
remuneration in a given environment (Hall & Murphy, 2003; Sun et al., 2010). Murphy (2013) found 
that government interventions (regulation, disclosure requirements, accounting rules and taxation 
changes) in reaction to the issues surrounding executive remuneration, themselves bring about certain 
changes. Asian countries and emerging economies have different executive remuneration structures, 
leading to some questions as to whether agency theory can explain executive remuneration in all 
environments (Sahakiants & Festing, 2019; Sun et al., 2010). Especially in emerging economies, 
institutional theory can be useful in explaining and understanding executive remuneration (Sahakiants 
& Festing, 2019). Bruce, Buck, and Main (2005) mention that institutional theory can draw together 
aspects of agency, managerial power and stewardship theories and provide an overall understanding 
of the changes in executive remuneration. 
A final theory that is relevant to the present study is the upper echelons theory. While the upper 
echelons theory is not normally associated with executive remuneration per se, it could be useful in 
explaining why some executives engage in rent seeking behaviour. The upper echelons theory 
proposes that the characteristics of the executives influence their strategic actions and ultimately 
company performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The executive characteristics include both the 
observable (for example: age, tenure, education, and experience) and the psychological (for example: 
personality traits and values) (Hambrick & Mason, 1984, p. 198; Wang, Holmes, Oh & Zhu, 2016, p. 
777). Van der Zee and Swagerman (2009) took this thought process one step further and connected 
executive characteristics with ethical behaviour (or the lack thereof). Their reasoning was that the 
upper echelons theory proposes a link between executive characteristics and strategic actions, with 
the strategy of the company determining its targets and how executives are remunerated. Van der Zee 
and Swagerman (2009, p. 31) postulated that young executives, with a short tenure, could feel 
pressured to meet certain strategic targets on which their remuneration is based, and were thus more 
likely to engage in unethical and manipulative behaviour.  
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2.3.3  Characteristics of common share-based remuneration 
Different types of instruments are employed as share-based remuneration globally. Some share-based 
remuneration schemes are classified as appreciation schemes (as they reward only for the increase in 
the share price), while others are classified as full quantum schemes (as they remunerate based on the 
entire value of the share) (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p. 49). When comparing appreciation 
schemes (such as share options, SARs and share purchase plans) and full quantum schemes (such as 
deferred bonus schemes and contingent share plans), the following differences are noted 
(Mavrodinov, 2012, p. 25; PwC, 2015; Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a): 
• Full quantum schemes expose executives to both upside gain and downside risk, while 
appreciation schemes compensate exclusively for increases in the share price without exposure to 
losses if the share price decreases. 
• Share options (the dominant type of appreciation scheme) are derivative instruments and increase 
risk-taking by the holders thereof, while the same cannot be said of full quantum schemes, which 
are non-derivative instruments. Some propose that the risk-taking facilitated by share options is 
desirable (because executives are naturally risk-averse), while others feel that share options 
induce excessive risk-taking. 
• Executives who hold appreciation scheme instruments (such as share options) are more likely to 
engage in share repurchases than pay out dividends. However, certain full quantum schemes 
(those where ownership is transferred on grant date although the share may still be forfeited) do 
not affect the proportion of shareholder distributions made up of share repurchases and 
dividends. 
• When the schemes are equity-settled (i.e. settled through the company issuing shares), 
appreciation schemes are more EPS-dilutive, as more shares have to be issued to transfer a certain 
value. 
When discussing share-based remuneration, it is important to consider several dates that occur during 
the life of such an award. The first important date is the grant date (when the awards are contractually 
promised to the employees and the vesting conditions are set); the second is the vesting date (when 
the employee meets all vesting conditions and becomes unconditionally entitled to the award); and 
the third is the exercise date (when the employee exercises the award and receives the shares or cash) 
(Massie et al., 2014, p. 3). The vesting date and the exercise date might be the same date, or 
alternatively the exercise date could occur at some point after the vesting date. Vesting conditions 
almost always include that the executive must stay in service during the vesting period (referred to as 
a service vesting condition). In addition, performance vesting conditions (hereafter referred to as 
performance conditions) have become increasingly common (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). The 
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common types of share-based remuneration schemes will now be discussed with the aforementioned 
dates and vesting conditions as background. 
2.3.3.1 Appreciation scheme: Share options 
Share options were the most common form of share-incentive during the 1990s and early 2000s 
(Steenkamp, Dippenaar, Fourie, & Franken, 2019, p. 3). What is commonly referred to as a share 
option, is in fact an option written by the company which entitles the holder thereof (the executive) 
to buy shares in the company at a pre-determined exercise price (Hall & Murphy, 2002). The executive 
is granted the option, and takes ownership thereof after the completion of a vesting period (during 
which the executive has to remain in service for the share option to vest) (Steenkamp & Wesson, 
2018a, p. 49). After the vesting date, the executive usually has a lengthy exercise period in which to 
exercise the option (Mavrodinov, 2012, p. 13,15). The share option holds value for the executive if it is 
‘in the money’ i.e. if the exercise price is lower than the current share price. As share options are often 
granted ‘at the money’ (i.e. at an exercise price equal to the share price on the grant date), they 
effectively remunerate executives for the increase in the share price between grant date and exercise 
date (Steyn, 2015, p. 22).  
Share options lead to large gains during a bull market, and may then reward executives for general 
market movements rather than the individual performance of the company (Mavrodinov, 2012, p. 6). 
Share options that are indexed to the market (where the exercise price is set equal to the grant date 
share price adjusted for general market movement over the period) is a way to employ options but 
still control for the general market movement, and only reward executives for above-market 
performance (Hall & Murphy, 2003). However, indexed options are rarely used (Hall & Murphy, 2003). 
Share options are usually equity-settled and not tax deductible for the company (employer) in South 
Africa (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p.50), unless the scheme qualifies as a broad-based employee 
share plan (Mavrodinov, 2012, p. 22). 
2.3.3.2 Appreciation scheme: Share appreciation rights  
Share appreciation rights (SARs) are effectively cash-settled share options, where the cash pay-out 
received by the executive equals the increase in the share price from grant date to exercise date 
(Massie et al., 2014, p. 5). SARs vest after the completion of a service period and, in addition, 
performance conditions are sometimes applied (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p. 60). The advantage 
of SARs over share options is that no dilution of current shareholders’ interest occurs and that SARs 
are deductible for tax purposes in South Africa, although the disadvantage is the cash outflow required 
to settle the obligation (Mavrodinov, 2012, pp. 22–23).  
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2.3.3.3 Appreciation scheme: Share purchase plans 
A share purchase plan allows executives the opportunity to buy shares in the company on credit, 
through the company granting a loan to finance this purchase. The shares are granted or acquired at 
a certain price, but the executive does not pay the price immediately as this amount is credited to a 
loan account with the company (Mavrodinov, 2012, p. 23). The executive only needs to repay the loan 
by a later date and then takes ownership of the shares. Effectively, a share purchase plan is similar to 
a share option plan – as the executive gains the increase in share price from grant date to the date the 
loan is repaid, because the executive pays the original price credited to the loan account – and is 
accounted for as such (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b, p. 4).  
2.3.3.4 Full quantum scheme: Contingent shares 
A contingent share plan (in contrast to share options, SARs and share purchase plans) is a full quantum 
scheme, i.e. the executive receives the full value of a company share at the exercise date, and not only 
the increase in a share’s value from grant date to exercise date. The executive needs to stay in service 
throughout a pre-determined vesting period (and possibly also comply with certain performance 
conditions) after which the executive receives shares in the company (at no cost) on the vesting date 
(Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b, p. 4). The vesting date and the exercise date are thus the same date. If 
the vesting of the scheme only requires the executive to stay in service for a number of years, but does 
not require the meeting of certain performance targets, the scheme is referred to as a restricted share 
plan (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p. 50). If performance targets are added, the scheme is referred 
to a performance share plan (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p. 50). The performance targets (called 
performance conditions) can be divided into non-market conditions (those not based on the share 
price, for example if based on EPS) and market conditions (those based on the share price) (IASB, 
2017d).  
Some schemes are structured so that the executive receives the shares upfront (on grant date) and 
will forfeit them if the service and performance conditions are not met (called forfeitable share plans 
for tax purposes) (Steyn, 2015, p. 20). An executive who has received a forfeitable share has the right 
to vote and receive dividends from the grant date (Steyn, 2015, p. 20). Other schemes only provide the 
executive with the shares on the vesting date (called conditional share plans for tax purposes) (Steyn, 
2015, p. 20). These schemes are usually equity-settled and therefore no tax deduction can be claimed 
by the company (unless the scheme qualifies as a broad-based employee share plan) (Mavrodinov, 
2012, p. 22). Similar to share options, the benefit of contingent shares is the absence of cash outflow 
accompanying them, but the downside is the dilution of current shareholders’ interest that occurs 
when additional shares are issued. 
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2.3.3.5 Full quantum scheme: Phantom shares 
When an executive receives the cash value of a share on the exercise (or vesting) date, instead of the 
actual share itself, this is referred to as a phantom share scheme (Massie et al., 2014, p. 5). Similar to 
a SAR (which is the cash-settled version of an option), the phantom share is the cash-settled version 
of a contingent share. As with SARs, the cash payout would be deductible for the company for taxation 
purposes, but the downside is the cash outflow required to settle the phantom shares. 
2.3.3.6 Full quantum scheme: Deferred bonus plans 
Some entities offer their executives the opportunity to defer a portion of their annual (short-term) 
bonus into shares. An executive would then forfeit a cash bonus, but in exchange receives shares at a 
later date, provided that certain vesting conditions are met (Massie et al., 2014, p. 5). To make it 
attractive for the executive, the number of shares to be received is generally a multiple (e.g. double) 
of the value of the cash bonus forfeited (Mavrodinov, 2012, p. 25). 
2.3.4 Effective design of share-based remuneration schemes 
Poorly designed incentives may increase rather than reduce agency costs. Poor design could include 
using inappropriate types of incentives (appreciation versus full quantum), employing performance 
conditions that can be manipulated, and choosing badly designed thresholds for performance 
conditions (Murphy & Jensen, 2011). Recently there has been a move away from appreciation schemes 
(share options and SARs) towards full quantum schemes (contingent shares) – as holding actual shares 
allow executives to be rewarded in the same way as shareholders (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). 
Moreover, appreciation schemes have not been as successful as hoped in properly incentivising 
executives (PwC, 2015). Murphy and Jensen (1990), Dittman and Maug (2007) and Beck (2016) advised 
that executives should rather hold material investments in company shares (rather than being offered 
share options). Dittmann and Maug (2007) ascribed the prevalent use of share options to rent 
extraction by executives.  
The performance conditions employed should be chosen carefully as they will focus the executive’s 
actions and energy only on certain aspects of company performance, which will naturally lead to a 
decreased concentration on other aspects (Gibbs, 2012). A possible solution is using a number of 
performance conditions that sandwich together and so fix the executive’s attention on multiple 
performance measures. Ideal performance conditions should reflect the executive’s performance 
accurately and completely, and exclude aspects that are out of the control of the executive (Gibbs, 
2012). The ideal performance measure is the individual contribution that the executive adds to the 
value of the company – unfortunately this is very difficult to measure (Murphy & Jensen, 2011, p. 27).  
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The share price of the company is often used as performance condition, although it is influenced by 
many factors beyond the executives’ control (Gibbs, 2012). The company’s share price movement 
relative to the movement of the entire stock exchange or subsector thereof would be more 
appropriate. Accounting earnings is used often, but is prone to manipulation (smoothing) and 
furthermore ignores the cost of capital (Murphy & Jensen, 2011, pp. 28–29). Ratios, such as EPS, are 
also often employed, but cause even more problems as both the numerator and denominator can be 
manipulated to reach the target – this could be detrimental to company value if the executive seeks 
to alter the denominator (e.g. through repurchasing shares to increase the EPS figure) (Murphy & 
Jensen, 2011, p. 29). Another possible solution is basing the performance conditions on so-called 
economic profit (the operating profit after allowing for cost of capital) (Murphy & Jensen, 2011, p. 33). 
In addition to choosing the correct performance conditions, the thresholds or targets of these 
conditions should be set appropriately (Murphy & Jensen, 2011). Thresholds must be set at 
appropriate levels (not too high and not too low). If the threshold is set too low, it does not really 
incentivise executives to expend energy and the executives do not want to surpass the threshold by 
too much, as they are concerned that this will increase the threshold for subsequent periods (Murphy 
& Jensen, 2011, pp. 5–7). The threshold should not be determined by using budgets and figures of 
prior years, but should rather be based on peer groups (as long as the peer groups are not selected by 
the executives themselves) (Murphy & Jensen, 2011, p. 19, 23).  
Additional problems may arise if a fixed-threshold performance condition is employed (e.g. the EPS 
must be R5.00 before the options vest – before this level is met the executive does not qualify for the 
incentive, and any subsequent increase above the set level does not lead to additional remuneration) 
(Murphy & Jensen, 2011, pp. 5–7). Examples of the possible negative effects of fixed thresholds include 
(Murphy & Jensen, 2011, pp. 5–7):  
• When the specific performance target has already been met (or the executive feels that the 
benchmark is not possible to meet), this might encourage executives to withhold effort (not 
engage in new projects) to save the positive effects of new projects for the next measurement 
period.  
• When the specific performance measure is close to meeting the required target, the executive 
would be incentivised to manipulate figures or engage in projects with a negative value for the 
company just to meet the target, without considering other factors such as the cost of capital. 
A more linear relationship between the performance condition and the reward should be used (for 
example, as soon as a minimum threshold is met, every increase above the threshold leads to 
additional rewards or more shares) (Murphy & Jensen, 2011, p. 12). If the thresholds are not 
appropriately set, it could lead to the manipulation of accounting figures and the share price (the 
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performance condition), excessive risk-taking, not undertaking projects with positive net present cash 
flows, and ignoring the internal cost of capital (Murphy & Jensen, 2011).  
2.3.5 The accounting treatment and measurement of executive share-based remuneration 
The accounting treatment of share-based remuneration has always been a contentious issue. Globally, 
most listed companies either apply the accounting rules of IFRS, which are issued by the IASB, or 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for US companies (US GAAP), published by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). After a long process, the IASB issued IFRS 2 Share-based payments 
(IASB, 2017d) in 2004 to prescribe the accounting treatment of SBPs in general (including executive 
share-based remuneration) for financial years ending on or after 31 December 2005. The FASB also 
issued FAS 123R (subsequently renamed ASC 718 Compensation – Stock compensation) which was 
effective for financial years commencing after 15 June 2005 and provides rules similar to those of IFRS 
2, but for US companies (Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, & Kalpathy, 2018; Hopkins & Lazonick, 2016). Given that 
South African listed companies have to apply IFRS in their annual financial statements, most of the 
discussion below centres on the accounting requirements contained in IFRS 2, but, additionally, brief 
mention is made of the US requirements.  
2.3.5.1 Before the effective date of IFRS 2 
Before the effective date of IFRS 2, equity-settled share-based remuneration paid to executives was 
not expensed in the annual financial statements of companies applying IFRS, although most companies 
did disclose some details regarding the share-based remuneration paid (Pretorius & De Villiers, 2013). 
Cash-settled share-based payments were employed infrequently, as they would have been expensed 
even before the effective date of IFRS 2. Under US GAAP, share options were also not expensed before 
2005 if granted ‘at the money’ (i.e. at an exercise price equal to grant date fair value of the share under 
option) – as was commonly done (Geiler, 2012, p. 21). The predominant type of scheme in the 1990s 
and early 2000s was share options (Mavrodinov, 2012) and the popularity of share options was 
probably fuelled, at least in part, by its favourable accounting treatment (Hall & Murphy, 2003).  
2.3.5.2 The development of IFRS 2 
Share options (and other equity-settled share-based remuneration) to employees are substantially the 
same as other payments made to employees (such as salaries) and should therefore be expensed in a 
company’s annual financial statements (Sacho & Wingard, 2004) as this provides relevant, reliable and 
comparable financial information (Fisher & Wise, 2006). Based on this argument, IFRS 2 concluded that 
it is appropriate to expense equity-settled SBPs (IASB, 2017d). 
After the initial debate regarding whether equity-settled share-based remuneration of executives 
should be expensed, a secondary debate raged regarding how the expense should be calculated (i.e. 
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when the value of the share-based remuneration should be measured, to then expense it over the 
vesting period) (Grey, Cotter, & Barnes, 2002). The measurement is problematic as it is a bartering 
transaction (employee services for shares) – the measurement of which needs to be determined by 
accounting rules (Guay, Kothari, & Sloan, 2003). Equity-settled share-based remuneration could be 
measured at the grant date, the vesting date, or the exercise date. The precise value of the SBP is only 
known on the exercise date, but is unconditionally due at vesting date (Grey et al., 2002) and 
conditionally due at the grant date.  
Sacho and Oberholster (2005) argued that exercise date accounting would be more appropriate for 
the recognition of equity-settled SBPs to employees than grant date fair value. Their motivation 
included that the economic substance of the transaction was similar to that of a liability, and exercise 
date accounting would therefore reconcile the actual amount received by employees to the expense 
in the annual financial statement and would lead to simpler accounting treatment (Sacho & 
Oberholster, 2005). Furthermore, it could be argued that no share option or share exists during the 
vesting period (it is then still contingent upon the satisfying of the vesting conditions) – and the claim 
is a contingent one for which a variable number of shares will vest (the number of shares for which 
vesting conditions are satisfied) (Ohlson & Penman, 2005). In the end, the IASB settled this debate by 
ruling that equity-settled SBPs to employees should be recognised at the grant date fair value (IASB, 
2017d). 
2.3.5.3 Measuring share-based remuneration under IFRS 2  
IFRS 2 distinguishes between three types of SBPs: equity-settled, cash-settled and choice-settled. 
Equity-settled SBPs are those SBPs which will eventually be settled in the company’s own shares, while 
cash-settled SBPs will be settled in cash with the value of the cash being determined by the company’s 
share price in some manner (IASB, 2017d). Choice-settled SBPs are less common and provide either 
the company or the counterparty with the choice on how the SBP should be settled eventually – either 
using cash or using shares (IASB, 2017d). Table 2.2 explains the accounting treatment of the three 









Equity-settled  The fair value of the share or share option granted is measured once only, at grant date. 
Every year, the annualised grant date fair value (the grant date fair value divided by the 
number of years in the vesting period) is then recognised as expense and equity reserve. 
When exercised, the equity reserve is transferred to share capital. No subsequent 
remeasurement takes place if the fair value changes subsequent to grant date. 
Cash-settled  At every reporting date until the instrument has been settled, the fair value of the 
instrument is determined (this fair value would probably change over time). A liability is 
recognised, and remeasured at each reporting date. The liability’s value at a certain 
reporting date equals the fair value at that reporting date multiplied by the percentage 
of the vesting period that has been completed. The remeasurement of the liability is 
recognised as an expense, and is a result of both the passage of time and the fair value 
of the instrument changing. Upon settlement (payment of cash) the liability is 
derecognised. 
Choice-settled  Usually the choice of settlement (in cash or shares) rests with the company, and then 
the SBP’s accounting treatment matches that of equity-settled SBPs during the vesting 
period, with some differences on exercise date.  
IFRS 2 does not prescribe the use of any specific technique in determining the fair value of equity-
settled SBPs on grant date or the fair value of cash-settled SBPs on reporting date (IASB, 2017d). Option 
pricing models, such as Black-Scholes and Binominal, are often used to value share options (and other 
equity-settled share-based remuneration) on grant date because no quoted market price is available 
for these instruments (Hall & Murphy, 2002; Steyn, 2015, pp. 22–23). However, executive share 
options differ extensively from conventional traded options (which the option pricing models were 
intended to value), given that they are non-tradeable and have long exercise periods, but are usually 
exercised earlier in the exercise period (Hall & Murphy, 2002). Aspects to be considered are the risk-
free interest rate, current value of shares, exercise price (if any), volatility of share price, expected 
dividends, length of vesting and exercise period, and the probability of performance conditions being 
met, if applicable (IASB, 2017d; Steyn, 2015, pp. 22–23). 
It is important to note, from Table 2.2, that recognising equity-settled SBPs at the grant date fair value 
(irrespective of later changes in the fair value) could lead to the value actually realised by executives 
on the exercise date differing substantially from the amount expensed in the annual financial 
statement (Murphy, 2013). In a typical bull market, employing the grant date fair value as measure 
would understate the value that executives derive from share-based remuneration. The potential 
difference between grant date fair value and exercise date fair value emphasises the importance of 
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extensive financial statement disclosure regarding the value that executives actually derive from share-
based remuneration during the reporting period (Hopkins & Lazonick, 2016). As IFRS 2 does not require 
disclosure of the value realised on exercise date (IASB, 2017d), it is imperative that this disclosure 
should be prescribed by other sources (such as listing requirements or corporate governance 
frameworks).  
In the US, however, the disclosure requirements sometimes exacerbated the confusion between grant 
date and exercise date value (for some incentives the grant date value should be disclosed, and for 
some the exercise date value) (Murphy, 2013, pp. 219–220). In South Africa, a similar situation was 
noted in respect of the disclosure of share-based remuneration paid to individual executives. The 
previous Companies Act 61 of 1973 prescribed that the gain on exercise of share options be disclosed 
(Republic of South Africa, 1973), while the current Companies Act 71 of 2008 requires the disclosure 
of the “value” of all share-based remuneration, without determining how and when this should be 
measured (Republic of South Africa, 2008). Some South African companies disclose the exercise date 
value, while others disclose the grant date fair value, or employ a mixed method (Dippenaar & 
Steenkamp, 2017). The disclosure requirements pertaining to per-director disclosure of share-based 
remuneration will be further discussed in Section 2.3.5. 
Murphy (2013) noted that when and how to measure share-based remuneration remains one of the 
most contentious and important issues surrounding executive compensation. As IFRS 2 recognises 
equity-settled share-based remuneration based on the grant date fair value of such incentives, most 
academic research has followed suit (Murphy, 2013, p. 218), although some have used the IFRS 2 
expense or the value on exercise date (Urson, 2016). In reviewing the previous research on executive 
share-based remuneration, it is critical to consider the measurement basis employed. 
2.3.5.4 The recent review of IFRS 2 
Although the accounting treatment prescribed by IFRS 2 is generally well-accepted, the IASB has 
received an abnormally large number of interpretation requests regarding IFRS 2 and in 2012 
earmarked IFRS 2 for further research (IASB, 2015). During this research project (which lasted from 
2012 to 2016) the IASB found that one of the main problems surrounding IFRS 2 is using grant date fair 
value in accounting for equity-settled SBPs with employees (IASB, 2016). During the research project, 
alternative classification and measurement methods were considered for equity-settled SBPs to 
employees. After developing the alternatives, the IASB decided to halt the IFRS 2 research project, as 
commentators felt that IFRS 2 was operational and significant changes could only be considered after 
the conclusion of the ongoing research project on Financial instruments with characteristics of equity 
(FICE) (IASB, 2016). A discussion paper on FICE has been published and comments have been gathered, 
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but the further direction of the project will only be determined during 2020 (IASB, 2019). As yet, no 
exposure draft or finalised IFRS is forthcoming based on the FICE project.  
2.3.6  Global trends regarding executive share-based remuneration 
Globally, companies are increasingly employing share-based remuneration for executives and this has 
probably contributed to the sharp rise in overall executive compensation (Pepper & Gore, 2014). The 
global trend regarding executive share-based remuneration will now be discussed (in terms of the 
types of share-based incentives which were common in the last 30 years, and the quantum of 
remuneration comprising share-based incentives). The US is probably the most studied country in this 
regard (Qu, Percy, Stewart, & Hu, 2016), followed by the UK and other Western European countries. 
However, some mention will also be made of the trends in developing countries.  
2.3.6.1  The United States 
In the US, share options were already widely used during the 1990s (Fisher & Wise, 2006) and were 
the pay component with the highest value during most of this period (Hall & Murphy, 2002). Factors 
that probably contributed to the extensive use of share options during the 1990s were: the non-
recognition of share options as expense items before the effective date of FAS 123R; the favourable 
tax treatment of gains in the hands of executives; and the prevailing bull market in the 1990s (Hall & 
Murphy, 2003). After the Enron scandal in 2001, regulators and stakeholders identified share options 
as a possible aggravating factor (Murphy, 2013). This event started the US out on a road of instituting 
corporate governance regulations and mandatory accounting recognition which altered the structure 
and characteristics of share-based remuneration in the US during the first decade of the new 
millennium (Fisher & Wise, 2006). From 15 June 2005, companies in the US were required to expense 
share options granted as a result of FAS 123R being issued (Murphy, 2013). This levelled the playing 
field between share options (previously unrecognised as expenses in financial statements) and 
contingent shares (which had been recognised as expenses in financial statements since 1972), and 
caused a decrease in the use of share options and an increase in the use of contingent shares during 
the last part of the 2000s (Murphy, 2013).  
In the years 2006 to 2010, share-based incentives were used extensively and made up 45 per cent of 
executive earnings in 2006 and 48 per cent in 2010 (Pepper & Gore, 2014). By 2014 this percentage 
had increased to 62 per cent (if share-based incentives are measured using the grant date fair value) 
or 81 per cent (if share-based incentives are measured using the value realised on exercise date) 
(Hopkins & Lazonick, 2016). The substantial difference between the grant date fair value and the value 
realised on exercise date emphasises the need to disclose the realised value, especially when share-
based remuneration is equity-settled and recognised based on the grant date fair value.  
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Performance conditions were increasingly used, especially after the effective date of the FAS 123R 
(Bettis et al., 2018). By 2018, most companies employed two or three different incentive schemes, 
with performance share schemes being most popular, followed by restricted shares and then share 
options (Meridian Compensation Partners, 2018, p. 19). The performance conditions employed most 
often were based on TSR (53% of companies), EPS, and operating income (indexed to those of a peer 
group) (Meridian Compensation Partners, 2018).  
2.3.6.2 The United Kingdom and the rest of Western Europe 
In the UK, 40 per cent of executive earnings in 2006 were attributable to share-based incentives, with 
this figure increasing to 50 per cent in 2010 (Pepper & Gore, 2014). By 2015, over 60 per cent of the 
remuneration received by a sample of UK executives was attributable to share-based pay (if one 
measures the share-based incentives based on the fair value on exercise date) (Kotnik, Sakinç, & 
Guduras, 2018, p. 10). This trend of share-based incentives increasing can also be found in most 
Western European countries (Pepper & Gore, 2014). Kotnik et al. (2018, p. 10) reported that, by 2015, 
51 per cent of executive remuneration was share-based in a study that combined companies from the 
UK, France, Germany, Sweden and Italy. The percentage was highest in the UK (60%), slightly lower in 
France (58%) and Sweden (42%), and substantially lower in Germany (29%) and Italy (14%) (Kotnik et 
al., 2018, p. 10). These varying percentages emphasise the heterogeneity that exists between countries 
– as pointed out by institutional theory.  
In 2005, before the effective date of IFRS 2, share options were the prevalent type of share-based 
incentives offered (Avallone et al., 2014). Evidence from Italy suggests that the adoption of IFRS 2 did 
not significantly decrease the usage of share options, but rather that share option usage decreased 
during the global financial crisis (Avallone et al., 2014). By 2015, the most common form of share-based 
incentive was contingent shares, and share options were rarely employed (in France, however, share 
options were still often used) (Kotnik et al., 2018, p. 9). Even before they became prevalent in the US, 
performance conditions were common in the UK, already being employed in the early 2000s (Carter, 
Ittner, & Zechman, 2009). By 2019, around 75 per cent of the top 250 UK companies employed 
performance conditions that were based on either TSR or profit metrics (including EPS), or both 
(WillisTowersWatson, 2019).  
2.3.6.3 Other countries  
Executive remuneration trends in Asian countries and developing countries might differ from those in 
the US, UK and Western Europe, and are relatively less researched (Sahakiants & Festing, 2019; Sun et 
al., 2010). Some Chinese firms use share-based remuneration, but in Japan, share-based remuneration 
has never been widely accepted (Pepper & Gore, 2014), with only between 15 and 20 per cent of 
executive remuneration being share-based (Morikuni, 2018). However, since 2016 companies have 
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been able to issue restricted shares to executives, and by 2018 the number of restricted share plans 
exceeded the number of share option plans (Morikuni, 2018), signalling a possible increase in future 
share-based remuneration.  
Less is known about the value of executive share-based remuneration in developing countries, as the 
disclosure thereof is even less detailed (Mercer, 2014). For example, in Malaysia, disclosure of 
executive remuneration per director is not mandatory (Jaafar, Nawawi, & Salin, 2014). This makes data 
regarding share-based remuneration trends difficult to obtain. However, share options were in usage 
in Malaysia when IFRS 2 became effective (Atan, Jasni, & Shahwan, 2010), and still seem to be used in 
India (Seth, 2018). Much of the research on executive remuneration in developing countries ignores 
share-based remuneration, and focuses solely on guaranteed remuneration, such as salaries and 
benefits. The trends relating to executive share-based remuneration in South Africa will be discussed 
in Section 2.3.9. 
2.3.7 Previous global studies on executive share-based remuneration  
Much of the previous global research on executive remuneration tended to consider: 
1. The link between corporate performance (past, current and future – measured by using 
different proxies) and executive remuneration (including or excluding a measure for share-
based remuneration); and 
2. The company or executive characteristics (including corporate governance) that determine 
the size and structure of executive remuneration. 
Some of the research conducted in relation to the above-mentioned two main focus areas has included 
share-based remuneration as part of executive remuneration. However, probably because of its 
complexities, most earlier studies excluded share-based remuneration when measuring executive 
remuneration (Ntim et al., 2015, p. 68; Steyn, 2015, p. 1). Research done specifically on share-based 
remuneration has considered the appropriate accounting treatment of share-based remuneration 
(discussed in Section 2.3.5) and the characteristics of share-based remuneration over the years 
(discussed in Section 2.3.6). The link between employing share-based remuneration and the 
manipulation of earnings and share price metrics, as well as share repurchases, has also gained 
increased research attention in the last few years (Avallone et al., 2014).  
Most previous studies deal only with the CEO as a proxy for all executives (Steyn, 2015, p. 8), although 
some variation is noted between the CEO, the next highest paid executive and those lower down in 
the hierarchy (seen as a group) (Rankin, 2010, p. 242). The following section will discuss some pertinent 
findings of previous studies which pertain to executive share-based remuneration. 
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2.3.7.1 Pay–performance link 
An important theme in recent research in the field of executive remuneration has centred on the so-
called pay–performance link (i.e. whether higher executive remuneration can be linked to improved 
company performance) (Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 2018). Murphy and Jensen (1990) initiated this debate 
by advocating that the large amounts being paid as executive remuneration do not represent the main 
problem, but rather the fact that executive remuneration and company performance appear to be 
unrelated. So far, research has failed to establish a strong link between total executive pay and 
company performance, and this has left many scholars questioning whether agency theory can fully 
explain the quantum of executive remuneration, especially in times of financial crisis (Pepper & Gore, 
2015).  
Executive pay is, however, more strongly linked to company performance (measured by the share 
price) when share-based remuneration is employed (Hall & Murphy, 2002; Ntim et al., 2015). 
Moreover, using performance conditions could improve this link (Qu et al., 2016). However, most of 
the previous research has excluded share-based remuneration as part of the proxy for executive 
remuneration (Ntim et al., 2015). To test whether (actual) company performance and executive pay 
are correlated, it would be more appropriate to include the actual value realised from SBPs exercised 
in the remuneration proxy, and not the fair value of awards granted during the year (as the grant date 
fair value is more important when structuring executive remuneration beforehand) (Murphy, 2013, p. 
219).  
2.3.7.2 Determinants of share-based remuneration 
Company size (as proxied by market capitalisation or total assets) remains the number one 
determinant of executive remuneration, including share-based remuneration (Gabaix, Landier, & 
Sauvagnat, 2014; Walker, 2010), with larger companies being more likely to employ share-based 
remuneration (Steyn & Cairney, 2016). In addition, larger companies are more likely to attach 
performance conditions to their share-based remuneration (Bettis et al., 2018). Some characteristics 
pertaining to the executives themselves may also influence share-based remuneration, for example 
CEOs who are more powerful and have been in tenure for longer periods often have vesting conditions 
that are easier to attain (Qu et al., 2016). However, effective corporate governance may curb the effect 
of executive characteristics on share-based remuneration. 
On observing that “executive compensation forms a litmus test for corporate governance law’s 
effectiveness”, Dorff (2005) went on to make the point that “[t]he interests of management and 
shareholders diverge most sharply in this arena, where every dollar taken from shareholders transfers 
directly to management”. Companies with better corporate governance are more likely to employ 
appropriately designed share-based remuneration that aligns the interests of the shareholders and 
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executives (Bebchuk, Grinstein, & Peyer, 2010). Improved corporate governance leads to longer 
vesting periods and the increased usage of performance conditions (Qu et al., 2016). Moreover, 
shareholder activism can lead to increased disclosure and transparency regarding share-based 
remuneration in annual financial statements and in this way shape a company’s policies regarding this 
critical aspect of executive remuneration (Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 2018; Viviers, 2015).  
2.3.7.3 Possible manipulation as a result of share-based remuneration 
Financial incentives were originally instituted to reduce agency problems, but may cause more 
problems than they solve (Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 2018). Shareholders and regulators have become 
concerned that share-based remuneration might encourage, rather than stifle, self-serving and 
fraudulent behaviour in executives (Qu et al., 2016; Sahakiants & Festing, 2019). For example, during 
the 2000s it became known that executive share options were sometimes repriced or backdated (Arya 
& Sun, 2004; Bernile & Jarrell, 2009). This repricing or backdating was often orchestrated by executives 
to increase their own remuneration and negated the incentive purpose of executive share-based 
remuneration (Adam & Schwartz, 2009; Arya & Sun, 2004). Furthermore, granting appreciation 
scheme instruments, such as share options, might lead to a short-term focus and opportunistic 
behaviour (Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, & Thakor, 2014).  
Most performance conditions and incentives provide opportunity for manipulation and unethical 
behaviour (Rodgers & Gago, 2003, p.189–190; Jacquart & Armstrong, 2013) and, as such, the design 
of optimal incentives with appropriate performance conditions has become important (Qu et al., 
2016). During the last decade full quantum schemes (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a), which more 
closely align the financial interests of shareholders and executives have become more prevalent. The 
performance conditions employed, however, are most often based on EPS and TSR, which are open to 
manipulation through earnings management and the excessive repurchasing of shares (Murphy & 
Jensen, 2011).  
Bebchuk et al. (2002) were first to link share-based remuneration to possible rent extraction by 
executives. They pointed out that share-based remuneration allows executives many opportunities to 
influence their own pay. Share-based remuneration is intrinsically linked to the share price and, with 
performance conditions also becoming common, executives can enhance their own pay in two major 
ways: by manipulating the share price (through share repurchases, for example) or by artificially 
enabling performance vesting targets to be met (for example, through earnings management when 
the vesting is contingent upon EPS). Studies have found evidence of discretionary accruals to manage 
earnings (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006) and share repurchases to increase EPS, where EPS targets 
are employed for share-based remuneration (Farrell, Unlu, & Yu, 2014; Farrell, Yu, & Zhang, 2013; 
Hribar et al., 2006; Young & Yang, 2011). Goergen and Renneboog (2011) reviewed the existing 
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literature on share-based remuneration and found that rent extraction by executives provided the 
most plausible explanation for the practices found in the share-based remuneration landscape. It has 
been hypothesised that executive pay and company performance will only be related (and so reduce 
agency costs) in a strong corporate governance environment (Ntim et al., 2015), while in an 
environment with weak corporate governance, rent extraction will prevail (Goergen & Renneboog, 
2011). 
2.3.8 The regulation and disclosure of executive share-based remuneration in South Africa 
Luiz (2006) mentioned the following as key requirements relating to the governance of executive 
remuneration in its totality: detailed disclosure regarding individual remuneration; independent 
remuneration committees that determine the structure and size of remuneration; an established link 
between pay and company performance; and shareholders having a voting right on remuneration 
policy. Executive remuneration is becoming increasingly regulated in South Africa. By 2020 all the 
requirements identified by Luiz (2006) had been included in the corporate governance regime 
applicable to the executive remuneration of South African listed companies. King IV, which came into 
effect from March 2018 year ends onwards, has prescribed requirements regarding all these issues 
(IoDSA, 2016). However, not all the requirements mentioned by Luiz (2006) were addressed by 
corporate governance regulations throughout the period under review (2002–2017). 
This section covers only the disclosure and other requirements relating specifically to executive share-
based remuneration (and not all executive remuneration in general) in South Africa during 2002–2017, 
as this is the aspect of corporate governance relevant to this study. If one considers share-based 
remuneration specifically, extensive disclosure regarding the extent of the share-based remuneration 
(in both number and value) is critical. Furthermore, comprehensive information is needed on the 
nature and functioning of the share-based remuneration schemes, as well as the vesting conditions 
employed.  
When one specifically considers the share-based remuneration of executives, the following regulations 
need to be taken into account: IFRS 2 (IASB, 2017d), the JSE Listing Requirements (JSE, 2017a), the 
previous Companies Act 61 of 1973 (Republic of South Africa, 1973), the current Companies Act 71 of 
2008 (Republic of South Africa, 2008), and the King Reports on corporate governance in South Africa 
(King II, III and IV) (IoDSA, 2002, 2009, 2016). King IV was not effective during the target period of the 
present study (it is effective from reporting dates which end on or after 31 March 2018). However, 
King IV is also discussed in this section as it has provided much improved requirements on the value of 
share-based remuneration earned by and owed to individual executives. 
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2.3.8.1 Disclosure of individual executive’s remuneration 
Disclosure of the remuneration received by individually named executives provides detailed and useful 
information that can hold executives accountable and so deter excessive remuneration, but allows for 
benchmarking which may again lead to increasing levels of remuneration (Madlela & Cassim, 2017, pp. 
387–388). It is important that both the number of instruments involved, as well as the value thereof, 
should be disclosed.  
The disclosures prescribed by the JSE Listing Requirements pertain mainly to the number of 
instruments involved, and remained unchanged throughout the target period of the present study. In 
section 7.B.7 (i), the JSE Listing Requirements require disclosure (per named executive) regarding each 
type of share-based remuneration held by an executive (JSE, 2017a): 
in respect of share options or any other right given which has had the same or a similar effect 
in respect of providing a right to subscribe for shares (“share options”):  
(i) the opening balance of share options, including the number of share options at each 
different strike price;  
(ii) the number of share options awarded and their strike prices; 
(iii) the strike dates of differing lots of options awarded; 
(iv) the number of share options exercised and at what prices; 
(v) the closing balance of share options, including the number of share options at each 
different strike price. 
Moreover, the JSE Listing Requirements prescribe (in section 7.B.7 (j)) that certain details be provided 
in respect of share purchase plans (JSE, 2017a): 
(j) any shares issued and allotted in terms of a share purchase/option scheme for employees 
(or other scheme/structure effected outside of the issuer which achieves substantially the 
same objectives as a share purchase/option scheme), usually held as a pledge against an 
outstanding loan to an employee in a share purchase scheme trust, which have not been fully 
paid for, including the number so issued and allotted, the price of issue and allotment, the 
release periods applicable to such shares and any other relevant information. 
In South Africa, the disclosure requirements pertaining to the value of executive share-based 
remuneration is contained in company law (both the previous and current Companies Act) and 
corporate governance regulations (the King Reports). Several ‘governance periods’ can be identified 
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during the period of study (based on the various regulations that were effective during different 
periods): 
• 1 January 2002 (start date of the study) to 28 February 2010: the previous Companies Act and King 
II were applicable; 
• 1 March 2010 (effective date of King III) to 30 April 2011: the previous Companies Act and King III 
were applicable; and 
• 1 May 2011 (effective date of current Companies Act) to 31 December 2017 (end date of the 
study): the current Companies Act and King III were applicable. 
The previous Companies Act 61 of 1973, in section 297(2A)(g)(i), required companies to disclose the 
“gains made on the exercise of share options, the gain being the difference between the price paid for 
the shares and the market price of the shares on the date of exercise” (Republic of South Africa, 1973). 
This was required in a table format, showing separately the gains made by executive and non-executive 
directors; however, no disclosure per individual director was required (Republic of South Africa, 1973). 
But, from 2002, King II (IoDSA, 2002, p. 61) prescribed that “companies should provide full disclosure 
of director remuneration on an individual basis, giving details of earnings, share options, restraint 
payments and all other benefits”. In 2002, this requirement in King II initiated a trend of disclosing all 
remuneration to directors on an individual basis, even the gain on share options required by the 
previous Companies Act (although individual disclosure was not required by the previous Companies 
Act). 
King III (read together with its Remuneration practice note) extended the disclosure initiated by King 
II, and prescribed that the fair value of share-based remuneration granted during the year should be 
disclosed (IoDSA, 2009, 2012, p. 16). King III also noted that disclosure of the fair value of all 
outstanding share-based instruments at reporting date, as well as the value received on exercise of 
instruments during the year, could be regarded as best practice, although not required (IoDSA, 2012, 
p. 16).  
The current Companies Act 71 of 2008 requires, in section 30(6)(e), that companies disclose per 
individually named director “the value of any option or right given directly or indirectly to a director” 
(Republic of South Africa, 2008). Thus, the current Companies Act has extended the requirement of 
the previous Companies Act (all share-based remuneration is included, not just share options) and 
requires per-director disclosure. Although the previous Companies Act was clear that it required the 
gain on the exercise of share options, the current Companies Act is less clear regarding how and when 
this value should be calculated. It could be interpreted as the fair value of all share-based remuneration 
granted, the value of all instruments that were exercised during the year, or even the IFRS 2 expense 
(Dippenaar, 2018). Considering that King III and the current Companies Act were drafted at the same 
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time, and that King III requires the disclosure of the grant date fair value (IoDSA, 2012), it can be 
assumed that the current Companies Act was alluding to the grant date fair value (Dippenaar, 2018). 
Given that multiple sources required disclosure on the value of the share-based remuneration of 
individual executives during the target period (2002–2017), companies seem to be applying the 
requirements in various ways and formats in their annual financial statements, and the disclosure is 
sometimes still incomplete in some respects (Steyn & Cairney, 2016, p. 246; Urson, 2016, p. 57). By 
2014 (i.e. after King III became effective), Dippenaar and Steenkamp (2017) found that some listed 
companies did not provide the value of share-based remuneration earned per individual director at 
all, while others provided inconsistent measures – some provided the IFRS 2 expense, some the fair 
value on exercise date and some the fair value on grant date. Even within one financial statement a 
single company could be using various measures for different schemes: for one scheme the grant date 
fair value would be disclosed per director, and for another the exercise date fair value (typically for 
options) (Dippenaar & Steenkamp, 2017). Steenkamp et al. (2019), in a study of companies listed in 
the Financial, Industrial and Basic Materials industries of the JSE, found that regulatory requirements 
relating to the disclosure of share-based remuneration on an individual level were not always complied 
with, especially by smaller companies. Companies also disclosed the value of share-based 
remuneration inconsistently, vacillating between grant date fair value, exercise date fair value, and the 
IFRS 2 expense (Steenkamp et al., 2019).  
King IV (effective from 1 April 2017, i.e. for reporting periods ended on or after March 2018) explicitly 
requires the fair value of share-based remuneration granted, outstanding at reporting date and those 
that were exercised during the year (IoDSA, 2016). If complied with, these disclosures should enable 
appropriate monitoring regarding the value of executive share-based remuneration. Another key 
difference between the disclosures required by King III and King IV is that King III required a company 
to comply or otherwise explain why it did not comply. King IV, on the contrary, requires ‘apply and 
explain’, meaning that a company is expected to comply with the disclosures but, in addition, to explain 
how it has complied and calculated amounts used (Natesan & Du Plessis, 2019). 
2.3.8.2 Requirements relating to the disclosure of performance conditions 
Share-based remuneration schemes can be quite complex to annual financial statement users owing 
to the variety of scheme types employed in the market and the fact that performance conditions are 
increasingly being attached. IFRS 2 requires explicit disclosure of the nature of the scheme (i.e. its 
operation) and the vesting conditions (IASB, 2017d). King III advised that share-based remuneration 
should have a vesting period of at least three years (IoDSA, 2009).  
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Furthermore, adequate disclosure is needed on the performance conditions employed as well as on 
the actual performance of executives in respect of the chosen targets (when previously granted awards 
vest in the current reporting period). Mans-Kemp and Viviers (2018) conducted a study on the 
disclosures that JSE-listed companies provided regarding the actual performance of executives in 
relation to performance conditions that were set, and found that the number of companies that 
provided such disclosures increased over the period 2002–2015. However, much of the disclosure 
lacked depth and provided insufficient information to trigger shareholder activism in this regard 
(Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 2018). 
King III required that performance conditions should be linked to shareholder value and company 
performance (preferably measured against a peer group) (IoDSA, 2009). Comprehensive disclosure of 
the performance conditions employed, as well as the reasons for their selection as vesting conditions, 
should be made (IoDSA, 2009). Moreover, the thresholds set in relation to the performance conditions 
should be on a sliding scale to reward basic, moderate and significant performance differently (IoDSA, 
2009).  
King IV firmly established the principle that separate disclosure should be made of the remuneration 
policy chosen and the implementation thereof – this would include the performance conditions chosen 
as well as the measurement of actual performance in relation to the chosen targets (IoDSA, 2016). King 
IV even advised that performance conditions should be based on economic, social and environmental 
measures (the so-called triple bottom line) instead of on pure financial metrics only (IoDSA, 2016).  
2.3.8.3 Conclusion 
King IV, especially, has stipulated extensive disclosures regarding the value of share-based 
remuneration, requiring that the value of share-based instruments granted during the year, exercised 
during the year and outstanding at the reporting date should be provided (IoDSA, 2016). Additionally, 
King IV requires disclosure regarding the link between executive remuneration and company 
performance – not only regarding financial performance, but also the so-called triple bottom line 
(IoDSA, 2016). From 2018 onwards, if companies comply with King IV, it would thus seem that 
stakeholders would have adequate information to monitor executive share-based remuneration 
effectively. It is critical, going forward, that financial databases adjust their capturing processes, to 
provide researchers with comprehensive information on the value of executive share-based 
remuneration. During the 2002–2017 period, IRESS only had the one line, ‘gain on shares’, which 
captured whatever value the company disclosed (which could be the gain on exercise, the IFRS 2 
expense, or the grant date fair value). 
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2.3.9 Previous studies in South Africa regarding executive share-based remuneration 
Although emerging markets are increasingly adopting the Western style of executive remuneration 
(including share-based remuneration) (PwC, 2015), most previous South African studies on executive 
remuneration have excluded share-based remuneration (Steyn & Cairney, 2016, p. 248). This was 
identified as a weakness in two recent studies, Urson (2016) and Steyn (2015). Moreover, much of the 
research deals exclusively with the remuneration paid to the CEO (Steyn, 2015, p. 8). A summary of 
the previous research papers in South Africa that have included share-based remuneration is shown in 
Table 2.3. 
Most previous South African studies examined whether executive remuneration is linked to company 
performance (Bussin & Blair, 2015; Crafford, 2015; De Wet, 2012; Deysel & Kruger, 2015; Dommisse, 
2011; Kirsten & Du Toit, 2018; Ntim et al., 2015; Steyn, 2015; Urson, 2016). Some of the studies 
investigated only the CEO’s remuneration (Bussin & Blair, 2015; Deysel & Kruger, 2015; Dommisse, 
2011; Steyn, 2015; Urson, 2016), while the others studied the remuneration of all executives.  
The earlier studies (looking at the pay–performance link) did not pay much attention to the 
measurement of the share-based remuneration portion of executive remuneration, perhaps because 
share options were predominantly employed at that stage. In accordance with the previous Companies 
Act (read together with King II), the gain realised on the exercise of share options was typically 
disclosed in annual financial statements, and then captured by the IRESS financial database. When a 
study examined only CEO remuneration, the data were typically captured from financial statement 
remuneration reports or IRESS (Dommisse, 2011). An earlier study that considered the remuneration 
data of all executives collected the directors’ remuneration expense per the income statement (which 
would contain the IFRS 2 expense from 31 December 2005 year ends onwards) (De Wet, 2012). 
Later, when both share options and contingent shares were employed by companies (Steenkamp & 
Wesson, 2018a), the financial statement disclosures regarding the value of executive share-based 
remuneration became inconsistent (Steenkamp et al., 2019). The inconsistent disclosure might have 
been the result of the current Companies Act 71 of 2008 requiring the ‘value’ of share-based 
remuneration to be disclosed without stating how this value should be measured (Dippenaar, 2018). 
Given that annual financial statement disclosure became more inconsistent, the measurement of 
executive share-based remuneration in the later studies became more problematic. In some of the 
later studies, the measurement of the share-based portion was unclear (Ntim et al., 2015) or merely 
stated that the share-based remuneration data were collected from annual financial statements 
without indicating the measurement basis (grant date fair value, IFRS 2 expense, or value realised on 
exercise) (Deysel & Kruger, 2015).  
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Recently, the IFRS 2 expense (Kirsten & Du Toit, 2018; Urson, 2016) was mainly employed, although 
the IFRS 2 expense comprises both equity-settled incentives (which are annualised based on the grant 
date fair value) and cash-settled incentives (which are based on the reporting date fair value). Other 
studies employed the annualised expected value (Bussin & Blair, 2015; Steyn, 2015), which is similar 
to the annualised grant date fair value method employed by IFRS 2 for equity-settled SBPs. However, 
Murphy (2013, p. 219) advised that the value realised on exercise date would be more appropriate to 
use in studies seeking to explore the link between executive pay and company performance, as realised 
pay would be expected to be closely linked to actual performance. This is especially true in an 
environment where share options (that can be exercised long after vesting date) are used less often, 





A summary of previous South African studies on executive share-based remuneration: Sample, data 
source and period covered (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p. 54) 
Name of study Sample Data source Period 
Waweru, Gelinas, and Uliana 
(2009) 
4 listed banks Annual financial 
statements (AFS) 
2005 
Dommisse (2011) Top 120 listed companies IRESS 2009 
De Wet (2012) All listed companies IRESS 2006–2010 
 
Mavrodinov (2012) 50 large and mid-cap listed 
companies 
AFS Around 2011 
Massie, Collier, and Crotty 
(2014) 
50 listed companies  AFS 2012 
Bussin and Blair (2015) All listed companies IRESS 2008–2012 
 








Ntim, Lindop, Osei, and Thomas 
(2015) 
All listed companies AFS 2003–2007 
Scholtz and Engelbrecht (2015) Top 100 listed companies AFS 2009–2012 
 
Steyn (2015); Steyn and Cairney 
(2016) 
Top 100 listed companies AFS 2011–2013 
 
Urson (2016) 51 companies listed in the 




Steenkamp and Wesson 
(2018a, 2018b) 
32 listed companies in a wide 
range of industries 
IRESS updated to 
AFS 
2002–2015 
Kirsten and Du Toit (2018) 42 companies listed in the 




Steenkamp, Dippenaar, Fourie, 
and Franken (2019) 
62 companies listed in the 






Waweru, Gelinas and Uliana (2009) compared the executive remuneration of a number of South 
African listed banks to those in Canada. They found that in 2005 South African banks were less likely 
to employ share-based remuneration than their Canadian counterparts (Waweru et al., 2009). Scholtz 
and Engelbrecht (2015) found that improved corporate governance decreased executive 
remuneration, and specifically share options. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2015) found that company 
performance and executive remuneration were best correlated where effective corporate governance 
processes were in place. 
The first comprehensive South African study done focusing solely on executive share-based 
remuneration was by Mavrodinov (2012). At the end of 2011, Mavrodinov (2012) examined the share-
based remuneration schemes employed by 50 JSE-listed companies and found that SARs and 
contingent shares were used more often than share options. The majority of the companies (72%) 
were using full quantum schemes (about half of these companies were employing both full quantum 
and appreciation schemes) (Mavrodinov, 2012, p. 38). Most companies were employing multiple 
schemes (some for retention purposes and some to incentivise executives). The most popular scheme 
grant was performance shares with a three-year vesting period, and as a result of this the usage of 
performance conditions had escalated (Mavrodinov, 2012). It was usual for companies to employ 
several targets (share price related targets were most popular, followed by EPS and return on equity), 
although these targets were poorly disclosed in annual financial statements (Mavrodinov, 2012, pp. 
42–43). The Mavrodinov-study found that most schemes were equity-settled, and that appreciation 
schemes often employed staggered vesting over a three- or four-year period (commencing two or 
three years after grant date). 
Massie et al. (2014) studied the 2012 executive remuneration of 50 JSE-listed companies in depth. 
They connected the large amounts of share-based remuneration being realised by executives to the 
growing income inequality in South Africa, and pointed out that share-based remuneration could be 
artificially increased by repurchasing shares, allowing for rent extraction by executives (Massie et al., 
2014).  
Steyn and Cairney (2016) studied the importance of SBPs (and other long-term incentives) among the 
top 100 JSE-listed companies, in relation to total compensation. They specifically considered 
performance shares and share options. Such share-based remuneration was found to make up 38 per 
cent of total compensation on average (28% when based on medians) – if measured at the annualised 
expected value (Steyn & Cairney, 2016, p. 256). The proportion of pay comprising share-based 
remuneration is lower than in the US, but still significant (Steyn & Cairney, 2016). The larger the 
company, the higher the percentage of total remuneration comprising share-based remuneration 
(Steyn & Cairney, 2016). They advised that share-based remuneration should be included in future 
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research on executive remuneration, even if it is difficult to measure and some assumptions have to 
be made in the measurement process (Steyn & Cairney, 2016; Urson, 2016). 
As part of the pilot work for the present study, Steenkamp and Wesson (2018a) performed a trend 
analysis of the share-based remuneration schemes employed during the period 2002−2015 for a small 
sample of companies. The number of schemes employed increased from 2002 to 2008, but remained 
constant thereafter (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p. 59). Share options were employed extensively 
until 2008, but were first replaced by SARs and later by contingent shares as the dominant scheme 
type (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). The authors found that the effective date of IFRS 2 led to a 
decrease in share options as primary share incentive scheme, SARs seemingly replacing share options 
after that date. Contingent shares, and the use of performance conditions, became more prominent 
after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b).  
During the 2002–2015 period, most schemes were equity-settled (except SARs) and the vesting period 
was usually between three and five years (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p. 60). TSR and EPS were the 
performance conditions employed most often (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a, p. 60). In addition, it was 
found that the IRESS financial database (in the ‘gain on shares’ data line) did not accurately record the 
value executives realised from share-based incentives, and that these amounts had to be collected 
from the annual financial statements (although financial statement disclosure was also inconsistent) 
(Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). 
2.3.10 Conclusion 
Share-based remuneration is increasingly employed as a long-term incentive for executives. Executive 
share-based remuneration originated from the agency theory. Share-based remuneration can align the 
interests of shareholders and executives, and improve the link between company performance and 
executive pay. However, in the absence of strong corporate governance, share-based remuneration 
can also allow executives to influence and enhance the value of their own pay.  
In South Africa, it seems as if share-based remuneration constitutes a smaller portion of total executive 
remuneration than in the US and the UK, but it is still substantial. However, the disclosures relating to 
the value of executive share-based remuneration, per individual executive, were inconsistent during 
the 2002–2017 period and did not allow proper monitoring and research. The requirements of King IV, 
if adhered to, will solve this shortcoming from 2018 year ends onwards.  
Previous South African studies, looking exclusively at executive share-based remuneration, have only 
considered short periods of time or small samples of companies. From the limited research conducted 
in South Africa, it appears that share options were the most common share-based incentive employed 
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during the earlier years of the present study (before the effective date of IFRS 2 and the start of the 
global financial crisis), but was systematically replaced first by SARs, and more recently, by contingent 
shares. However, a comprehensive longitudinal study of executive share-based remuneration has not 
been completed for the 2002–2017 period. 
2.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHARE REPURCHASES AND EXECUTIVE SHARE-BASED 
REMUNERATION 
… executives motivating such buy-backs may face a conflict of interest because they usually 
hold valuable quantities of share-based instruments as part of their remuneration, which may 
either increase in value or be sold by an executive during a buy-back program. A buy-back 
program also has the potential to determine whether or not any of these share-based 
incentives vest in the executive if the buy-back results in the executive meeting a financial 
target that serves as a vesting condition (Massie et al., 2014, pp. 45–46). 
Share repurchases in South Africa are not well disclosed in financial statements nor always announced 
in real time via SENS, and as such cannot be monitored adequately. This is a problem because, as 
shown in the quotation above, share repurchases create a potential avenue for executives to reach 
certain performance targets based on share price, TSR and/or EPS (which enables the vesting of share-
based remuneration) and could also increase the share price and thus the value of their own share-
based remuneration (Lazonick, 2014; Massie et al., 2014). In criticising share repurchases in the US, 
Lazonick (2015, p. 3) states that “the only logical explanation for the prevalence of buybacks is that 
stock-based pay gives executives ample incentives to do them”.  
2.4.1 Previous research 
The relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration has not yet 
been researched in South Africa, but a number of studies have been done elsewhere. Earlier studies 
mostly explored the link between share options and share repurchases, as share options initially were 
the predominant type of share incentive offered to executives. However, other types of scheme have 
now also become popular (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b) and are included in more recent studies.  
Table 2.4 shows the earlier studies that have investigated the relationship between executed share 
repurchases (dependent variable) and executive share-based remuneration (independent variable). 
Liljeblom and Pasternack (2006) were excluded from the list of previous studies as they used 
repurchase announcements (i.e. planned repurchases and not executed repurchases) as dependent 
variable. Similarly, Cuny, Martin, and Puthenpurackal (2009) were excluded as they employed only net 
payout (including repurchases) as dependent variable, but did not separately analyse share 
repurchases as dependent variable. 
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Table 2.4  
Previous studies examining the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration: Scope and main findings 




Main findings on relationship 
Jolls (1998) 1992; US All executives; All 
instruments 
Positive relationship between decision 
to repurchase and number of share 
options held 
Fenn and Liang (2001)  1993–1997; US All executives; 
Share options  
Positive relationship between 
repurchase value and number of share 
options held 
Kahle (2002) 1991–1996; US All executives; 
Share options  
Positive (no) relationship between 
decision to repurchase (repurchase 
value) and number of share options held 
Weisbenner (2004) 1995; US CEO and top five 
executives; Share 
options  
No relationship between repurchase 
value and number of share options held 
Aboody and Kasznik 
(2008) 
2002–2003; US CEO; All 
instruments 
Positive (negative) relationship between 
share repurchases and share options 
granted (restricted share grants)  






Positive relationship between open 
market share repurchases and share 
options held 
Young and Yang (2011) 1998–2006; UK All executives; All 
instruments 
Positive relationship between share 
repurchases and the use of EPS-related 
conditions 
Bhargava (2013) 1996–2005; US Top five executives; 
Share options 
Positive relationship between 
repurchase value and share options 
exercised  




CEO and all 
executives; Share 
options 
No relationship between share 
repurchases and number of share 
options held 






Positive relationship between share 
repurchases and share-based 
remuneration 
Geiler and Renneboog 
(2016) 
1996–2007; UK CEO; All 
instruments 
Positive relationship between share 
repurchases and share-based 
remuneration 
Edmans, Fang, and 
Huang (2018) 
2006–2016; US CEO; All 
instruments 
Positive relationship between share 
repurchases and vesting of share-based 
remuneration 
Moore (2018) 2004–2014; US CEO; All 
instruments 
Positive relationship between share 
repurchases and vesting of share-based 
remuneration 
Department for 
Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy 
(2019) 
2009–2016; UK CEO; All 
instruments 
No relationship between share 
repurchases and the employment of EPS 
and/or TSR-related conditions 
Gao and Kronlund 
(2020) 
1992–2017; US All executives; 
Share options  
Positive relationship between share 
repurchases and share options 
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Earlier studies undertaken in other countries (Table 2.4) mostly found a positive statistical relationship 
between share repurchase and executive share-based remuneration variables. This is also the premise 
on which the present study hinges: that executives might be increasing the share price through 
repurchasing shares, to increase the value of their own share-based remuneration. 
The number of share-based instruments held by executives was mostly used as proxy during the initial 
studies conducted on data before 2010 (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Fenn & Liang, 2001; Jolls, 1998; 
Kahle, 2002; Lamba & Miranda, 2010; Weisbenner, 2004). As share options were the dominant 
incentive type as the stage of these studies, the researchers only considered the number of share 
options held by executives as independent variable. Two studies in the US found a positive relationship 
between the decision to repurchase and the number of share options held (Jolls, 1998; Kahle, 2002), 
while another in the US (Weisbenner, 2004) and one in Europe (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015) found no 
relationship between the two variables. Only one study (Fenn & Liang, 2001) found a positive 
relationship between share repurchase value and the number of share options held, while three others 
did not (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Kahle, 2002; Weisbenner, 2004). However, Lamba and Miranda 
(2010) did find a positive relationship between the number of shares repurchased and the number of 
share options held by executives.  
Looking at the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph, it seems as if evidence of a relationship 
between share repurchase variables and the number of share-based instruments held by executives 
could only be found in the early years of the present study (i.e. before 2010). Before 2010 share options 
were the dominant scheme type employed. Share options have long exercise periods and thus the 
number of share options that executives were able to accumulate could become quite large (in 
comparison to full quantum schemes where instruments are automatically exercised on vesting date, 
and an executive cannot accumulate extensive numbers of unexercised instruments). Executives 
holding large numbers of share options are more likely to favour share repurchases over dividend 
payments, owing to the fact that the payment of dividends causes a decrease in the share price (which 
is not advantageous to the holder of an option) and share repurchases do not affect the fair value of 
share options (Jolls, 1998). 
Recently conducted studies (Edmans et al., 2018; Gao & Kronlund, 2020; Moore, 2018) focused on the 
share-based instruments exercised or vested. Most of these studies included all types of share-based 
incentives and found a positive relationship between both the decision to repurchase and share 
repurchase value and the share-based instruments exercised and/or vested. These recently conducted 




Young and Yang (2011) found a positive relationship between share repurchases (both the decision to 
repurchase and share repurchase value) and the usage of EPS-related conditions. They, however, only 
considered the period up to 2006 in the UK, when EPS-related conditions might not have been very 
common. In a later study in the UK, covering the 2009–2016 period, no relationship was found 
between repurchasing shares and the use of conditions related to TSR and/or EPS (Department for 
Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2019).  
2.4.2 Expected findings of the present study: Based on previous research 
Since no study exists on the statistical relationship between share repurchase and executive share-
based remuneration variables in South Africa, the findings of earlier studies undertaken in other 
countries (discussed in Section 2.4.1) were used to formulate an expectation (alternative hypothesis) 
on the relationship in South Africa. Looking at the findings of previous studies, it was expected that, in 
South Africa, positive relationships would be found between share repurchase variables and: 
• the number of instruments held by executives (but only in the early years of the present study 
when share options were the dominant type of share-based incentive); 
• the number of instruments exercised by executives; and  
• the usage of conditions related to share price, TSR and/or EPS (but only in the early years of the 
present study). 
To infer the possibility of executives extracting rents from the companies they work for, the share 
repurchase (and increase in share price) should theoretically occur before the exercise of the share-
based remuneration. In practice, the exact dates when a share repurchase occurs is not always 
available. Gao and Kronlund (2020), for example, could narrow the date of the repurchase down to a 
certain month (owing to US announcement rules), while Edmans et al. (2018) and Moore (2018) 
employed quarterly repurchases to ensure that the share repurchase and vesting of share-based 
remuneration were closely aligned. In the South African environment, however, it is not possible to 
pinpoint the exact timing of all share repurchases owing to the nature of announcement rules relating 
to general repurchases. The most accurate record of share repurchases in South Africa is found in 
annual financial statements, which provide only annual data on repurchases. It is therefore a limitation 
of the present study that, when studying the relationship between share repurchases and the exercise 
of share-based remuneration, it was not possible to ensure that the date of the share repurchases 
preceded the date of the exercise of the share-based remuneration. 
2.4.3 The importance of this study from a social justice and ethical perspective 
As the expected findings suggest that executives of JSE-listed companies might be using share 
repurchases to enrich themselves, the present study is also important from a social justice and an 
ethical point of view. When the apartheid regime in South Africa ended, principles of equality and 
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social justice were enshrined in the new constitution, making the reduction of inequality a legal 
concern (Collier et al., 2010, p.86). Income inequality is very high in South Africa (Hundenborn et al., 
2019), mostly caused by a high wage differential between the highest earners (for example, executives) 
and the lowest earners (for example, unskilled workers) in a company (Collier et al., 2010, p. 85; Viviers 
et al., 2019). The implications of the so-called wage gap include a lack of social cohesion, decreased 
economic growth, socio-economical problems (for communities, families and individuals), high crime 
rates and political corruption (Collier et al., 2010, p. 88). As such, social justice would be served if the 
wage gap in South Africa decreases, but, if executives increase their own share-based remuneration 
(though share repurchases or other actions) this could widen the wage gap even further. 
 
The Employment Equity Act requires employers to submit a statement regarding the remuneration 
paid to employees in each ‘occupational category and level’ (Collier et al., 2010, p. 91). If large 
differences exist between the remuneration of employees in the different categories and levels, then 
a company must enact measures to reduce the differentials (Collier et al., 2010, p. 91). However, share-
based remuneration is not included in the definition of the remuneration that needs to be reported 
(Collier et al., 2010, p. 91), which reduces the effectiveness of this process in decreasing the wage gap 
between executives, who are often remunerated extensively using share-based remuneration, and 
other employees. In the current South African context, the only deterrent for the wage gap widening 
because of executives earning large amounts from share-based remuneration seems to be corporate 
governance, shareholder activism and media attention (Viviers et al., 2019). King IV, for example, 
requires that executive remuneration “be fair and responsible in the context of overall employee 
remuneration” (IoDSA, 2016, p. 31).  
 
The possibility that the executives of JSE-listed companies could be using share repurchases to enhance 
the value of their own remuneration also has ethical implications. Increased usage of share-based 
remuneration might have inadvertently led to executives having an incentive to behave unethically, 
manipulate financial results and focus on strategies that lead to short-term increases in the share price 
(Collier et al., 2010, p. 98; Perel, 2003, p.383; Rodgers & Gago, 2003, p.189–190). As a result, Perel 
(2003, p. 381) questioned whether it is ethical to link executive remuneration to the company share 
price. If the performance conditions attached to incentives such as share-based remuneration entice 
executives to focus solely on the interests of shareholders, then the interests of other stakeholders 
(such as clients, suppliers, and employees) are neglected (Perel, 2003, p.383; Rodgers & Gago, 2003). 
Ethical behaviour, defined as honesty, transparency and concern for the welfare of all company 
stakeholders, decreases as executives aim to increase the short-term share price to maximise 
shareholder value and increase the value of their own share-based remuneration (Perel, 2003, p.386). 
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2.5  CONCLUSION 
Repurchasing shares does not presuppose unethical activity, but share repurchases do provide 
executives with a loophole to ‘financially engineer’ a company’s performance metrics (share price, TSR 
and EPS). Improved metrics can lead to increased executive share-based remuneration. As such, share 
repurchases allow executives the opportunity to increase the value of their own share-based 
remuneration, and therefore it is important that stakeholders actively monitor share repurchases in 
South Africa (Massie et al., 2014, p. 36). Since the study of Wesson (2015), the JSE has required listed 
companies to disclose their share repurchase activities in their annual financial statements (after the 
fact), but the JSE does not require real-time announcements of all executed general share repurchases. 
This shortcoming in the regulation of share repurchases necessitates the present study: to ascertain 
whether a positive statistical relationship between share repurchase and executive share-based 
remuneration variables exists in South Africa. Earlier studies undertaken in other countries have 
confirmed the existence of such a relationship.  
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology employed to address the research aim of this study: 
namely to determine whether a positive statistical relationship exists between share repurchases and 
executive share-based remuneration. If such a relationship were found to exist in South Africa, it would 
point out that executives might be abusing share repurchases in an attempt to enhance their own 
remuneration. Such a finding would strengthen the case of many stakeholders that are seeking stricter 
regulation regarding share repurchases, and its effect on executive share-based remuneration, in 
South Africa.   
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between share repurchases and 
executive share-based remuneration in South Africa in order to gain an understanding of whether 
additional regulation and disclosure about the timing of share repurchases might be warranted. To 
achieve this aim, data regarding both share repurchases (Research question 1) and share-based 
remuneration (Research question 2) were gathered. After data collection, appropriate regression 
models were applied to ascertain the nature of the relationship between the two variables (Research 
question 3). A detailed description of the research methodology followed is provided in this chapter.  
3.2  OVERALL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In business research, a certain tension exists between the world of basic and applied research (Burns 
& Burns, 2008, p. 10), as business research seeks to address real world business issues (Zikmund, Babin, 
Carr, & Griffin, 2013, pp. 4–5). However, since pragmatic business research is conducted with academic 
rigour, it is relevant in practice (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012, p. 8). Although this study was 
conducted with a strong theoretical foundation and using rigorous methods, it still sought to address 
the real-world problem of whether share repurchases in South Africa could be used by executives to 
increase the value of their own share-based remuneration, which would warrant improved regulation 
of share repurchases in the South African environment. 
This study was conducted from a positivistic paradigm, as an objective approach was taken where the 
researcher remains value-neutral regarding the research subjects (companies) (Burns & Burns, 2008, 
pp. 13–14; Saunders et al., 2012, pp. 134–135). A deductive approach was followed as a hypothesis 
was developed based on the literature review conducted, and then tested (Burns & Burns, 2008, p. 23; 
Saunders et al., 2012, p. 145). To test the hypothesis, quantitative data (amounts and numbers) 
regarding share repurchases and share-based remuneration were collected and statistically analysed. 
Thus a quantitative research design was followed (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 162). Panel data were used 
to allow more in-depth analysis. This study was firstly descriptive (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 171; 
Zikmund et al., 2013, p. 53), as it described the extent of share repurchase activity in the South African 
environment (Research question 1) and the characteristics of executive share-based remuneration 
(Research question 2). Furthermore, the study possessed explanatory elements (Saunders et al., 2012, 





Further details regarding the pilot study and the selection of the final research population are provided 
in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. In Sections 3.3 to 3.5 the detailed research methods and techniques applied 
to address the three separate research questions are described. Section 3.6 addresses the reliability 
and validity of the research methodology, while Section 3.7 concludes this chapter by addressing the 
ethical considerations and why it was necessary to collect public data on share repurchases and 
executive share-based remuneration afresh into a new database. 
3.2.1 Pilot study 
Before finalising the research methods, a pilot study was undertaken for a limited number of 
companies (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 171; Zikmund et al., 2013, pp. 52–53). Although the data collection 
process and previous trends regarding share repurchases have been well-documented by researchers 
like Wesson (2015), less was known regarding executive share-based remuneration. No existing studies 
in South Africa had collected comprehensive longitudinal data on share-based remuneration, and the 
methods to capture data on share-based remuneration accurately had to be developed during the pilot 
study. The issues noted during the pilot study and the effect they had on the final research method 
are discussed in Section 3.2.1.1. 
No previous study had been done on the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-
based remuneration in South Africa. Earlier studies undertaken in other countries employed different 
proxies for share repurchases (dependent variable) and executive share-based remuneration 
(independent variable). The pilot study informed the choice regarding the most appropriate proxies to 
be employed in the South African environment – given the quality of the data available. These aspects 
are addressed in Section 3.2.1.2. 
Before conducting the pilot study, the research hypotheses employed in the present study (see Section 
3.5) had already been developed, based on the work of Lazonick (2014) and in line with the findings of 
previous research (see Section 2.4.2). As such, no data snooping or data mining occurred in the present 
study.  
3.2.1.1 Executive share-based remuneration 
Section 3.2.1.1 deals with the issues that were noted during the capturing of data on executive share-
based remuneration in the pilot study. These aspects were also discussed in Steenkamp and Wesson 
(2018a; 2018b).  
Per-executive disclosure of both the number of instruments involved and the value of executive share-
based remuneration is provided by companies in annual financial statements as required by the 
Companies Act (previous and current), the JSE Listing Requirements, and the King Reports (King II and 
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King III). However, varying values are provided by different companies – some disclose the gain realised 
on exercise, others the IFRS 2 expense, and yet others the grant date fair value in respect of executive 
share-based remuneration.  
The per-executive data contained in the annual financial statements, relating to both the value of 
share-based instruments and the number of instruments, are captured by the IRESS financial database 
(previously called INET BFA or BFA McGregor) in the IRESS product called ‘Director Search’. The value-
based and the number-based data are presented in two separate sections in IRESS, per executive, and 
need to be combined to form a complete observation on a single executive for a certain year. The 
number-based data are also provided separately for each scheme in which the executive partakes, and 
need to be classified under the correct scheme type (for example, share options, SARs, performance 
shares). To gather the data required for the present study, the IRESS data had to be extracted from the 
financial database per executive per year (no data dump was available) and then combined and sorted 
under the correct scheme type, resulting in a time-consuming data collection process. 
Concerning the value-based data, IRESS captures a line item called ‘gain on shares’ which was reported 
from 2002 onwards, and was probably designed to capture the gain realised from the exercise of share 
options (as required by the previous Companies Act read together with King II). Over the years, as the 
previous Companies Act was replaced by the current one and King II was replaced by King III, 
companies have started to disclose different values pertaining to share-based remuneration. Thus the 
‘gain on shares’ value captured by IRESS could be any of the following: gain realised on all or some of 
the share-based remuneration exercised; IFRS 2 expense; or grant date fair value for all or some of the 
share-based remuneration granted. Furthermore, it was noted that IRESS reported no ‘gain on shares’ 
while instruments were exercised during the year (and thus a gain would actually have been realised), 
or reported a ‘gain on shares’ while no instruments were exercised (and thus no gain could be realised). 
The ‘gain on shares’ line item, if assumed to be the gain on the exercise of all share-based incentives, 
was significantly understated by IRESS (when compared to the annual financial statements), based on 
an analysis of variance test (statistically significant at less than 1%) (Steenkamp and Wesson, 2018a). 
Relating to the number-based data, IRESS captures the following (per scheme): the number of 
instruments held at the start of the reporting period, the number granted during the period, the 
number exercised during the period, the number lapsed or forfeited during the period, and the number 
of instruments held at the end of the reporting period. On comparing the data contained in IRESS to 
the data in the source annual financial statements, some input errors were found (resulting from 
human error and the inconsistent disclosure practices of companies). Some cells in IRESS were blank 
while it was obvious they should not be; some inaccuracies were noted (i.e. when the closing balance 
number of instruments did not agree with the opening balance adjusted for changes that occurred 
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during the year); and data were sometimes duplicated. The difference between the data in the 
financial statements and the data captured by IRESS, in relation to the number of schemes employed, 
was statistically significant at the five per cent level (based on an analysis of variance test) (Steenkamp 
& Wesson, 2018a). 
From 2006 (when IFRS 2 became effective), the number-based section in IRESS captured a description 
of the scheme, which sometimes enabled an understanding of the vesting conditions attached to the 
scheme. However, this was not always the case (sometimes the description was not clear or 
comprehensive). Moreover, prior to 2006 no descriptions were available. To enable a thorough 
understanding of the performance conditions employed, annual financial statements had to be 
consulted.  
It was found that some companies did not employ executives, only non-executive directors (e.g. Pick 
n Pay Holdings Limited). For such companies, data on share repurchases could thus be collected, but 
no data on executive share-based remuneration could be collected. Based on the pilot study, it was 
decided that companies that do not have executives would be included in the population and data on 
their share repurchases would be collected for the sake of completeness, but that they would be 
excluded from the final analysis of the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-
based remuneration.  
Previous studies which investigated the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-
based remuneration either employed the value attached to executive share-based remuneration or 
the number of instruments involved as proxy for executive share-based remuneration (see Table 3.1). 
If one employed the value, then the measurement of the value (as either grant date fair value, IFRS 2 
expense, or the value realised on exercise) should be determined and consistently used throughout 
the study to enable valid results. Based on the results of the pilot study, it was decided that the value 
of executive share-based remuneration was not consistently reported in annual financial statements, 
nor captured by IRESS. It would be impossible to gather, for every company for every year, a consistent 
measure of the value of share-based remuneration. Therefore, the pilot study assisted in clarifying that 
it would be most appropriate, when considering the 2002–2017 period in the South African context, 
to employ the number of share-based instruments as proxy for executive share-based remuneration. 
The pilot study also showed that it would be inaccurate merely to extract the data regarding the 
number of instruments employed from IRESS. The data extracted from IRESS would have to be updated 
according to the relevant annual financial statements in the case where cells in IRESS were blank, or 
obviously inaccurate. Furthermore, it was noted from the pilot study that financial statements would 
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have to be consulted to obtain or confirm the type of scheme employed, as well as the performance 
conditions attached to each scheme. 
3.2.1.2 Relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration  
During the pilot study, the previous studies which considered the relationship between share 
repurchases and executive share-based remuneration (listed in Table 2.4) were consulted to develop 
an appropriate strategy to examine this relationship in the South African context. When looking at the 
previous studies, it was found that one could measure both share repurchases (the dependent 
variable) and executive share-based remuneration (independent variable) as either a rand value or a 
number of shares or instruments.  
Given the poor disclosure quality of the rand value of executive share-based remuneration, it was 
decided that it would be most appropriate to employ the number of share-based instruments as proxy 
for executive share-based remuneration (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020a). The proxies employed by 
previous studies prompted the decision to utilise three different variables: the number of share-based 
instruments held at year end; the number of share-based instruments exercised during the year; and 
a binary variable indicating whether or not performance vesting conditions based on share price, TSR 
and/or EPS were employed (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020a).  
After considering previous studies, it was decided to employ two variables for share repurchases. 
Firstly, a binary variable, indicating whether or not a share repurchase occurred during the year and, 
secondly, a ratio-scale variable indicating the quantum of share repurchases (Steenkamp & Wesson, 
2020a). To ensure that possible reverse causality was averted, share repurchases were measured in 
rand values (given that executive share-based remuneration was not measured in rand value) 
(Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020a). 
The pilot study on the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020a) studied only a small sample of companies, and thus only 
correlation techniques were applied. During the execution of the pilot study, the importance of scaling 
the dependent and independent variables was noted, based on the procedures followed by previous 
global studies considering the same research problem (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020a). 
3.2.2  Further details regarding the research population 
The research population was defined in Chapter 1 as those companies with primary listings on the JSE’s 
Main Board, excluding those in the Basic Materials and Financial industries, for the period 2002–2017. 
All companies that formed part of the research population were included in the study. As such, a 
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census of these companies was conducted, and no sampling occurred. This section details the process 
followed to ensure that all relevant companies were included. Important criteria were: 
• that companies were registered in JSE industries other than Basic Materials and Financial 
industries; 
• that companies had a primary listing on the JSE; and 
• that three years of annual financial statements were available over the period under investigation. 
The first two criteria (JSE industry and primary listing) were tested in 2017 (end date of the study) or 
at the date of the company’s delisting (if earlier). The JSE industry was determined using either 
responses to email correspondence with the JSE (info@jse.co.za, April 5, 2019), or the Profile’s Stock 
Exchange Handbook (2018 Issue 1) (Profile Media, 2018), or earlier versions of the Profile’s Stock 
Exchange Handbook (for delisted companies). The listing status of dual-listed companies was verified 
directly with the JSE, via email correspondence (info@jse.co.za, February 22, 2017; April 5, 2019). The 
number of years of annual financial statements available (third criteria) was verified using the IRESS 
financial database (product: Library).  
The companies selected by Wesson (2015), in a study of share repurchases during the period 1999–
2009, were used as starting point to construct the population. Companies included in the Wesson 
study (which commenced in 1999) that had fewer than three years of annual financial statements from 
2002 (the start date of the present study) onwards were eliminated from the population. The 
remaining companies were included in the present study if they still had a primary listing in an 
appropriate JSE industry (in 2017, or at the point of delisting). Some companies had moved to the Basic 
Materials and Financial industries of the JSE, while some had changed their dual listing status to receive 
a primary listing elsewhere (e.g. Steinhoff International Holdings N.V. and Mediclinic International 
PLC). 
New companies were then added to the Wesson (2015) list of companies (amended as detailed above). 
Firstly, all companies that had fewer than three listed years (fewer than three annual financial 
statements available) before 2009 (as recorded during the Wesson study), but met the criteria of the 
present study were included. These were verified with the JSE (info@jse.co.za, email, May 31, 2017). 
Secondly, companies which registered on the JSE’s Main Board or moved from the Alternative 
Exchange (AltX) to the Main Board from 2010 onwards (lists were received from JSE via email 
correspondence) were also analysed to determine their industry, dual-listing status and number of 
years listed (info@jse.co.za, emails, February 20, 2017; June 1, 2017; February 28, 2018; April 2, 2019). 
Companies which met all the criteria were included.  
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A list of all companies with primary listings on the JSE as at 31 December 2017 in the selected industries 
was obtained from the JSE (info@jse.co.za, email, April 5, 2019). As a secondary check for 
completeness, it was ensured that all these companies formed part of the final research population. 
The remaining companies in the research population (those that were not listed as at 31 December 
2017) were identified as companies that had delisted prior to 31 December 2017. 
The present study included the share-based remuneration of all executives (not only CEOs). It must be 
noted that a limited number of companies in the population did not have executives (or data available 
on executives). Such companies were included in the population, and data were collected regarding 
their share repurchases. Such companies’ data are thus included in the analysis provided in Chapter 4 
(on share repurchases). However, companies without executives were excluded from Chapter 5 (on 
executive share-based remuneration) and Chapter 6 (which considers the relationship between share 
repurchases and executive share-based remuneration). A list of such companies is provided in Section 
5.2, where their exclusion is explained. 
3.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 1: EXTENT OF SHARE REPURCHASE ACTIVITY 
Research question 1 sought to ascertain the extent of share repurchase activity by South African listed 
entities during the period 2002–2017. This entailed, firstly, an identification of company years in which 
share repurchases did occur and, secondly, the tallying of the quantum (number of shares and rand 
value) involved. Detailed research sub-questions were developed and are listed in Chapter 1. 
Wesson (2015) completed a database for South African share repurchases for the period 1999–2009 
for companies listed on the JSE’s Main Board (except those in the Basic Material and Financial 
industries). For companies in the Wesson (2015) study that also formed part of the present study’s 
population only the share repurchases in the period 2010–2017 were still outstanding, as the data for 
the 2002–2009 period could be obtained from the Wesson (2015) study. For companies that formed 
part of the present study but not the Wesson (2015) study (for example, new listings and companies 
that moved from the AltX), the share repurchases for the entire 2002–2017 period had to be 
determined. 
As data from the Wesson (2015) study and the present study were combined, it was deemed important 
that the present study employed the Wesson study’s method of collecting data on share repurchases. 
The method was applied for each company, separately. This is explained in the following two sections 
(3.3.1 deals with the identification of companies which repurchased and the number of shares 
repurchased, while 3.3.2 deals with the rand value spent on share repurchases).  
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It is important to note that repurchases done by share trusts were not identified as share repurchases 
in this study, as the JSE Listing Requirements do not identify them as share repurchases, and share 
trust repurchases are not required to be announced via SENS (Wesson, 2015). However, to ensure the 
complete and accurate collection of share repurchases done by the holding company and subsidiaries, 
the number of shares held by share trusts were captured and reconciled, as detailed in the next 
section.  
3.3.1 Research procedure regarding number of shares repurchased 
No commercial financial database provides complete and accurate data on the number of shares 
repurchased by JSE-listed companies, and therefore the data had to be collected directly from 
companies’ annual financial statements. However, most annual financial statements also do not 
explicitly report the number of shares repurchased. To ensure that all share repurchases were 
captured accurately, reconciliations had to be done from the data gathered from the financial 
statements. Figure 3.1 shows an example of the spreadsheet used for one company and one year, 
called Spreadsheet 1 going forward. In Spreadsheet 1 the following were reconciled (between opening 
balance number of shares, shares issued, shares repurchased, and closing balance number of shares): 
• Shares outstanding in the group (numbered 1 in Figure 3.1) 
• Shares in issue by holding company (numbered 2 in Figure 3.1) 
• Shares held by subsidiaries (numbered 3 in Figure 3.1)  
• Shares held by consolidated share trusts (numbered 4 in Figure 3.1) 
Every year’s reconciliation for a specific company (for each of the four entities mentioned in the bullets 
above) included a check on whether the opening balance number of shares, plus shares issued, minus 
shares repurchased, equalled the closing balance number of shares (second to last column in Figure 
3.1). In addition, the shares outstanding in the group were supposed to equal the shares in issue by 
the holding company, less those held by subsidiaries and consolidated share trusts. A validity check 
(numbered 5 in Figure 3.1) was therefore built into the spreadsheet used to capture the reconciliation 
described above, to ensure that the holding company number of shares (numbered 2 in Figure 3.1), 
minus shares held by subsidiaries (numbered 3 in Figure 3.1) and consolidated share trusts (numbered 
4 in Figure 3.1), did indeed equal the group number of shares (numbered 1 in Figure 3.1). 
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1. Number of shares: Group  
2017 107 891          -971    106 920  -  p. 71  
2. Number of shares: Holding company  
2017 114 272            114 272 -  p. 71  
3. Number of shares held by subsidiaries  
2017 6 381          971    7 352 - Opening balance, p. 42, p. 71  
4. Number of shares held by consolidated share trusts 
2017 0             0  - p. 72 
5. Check (compares number 1 with 2,3,4) 
2017 -       -   
Figure 3.1. An example of the reconciliations executed to identify the number of shares repurchased
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The data to populate Spreadsheet 1 was collected from the company’s annual financial statement 
(which was obtained either in hard copy or electronic copy from the IRESS database (product: Library)). 
As the disclosures regarding share capital issued and held by subsidiaries and consolidated share trusts 
were not always disclosed in a single note in the annual financial statement, the following parts of the 
financial statement had to be searched: directors’ report, cash flow statement, statement of changes 
in equity, share capital note, treasury shares note, and shareholder spread (shareholders’ analysis). 
The pages on which each piece of information was found to populate the reconciliation were noted 
on Spreadsheet 1 (last column in Figure 3.1). 
Once the reconciliations had been completed, the number of shares repurchased were determined 
(these are the numbers of shares indicated in the grey-shaded columns). The repurchasing entity (the 
holding company repurchasing from third parties; the holding company repurchasing treasury shares; 
or subsidiaries) involved was clarified from Spreadsheet 1. The first grey-shaded column in Figure 3.1 
(labelled ‘Holding company from third parties’) was allocated to the ‘holding company from third 
parties’ repurchasing entity. The second and the third grey-shaded columns in Figure 3.1 (labelled 
‘Subsidiaries directly from holding company’ and ‘Subsidiaries from third parties’) were both allocated 
to the ‘subsidiaries’ repurchasing entity. All repurchases by ‘subsidiaries’ (both those labelled 
‘Subsidiaries directly from holding company’ and ‘Subsidiaries from third parties’) were included in 
the treasury share balance (number of shares held by subsidiaries) and subsequent repurchases 
thereof by the holding company qualified as the ‘Holding company repurchasing treasury shares’. 
Lastly, the fourth grey-shaded column (labelled ‘Holding company repurchasing treasury shares’) was 
attributed to the ‘holding company repurchasing treasury shares’ repurchasing entity.  
After the repurchasing entities had been determined, further analyses were done on the type of 
repurchase involved (specific versus general) and whether the repurchase was announced via SENS. 
This analysis was done in another custom-designed spreadsheet (hereafter called Spreadsheet 2). 
Spreadsheet 2 contained only the repurchases done by the holding company and subsidiaries (as 
repurchases by share trusts were not included in the study given that they did not qualify as 
repurchases under the JSE Listing Requirements). In Spreadsheet 2, for every year in which a 
repurchase had occurred, the number of shares repurchased by each of the repurchasing entities 
(holding company from third parties; holding company repurchasing treasury shares; and subsidiaries) 
was listed (this information was extracted from Spreadsheet 1).  
To determine whether the type of repurchase was general or specific, two sources were considered. 
Firstly, the annual financial statement disclosure frequently indicated the repurchase type, and this 
information had already been obtained when Spreadsheet 1 was populated (when the financial 
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statement indicated the repurchase type, this information was added to Spreadsheet 2 immediately 
while busy populating Spreadsheet 1). Secondly, the SENS announcement (if the repurchase was 
announced via SENS) mostly indicated the type of repurchase. When the financial statement did not 
give any detail, the repurchase type was usually clarified using SENS data. Where neither the financial 
statement nor SENS indicated the type of repurchase, it was assumed to be general (as general 
repurchases only need to be announced via SENS after the 3% threshold is reached, but all specific 
repurchases need to be announced via SENS).  
In the literature review, four repurchase types were identified: general repurchases; pro rata specific 
repurchases; specific repurchases where the holding company repurchases treasury shares; and other 
specific repurchases. Other specific repurchases included where subsidiaries purchased shares directly 
from the holding company (second grey-shaded column in Figure 3.1). Other specific repurchases also 
included where shares were repurchased by the holding company or subsidiaries from a share trust. 
To determine whether the repurchase was announced via SENS or not, the SENS announcements 
(obtained from IRESS: product Library) were consulted. To search for the applicable SENS 
announcements, the following terms were employed: “buy back”, “buy-back”, “buyback”, “treasury” 
and “repurchase” (Wesson, 2015). The term “repurchase” reaped the most applicable 
announcements. The SENS announcements were studied to determine to which period or date they 
related and whether the announcements related to specific or general repurchases. Based on the 
information provided in the SENS announcements, the announced repurchases were paired to the 
repurchases already identified in Spreadsheet 2. When a share repurchase announcement pertained 
to general repurchases, the announcement occasionally related to repurchases executed over 
multiple reporting periods. If the number of shares actually repurchased during the multiple reporting 
periods was greater than the number of shares announced via SENS, then the announced share 
repurchases were first allocated to the earliest reporting period(s) until all announced share 
repurchases had been allocated (this is similar to the first-in-first-out method). This method would 
cause the residual (unannounced) share repurchases to fall in the last reporting period. 
3.3.2 Research procedure regarding rand value spent on share repurchases 
In deciding on the most accurate rand value for the repurchases identified in Spreadsheet 2 (the 
process is detailed in 3.3.2), the values reported in the directors’ report, statement of changes in 
equity, cash flow statement, share capital notes and SENS announcements were considered. Where 
the statement of changes in equity and the cash flow statement were the only available values (and 
they differed), the statement of changes in equity was considered to be most accurate, as this 
reflected the change in share capital that occurred. Many times no cash was expended for share 
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repurchases as the repurchases were intragroup (then the holding company’s separate statement of 
changes in equity was considered) or settled with non-cash resources (in which case the group 
statement of changes in equity was considered). The rand value spent on share repurchases included 
any transaction costs paid, as this was most often how the rand value was reported in the statement 
of changes in equity. 
After the rand value contained in all the available sources had been documented, the most reliable 
value was chosen (often all sources stated the same value). Then, as a reasonableness test, the rand 
value paid per share repurchased was calculated. The value per share was compared to the value per 
share of the other repurchases that occurred for the same company. Where the value per share of a 
certain repurchase seemed unduly high or low in comparison to the other repurchases in the same 
time range for the same company, or all the values seemed unusual, the value per share was compared 
to the average share price of the company over that period (using the IRESS price data function). If the 
average share price (from IRESS price data function) differed substantially from the value per share 
for a certain repurchase in Spreadsheet 2, the annual financial statements and SENS announcements 
were reread to ensure that all information had been taken into account. 
3.3.3  Problems encountered when collecting share repurchase data  
Some minor problems were encountered during the collection of share repurchase data. These 
problems, and how they were addressed or solved, are detailed in this section. Company names are 
used to explain the phenomenon observed and for recordkeeping. Where a company name is 
mentioned, this is not meant as an example (unless explicitly stated as such) but rather this would be 
the only case in which the problem was encountered.  
3.3.3.1 Number of shares or rand value unknown 
In a limited number of cases, the rand value spent on repurchases was unknown, while the number of 
shares repurchased was known (or vice versa). In such cases, a nominal amount of R1 or 1 share 
repurchased was added to the relevant category, to indicate that such repurchase had taken place, 
but the number of shares or rand value was unknown. 
3.3.3.2 Splitting between subsidiaries and trusts 
Shares repurchased by the subsidiaries and consolidated share trusts are both accounted for as 
treasury shares in consolidated annual financial statements (and sometimes presented as one figure 
in these statements). However, repurchases by subsidiaries are included in the present study as they 
are defined as share repurchases by the JSE Listing Requirements, while consolidated share trust 
repurchases are excluded from the scope of the present study. As such, it was sometimes necessary 
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to split treasury share repurchases between those repurchased by subsidiaries (included in the 
present study) and share trusts (excluded from the present study). Where the number and rand value 
of share-repurchases by the subsidiaries and trusts were combined into one figure in the annual 
financial statements, this split was done using several methods – as appropriate or possible, given the 
available information. Moreover, the disclosures in subsequent years were consulted to verify 
whether improved disclosures in subsequent years could assist in splitting more accurately in the prior 
years. 
The primary method applied, when assigning values to subsidiaries and trusts repurchases, related to 
instances where the cumulative treasury share repurchases for the period – as well as the treasury 
shares held by each of these entities at year end – were known. Therefore, if the opening balance and 
closing balance number of shares held by both subsidiaries and trusts were available, and both showed 
a net increase in shares held during the year (therefore representing a net repurchase of shares), the 
total treasury share repurchases for the period (disclosed as a combined figure for subsidiaries and 
trusts) could be split between subsidiaries and trusts based on the proportionate net increase in the 
subsidiaries’ and trusts’ holdings during the year.  
To illustrate this, assume the net change in treasury shares held (subsidiaries and trusts together) was 
an increase of 100 shares, comprising a net increase of 80 in shares held by subsidiaries and a net 
increase of 20 in shares held by trusts (all information available in annual financial statements). It must 
be noted that 80 per cent (80 shares divided by a total of 100 shares) of the increase in treasury shares 
was then seen as attributable to subsidiaries, while the remainder (20%) was attributed to trusts. If 
the annual financial statement disclosure indicated that 600 treasury shares were acquired during the 
period, the 600 was then split as follows: subsidiaries were allocated 600 multiplied by 80 per cent 
(equalling 480 shares repurchased by subsidiaries), while trusts were allocated 600 multiplied by 20 
per cent (equalling 120 shares). A similar method was then followed to split the rand value.  
This primary method could only be applied if the gross treasury share repurchases (by subsidiaries and 
trusts cumulatively, i.e. the 600 shares in the example above) and the increases in the number of 
shares held by each separately (i.e. the 80 and the 20 increases in the example above) was known. 
Other variants of the primary method applied to individual cases are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
When the cumulative number of treasury shares repurchased (i.e. the 600 in the example above) for 
the period were not known, a different method (to the primary method discussed above) had to be 
applied. This was done for Stefanutti Stocks Limited where the net movement in shares held by both 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
subsidiaries and trusts (individually) was disclosed, but not the cumulative number of shares 
purchased or sold (neither for subsidiaries nor trusts separately, nor for them cumulatively). In such a 
case, the net movement in shares for subsidiaries (which could have been an increase or a decrease) 
was seen as either a repurchase or a sale of shares. The combined rand value in the statement of 
changes in equity for net repurchases (movement in all treasury shares) was then split as follows: 
• When the number of shares held by subsidiaries and trusts both increased, the rand value was 
seen as being proportionally divided between the two entities (proportionate to the number of 
shares repurchased by each entity). 
• When the number of shares held by subsidiaries increased, while the number of shares held by 
trusts decreased, the entire decrease (outflow) in the statement of changes in rand value was seen 
as attributable to subsidiaries. This amount is actually the net of the outflow as a result of 
subsidiary repurchases and inflow as a result of trust sales, but it was not possible to split. This 
understates the rand amount, but at least attaches a value other than a nominal R1 to the 
repurchase (refer to Section 3.3.3.1). If a net increase (inflow) was shown in the statement of 
changes in equity, a R1 value was ascribed to repurchases (this only occurred once, in 2012, and 
the number of shares repurchased was small). 
Where the number of shares repurchased by subsidiaries and trusts (individually) were known, but 
the rand value was combined in the statement of changes in equity, this was split proportionally. An 
example was Cashbuild Limited in 2016, where trusts repurchased 200 000 shares and subsidiaries 
almost 500 000. The rand value on the statement of changes in equity for repurchases was split by 
apportioning two-sevenths for trusts and five-sevenths for subsidiaries. 
When the subsidiaries repurchased shares, while the trusts only transferred shares to employees to 
settle SBPs, then the entire change in treasury share value in the statement of changes was seen as 
attributable to subsidiaries. This only occurred for Business Connexion Limited, in 2011 and 2014. In 
the other years studied, only the trusts transferred treasury shares (and the subsidiaries did not 
repurchase) and there was no rand value effect on the statement of changes in equity or cash flow 
statement. Therefore, in 2011 and 2014, the full rand value shown on the statement of changes in the 
equity and cash flow statement was assumed to be for the repurchase and not pertaining to the 
transfer by trusts.  
3.3.3.3  Splitting shares repurchased and sold by subsidiaries 
In some cases the disclosure in the annual financial statement pertaining to shares repurchased by 
the subsidiaries only reported a netted figure (on the number of shares and rand value involved) for 
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repurchases and sales of previously repurchased shares. In such cases (and similar to the method 
applied in Section 3.3.3.2 for Stefanutti Stocks Limited), the net amount of shares and net rand value 
was seen as repurchases (if the net amount of shares and/or rand value still constituted a repurchase). 
This occurred only for EOH Limited, in 2011 and 2013.  
When the number of shares repurchased and sold by subsidiaries was known, but the rand value was 
netted off, the amount spent on repurchases was estimated using a grossing up technique. This was 
done by dividing the net amount spent (or received) by the net shares repurchased (or sold), to 
calculate an average price per share. The average price per share was then multiplied by the number 
of shares repurchased (known) to approximate the rand value spent. This occurred in the cases of 
Cognition Holdings Limited (2017), ELB Limited (2017), and Metrofile Holdings Limited (2016 and 
2017). 
Where the rand value of treasury shares repurchased and sold by subsidiaries were known separately, 
but the numbers of shares involved were netted off, a process similar to the one in the previous 
paragraph (but reversed) was followed. In such cases, the rand value paid to repurchase shares, and 
the price at which treasury shares were sold were netted off, and then this net amount was divided 
by the net movement in shares, to determine an average price per share. The rand value spent on 
repurchases was then divided by this per-share figure to approximate the number of shares 
repurchased by subsidiaries. This occurred in Invicta Holdings Limited (2012 and 2013), but some 
adjustments were needed in 2013. In 2012 the market value of the shares sold (transferred as settle 
SBPs) was disclosed as a transfer in the statement of changes in equity, but in 2013 the cost price of 
the shares sold (transferred to settle SBPs) was shown as a transfer in the statement of changes in 
equity (the measurement was described in the share capital note). Thus, in 2013, the cost price of 
shares sold (transferred to settle SBPs) and the fair value at which shares were repurchased would be 
incompatible measurement bases. To compensate for this, another entirely different method was 
used in 2013. As the cost price of all treasury shares held by subsidiaries at the start of the year was 
disclosed in the notes to the annual financial statement, this total cost price was divided by the 
number of shares held by subsidiaries at the start of the year (to determine the average cost price per 
treasury share held by subsidiaries). The value transferred per statement of changes in equity (relating 
to the shares sold or transferred by subsidiaries) was divided by the average cost per treasury share, 
to determine the number of shares sold or transferred by subsidiaries. The number of shares sold or 
transferred was added to the net movement in shares held by subsidiaries (it was a net increase in the 
number of shares held), to calculate the number of shares repurchased by subsidiaries. 
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3.3.3.4  Black economic empowerment trusts 
Companies in South Africa often employ BEE trusts to allocate shares to qualifying employees and to 
improve their own BEE status. BEE trusts (and any shares repurchased by them) were excluded from 
this study, even if the BEE trusts were consolidated, because repurchases by share trusts were 
excluded. The shares owned by consolidated BEE trusts were, however, reconciled (in Spreadsheet 1) 
to ensure that all share repurchases by other entities were captured. Sometimes companies, instead 
of trusts, were employed to effect BEE transactions – such companies were referred to as BEE 
companies in the present study. BEE companies that were consolidated (only one or two were noted) 
were included in the study (repurchases done by them were seen as repurchases), but BEE companies 
that were not consolidated (which was the case for most of the BEE companies) were excluded as such 
companies did not qualify as subsidiaries. Where a BEE company was consolidated during the initial 
years of its existence, but not consolidated in later years (and also removed from comparative figures), 
such a BEE company was deemed to be unconsolidated (i.e. that it had mistakenly been consolidated 
in the initial years). 
3.3.3.5 Forfeitable share plans 
During the latter years covered by the study, performance and restricted shares (contingent shares) 
became increasingly popular. Some of the contingent share schemes in use were forfeitable share 
plans for taxation purposes, i.e. the shares were delivered to the executive (or a proxy) on the grant 
date. The accounting treatment and disclosure of the forfeitable shares issued differed vastly between 
companies and complicated the Spreadsheet 1 reconciliation. In many Spreadsheet 1s an additional 
control (akin to the number of shares held by consolidated share trusts) was added to reconcile the 
movement in the shares granted under such schemes. Shares were often repurchased by the holding 
company and then granted to the employees, but still treated as treasury shares (similar to a share 
trust) until vested in the employee. Other companies did not repurchase the shares to be granted, but 
just issued them to employees, and then treated them as treasury shares in the group until vested. 
Still other companies issued the shares to a subsidiary or other intermediary who then held the shares 
on behalf of the employees until vesting (without treating the issued shares as treasury shares 
thereafter). In one company in the population (Pick n Pay Stores Limited), forfeitable shares were 
issued to employees at grant date and were then not treated as treasury shares (although unvested). 
When these shares (not seen as treasury shares) were then forfeited by employees during the vesting 
period, the shares were returned to the company. This return of shares decreased share capital but 
was not seen as a share repurchase as no consideration was paid by the company.  
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For forfeitable share plans, the initial repurchase of shares (to then re-issue such shares to employees 
under the forfeitable share plan) was seen as a share repurchase when collecting the share repurchase 
data (if such repurchase occurred under the specific forfeitable share plan). However, barring this 
element that occurred only in some forfeitable share plan transactions, none of the forfeitable share 
plans gave rise to share repurchases. 
3.3.3.6  Share repurchases as a result of business combinations 
Share repurchases that arose from a business combination (for example, where an acquired subsidiary 
owned shares in the acquirer before the acquisition date, and these shares become treasury shares 
on the acquisition date) were excluded from the study. The reason for the exclusion is that the 
increase in treasury shares as a result of the business combination does not constitute a repurchase 
as defined by the JSE Listing Requirements, and the rand value of the shares repurchased is not 
available separately as it is included in the consideration paid for the business combination. Only two 
such instances were noted. Shares acquired through a business combination did, however, form part 
of the treasury share balance and, if subsequently sold to the holding company, were treated as a 
repurchase of treasury shares by the holding company. 
3.3.3.7 Share repurchases prior to listing 
Some companies included in the study listed on the JSE during the 2002–2017 period. A number of 
these companies may have engaged in repurchasing shares during the financial year in which they first 
listed, but before they listed. Such share repurchases were included in Spreadsheet 1 reconciliations 
to ensure that all changes in the number of shares were accurately recorded, but were excluded from 
Spreadsheet 2 (as they occurred prior to listing and therefore were not repurchases as defined by the 
JSE Listing Requirements). Repurchases prior to listing need not be announced on SENS. As an 
example, Life Healthcare Group Holdings Limited listed in 2010 but, just before listing, repurchased 
the 321.5 million shares that it reissued in the initial public offering. The repurchase was not 
announced via SENS. 
3.3.3.8  Adjustments to the data from the Wesson (2015) study 
A limited number of adjustments were made to the share repurchase data collected during the 
Wesson (2015) study. For Truworths Limited, a SENS announcement was made in 2013 that covered 
the period 2009 to 2013, and caused some of the 2009 repurchases to move from unannounced to 
announced. For Invicta Limited, it subsequently became clear that the treasury shares repurchased in 
2008 and 2009 were by a subsidiary and not a trust, as previously presumed by Wesson (2015). For 
Sun International Limited, in 2009, there was a share repurchase by the holding company, but the 
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shares were transferred to a subsidiary during 2010. The 2009 repurchase only became clear upon 
looking at the 2010 annual financial statement, and was therefore added to the 2009 year. 
3.3.4 Transferring the data in Spreadsheet 2 to a flat file used for data analysis 
The process detailed in Sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.3 was followed for the years 2010–2017 where the 2002–
2009 data had already been covered by Wesson (2015), and for the years 2002–2017 otherwise. After 
a Spreadsheet 2 had been completed for each company (indicating both the number and rand value 
of shares repurchased per repurchasing entity and repurchase type, as well as whether announced or 
not), the data were extracted to an Excel flat file containing the data of all companies included in the 
population per company year.  
For the companies included in the Wesson (2015) study that were also included in the population on 
the present study, the 2002–2009 share repurchase information was transferred from the flat file used 
by Wesson (2015) to the flat file of the present study. The flat file used in the Wesson study contained 
certain columns (categories), and the same categorisation was applied in the present study. This 
informed the headings of the columns (categories) employed in the flat file of the present study. 
Thus, similar to Wesson (2015), the flat file of the present study contained the following categories 
for the number of shares repurchased and the rand value spent, separately: 
1. Repurchasing entity: Holding company from third parties 
2. Repurchasing entity: Holding company repurchasing treasury shares  
3. Repurchasing entity: Subsidiaries 
4. Repurchase type: General 
5. Repurchase type: Specific – pro rata  
6. Repurchase type: Specific – holding company repurchasing treasury shares  
7. Repurchase type: Specific – other specific 
8. SENS: Announced general 
9. SENS: Announced specific – holding company repurchasing treasury shares 
10. SENS: Announced specific – pro rata 
11. SENS: Announced specific – other specific 
12. SENS: Unannounced general 
13. SENS: Unannounced specific 
To ensure accuracy and completeness of the present study’s flat file, a number of checks were built in 
to ensure efficient transferral from the various Spreadsheet 2’s and the flat file used by Wesson 
(2015). Firstly, per company for the new data collected during the present study, the total number 
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and rand value of shares repurchased as per Spreadsheet 2 were compared to the total number and 
rand value contained in the flat file (after extraction). Secondly, it was checked that the total number 
of shares repurchased by all repurchasing entities (categories 1 to 3 above) was equal to the total 
number of shares repurchased as both specific and general repurchases (categories 4 to 7 above) and 
the total number of shares repurchased that was announced and unannounced (categories 8 to 13 
above). This was also done for the rand value spent on share repurchases. Thirdly, to ensure that the 
number of shares and rand value were allocated consistently in the appropriate categories mentioned 
above, a formula was written to check that where a specific category contained a number of shares 
repurchased, the same category also contained a rand value spent. Discrepancies found in the checks 
above were noted and resolved.  
3.3.5 Data analysis regarding share repurchases 
The data collected in terms of the categories (numbered 1 to 13 above) were used to answer research 
sub-questions 1.3 to 1.5 (see Chapter 1). Total columns were then added for both the number of 
shares repurchased and the rand value spent. These totals included measures of both gross share 
repurchases (the total of share repurchases executed by all repurchasing entities – i.e. the total of 
categories 1 to 3 above) and net share repurchases (share repurchases excluding intragroup 
repurchases – i.e. the total of categories 1 and 3 only). The total columns were used to answer 
Research sub-question 1.2 (see Chapter 1). A final column was added to the flat file (database on share 
repurchases) which contained a binary response of ‘1’ if the company had executed a share 
repurchase during the year, or ‘0’ if the company had not. The binary response column was used to 
address Research sub-question 1.1. 
To address research sub-questions 1.1 to 1.5 descriptive statistics were employed. Furthermore, 
trends over the 2002–2017 period were analysed. This can be seen in Chapter 4. In addition, Chapter 
4 addresses Research sub-question 1.6, which entailed a comparison between the 2000–2009 period 
and the 2010–2017 period. Aspects compared were: the number of companies repurchasing (sub-
question 1.1), the quantum of share repurchases (sub-question 1.2), the preferred repurchasing entity 
(sub-question 1.3), the preferred repurchase type (sub-question 1.4), and the percentage of share 
repurchases that was announced (sub-question 1.5). These aspects were compared by calculating the 
same type of descriptive statistics separately for the two periods and then comparing the descriptive 
statistics for the two periods. The key idea was to elucidate differences in share repurchase activity 
after the global financial crisis, and then compare these with the findings of Wesson (2015) on the 
2000–2009 period, as well as with global share repurchase activity since the financial crisis. 
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3.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF SHARE-BASED REMUNERATION 
To address Research question 2, the characteristics relating to the executive share-based 
remuneration of South African listed companies was investigated. In line with Massie et al. (2014, p. 
7), both share-based awards in existence (to enable an understanding of the vesting conditions 
attached and the rewards offered) and share-based awards exercised (to measure the financial benefit 
that executives realised) were studied. Share-based remuneration is defined, for the purpose of this 
study, as any long-term incentive paid to executives of which the value depends on the share price 
(including, but not limited to, share options, SARs, and contingent shares). Research sub-questions 
were developed (see Chapter 1) and data correspondingly collected.  
3.4.1 Data collection from IRESS  
The data were primarily collected using the IRESS financial database (product: Director Search). The 
characteristics of executive share-based remuneration had to be downloaded from IRESS per 
executive per reporting period, which made the process quite time-consuming, while occasionally a 
bulk covering five years could be downloaded in one attempt. 
To ensure that the data on share-based remuneration were downloaded for all executives of a certain 
company for all years that the person acted as executive, a specific process was followed. IRESS 
gathers data on both executives and non-executives but indicates whether a certain person is an 
executive or non-executive. As first step, IRESS was consulted (for each company, and for each 
financial year) to determine the list of executives in service for that particular year. This list then served 
as template, and it was checked that the share-based remuneration was collected for all executives in 
service for all financial years.  
IRESS captures information regarding both the rand value of executive share-based remuneration 
(value-based data) and the number of instruments involved, for each scheme type employed (number-
based data). The collection of both value-based and number-based data is discussed in Sections 3.4.1.1 
and 3.4.1.2. 
3.4.1.1 Value-based data extracted from IRESS 
Figure 3.2 shows an example of the value-based data that IRESS captures per executive per reporting 
period (Figure 3.2 is an example of a case where five years of data can be exported in one attempt). 
The information shown in Figure 3.2 was copied to a flat file on executive share-based remuneration 
– containing the company name, year, and name of executive, with the value-based information 
adjacent. This process was repeated per executive per company year to produce a comprehensive 
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database on the value of executive remuneration, listed per executive, per company year (hereafter 
referred to as per-executive database on share-based remuneration). 
 
Figure 3.2. An example of the value-based executive remuneration data available in IRESS 
From the pilot study, it was noted that all line items in the figure up to the ‘total annual compensation’ 
line item was relatively well-captured, with minimal errors (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). However, 
the line item ‘gains on shares’ (see red arrow) was less reliable as data source. The line item was 
probably created in 2002 to capture the gain realised on the exercise of share options as required by 
the previous Companies Act read together with King II (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). However, in 
later years, share-based schemes other than share options became popular and the current 
Companies Act was less clear on which value should be disclosed in terms of share-based 
remuneration (Dippenaar, 2018; Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). Some companies disclosed grant date 
fair value, others the IFRS 2 expense, and still others the gain realised on exercise or vesting date 
(Dippenaar & Steenkamp, 2017). During 2002–2017, uninformed data capturers (in trying to populate 
the line item ‘gains on shares’) were probably capturing whatever measure the company disclosed 
regarding its executive share-based remuneration, with some companies not disclosing any value for 
share-based remuneration in the section dealing with short-term remuneration. An indirect 
contribution of the present study could be training data capturers at IRESS (or other financial database 
operators) who capture details related to share-based remuneration, to improve quality control. 
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The following value-based information was thus collected from IRESS (per executive, per company 
year) and included in the ‘per-executive database on share-based remuneration’ of this study, in 
thousands of rands: 
• Salary 
• Other short-term remuneration (calculated as the difference between the amounts shown as 
Total Annual Compensation and Salary in Figure 3.2) 
• Share-based remuneration (‘gains on shares’ in Figure 3.2) 
• Total remuneration (the total of the three elements listed in the bullets above). 
3.4.1.2 Number-based data from IRESS 
IRESS also captures information regarding the share-based schemes employed by companies, on a per 
executive basis. An example of one scheme for a single executive is shown in Figure 3.3. This 
information was copied and added to the ‘per-executive database on share-based remuneration’, 
which was created as explained in Section 3.4.1.1. This process was repeated per scheme, per 
executive for every company year. The ‘per-executive database on share-based remuneration’ thus 
contained comprehensive information on both the value of executive share-based remuneration and 
the schemes employed (per executive, per company year). The ‘per-executive database on share-
based remuneration’ had space for the details of each possible type of scheme (per executive), 
although not all executives were exposed to all types of scheme. The types of scheme on which data 
were collected were share options, SARs, restricted shares, performance shares, deferred bonus plans, 
share purchase plans, phantom shares and others. 
 
Figure 3.3. An example of the number-based per-scheme data available in IRESS 
The information presented in Figure 3.3 was available from 2002 onwards, although the early years 
(prior to 2005 or 2006) was often limited to the number of instruments held at year end. Figure 3.3 
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shows that the type of scheme is named. From either 2005 or 2006, depending on the individual 
company, IRESS has always provided a description of the scheme and the vesting conditions (which is 
available when hovering on the ‘i’ button). Sometimes this description was very short (one or two 
sentences with very little information), while some descriptions were extremely lengthy. The 
description is some sentence or paragraph copied directly from the annual financial statement, often 
being the IFRS 2 description of the scheme and its vesting conditions. An example of the wording of 
the ‘i’ button is as follows (2008 Shoprite from Figure 3.3):  
Share Option Scheme in terms of the rules of The Shoprite Holdings Ltd Share Incentive Trust, 
the trustees are authorised to acquire and allocate shares which in total may not exceed 20% 
of the issued ordinary share capital of the Company.* Options are forfeited when an option 
holder resigns prior to the vesting date of the options.** During the year under review, 
holders of 3,206,250 (2007: 3,881,250) options, out of a possible total of 5,368,750 (2007: 
4,668,750), who could exercise their options from 20 to 24 December 2007 (2007: 20 to 24 
December 2006), agreed to accept settlement of these options in cash. The fair value of the 
cancelled and settled options were accounted for as a deduction from equity, net of related 
tax (refer statement of changes in equity). All unpaid but exercisable rights of option holders 
who have elected cash settlement are included in the cash-settled share-based payment 
accrual (refer note 20). Options outstanding on 30 June 2008 are unconditional on the 
following dates or immediately in the case of a deceased estate (see Annual Report 2008 page 
82 for details). 
The information accessible via the ‘i’ button was read to ascertain the scheme type (since sometimes 
the IRESS name was misleading), the length of the vesting period and the accompanying performance 
conditions. When the scheme type heading in IRESS was contradicted by the information given via the 
‘i’ button, the information (in Figure 3.3) was reclassified to be shown under the correct scheme type. 
For each scheme type, the vesting period and performance conditions employed were also added to 
the ‘per-executive database on share-based remuneration’, if mentioned in the ‘i’ button information. 
Some executives were exposed to multiple schemes and this process was repeated per scheme. 
The following number-based information was extracted from IRESS (per scheme type for every 
executive), and collected in the ‘per-executive database on share-based remuneration’: 
• the length of the vesting period  
• the performance conditions attached  
• the number of instruments held at the start of the period  
• the number of instruments granted during the period  
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• the number of instruments exercised during the period  
• the number of instruments that lapsed or were forfeited during the period  
• the number of instruments held at the end of the period 
3.4.2 Correction of discrepancies based on annual financial statements 
Based on the evidence provided by the pilot study (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b), it was decided to 
update the data collected from IRESS where the data were incomplete (empty fields) or obviously 
inaccurate. Examples of inaccuracies included:  
• Data were duplicated (details relating to a single executive were captured twice). 
• The director was indicated as an ‘executive director’ by IRESS although the annual financial 
statement referred to the person as a non-executive director (non-executive directors were 
excluded from the present study). 
• The scheme type was incorrectly classified by IRESS. 
• Two scheme types (e.g. restricted shares and performance shares) were combined by IRESS 
although the annual financial statement showed them separately. 
• For a specific scheme, the number of instruments held at the beginning of a year (for a specific 
scheme) did not agree with the number instruments held at the end of the prior year.  
• For a specific scheme, the number of instruments held at the beginning of a year adjusted for 
changes (grants and exercises, etc.) that occurred during the year did not correspond to the 
number of instruments held at the end of the year.  
• The performance conditions attached to a certain scheme were not available in IRESS, and as a 
result the annual financial statement had to be consulted to obtain this information. 
• No information was captured by IRESS although the annual financial statement did contain 
information. 
In the case of incomplete or inaccurate data from IRESS, the discrepancies in the ‘per-executive 
database on share-based remuneration’ were updated based on the information disclosed in annual 
financial statements. The sections of the financial statement consulted included the directors’ report, 
the remuneration report, the related party note, the note regarding SBPs (IFRS 2) and the directors’ 
remuneration note accompanying the income statement.  
The pilot study (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b) found that the ‘gain on shares’ line significantly 
understated the value realised from share-based remuneration. Given the difficulty of accurately 
recalculating this amount, the inconsistent disclosures in the annual financial statement regarding this 
aspect (Steenkamp et al., 2019), and the fact that the value of executive share-based remuneration 
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would not be employed as independent variable in the present study, it was decided not to attempt a 
recalculation of all ‘gains on shares’ data items. As such, no corrections were made to the ‘gains on 
shares’ line – the data as extracted from IRESS were used unchanged. This remains an area for further 
study.  
3.4.3 Data analysis regarding executive share-based remuneration 
Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 detailed the process followed to create a comprehensive per-executive 
database on executive share-based remuneration (called ‘per-executive database on share-based 
remuneration’). This per-executive database contained 8 837 data line items. To address Research 
sub-question 2.1 (relating to the value of share-based remuneration in relation to total executive 
remuneration), it was decided to employ the per-executive database, as companies employ varying 
numbers of executives (thus, a per-company analysis would be less useful). The value-based 
information collected in the ‘per-executive database on share-based remuneration’ was employed to 
answer Research sub-question 2.1. 
To answer the remaining research sub-questions relating to Research question 2, it was decided rather 
to employ (mainly) per-company data on share-based remuneration, as the companies’ decisions 
regarding executive share-based remuneration (e.g. which scheme types to grant (sub-question 2.2), 
which vesting conditions to employ (sub-question 2.3), and the number of share-based instruments 
to employ (sub-question 2.4) had to be assessed. Thus, a ‘per-company year database on share-based 
remuneration’ had to be created. The share-based remuneration data of all executives employed by 
a certain company in a specific year was combined to create a data line item which captured the total 
executive share-based remuneration paid by that company in the specific year. These combined data 
line items were referred to as per ‘company year’ and 2 313 such line items were created. The 
database containing the 2 313 line items per company year was referred to as the ‘per-executive 
database on share-based remuneration’, and was later combined with the flat file on share 
repurchases (Section 3.3) to address Research question 3 (i.e. on the relationship between share 
repurchases and executive share-based remuneration). 
3.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REPURCHASES AND SHARE-BASED 
REMUNERATION 
The aim of the present study was to determine whether a statistical relationship exists between share 
repurchase and executive share-based remuneration variables in South Africa. Research question 3 
specifically addressed this. Earlier studies undertaken in other countries have indicated that a positive 
relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration can be expected to 
exist (see Section 2.4). The hypotheses developed were thus: 
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• H0: There is no relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration 
in South Africa. 
• Ha: There is a positive relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration in South Africa. 
The present study, similar to earlier research in other countries (Section 2.4), thus examined whether 
the existence of executive share-based remuneration is associated with increased share repurchases. 
Previous research identified share repurchases as the dependent variable, and executive share-based 
remuneration as the independent variable. However, other factors are also associated with increased 
share repurchases and should be employed as control variables (to determine, ceteris paribus, the 
effect of executive share-based remuneration on share repurchases). Given that multiple factors 
influence share repurchases, it was decided to employ a multiple regression model to examine the 
relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration. 
Earlier studies undertaken in other countries (see Table 2.4) informed the measurement of the 
dependent and independent variables, the identification and measurement of control variables, the 
identification of appropriate econometric regression models, and the expected relationships in this 
study. Previous studies, and how they influenced the choice of variables and econometric models 
employed as well as the expected relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration, are discussed in Sections 3.5.1 to 3.5.3.  
The unit of analysis was a specific company in a specific year (termed a company year). The data 
employed was obtained by combining (per company year) the flat file on share repurchases (created 
as described in Section 3.3) and the ‘per-company year database on share-based remuneration’ 
(created as described in Section 3.4). Checks of totals were done to ensure that all data were 
accurately transferred to the combined file containing details on both share repurchases and 
executive share-based remuneration. The flat file on share repurchases contained 2 392 company 
years, but data on executive share-based remuneration were only available for 2 313 of the 2 392 
company years. The remaining 79 company years for which no executive share-based remuneration 
was available (see Section 5.2) were excluded from the regression analyses. Thus only 2 313 company 
years were included in the regressions executed. All econometric analysis was conducted using Stata 
15.0. 
3.5.1 Dependent and independent variables 
Table 3.1 shows dependent (share repurchases) and independent (executive share-based 
remuneration) variables employed by the previous studies listed in Table 2.4. Geiler and Renneboog 
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(2016) studied the decision to repurchase (in relation to other payout methods) as well as the 
relationship between total payout and executive share-based remuneration. The decision to 
repurchase is included in Table 3.1, but the study of total payout is not included as share repurchase 





Measurement of dependent and independent variables for share repurchases and executive share-
based remuneration, respectively, as employed in previous studies (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2020a) 
Name of study Measurement of dependent variable 
(share repurchases) 
Measurement of independent variable 
(executive share-based remuneration) 
Jolls (1998) Decision between repurchases and 
other payout methods 
Number of share options held (and granted) 
scaled by number of company shares 
outstanding; value of restricted shares granted 
Fenn and Liang 
(2001)  
Repurchase value scaled by market 
capitalisation 
Number of share options held scaled by 
number of company shares outstanding 
Kahle (2002) Decision between repurchases and 
other payout methods; repurchase 
value scaled by market capitalisation 
Number of share options held scaled by 
number of company shares outstanding 
Weisbenner (2004) Repurchase value scaled by market 
capitalisation 
Number of share options held scaled by 
number of company shares outstanding 
Aboody and Kasznik 
(2008) 
Change in repurchase value scaled by 
market capitalisation 
Change in the value of incentives granted 
scaled by market capitalisation 
Lamba and Miranda 
(2010) 
Number of shares repurchased 
scaled by number of company shares 
outstanding 
Number (value) of share options held scaled by 
the number of company shares outstanding 
(market capitalisation) 
Young and Yang 
(2011) 
Binary variable (did company 
repurchase or not?); repurchase 
value scaled by assets 
Binary variable indicating whether EPS-related 
conditions were present 
Bhargava (2013) Log of repurchase value Log of value of share options granted and 
realised 
De Cesari and 
Ozkan (2015) 
Decision between repurchases and 
other payout methods; repurchase 
value scaled by market capitalisation 
Number of instruments held scaled by number 
of company shares outstanding 
Burns, McTier, and 
Minnick (2015) 
Binary variable (did company 
repurchase or not?); repurchase 
value scaled by assets 




Decision between repurchases and 
other payout methods 
Value of share-based remuneration scaled by 
assets 
Edmans, Fang, and 
Huang (2018) 
Binary variable (did company 
repurchase or not?); repurchase 
value scaled by market capitalisation 
Value (share price sensitivity) of share-based 
remuneration vested 
Moore (2018) Binary variable (did company 
repurchase or not?); percentage of 
shares repurchased 
Binary variable indicating whether or not share-






Binary variable (did company 
repurchase or not?); mean value of 
repurchases 
Binary variable indicating whether EPS-related 
or TSR-related conditions were present 
Gao and Kronlund 
(2020) 




3.5.1.1 Dependent variable 
A total of 15 previous studies are listed in Table 3.1. Of these studies three studies (Department for 
Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2019; Moore, 2018; Young & Yang, 2011) employed only 
share repurchases as dependent variable. Most of the other studies considered share repurchases in 
relation to dividends (payout in general versus retention) as dependent variable. However, some 
studies also considered aspects of executive remuneration; abnormal returns earned subsequent to 
repurchase announcements; mergers and acquisitions; and earnings management as dependent 
variables, in conjunction with share repurchases (in separate regressions within the same paper). 
A dependent variable often used in previous studies was the decision to repurchase (compared to 
either not repurchasing; increasing dividends; or retention). A ‘decision to repurchase’ indicator was 
used in nine of the previous 15 studies. As such, it was decided to include a binary dependent variable 
in the present study, taking the form of ‘1’ when a company repurchased in a certain year, and ‘0’ 
when a company did not repurchase. 
Additionally, most previous studies (11 of the 15 studies) employed the value spent on repurchases 
as dependent variable. Most often this value was scaled by either market capitalisation (6 studies) or 
assets (2 studies). Thus, in the present study the rand value spent on share repurchases, scaled by 
market capitalisation, was identified as a second dependent variable (in addition to the binary 
‘decision to repurchase’). Given the unique South African regulatory environment, the following rand 
values spent on share repurchases were identified: 
• Total (net) repurchases (excluding repurchases of treasury shares by the holding company, as such 
repurchases have no signalling value, are not expected to increase the share price of the company 
and do not represent a cash outflow from a group perspective) 
• Repurchases by the holding company from third parties (excluding repurchases of treasury shares) 
• Repurchases by subsidiaries 
• General repurchases 
• Other specific repurchases  
• Announced general repurchases  
• Unannounced general repurchases 
Data on whether or not a company executed a share repurchase, and the rand values involved, were 
collected as explained in Section 3.3. The market capitalisation used to scale the rand values involved 
was the lagged market capitalisation, as collected from IRESS Expert (financial database).  
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3.5.1.2 Independent variables 
In terms of independent variables, previous studies have either employed (i) the number of executive 
share-based instruments; (ii) the value of executive share-based instruments; or (iii) whether 
performance conditions based on EPS and/or TSR are employed. In South Africa, the value of share-
based incentives is poorly disclosed in the annual financial statements of companies and is not 
available from commercial financial databases – as such, the value of share-based remuneration is not 
an appropriate independent variable in the South African context. Furthermore, if one uses the value 
of share repurchases as dependent variable and the value of share-based remuneration as 
independent variable – all measured in the same year, as Geiler and Renneboog (2016) did – then 
reverse causality could become a problem. The reason for the possible reverse causality is the fact 
that increased share repurchases usually increase the share price and thus increase the value of share-
based remuneration, with the dependent variable thus influencing the independent variable (thus 
reverse causality).  
With this as background, it was decided to include two ratio-scale independent variables (relating to 
executive share-based remuneration): the number of share-based instruments exercised and the 
number of share-based instruments held at year end (both scaled by the number of company shares 
outstanding). The number of share-based instruments exercised aims to capture the number of 
instruments from which the executives would have realised a benefit in a given year. For appreciation 
scheme instruments (such as share options, SARs, and share purchase plans) the benefit is only 
realised on exercise (and not on vesting). However, for full quantum schemes the vesting and exercise 
date are the same, as the benefit is fully realised on vesting (which is therefore also seen as the 
exercise date). Some of the more recent studies (Edmans et al., 2018; Moore, 2018) employed the 
value of vested instruments, but this could be argued to be an incomplete measurement, as the 
benefit from share appreciation scheme instruments are only received on exercise date. 
In additional to the two ratio-scale variables, a third (binary) independent variable was added, to 
indicate whether the company employed performance conditions related to share price, TSR and/or 
EPS (or not). All share-based instruments (and not only share options) were included in the 
measurement of the independent variables, as full quantum schemes had become more prominent in 
the later years covered by the study (most of the more recent studies in Table 3.1 also included all 
instrument types). The share-based remuneration received by all executives were included in the 
present study, and not only those received by the CEO. Although the CEO is probably the most 
dominant executive, all executives would be involved in making the decision to repurchase and their 
financial interest should thus be considered (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015, p. 75).  
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Some of the previous studies employed a lagged independent variable, while others measured the 
dependent and independent variables in the same period as the dependent variable. However, when 
the exercise or vesting of share-based instruments is identified as independent variable, it makes 
sense to measure the instruments exercised (or vested) in the same period as the share repurchase. 
This was done in all the studies that employed the vesting of share-based instruments as independent 
variable (Edmans et al., 2018; Gao & Kronlund, 2020; Moore, 2018) – although the studies mentioned 
employed value of share-based incentives rather than the number of instruments involved. As the 
present study employed the number of instruments exercised as an independent variable, it was 
decided to measure all the dependent and independent variables in the same time period (i.e. the 
dependent variables were not lagged). 
The number of instruments involved, as well as whether performance conditions related to share 
price, TSR and/or EPS were employed, were collected as explained in Section 3.4. During the 
reconciliations done to identify the number of shares repurchased, the number of shares in issuance 
by both the holding company and the group was collected. It was decided to scale the number of 
share-based instruments exercised during the period and held at year end by the number of holding 
company shares outstanding (and not the group number of shares). This makes the research 
comparable to global research where a group number of shares does not exist, as subsidiaries are not 
allowed to repurchase. Additionally, using the holding company number of shares to scale the 
independent variable corresponds to the market capitalisation used to scale the dependent variable 
(market capitalisation is calculated as number of shares in issue by the holding company multiplied by 
the share price at a certain date). Moreover, employing the holding company number of shares 
corresponds to the JSE’s disclosed number of shares and market capitalisation practices (therefore it 
represents the real-time publicly available data of the JSE on the number of shares and market 
capitalisation) (Bester et al., 2008). 
3.5.1.3 Sub-questions for Research question 3 
Based in the dependent and independent variables identified, a number of sub-questions were 
developed in respect of Research question 3. These were listed in Chapter 1. To summarise, the sub-
questions considered whether (i) the decision to repurchase, and (ii) the value spent on share 
repurchases was related to any of the variables related to executive share-based remuneration (the 
number of instruments held by executives at year end; the number of share-based instruments 
exercised by executives during the reporting period; or employing performance conditions that are 
linked to share price, TSR and/or EPS). 
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3.5.2 Control variables 
The control variables employed by previous studies (Table 3.1) were examined in depth, to decide 
whether these controls should also be included in the present study. Usually the previous studies 
employed lagged values for some or all of control variables employed (when it was reasoned that 
share repurchases in a current period were related to a control variable in the prior period). As a fall-
back, it was decided that control variables should be lagged, unless an appropriate reason could be 
found not to do so. Previous research mostly employed scaled variables (usually scaled by assets). 
The control factors employed by at least half of the previous studies (i.e. by at least 8 of the 15 studies 
shown in Table 3.1) are: 
• company size (employed by all 15 studies); 
• company performance (employed by 11 of the 15 studies); 
• cash (employed by 11 of the 15 studies); 
• leverage (employed by 14 of the 15 studies); 
• company undervaluation (employed by all 15 studies); and  
• share price performance in the prior period (employed by 9 of the 15 studies). 
In the present study, it was decided to control for all the factors listed in the preceding paragraph. The 
measurement of each of the factors are addressed separately. All control variables were collected 
using the IRESS Expert (financial database). 
Company size was usually measured by market capitalisation (in 7 previous studies) or assets (in 7 
previous studies). In 12 of the 15 previous studies the logarithm of the chosen proxy was employed. 
In the present study it was decided to measure company size as the lagged value of the logarithm of 
market capitalisation. When looking at the findings of most of the previous studies, it was expected 
that larger companies would be more likely to engage in share repurchases (Burns et al., 2015; De 
Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Geiler & Renneboog, 2016) and to spend more resources on share repurchases 
(Burns et al., 2015; De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Edmans et al., 2018).  
A company which is performing well, and generating profits, would be more inclined to execute share 
repurchases (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Geiler & Renneboog, 2016). In previous studies, company 
performance was mostly measured as some form of return on assets. Two previous studies employed 
both operating and non-operating performance (Edmans et al., 2018; Weisbenner, 2004), but the 
remainder only focused on operating performance. It can be argued that company performance in the 
current year (rather than in the prior year) would influence share repurchase behaviour in the current 
year – in line with Jolls (1998), who used the non-lagged company performance in her analysis, while 
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lagging all other controls. It was decided to employ non-lagged return on assets to measure company 
performance in the present study. 
Companies with more excess cash, would be more likely to execute share repurchases (De Cesari & 
Ozkan, 2015). To estimate cash, six of the previous studies listed in Table 3.1 employed cash reserves 
(in the statement of financial position), while seven previous studies employed cash flow (from the 
statement of cash flows). When share repurchases are analysed, share repurchase value is often 
presented as a percentage of cash flow (Birstingl, 2016). Therefore, cash flow was used to measure 
the availability of cash in the present study: specifically cash available (cash from operating activities 
before payment of dividends), the nearest item to free cash flow as captured by IRESS Expert was 
employed. Cash available was not lagged, as it can be argued that a company which has excess cash 
in the current year, would be more inclined to engage in share repurchases in the current year (this 
idea was also mentioned in the 2009 annual financial statement of Woolworths Holdings Limited, as 
described in Section 4.4.1.3). The value of cash available was scaled by assets – in line with previous 
research. 
Leverage was mostly measured by the debt-to-assets ratio (in 8 of the 15 previous studies). The lagged 
debt-to-assets ratio was employed to proxy for leverage in the present study. A company with a lower 
debt-to-assets ratio would be more likely to engage in share repurchases (Geiler & Renneboog, 2016). 
Undervaluation is one of the major reasons that companies mention for engaging in share repurchases 
(Kahle, 2002). Previous studies (12 out of 15 studies) mostly used the market-to-book ratio to measure 
undervaluation. The lagged market-to-book ratio was employed in the present study. 
A falling share price can lead to a company viewing itself as undervalued, and therefore engage in 
share repurchases (Edmans et al., 2018). Thus, most of the previous studies included some measure 
for prior-period share price performance as control. The majority of the studies that controlled for 
share price performance, employed the percentage of increase or decrease in the share price over the 
prior period (calculated as the share price at the end of the prior period divided by share price at 
beginning of the prior period, minus 1). This measurement was also employed in this study.  
Dividends were included as an alternative dependent variable in eight of the 15 previous studies. Two 
of the three studies that employed only share repurchases as dependent variables controlled for 
dividends (using either a binary variable indicating whether the company had paid dividends, or the 
dividend yield) (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2019; Young & Yang, 2011). 
It was therefore decided to control for dividends, using the dividend yield as proxy. The dividend yield 
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in the current year was chosen to match the period in which the share repurchases occurred (as many 
studies employed dividends as an alternative dependent variable). 
Institutional shareholding, or individual ownership as the inverse of institutional ownership, was used 
as control variable in seven of the 15 previous studies. Institutional ownership is associated with 
higher payout (Geiler & Renneboog, 2016), but its association with share repurchase has not been 
established, as most previous studies that controlled for institutional ownership failed to find a 
significant correlation between share repurchases and institutional ownership (De Cesari & Ozkan, 
2015; Geiler & Renneboog, 2016; Moore, 2019). Furthermore, institutional shareholding is not 
available on the IRESS Expert financial database, where all control variables were sourced. As a result, 
it was decided to not include institutional ownership as control variable in the present study. The 
possible omitted variable bias that arises is discussed in Chapter 6 and included as a limitation of the 
present study in Chapter 7.  
Two of three studies that only used share repurchases as dependent variable controlled for the 
number of shares already held by executives (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 
2019; Moore, 2018). As the number of shares beneficially held by directors is available on IRESS Expert, 
it was decided to include the number of shares – scaled by the number of holding company shares 
outstanding – as control variable. As the other variables measured in number of shares (the 
independent variable measuring the number of share-based instruments exercised and held) were 
not lagged, it was decided not to lag the percentage of beneficial ownership by directors. 
In previous studies it was initially heavily debated whether share repurchases were linked to 
specifically executive share-based instruments, or rather the share-based instruments issued to all 
employees. The majority of the studies published before 2012 (4 of the first 7 studies in Table 3.1) 
employed both the share-based instruments held by all employees and those held by executives as 
independent or control variables (with mixed results reported). However, only one of the more recent 
studies (i.e. 1 of the last 8 studies in Table 3.1) included the share-based instruments held by all 
employees as control variable. It would therefore not seem essential to include this as control variable 
(only 5 of the 15 previous studies did so, and mostly the initial ones). Furthermore, the number of 
instruments held by all employees is not always specifically reported in annual financial statements 




3.5.3 Types of multivariate techniques performed 
The types of multivariate techniques employed in previous studies, to test the relationship between 
share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration, can be seen in Table 3.2. The term 
‘binary’ is used to indicate tests employing binary (or discrete) dependent variables, and the term 
‘ratio’ is used for ratio-scale dependent variables (like the number of shares repurchased or the rand 
value involved). 
Jolls (1998) and Weisbenner (2004) employed cross-sectional data when testing share repurchases as 
dependent variable, while the remainder employed panel data. Weisbenner (2004) mentioned that a 
shortcoming in using cross-sectional data is the inability to control for company fixed effects (which 
are expected when studying the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration). Owing to this shortcoming, Weisbenner (2004) supplemented the cross-sectional data 
he used to study share repurchases with panel data to study the change in shares outstanding (but 





Statistical techniques and fixed effects adjustments employed in previous studies 





Jolls (1998) Binary: Logistic regression 
model (logit) 
No mention No mention Dummies 
Fenn and Liang 
(2001)  
Ratio: Tobit regression 
model (tobit) 
No mention No mention Dummies 
Kahle (2002) Binary: Logit 
Ratio: Not indicated 
No mention No mention Dummies 
Weisbenner 
(2004) 
Ratio: Tobit  No mention No mention Controlled for 
Aboody and 
Kasznik (2008) 
Ratio: Robust regression 
model (i.e. not influenced 
by outliers) 
No mention No mention Dummies 
Lamba and 
Miranda (2010) 
Ratio: Tobit No mention Dummies No mention 
Young and Yang 
(2011) 
Binary: Logit 
Ratio: Tobit  
No mention No mention Controlled for 




Dummies Included as 
robustness check 
De Cesari and 
Ozkan (2015) 
Binary: Logit 
Ratio: Tobit  




Binary: Probit regression 
model 
Ratio: Tobit  




Binary: Logit and probit 
regression model 
 




Binary: Probit regression 
model & linear probability 
model (LPM) 
Ratio: Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) 
Controlled for Controlled for No mention 
Moore (2018) Binary: LPM 
Ratio: OLS 










No mention Controlled for 
Gao and 
Kronlund (2020) 
Ratio: OLS Controlled for Controlled for Controlled for 
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3.5.3.1 Decision to repurchase 
Considering the previous studies in Table 3.2, the use of a binary logistic regression model (logit) was 
the most common technique employed when the dependent variable was the decision to repurchase 
(a binary dependent variable), although some studies employed a probit regression model or a linear 
probability model (an ordinary least squares regression with a binary dependent variable). Employing 
the linear probability model (LPM) when the dependent variable is binary seems to have become more 
popular of late, if one considers Table 3.2.  
Theoretically, the LPM model is not suited when the dependent variable being studied is binary, as 
the model would predict values for the dependent variable other than zero or one (and possibly below 
zero or in excess of one) (Agresti, 2007, p. 68). Furthermore, the LPM estimates a constant marginal 
effect (the coefficient) at all levels of the independent variable, while the real effect is likely to be non-
linear (when the dependent variable is either zero or one) (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998, p. 
277; Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 243, 554). However, LPM coefficients are easy to interpret (Hellevik, 2009, 
p. 66). But, to determine the significance of the coefficients produced by the LPM, the residuals of the 
model need to be normally distributed. With a binary dependent variable, normality of the error is 
unlikely (Hair et al., 1998, p. 277), but asymptotic normality might be assumed in large samples 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 173). Heteroscedasticity is also likely to be a problem when employing a binary 
dependent variable, but this is easily compensated for by employing robust standard errors when 
using the LPM (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 562). Recently, there does indeed seem to be a move towards 
employing the LPM even while acknowledging its shortcomings, especially in large samples (Hellevik, 
2009; Wooldridge, 2010, p. 563).  
A logit model is probably better suited to the binary dependent variable being analysed. The logit 
model employs the maximum likelihood method, in contrast to the LPM which minimises the squared 
residual (Hair et al., 1998, p. 278) and will only predict values of zero or one (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 
565). Using the non-linear logistic function is more likely to yield logical results, as the independent 
variable might have different effects on the dependent variable at different levels (Agresti, 2007, p. 
100). However, the coefficients produced by the logit model have to be converted to a marginal effect 
(partial effect at the average) to enable a more intuitive understanding of the magnitude of the change 
in the dependent variable, as the independent variable increases by one unit (this is, however, easily 
computed by statistical packages) (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 565). Furthermore, the logit model does not 
require homoscedasticity and the errors need not be normally distributed (Long, 2008). 
Given that the majority of previous studies employed the Iogit model and that the logit seems to be 
most appropriate from an econometric perspective, it was decided to employ the logit model to 
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evaluate the binary dependent variable ‘decision to repurchase’ in the present study. However, the 
results of the logit were compared with those produced by the LPM model (as robustness check). 
Although the linear coefficient provided by the LPM could not provide information on the magnitude 
of the real non-linear relationship, the direction of the LPM coefficients would provide additional 
evidence of the existence of a relationship between the decision to repurchase and executive share-
based remuneration. 
Moreover, in a South African study on the determinants of share repurchases and dividends (Wesson 
et al., 2018), a binary variable was used as dependent variable, and analysed using a logit model (which 
provides additional support for using the logit model as main econometric technique in the present 
study). Wesson et al. (2018) mentioned that they had wanted to add executive options as control 
variable in their study, but that this data had not been available in the South African context at the 
time of their study – emphasising the need for the present study to be done. 
3.5.3.2 Value of share repurchases 
Table 3.2 shows that previous studies examining the value spent on repurchases (a ratio-scale 
dependent variable) most commonly used a left-censored tobit regression model. The tobit regression 
model is a partly linear and partly non-linear model which censors observations of the dependent 
variable which fall below or above a certain threshold (Ramalho, Ramalho, & Murteira, 2011). 
However, studies after 2016 all employed ordinary least squares (OLS). Possible reasons for later 
studies employing OLS include:  
• the tendency, mentioned in Section 3.5.3.1, to employ OLS in large samples, although not all OLS 
assumptions are met (this provides easily understandable coefficients if one is primarily interested 
in the direction of the relationship) (Hellevik, 2009)  
• the fact that no fixed-effects version of the tobit model is available, while OLS does allow control 
for fixed effects 
• the fact that tobit does not allow clustering of the standard errors per company, while this is easily 
done in an OLS model 
• the fact that a tobit regression model might be inappropriate when a large number of observations 
of the dependent variable cluster at the boundary (zero, where the censoring occurs) (Wooldridge, 
2010) 
The dependent variable, the value of share repurchases as a percentage of market capitalisation, will 
always range between zero and one (i.e. it is a percentage or a fraction). Wooldridge (2010, p. 748) 
asserts that it is possible to employ a two-limit tobit (censored at zero and one) as econometric model 
when the dependent variable is a fraction; however, he cautions that this only provides reliable results 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
112 
when a clustering occurs at both boundaries (i.e. at zero and one). Using a two-limit tobit is not 
appropriate when the dependent variable only clusters at the zero point (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 748). 
A large number of companies in South Africa do not execute share repurchases, and thus spend zero 
value on share repurchases (Wesson, 2015). It is therefore expected that the majority of the 
observations of the dependent variable would equal zero in the present study. Conversely, no 
company would be expected to repurchase all its shares (i.e. its entire market capitalisation). Thus, it 
is not expected that the dependent variable would take on the value of one. Given that clustering is 
expected at one boundary (zero) but not at the other (one), it would seem as if the use of the tobit 
model would be inappropriate. 
It should be noted that the bounded nature of the dependent variable is natural, i.e. not produced by 
censoring. The tobit model was specifically developed for censored data, where data-points above or 
below the point of censoring could occur, but are censored to a certain point (Ramalho et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the tobit model relies on strict assumptions regarding normality and homoscedasticity, 
which will probably not be met when the dependent variable is a fraction (Ramalho et al., 2011). The 
tobit model would therefore seem inappropriate to employ in the present study.  
The OLS model also does not seem appropriate when studying a dependent variable which is naturally 
bounded between zero and one (Gallani, Krishnan, & Wooldridge, 2015, p. 3). The OLS model could 
predict values outside the natural range (i.e. below zero or more than one) (Ramalho et al., 2011) and 
provides a constant coefficient (i.e. it is a linear model) while the relationship between the dependent 
variable and independent variables is likely to be non-linear (Gallani et al., 2015, p. 4).  
Wooldridge (2010, p. 751), however, proposes an alternative model when the dependent variable is 
naturally bounded between one and zero, with clustering at a single boundary: namely, the fractional 
regression model (FRM). The FRM is modelled using quasi-maximum likelihood estimation 
(Wooldridge, 2010, p.751). A further benefit of using the FRM, is that it relies on a logistic regression 
as backbone (i.e. it estimates a non-linear relationship) and always predicts values between zero and 
one (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996).  
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) developed the FRM to study the employee participation rates in pension 
plans using cross-sectional data. Later, Papke and Wooldridge (2008) expanded on the initial cross-
sectional model by showing that a Mundlak approach can be applied when dealing with panel data. 
Several papers have used the FRM to examine fractional responses, especially in the field of executive 
remuneration. Core, Guay and Larcker (2008) employed the FRM to examine the relationship between 
the percentage of press coverage that is negative and executive remuneration. Their dependent 
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variable had a large clustering at zero (median value of zero) (Core et al., 2008). Gallani et al. (2015) 
compared the usefulness of OLS and FRM models when examining the percentage of executive 
remuneration made up by each component (bonus, share-based remuneration, etc.). They found that 
the FRM produced marginal effects that were similar (in direction, size of coefficient, and significance) 
to those produced by the OLS, but that using FRM led to improved fit (r-squared) owing to its non-
linear coefficient and the fact that it bounds the dependent variable between zero and one. Using the 
FRM also allows researchers to examine the nature of the relationship at different levels of the 
independent variable, as the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is not 
constant (Gallani et al., 2015). Kang and Nanda (2018) examined the disclosure quality of executive 
remuneration in the annual financial statements of Indian companies. They employed the FRM 
because the dependent variable was the percentage of compliance, or the percentage of items 
disclosed. 
Although Gallani et al. (2015) mentioned that the FRM would be useful in studying share repurchase 
value as a percentage of payout, the FRM has not been used to study the fraction of market 
capitalisation repurchased. Two of the previous studies scaled share repurchase value by total assets 
(Burns et al., 2015; Young & Yang, 2011), rather than market capitalisation (this scaled value could 
theoretically exceed one, and thus technically does not qualify as a fraction). Furthermore, the FRM 
has only been available in statistical packages (in Stata, specifically) from 2015 onwards. Thus, earlier 
researchers might not have been aware of the regression model. 
With the aforementioned reasoning as background, it was decided to employ the FRM as primary 
model to investigate the relationship between share repurchase value (as a percentage of market 
capitalisation) and executive share-based remuneration. However, since the tobit model was the most 
prominent technique employed by previous studies, it was decided to employ a tobit regression as a 
robustness check. Additionally, this will enable a comparison of the findings of the present study with 
those of previous studies (which mostly employed tobit).  
3.5.3.3 Fixed effects and other adjustments 
Table 3.2 reveals that earlier studies mostly ignored company and year fixed effects, but the later 
studies most often adjusted for fixed effects relating to year and company. In accounting studies that 
employ panel data, such as the present study, it is usually important to control for fixed effects (De 
Jager, 2008). Both share repurchase behaviour and the resources spent varied quite substantially over 
the period being studied (see Chapter 4), therefore it was decided also to include year fixed effects 
(dummies) in all regressions executed. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
114 
It was further expected that company fixed effects would be significant, as institutional factors (e.g. 
the strength of corporate governance) pertaining to a specific company could influence both share 
repurchases (dependent variable) and executive share-based remuneration (independent variable). If 
these company fixed effects are not controlled for, then this would lead to omitted variable bias, as 
the error term would contain these company-specific effects that are correlated with the independent 
variable. Therefore, it was decided to incorporate company fixed effects in the regression models.  
However, both the tobit and the FRM do not provide an option to control for fixed effects (in Stata). 
Furthermore, the fixed effects model available for the logit model is a conditional one, which drops all 
companies for which no variance in the dependent variable occurs (i.e. when the company had no 
repurchases in the 2002–2017 period). Using the conditional (fixed effects), logit would severely 
decrease the data set used as many South African companies do not execute share repurchases at all, 
but these companies should not be excluded as they provide valuable information. Thus, the only 
regression model chosen that has appropriate fixed effects available is the LPM model, but the LPM is 
merely employed as a robustness check for the logit when examining the decision to repurchase in 
the present study. It was therefore decided to search for alternative ways to account for company 
fixed effects in the data. 
Adding company dummies to eliminate fixed effects might be sub-optimal as it diminishes the degrees 
of freedom severely and might influence the model’s overall effectiveness. Thus, the Mundlak 
approach was identified as an alternative approach to account for company fixed effects contained in 
the panel data. Under the Mundlak approach, an additional variable (the mean value per company) is 
calculated for every independent and control variable (Mundlak, 1978). These additional variables are 
then added to the regression model to control for fixed company effects (Mundlak, 1978). Papke and 
Wooldridge (2008), when controlling for fixed effects in the FRM, advocated using the Mundlak 
approach. It was decided to employ the Mundlak approach in all regressions executed, to enable 
comparisons between regressions.  
Industry effects were mostly compensated for using dummy variables in previous studies (Table 3.2). 
The data set used in the present study contained companies from a wide range of industries. Some of 
the industries contained a small number of observations, while others contained more. The JSE 
employed a new industry classification system from 2006 onwards, which differed substantially from 
the previous system used during 2002–2005. Mans-Kemp and Viviers (2018, p. 162) noted that a large 
number of companies had to be reclassified in 2006, when transitioning from the old to the new 
classification system. Thus it was decided that the industry classification system in the 2002–2005 
period and the 2006–2017 period were not comparable, and using different classification systems in 
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one study would lead to inconsistency (and possibly seemingly significant industry effects that actually 
result from reclassifications). Therefore, it was decided to only include industry dummies from 2006 
onwards, based on the new industry classification system employed by the JSE from that date. 
However, the inclusion of industry dummies in the main regression would have led to a loss of 
information relating to the 2002–2005 period. It was therefore decided to obtain the main regression 
results without inserting industry dummies. However, at the end of each section, a separate test was 
done which included industry dummies, to examine whether industry fixed effects were significant 
(for the 2006–2017 period only).  
Most of the more recent studies employed standard errors that were robust to heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at company level. These adjustments were also made in the present study, when available 
in the regression model being employed (in Stata the logit and tobit models did not allow for clustering 
by company). 
3.6 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
Reliability refers to the rigour with which research is conducted (i.e. whether data collection methods 
and statistical analysis were sound). Reliability may be inferred if (1) the researcher describes the 
research procedures in sufficient detail to allow replication by another person; and if (2) replication 
by another researcher renders the same results (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 192). Another factor which 
ensures reliability is if the procedures allow consistent data-capturing and analysis (Burns & Burns, 
2008, p. 411).  
Hofstee (2006, p. 53) advocates that one of the primary ways to ensure reliability of the research 
methods is to complete a preliminary or pilot study. In the case of the present study, the procedures 
to capture data on share repurchases were well developed by Wesson (2015), but little was known 
regarding executive share-based remuneration prior to the pilot study. The pilot study which was 
conducted (see Section 3.2.1) refined the data collection procedures, and made them more reliable 
and consistent.  
Threats to reliability include participant error or bias, and researcher error or bias (Saunders et al., 
2012, p. 192). Researcher error can be minimised by documenting all choices and procedures in detail, 
so that they can be repeated should a similar situation arise. For examples of this, as applied in the 
present study, see Sections 3.3.3 (relating to share repurchases) and 3.4.2 (relating to executive share-
based remuneration). The participants of the present study took the form of the companies studied, 
from which specifically disclosures regarding share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration were garnered. One of the major threats identified was the inconsistent disclosure of 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
116 
executive share-based remuneration in annual financial statements (and subsequent capturing by 
IRESS). Errors, where identified, were compensated for by updating IRESS data to match the financial 
statement disclosures. However, inaccurate or inconsistent disclosure in annual financial statements 
remains a limitation in the present study, as in any research that relies on financial data presented by 
companies in their financial statements. 
Validity differs from reliability in that it asks whether the research actually measures what it purports 
to measure (Hair et al., 1998, p. 9). Two types of validity exist, namely internal and external validity 
(Burns & Burns, 2008, pp. 426–427). In terms of the validity of the data items in the present study, 
there is little room for error, as most of them are straightforward numerical measures of financial 
data. Share repurchases are measured in the number of shares repurchased and rand value (Research 
question 1); executive share-based remuneration is primarily measured as the type of scheme 
granted, the performance conditions attached, and the number of instruments involved (Research 
question 2). These measures are easily understood to measure what they purport to measure.  
Regarding Research question 3, the choice of dependent and independent variables employed in the 
regressions was guided by earlier studies addressing the same research question. Internal validity is 
achieved when all other factors (control variables that might explain the movement in the dependent 
variable) are controlled for (Burns & Burns, 2008, p. 427). In the present study, the control variables 
(that are often associated with increased or decreased share repurchases) identified in previous 
studies were used during the regressions conducted to reduce omitted variable bias. In addition, 
internal validity can be threatened (Burns & Burns, 2008, pp. 432–435): 
• when small sample sizes are used (not the case in the present study); and 
• when the assumptions of the statistical tests used are violated (the choice of regression models 
and their appropriateness were discussed in Section 3.5.3). 
The final type of validity is external validity. This deals with the extent to which the results of the 
present study can be extrapolated to the population, or other groups and settings (Saunders et al., 
2012, p. 194). Sampling bias would usually pose a problem for external validity in terms of generalising 
to the population (Burns & Burns, 2008, p. 431), but in the present study no sampling occurred and 
therefore no generalisation to the population is required. It would, however, not be appropriate to 
generalise the findings to the JSE industries that were not studied (i.e. Basic Materials and Financial 
industries) as the share repurchase activity in those industries seems more subdued. Furthermore, it 
would not be appropriate to generalise the findings to other countries or other time periods in South 
Africa, as other regulatory requirements would be in place.  
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3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND COLLECTING PUBLIC DATA INTO A NEW DATABASE 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the proposed contributions of the present study is the creation of 
accurate and complete databases on share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration, 
that can be employed in future research endeavours. It was also necessary to obtain this data, to 
address the overall research aim of the present study effectively – namely to determine whether there 
is a relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration in South Africa. 
All the data employed in creating the databases were secondary data, obtained from the annual 
financial statements of the identified companies or the IRESS financial database, and in some cases 
from both. As such, potential ethical issues were considered to be minimal. Ethical clearance was 
obtained from Stellenbosch University’s Research Ethics Committee.  
However, executive remuneration is a sensitive issue, especially in South Africa given the high income-
inequality existing here. If a positive relationship between share repurchases and executive share-
based remuneration is found, the resultant possibility that executives might be abusing their power 
to extract rents from the companies they work for, could fuel debates relating to social justice and 
whether South African executives act ethically. As such, the researcher realises that the topic needs 
to be treated with sensitivity and caution, especially when the results of the present study are 
published. 
As mentioned before, only publicly available data were employed in the present study. The question 
arises whether the publicly available data could not have been used ‘as is’ (namely, whether it was 
necessary to reorganise public data to create new databases on share repurchases and executive 
share-based remuneration) to address the research aim of the present study.  
From a corporate governance perspective, the question is whether shareholders could employ the 
information that is publicly available in IRESS and annual financial statements ‘as is’ to monitor the 
companies they invest in. In respect of share repurchases, Wesson (2015) noted that IRESS does not 
provide an accurate record of share repurchase data. This was confirmed in the present study, as 
noted in Section 4.9. Furthermore, Wesson (2015) found the disclosures pertaining to share 
repurchases in annual financial statements to be inconsistent and stated that complex reconciliations, 
conducted by an IFRS specialist, are required to obtain a comprehensive record of share repurchase 
activity. Also, in respect of executive share-based remuneration data, the pilot study found that this 
data could be extracted from IRESS on a per-executive basis, but that the data had to be updated and 
interpreted based on the disclosures in the annual financial statements (Steenkamp & Wesson, 
2018a). Again, specialised IFRS knowledge had to be applied to produce accurate information on 
executive share-based remuneration. Furthermore, the information that is publicly available, in either 
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in the annual financial statements or the IRESS financial database, is not reported in a per-company 
format as is required for the purpose of the present study. Therefore, based on the findings of previous 
research and the pilot study, it is argued that the information contained in IRESS and annual financial 
statements could not be used ‘as is’ to reach the research aim of the present study. 
Although the present study was conducted from a corporate governance perspective, it might be 
appropriate to also address this question (relating to the necessity of recollecting public information 
into a new database) from the perspective of market efficiency. Fama (1970) noted that, in an efficient 
market, share prices will reflect all available information. However, it has been debated whether the 
JSE is even weak-form efficient (Grater & Struweg, 2015; Heymans & Santana, 2018). Furthermore, a 
more practical form of market efficiency takes into account the costs involved to make information 
public (Fama, 1991, p. 1575). Substantial time, effort and knowledge ‘costs’ had to be incurred by the 
researcher to produce a complete record of South African share repurchase activity, which differs 
substantially from that which is available from SENS announcements (see Section 4.7). Similarly, per-
company information on executive share-based remuneration is not publicly available in annual 
financial statements. Therefore, it is argued that, pertaining to information on share repurchases and 
executive share-based remuneration, the JSE is not efficient – given that complete and accurate data 
on these variables are not publicly available.   
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CHAPTER 4: EXTENT OF SHARE REPURCHASE ACTIVITY 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
Share repurchases can be used to distribute excess cash flow to shareholders, signal undervaluation 
to the market, extinguish the shareholding of specific shareholders, and increase the share price and 
EPS figure. Since the legalisation of share repurchases in 1999, South African listed companies have 
increasingly been employing this financial tool. However, the full extent of share repurchase activity 
is unknown, owing to the JSE’s announcement rules relating to general repurchases: companies only 
need to announce their general share repurchases on the SENS once a three per cent threshold has 
been reached.  
To address this knowledge gap, Research question 1 of the present study investigated the extent of 
share repurchase activity in South Africa during the 2002–2017 period. Most of the data relating to 
the 2002–2009 period had already been collected by Wesson (2015). The present study builds on the 
database created by Wesson (2015) by adding additional companies to the 2002–2009 period and 
collecting the data for the 2010–2017 period. Several research sub-questions were developed to 
investigate share repurchase activity (per company included in the population, annually for the 2002–
2017 period): 
• Sub-question 1.1: Which companies engaged in share repurchases? 
• Sub-question 1.2: What was the total quantum (number and value) of shares repurchased?  
• Sub-question 1.3: What percentage of share repurchases was associated with each of the 
repurchasing entities (i.e the holding company repurchasing from third parties; the holding 
company repurchasing treasury shares; and subsidiaries)?  
• Sub-question 1.4: What percentage of share repurchases was associated with each of the 
repurchase types (i.e. general repurchases; pro rata specific repurchases; specific repurchases 
where the holding company repurchases treasury shares; and other specific repurchases)? 
• Sub-question 1.5: What percentage of share repurchases was announced and not announced via 
the JSE’s SENS (transparency)?  
The term ‘quantum’ as employed in sub-question 1.2 entails both the number of shares repurchased 
and the rand value involved. Both aspects are discussed in Chapter 4, although the emphasis is placed 
on the rand value involved, as this is employed as dependent variable in Chapter 6. Further, in 
addressing sub-question 1.2, the rand value spent by South African companies (as a percentage of 
both profit and cash flow) is compared to trends from other countries. 
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A final research sub-question (sub-question 1.6) was added to the bulleted list above. Sub-question 
1.6 asked whether there was a difference in the share repurchase activity (in respect of number of 
companies; quantum of shares repurchased; preferred repurchasing entity; preferred repurchase 
type; and percentage of repurchases that were announced) when one compares the 2000–2009 and 
2010–2017 periods. This final sub-question is relevant, since Wesson (2015) largely illuminated pre-
2010 share repurchase activity, but little is known regarding the post global financial crisis activity. 
Post-crisis share repurchase trends in South Africa are compared to the pre-2010 trends reported by 
Wesson (2015). 
Knowledge of the extent of share repurchase activity during the 2002–2017 period (and especially the 
2010–2017 period) is useful to shareholders in that it informs them about the resources invested in 
share repurchases by companies. Shareholders are then able to assess whether the resources were 
well spent or should rather have been invested internally, for example in innovation and human 
resources. In addition, the present study determines the percentage of share repurchases that were 
announced via SENS. Shareholders and the JSE are then able to assess whether the information lost 
because of unannounced share repurchases is material to decision-making. Improved regulations 
could be drafted by the JSE to ensure that stakeholders are made aware of all share repurchases 
executed by JSE-listed companies, in real time. Finally, future researchers could use the share 
repurchase database created by the present study to compare share repurchases to other aspects 
relating to a company’s operations and corporate governance policies and practices.  
This chapter starts with a short summary of the research methodology followed (Section 4.2), which 
will enable an understanding of the different categories of share repurchases referred to. The research 
sub-questions are then addressed one by one (Sections 4.3 to 4.8), after which the data on share 
repurchase value collected in the present study are compared to that available in IRESS (Section 4.9) 
and concluding remarks are provided (Section 4.10). Please note that rounding may cause differences 
of one or two shares or rands in the totals reported in Chapter 4. 
4.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
As explained in Chapter 3, data on the companies that engaged in share repurchases during the period 
2002–2017, as well as the number of shares repurchased and rand value spent thereon, were hand-
collected from annual financial statements. The share repurchase data were categorised based on the 




Repurchases by share trusts (consolidated or otherwise) were excluded from the share repurchase 
database. The reasons for this included the lack of reliable data as well as the fact that the JSE does 
not define these repurchases as share repurchases nor requires such repurchases to be announced on 
SENS. Accordingly, repurchases by the holding company from share trusts were classified as 
repurchases by the holding company from third parties. 
It must be noted that this methodology was employed for all the companies forming part of the 
research population, from 2002 (or the first year of a company being listed, if later) to 2017 (or until 
the last year of a company being listed, if earlier). As Wesson (2015) had created a database containing 
the share repurchase activity of most JSE-listed companies for the 2000–2009 period, most of the data 
on the 2002–2009 period was extracted from the Wesson database. All data for the 2010–2017 period 
was hand-collected during the present study. Moreover, the present study added data on the entire 
2002–2017 period for new entrants to the population, where applicable. Delisted companies were 
included in the population until the date of their delisting. During the target period, several companies 
delisted from the JSE.  
4.3 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 1.1: NUMBER OF COMPANIES INVOLVED  
The research population was described in Chapter 3 on methodology. All the companies that formed 
part of the population had primary listings on the JSE. Listed companies in the Basic Materials and 
Financial industries were however excluded. Delisted companies were included until the point of 
delisting, and new companies were included from their date of listing. Owing to companies delisting 
and new companies listing, the number of companies studied varied over the period 2002–2017.  
A total of 220 companies were included in the final population, pertaining to the 2002–2017 period, 
and this resulted in 2 392 company years being studied. Of the 220 companies, 143 (65%) engaged in 
share repurchases at some point during the target period. Table 4.1 shows the number of companies 
studied in each of the years, as well as the number (and percentage) of these companies that engaged 





Number of companies studied, and the percentage that engaged in share repurchases 
Year Number of 
companies studied 
Number of companies 




engaged in share 
repurchases 
2002 160 40 25% 
2003 162 49 30% 
2004 163 40 25% 
2005 151 40 26% 
2006 144 38 26% 
2007 153 27 18% 
2008 159 40 25% 
2009 159 41 26% 
2010 154 41 27% 
2011 153 45 29% 
2012 152 38 25% 
2013 146 32 22% 
2014 138 39 28% 
2015 135 39 29% 
2016 134 46 34% 
2017 129 46 36% 
Total number of 
company years 2 392 641 27% 
On average, companies repurchased shares in 27 per cent of the company years studied. A relatively 
stable trend in the percentage of companies repurchasing was noticed over the period. Substantial 
deviations from the average (judged to occur when the annual percentage was five percentage points 
more or less than the average) only occurred in 2007, 2013 and 2016/2017. Figure 4.1 graphically 




Figure 4.1. Number of companies executing share repurchases as a percentage of the total number 
of companies in the sample 
During 2007, substantially fewer companies engaged in share repurchases than before. A reason for 
this decrease in share repurchasing activity could be the change in the STC regulations during this 
period. Before 1 October 2007, no STC was levied when a holding company repurchased treasury 
shares, but from 1 October 2007, STC was applicable. When tax changes occur, companies may be 
unsure as to the effect that the tax change will have and may refrain from acting until some clarity has 
been found (Nel & Wesson, 2019). Another possible explanation for the 2007 decrease in number of 
companies repurchasing could be the onset of the global financial crisis. But the crisis only started 
during 2007 and lasted until 2009. The number of companies repurchasing in 2008 and 2009 reflected 
only small deviations from the average for the period, so it does not seem as if the global financial 
crisis was the main contributing factor to the 2007 decrease.  
The next major change in South African tax law relating to share repurchases occurred on 1 April 2012, 
when the STC regime was replaced by dividends tax. During the year 2013, following the tax change, 
substantially fewer companies engaged in share repurchases, probably because they were unsure as 
to the tax consequences after dividends tax became effective. During 2016/2017, substantially more 
companies engaged in share repurchases than previously. The reason for this phenomenon still needs 
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4.4 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 1.2: SHARE REPURCHASE QUANTUM 
In this section the quantum of share repurchases during the 2002–2017 period is examined and 
compared to the findings of earlier global research. Quantum is understood to be both the number of 
shares repurchased and the rand value involved. However, the discussion only briefly deals with the 
number of shares, and examines the rand value involved in greater depth. The rand value spent on 
share repurchases is discussed more thoroughly as this was employed as dependent variable to 
address Research question 3 (Chapter 6). Furthermore, the rand value spent provides a more accurate 
picture of the resources invested in share repurchases. However, it was still deemed important to 
ascertain the number of shares repurchased, as a comprehensive share repurchase database had been 
developed, and the first step in the research methodology involved extensive reconciliations to ensure 
that all shares repurchased had been identified.  
Data on both gross share repurchases and net share repurchases were collected. Gross share 
repurchases included all repurchases executed (by any repurchasing entity), and thus included the 
holding company repurchasing treasury shares (from the subsidiary). On the other hand, net share 
repurchases were limited to where the subsidiary repurchased, or the holding company repurchased 
from third parties (i.e. excluding the holding company repurchasing treasury shares, which were 
deemed to be an intragroup transaction). Table 4.2 shows the gross and net number of shares 
repurchased, as well as the gross and net rand value spent on share repurchases, annually over the 





Number of shares repurchased and rand value spent on share repurchases: Net versus gross 
 Number of shares repurchased Rand value spent on share 
repurchases (R’000) 
Year Net Gross Net Gross 
2002 582 371 995 625 068 720 3 091 097 3 140 960 
2003 495 730 821 556 526 443 3 130 864 3 394 904 
2004 344 774 540 393 574 515 2 896 904 2 911 890 
2005 412 436 243 585 475 219 8 630 784 12 183 006 
2006 316 907 334 531 052 918 7 884 070 15 899 464 
2007 129 860 133 205 692 321 5 939 940 7 729 015 
2008 369 651 917 402 824 619 13 098 372 13 374 994 
2009 731 455 382 1 253 735 548 25 015 009 31 759 187 
2010 317 151 190 375 246 118 2 931 689 4 922 846 
2011 293 661 356 364 281 688 8 156 639 14 516 658 
2012 304 114 389 352 601 590 5 286 578 6 315 414 
2013 157 463 900 184 993 264 3 340 956 5 251 178 
2014 239 238 577 407 718 603 6 756 486 14 437 598 
2015 362 323 201 413 036 462 9 789 175 12 095 548 
2016 215 942 340 240 292 359 6 301 004 6 370 388 
2017 401 099 460 418 107 473 3 098 075 4 573 564 
Total 5 674 182 778 7 310 227 860 115 347 642 158 876 612 
4.4.1 Trends relating to the number of shares repurchased 
In this section, the trends relating to the number of shares repurchased are discussed briefly. Both the 
net (Section 4.4.1.1) and gross (Section 4.4.1.2) number repurchased will be analysed. Since the 
number of shares involved is quite large, the trends are easier to comprehend when presented 




Figure 4.2. Gross versus net number of shares repurchased 
Looking at the trends in Figure 4.2, one can see that a peak in share repurchase activity occurred 
during 2009. The reasons for this peak are discussed in Section 4.4.1.3. 
4.4.1.1 Trends: Net number of shares 
The average net number of shares repurchased per annum during 2002–2017 was approximately 
355 million shares. Relatively high numbers of shares were repurchased in 2002 and 2003 (probably 
owing to the initial uptake of the share repurchases phenomenon subsequent to their legalisation), 
dropping closer to the average in the period 2004–2006. A sharp drop in 2007 was noticed, possibly 
caused by the change in STC regulations and the onset of the global financial crisis (2007 had the 
smallest number of shares repurchased in the target period). In 2008 the number of shares was close 
to the average of 355 million shares. During 2009 the highest number of net shares during the period 
were repurchased, being 731 million shares. In the following year (2010), the number decreased below 
the average of 355 million shares. From 2010 onwards, the annual number of shares repurchased was 
generally less than the average for the period 2002–2017 (only in 2 of the 8 years during 2010–2017 
did it exceed 355 million shares) and the trend seemed to become more stable.  
A structural break possibly occurred between 2009 and 2010 (after the global financial crisis), as a 
different trend was noticed during 2002–2009 (a generally upward trend) than during 2010–2017. 
From 2010 onwards a relatively stable (although oscillating) pattern was observed (oscillating 
between approximately 200 million and 400 million shares repurchased annually). In 2013, after 
dividends tax was implemented, the number of shares repurchased dropped slightly below 200 
































was 286 million for the period 2010–2017. The substantially lower average during 2010–2017 
strengthens the argument that a structural break occurred between 2009 and 2010. 
In any study spanning the time period of the global financial crisis, one must consider whether the 
crisis caused a structural break in the data set. The decreased share repurchase activity in 2007 might 
have been influenced by the onset of the global financial crisis. However, the crisis did not seem to 
dampen the 2009 share repurchase activity in South Africa, as the highest number of shares (both on 
a net and gross basis) were repurchased that year. It could be postulated that the global financial crisis 
had caused a decrease in share prices on the JSE, leading to some companies repurchasing large 
numbers of shares in an attempt to signal undervaluation and to strengthen the share price. This 
notion is evaluated further when analysing the causes for the large peak in share repurchases during 
2009 (in Section 4.4.1.3). But, it does seem that the 2007–2009 period was characterised by extreme 
share repurchase behaviour, which stabilised from 2010 onwards. This supports the idea that a 
structural break occurred between 2009 and 2010.  
The picture painted by the trend analysis is also one of an environment strongly influenced by 
changing tax legislation, and the uncertainty brought about by the changes. In 2007, the change in the 
STC regulations seems to have led to a decrease in the number of shares repurchased (possibly 
accelerated by the onset of the global financial crisis). In 2013, just after the introduction of dividends 
tax, another sharp decrease in the share repurchase activity was noticed.  
4.4.1.2  Trends: Gross number of shares 
The difference between the net number of shares repurchased and the gross number of shares 
repurchased is attributable to the holding company repurchasing treasury shares. This type of 
repurchase might be expected to exhibit an oscillating behaviour pattern, as companies would first 
repurchase shares through subsidiaries (with few repurchases of treasury shares by the holding 
company). Then (when the 10% threshold that subsidiaries are allowed to hold was reached) the 
holding company would buy large numbers of shares from subsidiaries, and cancel those shares. 
Owing to this, one would expect to see a wave-like pattern of fewer treasury share repurchases by the 
holding company, followed by large repurchases of treasury shares by the holding company, followed 
by fewer repurchases.  
Considering the difference between gross number of shares repurchased and the net number in Figure 
4.2, one can observe this wave-like pattern in the darker band (i.e. the difference between the gross 
and net number of shares repurchased). The band is narrower in 2002–2004, growing wider in 2005–
2006 (just before the change in the STC regulation that would lead to this type of repurchase being 
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liable for STC) and again growing narrower in 2007–2008 (just after this type of repurchase became 
liable for STC). This makes sense from a tax avoidance or tax minimisation perspective, too. In the year 
2009, a large difference between gross and net repurchases occurred, which is discussed in Section 
4.4.1.3. From 2010 to 2017 the band (difference between gross and net repurchases) remained 
relatively small and relatively constant, except in 2014 when a slightly larger number of treasury share 
repurchases by the holding company were recorded. 
4.4.1.3  What happened in 2009? 
During 2009 a peak was observed in both the net number of shares repurchased and treasury share 
repurchases by the holding company. To ascertain the reason for this peak (which occurred in the time 
period affected by the global financial crisis), the per company share repurchase data for 2009 were 
scrutinised.  
The largest number of shares repurchased by a single company in 2009 was repurchased by Netcare 
Limited (Netcare). During 2009, Netcare repurchased 95.9 million shares from share trusts and 
340.4 million shares from subsidiaries – a total of 436.3 million shares. In 2006 Netcare had gained 
control of a company that already owned 340.4 million shares in Netcare. In 2009 Netcare decided to 
eliminate the cross-holdings that existed by repurchasing and cancelling the treasury shares held by 
share trusts and the subsidiary acquired in 2006. During the period 2010–2017, Netcare repurchased 
shares only once, in 2015, which was a specific repurchase executed by the holding company itself. It 
would seem as if the large repurchase in 2009 was indeed to eliminate treasury shares held by trusts 
and subsidiaries, since Netcare no longer had use for the treasury shares. The Netcare repurchase 
would largely explain the peak in treasury share repurchases by the holding company noticed in 2009. 
The 2009 annual financial statement read: “Netcare repurchased 436 million of its own shares to 
remove cross-holding in the Group and thereby realise administrative and cost efficiencies. The timing 
of the buyback was critical to take advantage of the lower share price” (Netcare Limited, 2009, p. 25). 
This was an interesting comment to make, as the repurchase was intragroup, so the price at which the 
repurchase occurred would not affect the group (comprising subsidiaries, trusts and holding company 
as one unit). The low price at which the repurchase was made would benefit only the holding company 
(if seen in isolation).  
The Netcare comment does make an important observation. It points out that low share prices on the 
JSE might have played a role in the large number of shares repurchased in South Africa during 2009. 




Figure 4.3. Movement in the ALSI-index during 2002–2017 (Source: JSE, 2019) 
From 2002 to the middle of 2008, the ALSI grew steadily, with sharp increases between 2005 and the 
middle of 2008. From June 2008 to June 2009 the ALSI fell sharply, reaching a point equal to the 2005 
values. Companies could have perceived this drop in share price to be a good opportunity to invest in 
themselves at a reasonable price, and, in line with the signalling theory, to signal undervaluation to 
the market. If the market reacted to this signal, the market would buy the company’s shares, which 
would bolster the dropping share prices. The market started recovering a year later, equalling the 
2008 level again by 2011. So, an inference can be made from the comment in Netcare’s annual 
financial report that companies could have been increasing share repurchases in 2009, owing to the 
low share prices on the JSE. This makes sense when considering the theoretical perspectives pertaining 
to share repurchases (signalling or undervaluation theory). 
It is important to note that the decreasing ALSI from middle 2008 to middle 2009 could also have led 
to other companies repurchasing shares during this period. Such repurchases could have been 
captured in the 2008 year, the 2009 year or the 2010 year, depending on the company’s financial year 
end and the date of the repurchase.  
The company which repurchased the second largest number of shares during 2009 was MTN Group 
Limited (MTN). MTN repurchased 243.5 million of its own shares and paid for this repurchase by 
issuing 213.9 million new shares. It repurchased at a discount owing to the seller not being able to find 




















































































































































repurchased were owned, indirectly, by the Public Investment Corporation) and to initiate a BEE 
transaction. This was a once-off and unique repurchase, and only a net number of 11.6 million shares 
were actually repurchased (243.5 million minus 231.9 million). MTN had not repurchased shares 
before 2009, but between 2011 and 2017 engaged in large share repurchases (executed by both the 
holding company and subsidiaries). MTN’s repurchase of 243.5 million shares would largely explain 
the 2009 peak in net repurchases (net repurchases already excludes the intragroup repurchases 
executed by Netcare). 
The company with the third largest number of share repurchases during 2009 was Woolworths 
Holdings Limited (Woolworths). In its 2009 annual financial statement, Woolworths explained that the 
company sold its controlling interest in Woolworths Financial Services, and therefore had excess free 
cash flow, which it then distributed to shareholders through a large special dividend (R750 million) 
and by repurchasing shares on the open market (113.1 million shares for R317 million). Woolworths 
is an active repurchaser: it repurchased shares in all the financial years ending between 2002 and 
2017, excluding 2004. The largest number of shares were repurchased during 2005, and the 2009 
repurchase was the second largest annual repurchase by Woolworths. As such, the 2009 Woolworths 
repurchase was not an isolated occurrence and cannot be considered unusual in terms of Woolworths’ 
accustomed repurchase activity.  
To summarise, the 2009 peak in South African share repurchases can largely be explained by three 
repurchases: 436.3 million intragroup repurchases by Netcare, 243.5 million specific repurchases by 
MTN, and 113.1 million general repurchases by Woolworths. These repurchases seem to confirm the 
theoretical perspectives on share repurchases noted in Chapter 2. Share repurchases were executed 
as a result of the falling share prices on the JSE (undervaluation), a desire to restructure a company’s 
shareholding and the availability of excess free cash flow. 
4.4.2 Trends relating to the rand value spent on share repurchases 
In this section, the trends relating to the rand value spent on share repurchases is discussed. Since the 
rand values involved are large, the trends relating to share repurchase value are easier to comprehend 
when presented graphically (see Figure 4.3). The average gross share repurchases over the 2002–2017 




Figure 4.4. Gross versus net rand value spent on share repurchases 
The trend observed in Figure 4.4 is mostly similar to the one in Figure 4.2 (number of shares 
repurchased), except in 2002–2004, 2010 and 2017. In those periods the number of shares 
repurchased were relatively high, while the rand values spent were relatively low. This can be visually 
represented by the annual rand value spent per share repurchased, as seen in Figure 4.5. The annual 
rand value spent per share repurchased was calculated by dividing the total rand value spent on 
repurchases (during a specific year) by the total number of shares repurchased during the year. 
 






































































In 2002–2004, 2010 and 2017 the net average price paid per share repurchased was less than R10 per 
share (which was substantially lower than in the rest of the target period). This means that the 
companies that did repurchase, repurchased at a relatively lower price than in other periods. This 
could either coincide with a low point in the overall JSE share prices (ALSI) or point to the fact that 
companies with a relatively lower share price repurchased during this period.  
When considering the 2002–2017 period, the ALSI was at its lowest point between 2002 and 2004 
(Figure 4.3). This would explain the fact that large numbers of companies repurchased shares to try 
out the new financial tool (as seen in Figure 4.1); large numbers of shares were repurchased (as seen 
in Figure 4.2); but the rand values spent were relatively low (as seen in Figure 4.4).  
From approximately June 2008 to June 2009 the ALSI dropped sharply (Figure 4.3) as a consequence 
of the global financial crisis. The falling share prices on the JSE could lead to a company perceiving its 
shares to be undervalued at this time, leading to increased share repurchases at this lower price. As 
previously explained, the increased share repurchases from June 2008 to June 2009 (coinciding with 
the lower ALSI share prices) could either be recorded in a company’s 2008, 2009 or 2010 financial 
year. From Figure 4.5 it seems that the lower-priced repurchases were mostly realised in 2010, 
although 2009 also showed a lower repurchase price per share than 2008 (Figure 4.5). 
However, during 2017, an exceptionally low price per share was paid for the shares repurchased (even 
though the ALSI was increasing). Figure 4.1 shows that the absolute number of companies engaging 
in share repurchases increased substantially in the 2016–2017 period, as did the percentage of listed 
companies which engaged in share repurchases. Considering the rising share prices on the JSE over 
this period (see Figure 4.3), one would not expect to see large share repurchases occurring in the 
period 2016–2017. Even though the absolute number of companies engaging in share repurchases 
increased during the 2016–2017 period, the annual number of shares repurchased remained relatively 
constant over the period 2010–2017 (see Figure 4.2). It would seem that share repurchases, as a 
financial management tool, had become an accepted practice in South Africa and more widespread, 
but the number of shares involved (per company) decreased as the incentive to do so (undervaluation) 
lessened. It may be that the companies which executed share repurchases for the first time during 
2017 were smaller companies, with lower share prices. This notion is further evaluated in Section 
4.8.2.2, which deals with the post global financial crisis period for companies of different sizes. 
4.4.3  Comparison to previous research 
In this section, the South African share repurchase trends noted during the 2002–2017 period (as 
described in Sections 4.4.1. and 4.4.2) are summarised and then compared to findings from previous 
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research (Section 4.4.3.1.). To further compare the value spent on share repurchases in South Africa 
and that spent in other countries, share repurchase value as a percentage of both profit (Section 
4.4.3.2) and cash flow (Section 4.4.3.3) are discussed. It is prudent to be aware of the trends of share 
repurchases in relation to both profit and cash flow, as excessive share repurchasing (share 
repurchases that are high in relation to profit or cash flow) can be damaging to a company’s financial 
health and long-term prospects. For listed companies in the US, share repurchases as a percentage of 
profit and available cash flow have been increasing (Birstingl, 2016). However, no South African study 
has yet considered these ratios.  
4.4.3.1  Share repurchase trends 
In South Africa, share repurchases were legalised in 1999. Initially, there was a slow uptake in share 
repurchases. Although relatively large numbers of shares were repurchased during 2002 and 2003, 
share prices on the ALSI were relatively low, and thus the rand value involved was small over the 2002–
2004 period. From 2005 to 2009, a generally increasing trend was noticed in the rand value spent on 
share repurchases (with only a slight dip in 2007 when a change in tax rules occurred). During the 
global financial crisis of 2008–2009 large amounts were spent on share repurchases, possibly because 
companies wanted to provide price support when share prices on the JSE started to fall. After the 
financial crisis, share repurchase activity was more subdued than during the crisis. A relatively stable, 
though oscillating, trend occurred from 2010 to 2017.  
The only South African study that has identified comprehensive share repurchase trends (considering 
announced and unannounced share repurchases for a large number of companies) was Wesson 
(2015). The Wesson study considered the 2000–2009 period in South Africa. As the present study used 
most of the data of the Wesson study for the 2002–2009 period, it is to be expected that the findings 
of the present study (for the 2002–2009 period at least) would in most part agree with the findings of 
Wesson (2015) for that same period. In Section 4.8, the findings of the present study for the 2010–
2017 period are compared to the findings of Wesson (2015) relating to the 2000–2009 period, to 
establish whether changes in share repurchase activity occurred in the post global financial crisis 
period.  
The share repurchase trends noted in South Africa during the 2002–2017 period can, however, be 
compared to those noted in earlier studies (undertaken in other countries). As reported in Section 
2.2.1, share repurchases in the US and Western Europe grew substantially during 2005–2007 (Sakinç, 
2017) – which is similar to the increasing trend noticed in South Africa over this period, although share 
repurchases in South Africa dipped in 2007 owing to changing tax rules. During the global financial 
crisis, share repurchases in the US and Western Europe decreased substantially (Sakinç, 2017), 
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whereas South African share repurchase activity increased considerably. However, an increase in 
share repurchase activity during the financial crisis was also noted in Japan, and makes sense from a 
price support perspective as share prices were lower during the crisis (Franks et al., 2018, pp. 10–11). 
After the financial crisis, US share repurchases showed an increasing trend, while share repurchases 
in both Western Europe and South Africa did not show an increasing trend. A relatively stable, though 
oscillating, pattern was noted by Sakinç (2017) in Western Europe, as was also noted in the present 
study relating to South Africa. As such, the share repurchase trends in South Africa seemed to emulate 
those of Japan during the financial crisis, and those of Western Europe before and after the crisis.  
4.4.3.2  Share repurchase value in relation to profit 
Previous studies have found profitability to be a contributing factor in companies executing a share 
repurchase and thus used it as control variable (Fenn & Liang, 2001; Geiler & Renneboog, 2016; Jolls, 
1998; Liljeblom & Pasternack, 2006). To test this theoretical link and to understand the profits that 
South African companies invest in share repurchases, share repurchases will be expressed as a 
percentage of profit over the 2002–2017 period. The net share repurchase value was used as 
numerator as this represents the outflow of resources from the group. Earlier studies (Birstingl, 2016; 
Sakinç, 2017) seem to have used profit after tax (i.e. before deducting non-controlling interest) as 
denominator to calculate the ratio of share repurchase value to profit. It could, however, be argued 
that profit attributable to the holding company is more appropriate, as the numerator in the ratio is 
the rand value spent on repurchases of the holding company’s ordinary shares. As the numerator 
focuses solely on repurchases of holding company shares, profit attributable to the holding company 
would be more appropriate as denominator. However, it was decided to calculate the percentage on 
both profit after tax (to be comparable with earlier studies) and profit attributable to the holding 
company (to provide a more precise indication of the ratio).  
The profit after tax and profit attributable to the holding company figures were extracted from the 
IRESS Expert financial database (per company and per financial year). The notes in IRESS Expert 
indicate that profit attributable to the holding company is calculated as profit after tax, plus profits 
from discontinued operations, minus profits attributed to the non-controlling interest in subsidiaries. 
The figures were exported and added to the database containing the share repurchase data (per 
company and per financial year). For a limited number of entries (33 company years), the profit figures 
were not available (mostly for the earlier years 2002–2005). Since the profit figures were not available, 
these company years were excluded from the descriptive analysis to follow in Section 4.4.3.2. For this 
reason, the total net repurchases (for the period 2002–2017) used in the calculations to follow was 
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R114.4 billion, which differs slightly from that reported earlier in Table 4.2. The annual percentages 
(and data used to calculate this) can be seen in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3  





Profit after tax 
(R'000) 
Profit attributable 
to the holding 
company (R'000) 








2002 2 300 925 27 077 035 24 219 302 8.5% 9.5% 
2003 3 130 479 36 231 571 33 811 384 8.6% 9.3% 
2004 2 892 104 41 655 318 38 503 485 6.9% 7.5% 
2005 8 627 084 69 187 308 65 513 983 12.5% 13.2% 
2006 7 835 201 74 185 225 71 336 535 10.6% 11.0% 
2007 5 931 940 84 099 886 81 383 335 7.1% 7.3% 
2008 13 088 472 93 233 031 89 041 725 14.0% 14.7% 
2009 25 010 409 75 013 688 113 696 120 33.3% 22.0% 
2010 2 918 189 117 407 789 109 969 590 2.5% 2.7% 
2011 8 126 439 101 729 723 92 669 573 8.0% 8.8% 
2012 5 274 578 98 926 083 96 591 450 5.3% 5.5% 
2013 3 340 886 114 568 460 106 107 523 2.9% 3.1% 
2014 6 756 157 138 542 634 127 149 158 4.9% 5.3% 
2015 9 789 175 134 123 002 129 156 923 7.3% 7.6% 
2016 6 301 004 99 788 844 175 903 655 6.3% 3.6% 
2017 3 063 570 125 454 763 125 622 644 2.4% 2.4% 
Total 114 386 612 1 431 224 360 1 480 676 385 8.0% 7.7% 
Overall, net share repurchases were equal to 8.0 per cent of profit after tax and 7.7 per cent of profit 
attributable to the holding company. This was calculated using the data for all the companies in the 
population, and not only for the companies that repurchased, to be comparable to previous studies 
in the US and Europe (although these studies included mostly larger companies that were more likely 
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to execute share repurchases). If the percentage were calculated only for those companies that 
repurchased during a specific year, the net repurchases would equal 20 per cent of profit after tax and 
19 per cent of profit attributable to holding company (a much higher percentage). 
In the US, share repurchase value increased from 40 per cent of net income (similar to profit after tax) 
in 2005 to 140 per cent of net income in 2009 (Birstingl, 2016, p. 8). In 2010 the US percentage fell to 
just less than 30 per cent (its lowest point during the 2005–2016 period), increasing to almost 70 per 
cent again by 2016 (Birstingl, 2016, p. 8). If one compares the US percentage to that in South Africa, 
one can see that South African repurchases (as a percentage of profit) are much less than those of the 
US. In Western Europe, however, share repurchases only averaged 19 per cent of net income over the 
2002–2015 period (ranging from 1% of net income in Portugal and 7% in Italy to 24% of net income in 
the UK and 31% in Switzerland) (Sakinç, 2017). It would therefore appear that share repurchases in 
South Africa are more similar in quantum to those of Western Europe. 
The percentage based on profit after tax and the percentage based on profit attributable to the 
holding company followed approximately the same trend over the 2002–2017 period. Only during 
2009 a substantial difference was noted – owing to profit attributable to the holding company being 
substantially larger in that year. This increase in profit attributable to the holding company could be 
ascribed to losses in subsidiaries with a high non-controlling interest percentage, or large profit-
making discontinued operations. As the trends of share repurchases to profit after tax and to profit 
attributable to the holding company follow relatively similar trends, further discussion will 
concentrate only on profit after tax as net income (which is similar to profit after tax) was employed 
by earlier studies. 
In Figure 4.6 the trends in net share repurchases and profit after tax are noted as vertical bars. The 




Figure 4.6. Repurchase value in relation to profit after tax 
The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of both net repurchases and profit after tax was calculated 
for each of the following periods: 2002–2017, 2002–2009 and 2010–2017. Firstly, the CAGR was 
calculated by dividing the value (of a certain variable) at the end of the period by the value at the start 
of a period. Secondly, this result was raised to an exponent equal to one divided by the number of 
years from the start of the period to the end of the period. Finally, a value of one was deducted from 
the result of the second step. 
Profit after tax generally had an increasing trend over the 2002–2017 period. The CAGR of profit after 
tax was 11 per cent over the period 2002–2017 (and 16% over the 2002–2009 period). From this, it 
could be seen that profit after tax increased by more than inflation (the CAGR of the consumer price 
index – CPI, or inflation – was only 5% over both the 2002–2009 and 2002–2017 period, calculated on 
the CPI indexes received from the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch). Over the 2002–2009 
period, net repurchases also increased. However, the CAGR of net repurchases was 41 per cent over 
the period 2002–2009, a much higher rate than that of profit after tax (and inflation). The share 
repurchase activity in 2009 might be considered abnormally high, but the increase from 2002 to 2008 
was still 34 per cent (confirming that, during the 2002–2008 period, net repurchases increased at a 
higher rate than profit after tax). 
The fact that net repurchases increased at a higher rate than profit after tax during 2002–2009 led to 
a growth in the percentage of net repurchases to profit after tax from almost nine per cent in 2002 to 
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stabilise at a new level. Profit after tax was increasing only slightly over this period, and this led to a 
relatively stable percentage of net repurchases to profit after tax over the 2010–2017 period (ranging 
between 2% and 8%). There was a definite shift to a lower rate of share repurchases to profits during 
2010–2017 (when compared to 2002–2009).  
4.4.3.3  Share repurchase value in relation to cash flow 
Share repurchases have been linked to companies having excess cash resources available (the free 
cash flow hypothesis, as explained in Section 2.2.3.2). To test whether this theoretical link between 
share repurchases and available cash flow also exists in South Africa and, to gain an improved 
understanding of the cash resources invested in share repurchases, net share repurchases were 
expressed as a percentage of cash flow. As in Section 4.4.3.2, the net share repurchase value was used 
as numerator as this represented the outflow of cash from the group.  
Birstingl (2016) used free cash flow as denominator to calculate a similar ratio, but IRESS Expert does 
not have a free cash flow line item available. The closest cash flow element available on IRESS Expert 
is ‘cash available’ – which is calculated as cash from investing activities before payment of dividends. 
Owing to the lack of a free cash flow line item, cash available was extracted from IRESS Expert and 
used as denominator in the calculations to follow. For a limited number of company years (30), the 
line item ‘cash available’ was missing on IRESS Expert. These company years were excluded from the 
analysis done in Section 4.4.3.3, and therefore a net repurchase value of only R114.4 billion was 
employed in Table 4.4 (which is slightly less than the figure reported in Table 4.2). A summary of the 





Net share repurchases, cash available and net share repurchases as a percentage of cash available  
 Net repurchases (R’000) Cash available (R’000) 
Net repurchases as 
percentage of cash 
available 
2002 2 300 925 37 788 238 6% 
2003 3 130 479 53 222 453 6% 
2004 2 892 104 68 581 843 4% 
2005 8 627 084 85 869 556 10% 
2006 7 835 201 92 490 876 8% 
2007 5 931 940 101 139 036 6% 
2008 13 088 472 125 494 737 10% 
2009 25 010 409 131 184 895 19% 
2010 2 918 189 147 300 687 2% 
2011 8 126 439 136 386 621 6% 
2012 5 274 578 157 973 454 3% 
2013 3 340 886 176 649 972 2% 
2014 6 756 157 183 015 418 4% 
2015 9 789 175 176 609 894 6% 
2016 6 301 004 176 696 147 4% 
2017 3 063 570 181 185 022 2% 
Total 114 386 612 2 031 588 849 6% 
Overall, net share repurchases amounted to six per cent of cash available. This was determined using 
the data for all the companies in the population, and not only for the companies that repurchased, to 
be comparable to previous studies. If the percentage were calculated only for those companies that 
repurchased during a specific year, the net repurchases would equal 12 per cent of cash available. 
In the US, share repurchases as a percentage of free cash flow increased from 30 per cent in 2005 to 
more than 150 per cent in 2007 (Birstingl, 2016, p. 9). During and just after the global financial crisis 
lower percentages were noted (falling to less than 20%), but the percentage had increased to more 
than 50 per cent by 2016 (Birstingl, 2016, p. 9). Again, one can see that share repurchase activity in 
South Africa was substantially less than that of the US. No Western European study could be identified 
that considered share repurchases as a percentage of cash flow; however, it was expected that South 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
140 
African share repurchase activity would be more similar to that experienced in Western European 
countries. 
Figure 4.7 shows net share repurchases and cash available as vertical bars. The percentage of share 
repurchases in relation to cash available is shown as an unbroken line on the graph. 
 
Figure 4.7. Repurchase value in relation to cash available 
Cash available showed a substantial increasing trend over the 2002–2009 period. The CAGR (see 
definition in Section 4.4.3.2, just below Figure 4.6) of cash available was 19% over the 2002–2009 
period, which was larger than inflation increases (which was 5% on average, per year over the same 
period). However, cash available only increased very slightly during the 2010–2017 period (a CAGR of 
only 1% increase was noted). As previously mentioned, share repurchases increased at a rate higher 
than inflation during the 2002–2009 period, but settled at a lower, and more constant, rate from 2010 
onwards. Correspondingly, the percentage of share repurchases to cash available exhibited an upward 
trend during 2002–2009 (CAGR of 41%). During 2002–2006, if one excludes the period of the global 
financial crisis, the CAGR was still 28 per cent. From 2010 onwards, however, the percentage of share 
repurchase value to cash flow dropped to a lower point, exhibiting relative stationarity around this 
lower average (a CAGR of only 3% over the 2010–2017 period).  
4.4.4  Conclusion 
After its legalisation in 1999, the quantum of share repurchases in South Africa exhibited an increasing 
trend during 2002–2007 (especially during the 2005–2007 period). An increasing trend during 2005–



























Repurchases (R) Cash available (R) Repurchases: Cash available percentage
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
141 
During the financial crisis, however, share repurchases in the US and Western Europe decreased, while 
those in South Africa increased. Japan also experienced an increase in share repurchase activity during 
the crisis, and connected it to price support during a time when share prices on the stock exchange 
were falling.  
After the global financial crisis, share repurchase activity in the US again showed an increasing trend, 
while Western European countries maintained a more stable share repurchase level during the 2010–
2015 period (with no discernible increase). In South Africa, share repurchase levels also stabilised after 
the financial crisis. It would seem that the South African share repurchase quantum is more similar to 
that of Western European countries than that of the US. However, in the financial crisis, South African 
share repurchases followed the Japanese pattern.  
South African share repurchase value as a percentage of both profit and cash flow is small in 
comparison to that observed in the US; however South African share repurchase value (in comparison 
to profit) seems more comparable to that of Western European countries. Although the percentages 
are small, they are still substantial enough to warrant shareholder scrutiny of the matter – to ensure 
that directors who execute share repurchases are doing so in the best interests of the company. 
During the period 2002–2009, share repurchases as a percentage of both profit and available cash 
flow, increased. Subsequent to the global financial crisis, share repurchases decreased to a lower 
percentage of profit and available cash. The percentage was relatively constant from 2010–2017, 
which emphasises the fact that the share repurchases quantum seemed to have stabilised at a new 
norm. One of the factors that could have influenced share repurchase behaviour during the post 
financial crisis period was the implementation of dividends tax, which shifted the tax burden relating 
to share repurchases from the companies executing share repurchases to the beneficial owner of the 
share. This shift might have increased shareholders’ preference for dividends (Nel, 2018), thereby 
stabilising the demand for share repurchases. 
4.5 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 1.3: REPURCHASING ENTITIES  
Share repurchases can be categorised based on the repurchasing entity that executed the repurchase. 
The repurchasing entities are: the holding company repurchasing from third parties, the holding 
company repurchasing treasury shares, and subsidiaries. The annual rand value spent on share 
repurchases by each of the repurchasing entities is shown in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.8. The fourth 
column in Table 4.5 corresponds to the net share repurchase value in Table 4.2, whereas the final 

















2002 666 161 201 2 424 936 244 3 091 097 445 49 863 000 3 140 960 445 
2003 566 791 472 2 564 072 391 3 130 863 863 264 040 207 3 394 904 071 
2004 684 676 509 2 212 227 471 2 896 903 980 14 986 001 2 911 889 981 
2005 296 709 673 8 334 074 518 8 630 784 191 3 552 221 919 12 183 006 110 
2006 3 667 400 001 4 216 670 192 7 884 070 193 8 015 393 600 15 899 463 793 
2007 1 833 652 808 4 106 287 511 5 939 940 319 1 789 074 448 7 729 014 767 
2008 7 757 567 041 5 340 805 378 13 098 372 418 276 621 667 13 374 994 085 
2009 22 776 029 906 2 238 979 008 25 015 008 914 6 744 178 260 31 759 187 173 
2010 58 626 764 2 873 061 911 2 931 688 676 1 991 157 000 4 922 845 676 
2011 1 612 350 871 6 544 287 860 8 156 638 731 6 360 019 110 14 516 657 841 
2012 2 020 624 077 3 265 953 487 5 286 577 563 1 028 836 000 6 315 413 563 
2013 1 304 625 524 2 036 329 976 3 340 955 500 1 910 222 000 5 251 177 500 
2014 2 153 655 053 4 602 830 933 6 756 485 986 7 681 111 514 14 437 597 500 
2015 8 628 378 267 1 160 797 219 9 789 175 486 2 306 373 000 12 095 548 486 
2016 4 088 784 406 2 212 219 581 6 301 003 987 69 383 639 6 370 387 626 
2017 1 633 728 560 1 464 346 422 3 098 074 982 1 475 488 777 4 573 563 759 
Total 59 749 762 132 55 597 880 101 115 347 642 234 43 528 970 142 158 876 612 376 
Percentage of net repurchases 52% 48% 100% n/a n/a 
Percentage of gross repurchases 38% 35% 73% 27% 100% 
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From Table 4.5 one can see that the holding company repurchasing from third parties was the 
preferred repurchasing entity over the 2002–2017 period for the companies included in the research 
population of the present study. This preference was mainly attributable to the large spike in the 
holding company repurchasing from third parties in 2009 (Figure 4.8). Furthermore, the holding 
company repurchasing from third parties only exceeded subsidiary repurchases by a very small 
margin. Figure 4.8 graphically represents the rand value spent on share repurchases by each of the 
three possible repurchasing entities over the 2002–2017 period.  
 
Figure 4.8. Rand value spent on share repurchases by each of the repurchasing entities 
The wave-like pattern exhibited by the holding company repurchasing treasury shares has been 
discussed in Section 4.4. The remainder of this section concentrates on the holding company 
repurchasing from third parties versus subsidiaries as repurchasing entity. Before 2008, subsidiaries 
were the preferred repurchasing entity (if one considers the composition of net repurchases). Reasons 
for this include the fact that no STC (or other taxes) was payable when subsidiaries repurchased shares 
of the holding company, and that the subsequent resale to the holding company was also exempt 
from STC until 1 October 2007. Additionally, repurchases done by subsidiaries allowed the group more 
flexibility: such shares were not cancelled and could be resold or used to effect business combinations 
or settle share-based incentives to employees. In comparison, when the holding company itself 
repurchased shares, the transactions attracted STC and the shares were cancelled. As such, prior to 
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After the change of the STC legislation (in 2007), subsidiary repurchases were still exempt from STC, 
but the subsequent resale to the holding company attracted STC, rendering subsidiary repurchases 
less attractive than previously. The effect of this was immediate – in 2008 the holding company 
became the preferred repurchasing entity for the first time during the target period. The holding 
company (repurchasing from third parties) was the preferred repurchasing entity during 2008 and 
2009, and much of the 2009 spike was attributable to the holding company (see Section 4.4.1.3 for a 
discussion of the 2009 spike) repurchasing from third parties. 
From 2008 onwards, repurchases by subsidiaries generally showed a decreasing trend (except for a 
spike in 2011). After holding company repurchases spiked in 2008–2009, they dropped to almost zero 
in 2010. From 2010 onwards, a generally increasing trend was noticed, with holding company 
repurchases consistently exceeding those executed by subsidiaries from 2015 onwards. It therefore 
seemed that holding company repurchases generally became more popular from 2008 onwards, while 
subsidiary repurchases were employed less often from 2008 onwards. 
4.6 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 1.4: REPURCHASE TYPES 
Share repurchases can be divided between those occurring under specific authority (specific 
repurchases) or under general authority (general repurchases). Specific repurchases are transacted 
with specified counterparties at predetermined dates and predetermined prices, and shareholders 
have to authorise the repurchase specifically before it can occur. Specific repurchases can be further 
subdivided between the holding company repurchasing treasury shares, pro rata repurchases, and 
other specific repurchases. General repurchases, on the other hand, occur on the open market at the 
ruling market price and the counterparty is not known to the company (and the counterparty does 
not know that the shares are being repurchased by the company itself). Annually at the AGM, 
shareholders provide the directors with general approval to execute general repurchases limited to a 
certain percentage of issued shares. However, the number of shares actually repurchased is normally 
less than that authorised.  
Table 4.6 shows the rand value spent on share repurchases executed under both specific and general 
authority. The fifth column in Table 4.6 corresponds with the net share repurchase value in Table 4.2, 








Pro rata specific 
repurchases 
Other specific 






2002 2 220 137 321 283 628 000 587 332 124 3 091 097 445 49 863 000 3 140 960 445 
2003 2 888 858 345 64 381 708 177 623 810 3 130 863 863 264 040 207 3 394 904 071 
2004 2 190 690 272 490 551 789 215 661 919 2 896 903 980 14 986 001 2 911 889 981 
2005 5 569 791 279 2 461 287 721 599 705 191 8 630 784 191 3 552 221 919 12 183 006 110 
2006 7 720 243 121 39 677 909 124 149 163 7 884 070 193 8 015 393 600 15 899 463 793 
2007 4 474 295 319 - 1 465 645 000 5 939 940 319 1 789 074 448 7 729 014 767 
2008 6 551 063 904 6 423 296 941 124 011 574 13 098 372 418 276 621 667 13 374 994 085 
2009 2 998 737 118 - 22 016 271 795 25 015 008 914 6 744 178 260 31 759 187 173 
2010 1 831 310 154 - 1 100 378 522 2 931 688 676 1 991 157 000 4 922 845 676 
2011 5 533 554 146 60 000 001 2 563 084 584 8 156 638 731 6 360 019 110 14 516 657 841 
2012 3 995 177 053 - 1 291 400 511 5 286 577 563 1 028 836 000 6 315 413 563 
2013 3 249 012 500 - 91 943 000 3 340 955 500 1 910 222 000 5 251 177 500 
2014 5 987 414 248 200 200 000 568 871 738 6 756 485 986 7 681 111 514 14 437 597 500 
2015 1 297 538 910 - 8 491 636 576 9 789 175 486 2 306 373 000 12 095 548 486 
2016 2 307 646 867 251 643 000 3 741 714 121 6 301 003 987 69 383 639 6 370 387 626 
2017 1 926 154 186 - 1 171 920 796 3 098 074 982 1 475 488 777 4 573 563 759 
Total 60 741 624 741 10 274 667 070 44 331 350 422 115 347 624 234 43 528 970 142 158 876 612 376 
Percentage of net repurchases 53% 9% 38% 100% n/a n/a 
Percentage of gross repurchases 38% 6% 28% 73% 27% 100% 
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Considering the totals in Table 4.6, it can be seen that general repurchases only constituted 38 per 
cent of gross repurchase value for the 2002–2017 period (53% of net repurchase value). While, in 
South Africa, total specific repurchases exceed general repurchases, the norm in many other countries 
(for example, in the US and Western Europe) is that the majority of share repurchases occur on the 
open market. Figure 4.9 graphically represents the repurchases executed using each type of 
repurchase in Table 4.6 (excluding specific repurchases where the holding company repurchases 
treasury shares, which has already been discussed in Section 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.9. Rand value spent on share repurchases per repurchase type 
If one looks at Figure 4.9, one can easily see that pro rata specific repurchases were the least 
prominent type of repurchase and were used only intermittently. Moderate pro rata repurchase 
activity was noted during the early 2000s, but from 2009–2017 few pro rata share repurchases 
occurred. The remaining two repurchase types (general repurchases and other specific repurchases) 
are discussed in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2.  
4.6.1  General repurchases 
General repurchases increased from 2002 to 2006. From 2007 onwards, a decreasing trend in general 
repurchases occurred. It is important to note that general repurchases did not increase during the 
overall peak in 2009 (the 2009 peak was mainly attributable to specific repurchases by Netcare and 
MTN). General repurchases averaged R3 266 million per annum between 2010 and 2017, whereas the 
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period would support the notion of a decreasing trend in general share repurchases, especially after 
the global financial crisis. 
Subsidiary repurchases also decreased after the financial crisis (Section 4.5). In fact, the trend 
exhibited by general repurchases seems very similar to that of subsidiary repurchases. Figure 4.10 
compares rand value spent on share repurchases by subsidiaries and the rand value spent on share 
repurchases under general authority. 
 
Figure 4.10. Rand value spent on share repurchases: A comparison of general and subsidiary 
repurchases 
During most of the target period the trends displayed by subsidiary repurchases and general 
repurchases were very similar. It would seem that general repurchases were mainly executed by 
subsidiaries.  
4.6.2  Other specific repurchases 
Other specific repurchases (specific repurchases which exclude pro rata repurchases and treasury 
shares repurchased by the holding company) showed very little activity during the period 2002–2008 
(when general repurchases by subsidiaries were occurring quite extensively and more pro rata specific 
share repurchases occurred). In 2009 other specific repurchases peaked, mainly owing to the MTN 
repurchase described in Section 4.4.1.3. After the 2009 peak, from 2010 to 2017, other specific 
repurchases oscillated around a higher average value (R2 378 million per annum) than before the 























It seems that after the 2009 peak in other specific repurchases, such share repurchases generally 
occurred at a higher rate. Since general repurchases by subsidiaries were less frequent during 2010–
2017, it would seem that other specific repurchases were replacing a portion of the general 
repurchases over this period.  
Since general repurchases and subsidiary repurchases seem linked, it also needs to be ascertained 
whether other specific repurchases and the holding company repurchasing from third parties follow 
similar trends. Figure 4.11 compares the rand value spent on share repurchases by the holding 
company (from third parties) and the rand value spent on other specific repurchases.  
 
Figure 4.11. Rand value spent on share repurchases: A comparison of other specific and holding 
company repurchases 
The trends relating to other specific repurchases and the holding company repurchasing from third 
parties are highly similar. The similarity in trends supports the notion that specific repurchases are 
mostly executed by the holding company. This would make sense from a theoretical perspective, as 
some of the reasons mentioned for companies engaging in share repurchases are to buy out the 
interest of dissenting shareholders and to protect the company against a takeover. Specific 
repurchases are aimed at targeted shareholders whose shares the company wants to repurchase for 
a specific reason (these shareholders could be a minority interest group that does not agree with the 
company’s business plans). As shares repurchased by the holding company are cancelled, it makes 
logical sense that specific repurchases are usually executed by the holding company. The cancellation 
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4.7 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 1.5: TRANSPARENCY  
Perhaps the most important issue, from a South African perspective, is how much of the share 
repurchase activity is announced on SENS (also referred to as the transparency of share repurchases). 
Share repurchases that are announced via SENS are seen as transparent, as this information is 
available to stakeholders when seeking a basis for their economic decisions.  
Table 4.7 shows the proportion of share repurchase value that was announced and unannounced per 
annum. The final column in Table 4.7 corresponds with the gross share repurchase value in Table 4.2. 
The announced share repurchases are divided between (i) general share repurchases; (ii) the holding 
company repurchasing treasury shares; and (iii) pro rata and other specific repurchases. Pro rata share 
repurchases were combined with other specific repurchases, as pro rata share repurchases only 
occurred intermittently (many years showed a zero rand value spent on pro rata share repurchases). 
Furthermore, pro rata share repurchases and other specific repurchases had similar rules pertaining 
to SENS announcements (they should both be announced before they occur) and both types had high 







Table 4.7  
Share repurchase value: Announced versus unannounced repurchases (in rands) 






Pro rata and 
other specific 
repurchases 
General Specific  
2002 1 919 103 818 37 099 932 807 584 124 301 033 504 76 139 068 3 140 960 446 
2003 1 200 235 412 192 730 860 238 005 519 1 688 622 933 75 309 347 3 394 904 071 
2004 1 074 200 050 11 396 001 705 363 708 1 116 490 222 4 440 000 2 911 889 981 
2005 3 295 673 735 1 540 808 919 3 060 992 912 2 274 117 544 2 011 413 000 12 183 006 110 
2006 3 783 765 734 7 979 257 600 163 827 072 3 936 477 388 36 136 000 15 899 463 793 
2007 2 736 007 841 1 677 024 448 1 465 645 000 1 738 287 478 112 050 000 7 729 014 767 
2008 3 770 981 870 29 797 000 6 524 885 941 2 780 082 034 269 247 241 13 374 994 085 
2009 541 549 692 3 732 405 763 21 985 227 795 2 457 187 426 3 042 816 497 31 759 187 173 
2010 857 399 415 1 748 557 000 129 270 534 973 910 738 1 213 707 988 4 922 845 676 
2011 2 091 987 884 2 893 069 000 2 323 357 585 3 441 566 262 3 766 677 110 14 516 657 842 
2012 319 486 402 - 419 523 800 3 675 690 651 1 900 712 711 6 315 413 563 
2013 550 853 598 1 432 320 000 943 000 2 698 158 902 568 902 000 5 251 177 500 
2014 915 767 472 6 379 525 514 270 675 218 5 071 646 776 1 799 982 519 14 437 597 500 
2015 85 096 889 2 247 990 000 8 030 625 865 1 212 442 021 519 393 711 12 095 548 486 
2016 188 194 292 34 953 574 3 865 859 121 2 119 452 574 161 928 065 6 370 387 626 
2017 364 319 378 1 474 257 777 1 099 845 798 1 561 834 808 73 305 998 4 573 563 759 
Total 23 694 623 483 31 411 193 388 51 091 632 992 37 047 001 261 15 632 161 255 158 876 612 378 
Percentage of gross repurchases  15% 20% 32% 23% 10% 100% 
Percentage of specific repurchases n/a 32% 52% n/a 16% n/a 
Percentage of general repurchases 39% n/a n/a 61% n/a n/a 
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Of the gross share repurchases executed over the 2002–2017 period, only 67 per cent were 
announced. This means that shareholders had no information regarding the timing of 33 per cent of 
the share repurchases conducted. Shareholders would only learn about these share repurchases in 
the annual financial statement (depending on how the information was presented in the statement) 
– which is usually published many months after the actual share repurchase has occurred and is 
therefore not useful information for decision-making.  
When considering the specific repurchases that were not announced, these mainly related to the 
holding company repurchasing treasury shares. Of the R43 529 million spent by holding companies 
when repurchasing treasury shares, only R31 411 million (72%) of expenditure was announced. The 
unannounced portion of the expenditure of holding companies on repurchasing treasury shares 
(R12 118 million) constituted 78 percent of the total unannounced specific repurchases worth 
R15 632 million.  
However, from Table 4.7 it can be ascertained that the non-announcement of share repurchases 
mostly resulted from general repurchases, which only need to be announced once three per cent of 
the outstanding shares have been repurchased. If one considers general repurchases in isolation, then 
only 39 per cent of the total general repurchases were announced, while 61 per cent were not 
announced. The three per cent announcement rule of the JSE leads to shareholders being uninformed 
about more than half of the general repurchases executed by JSE-listed companies. From 2002 to 2017 
the percentages of unannounced general share repurchases showed a sharply increasing trend, 
ranging from 14 per cent in 2002 to above 80 per cent from 2012 onwards. This increasing trend might 
result from sponsors of JSE-listed companies advising their clients to interpret the three per cent rule 
as an annual threshold, rather than as a cumulative one (this interpretation has become more 
prevalent in recent periods) (Wesson, 2015, p. 191). The trend relating to unannounced general 




Figure 4.12. Unannounced general repurchase value as a percentage of total general repurchase 
value 
One remaining question that beckons answering is whether the unannounced general share 
repurchases are material in the sense that they would influence the decisions of shareholders and JSE 
investors. Over the 2002–2017 period, net share repurchase value (which amounted to R114.4 billion 
for those companies for which profit figures were available) was eight per cent of profit after tax (see 
Section 4.4.3.2) However, this percentage was calculated with reference to all companies in the 
population and not only those who repurchased. If one only considered the companies that 
repurchased shares, then this percentage increased to almost 20 per cent of profit after tax over the 
2002–2017 period. Of the R114.4 billion net repurchase value, approximately R37.0 billion related to 
unannounced general repurchases, thus the unannounced general repurchases equated to more than 
six per cent of profit for those companies who did repurchase. Depending on how one calculates 
materiality (from an auditing perspective it is usually calculated as between 5 and 10% of profit), this 
percentage would be material throughout the period, for those companies who did repurchase.  
4.8 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 1.6: COMPARING THE POST CRISIS PERIOD TO 2000–2009  
4.8.1 Introduction 
Wesson (2015) previously reported on the South African share repurchase activity during 2000–2009. 
The present study investigated share repurchase activity in the 2002–2017 period. Thus, the present 







































had not been available before. The findings of the present study on the 2010–2017 period can be 
compared to the findings of Wesson (2015) on the 2000–2009 period, to identify possible changes in 
share repurchase behaviour between the two periods. The findings of the present study (pertaining 
to the 2010–2017 period only) are compared to those of Wesson (2015) in answering research sub-
questions 1.1 to 1.5. The rand value spent on share repurchases was employed to compare the 2000–
2009 and 2010–2017 periods (as the rand value was also employed in Sections 4.5 to 4.7).  
It should be noted that results on the 2002–2009 period, as reported in the present study, differ 
slightly from results from the 2002–2009 period as reported by Wesson (2015), since the companies 
making up the research population of the present study differed from the population employed by 
Wesson (2015). Reasons for these differences were threefold. Firstly, companies moving from the AltX 
to the Main Board between 2010 and 2017 were included in the present study for the entire period 
that they were listed on the JSE (AltX or Main Board) between 2002 and 2017, although they were not 
included by Wesson (2015). Secondly, companies which amended their listed industry to the Basic 
Materials or Financial industries, or switched to a secondary listing on the JSE (previously having had 
a primary listing) during the period 2010–2017 were excluded from the present study, whereas they 
were included by Wesson (2015). Thirdly, new JSE listings during 2008 and 2009 were excluded from 
the Wesson study owing to the lack of the availability of three consecutive annual reports, but were 
included in the present study. 
For the analysis per company size employed in Sections 4.8.2.2 and 4.8.3.2, companies were classified 
as either Top40 (J200 index as per JSE), MidCap (J201 index as per JSE), Small (J202 index as per JSE) 
or Fledgling (J204 index as per JSE). The constituents of the mentioned indexes were requested from 
the JSE as at 31 December of each of the years covered by the study, and were used to classify the 
companies based on their size. However, not every company included in the study could be classified 
as either Top40, MidCap, Small or Fledgling in every company year. The non-classification was due to 
some of the companies not forming part of any of the indexes in a specific year. Companies that 
transferred their listing to the Main Board at a later stage were not indexed if they were still listed on 
the AltX of the JSE at that stage, or if they did not meet the JSE’s index inclusion criteria (which 
stipulated minimum free float and liquidity requirements). 
If one only considers the 2010–2017 period, the data set included 1 141 company years. Of these 1 141 
company years, only 1 029 (90%) could be classified based on size. In the 1 029 company years, only 
nine per cent of the companies were classified as Top40, as many of the Top40 constituents were 
dual-listed (with a secondary listing on the JSE) or listed in the Basic Materials and Financial industries. 
Because of the limited number of Top40 companies, it was decided to merge the Top40 and the 
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MidCap groups. Thus, only three size groups were identified (percentages were based on those 
company years that could be classified according to company size): Top40 and MidCap (hereafter 
Top40/MidCap) (32%), Small (24%) and Fledgling (44%). 
4.8.2 Number of companies engaging in share repurchases (sub-question 1.1) 
A total of 172 companies were included in the population during the period 2010–2017, and a total of 
102 (59%) of these companies executed one or more share repurchases during the period. During the 
2000–2009 period, Wesson (2015, p. 88) found that 51 per cent of the 227 companies studied 
executed share repurchases at some point. It would therefore seem as if more companies engaged in 
share repurchases after the global financial crisis than during 2000–2009. 
During the 2000–2009 period the most active repurchasers executed share repurchases in eight of the 
10 years studied (in 80% of the years) (Wesson, 2015, p. 91). Only four such companies were identified: 
Bidvest Group Limited, Grindrod Limited, Sasol Limited, and Truworths International Limited (Wesson, 
2015, p. 91). During the 2010–2017 period, the most active repurchasers repurchased shares in all the 
years being studied (i.e. in 100% of the years), and eight such companies were identified (Afrimat 
Limited, Blue Label Telecoms Limited, Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Limited, Clicks Group 
Limited, Sun International Limited, Truworths International Limited, Vodacom Group Limited, and 
Woolworths Holdings Limited). It therefore seems that, post 2010, share repurchase activity was 
becoming more ingrained in the financial management activities of certain companies, as some 
companies employed it annually.  
4.8.2.1  Number of companies: Regular versus irregular repurchasers 
Companies that did execute share repurchases were divided into three groups. These three groups 
were: those that only repurchased in one of the years in which they were listed (‘repurchased once’); 
those that repurchased in more than one year but less than 50 per cent of the years they were listed 
(‘repurchased irregularly’); and those that repurchased in 50 per cent or more of the years they were 
listed (‘repurchased regularly’). Figure 4.13 shows the proportion of companies that fell into each of 




Figure 4.13. Percentage of repurchasing companies who repurchased once, irregularly and 
regularly, 2010–2017 
Looking at the 2000–2009 period, Wesson (2015, p. 91) showed that 27 per cent of the companies 
repurchased once, 41 per cent repurchased irregularly and 32 per cent repurchased regularly. When 
comparing this to Figure 4.13, it can be seen that the percentage of companies that repurchased once 
remained approximately the same (27% as compared to 29%). However, the percentage of irregular 
repurchasers decreased (41% of the companies decreased to 30%), while the percentage of regular 
repurchasers increased (32% of the companies increased to 41%). This coincides with the view 
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 4.8.2 namely that companies had become more active 
repurchasers from 2010 onwards. It seems that the repurchasing of shares has become an established 
practice in South Africa, and companies have started executing share repurchases more regularly since 
2010. 
4.8.2.2  Number of companies: Companies of different sizes 
Of the 326 company years (during the 2010–2017 period) in which share repurchases occurred, only 
296 (91%) could be classified as either Top40/MidCap, Small or Fledgling. Based on the number of 
repurchasing company years that could be classified based on size, 107 (36%) of the repurchase years 
related to Top40/MidCap companies, 74 (25%) related to Small companies, and 115 (39%) related to 
Fledgling companies. The time trends relating to the percentage of companies in each size group which 








Figure 4.14. Percentage of companies in each size group that repurchased shares, 2010–2017  
Considering the time trends shown in Figure 4.14, it can be ascertained that the Top40/MidCap 
companies were the most active repurchasers – for most years during 2010–2017 the Top40/MidCap 
group had the highest percentage of repurchasers of all the groups. The percentage of Top40/MidCap 
companies repurchasing was relatively stable (mostly ranging between 30% and 35%). However, the 
gap between the repurchasing percentage of Top40/MidCap companies and other companies grew 
smaller in later years. From 2013, especially, the percentage of Small and Fledgling companies 
engaging in share repurchases increased – to the point of exceeding the percentage of Top40/MidCap 
companies engaging in share repurchases in 2016 and equalling the percentage of Top40/MidCap 
companies in 2017. It seems that Small and Fledgling companies were responsible for the increased 
number of companies engaging in share repurchases noticed in Figure 4.1. This trend, of share 
repurchases becoming more prevalent under Small and Fledgling companies during 2016 and 2017, 
might be a result of share repurchases (as financial tool) becoming more widely accepted and 
employed (initially, share repurchases were predominantly executed by larger companies). 
Wesson (2015, p. 93) reported that, on considering repurchasing appetite during the 2000–2009 
period, smaller companies were more likely to execute a repurchase. This finding of small companies 
being the most active repurchasers did not hold true for the majority of the 2010–2015 period, but 
was again found during 2016 and 2017. 
4.8.3 Quantum of share repurchases (sub-question 1.2) 
During the period 2010–2017, the companies in the research population repurchased 2 759 million 









































of R8 560 million per annum), calculated on the figures in Table 4.2. According to Wesson (2015, p. 
89), a total of 5 658 million shares were repurchased during 2000–2009 (an average of 607 million per 
annum) with a rand value of R136 887 million (an average of R13 689 million per annum). The quantum 
of share repurchases in South Africa thus decreased substantially after 2009, with the activity of the 
2010–2017 period being almost half that of the period 2000–2009.  
The four companies which spent the most on share repurchases (measured at a gross level) during 
2010–2017 were: 
• Bidvest Group Limited (R5.1 billion; 7.4% of total repurchase value; repurchased in 2 years); 
• Clicks Group Limited (R6.2 billion; 9.0% of total repurchase value; repurchased in 8 years);  
• Imperial Holdings Limited (R6.4 billion; 9.4% of total repurchase value; repurchased in 7 years); 
and  
• MTN (R11.6 billion; 17.0% of total repurchase value; repurchased in 4 years).  
No other companies spent more than R5 billion on gross share repurchases during the 2010–2017 
period. The four companies mentioned in the previous paragraph accounted for almost 43 per cent of 
the share repurchase value on a gross basis. Wesson (2015, p. 92) found that the four companies 
which spent the most on share repurchases during 2000–2009 contributed in excess of 50 per cent of 
the share repurchase value during that period. This is an indication that, although more companies 
were engaging in share repurchases and more regularly, the rand value invested in such activities per 
company had decreased during 2010–2017. 
4.8.3.1  Quantum: Regular versus irregular repurchasers 
Three groups were employed to divide companies based on the regularity with which they 
repurchased shares. The groups were: ‘repurchased once’ (those companies that repurchased in only 
one of the years in which they were listed); ‘repurchased irregularly’ (those companies that 
repurchased in more than one year, but fewer than half the years they were listed); and ‘repurchased 
regularly’ (those that repurchased in half or more of the years they were listed). Considering the rand 
value spent on share repurchases pre-2010, Wesson (2015, p. 92) found that regular repurchasers 
contributed to the largest share repurchase value (66%), while irregular repurchasers and once-off 
repurchasers contributed 18 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. Figure 4.15 shows the share 
repurchase value (2010–2017) attached to each of the groups which repurchased shares (calculated 




Figure 4.15. Percentage of share repurchase value attributable to companies who repurchased 
once, irregularly and regularly, 2010–2017 
As was the case prior to 2010, those companies repurchasing regularly contributed most of the rand 
value during the 2010–2017 period. And, as the number of companies repurchasing regularly 
increased (see Section 4.8.2.1), so did the rand value spent by them on share repurchases (in 
comparison to the other groups of repurchasers). During 2010–2017, 72 per cent of the share 
repurchase value was spent by companies who repurchased regularly (up from 66% pre-2010), while 
each of the other groups contributed 14 per cent of the value of repurchases.  
The majority of the rand value spent on share repurchases originated from companies which 
repurchased regularly. Given that the regular repurchasers repurchased in at least half the years they 
were listed (i.e. in 4 of the 8 years if listed during the entire 2010–2017 period), one would have 
expected the rand value attributable to this group to be quite large. Interestingly, the rand value spent 
by companies which repurchased regularly (i.e. in at least 4 of the 8 years if listed throughout 2010–
2017) was exactly four times as large as the rand value spent by companies which repurchased only 
once. This emphasises that the rand value spent by once-off repurchasers could still be quite large. 
The irregular repurchasers repurchased in two or three years, and spent an amount equal to that of 





Repurchased once Repurchased irregularly Repurchased regularly
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4.8.3.2  Quantum: Companies of different sizes 
Gross repurchases to the value of R67 615 million (99%) could be classified as executed by either a 
Top40/MidCap, Small or Fledgling company during the 2010–2017 period. Of the repurchases that 
could be classified, almost 89 per cent were attributable to Top40/MidCap companies, while seven 
per cent were attributable to Small companies and only four per cent to Fledgling companies. Wesson 
(2015, p. 92) also found that the largest companies contributed the bulk of the share repurchase value 
during the 2000–2009 period. One of the reasons why the majority of gross repurchase value was 
attributable to Top40/MidCap companies is that these companies had a large market capitalisation, 
which would lead them to spending more cash to repurchase the same percentage of their 
outstanding share capital than a smaller company.  
4.8.4 Repurchasing entities (sub-question 1.3) 
Wesson (2015) found that subsidiaries were the preferred repurchasing entity during the 2000–2009 
period (40% of gross repurchase value was attributable to subsidiaries). Holding companies 
repurchasing treasury shares made up 31 per cent of gross repurchase value, while the remainder 
(almost 29%) was attributable to the holding company repurchasing from third parties (Wesson, 
2015). 
In the present study, considering the 2010–2017 period, it was found that subsidiaries were still the 
preferred repurchasing entity – making up 35% of gross repurchase value (calculated on the 2010–
2017 figures presented in Table 4.5). Given that the percentage attributable to subsidiaries decreased, 
the percentage attributable to both the holding company repurchasing treasury shares (now 33%) and 
the holding company repurchasing from third parties (now 31%) increased. 
The decreased preference for subsidiary repurchases in the post global financial crisis period could 
possibly be associated with amendments to the tax definition of a dividend during 2011 and the 
introduction of dividends tax during 2012. Before these amendments, subsidiaries were the only 
repurchasing entity that was exempt from tax on share repurchases executed. Subsequent to the 
introduction of dividends tax, the preference for subsidiaries owing to tax exemption would have 
fallen away, as none of the repurchasing entities would be liable for tax when executing share 
repurchases (the person selling the share would possibly be liable for tax).  
In Section 4.5 it was noted that the holding company repurchasing from third parties was the preferred 
repurchasing entity for the entire 2002–2017 period for the population of the present study. This is 
noteworthy as Wesson (2015, p. 96) found that subsidiaries were the preferred repurchasing entity 
during 2000–2009, and the present study found subsidiaries still to be the preferred repurchasing 
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entity during 2010–2017. Two reasons can, however, be found for this discrepancy. Firstly, the present 
study excluded the 2000–2001 period, while the Wesson study included this period, which would have 
altered the proportions attributable to each repurchasing entity (as 2000–2001 saw mostly subsidiary 
repurchases being executed) (Wesson, 2015, p. 96).  
Secondly, the populations employed by the Wesson study and the present study were slightly different 
(see Section 4.8.1 for the reasons for this). Specifically, Sasol Limited was included in the population 
employed by Wesson (2015) and not in the present study’s population owing to the fact that, by 2017, 
the listing of Sasol Limited had transferred to the Basic Materials Industry of the JSE. Sasol Limited was 
responsible for the highest rand value expenditure on repurchases during the 2000–2009 period (i.e. 
repurchases of R38 billion, which equalled almost 28% of the gross repurchase value expended by all 
companies in Wesson’s population) (Wesson, 2015, pp. 91–92). The repurchases of Sasol Limited were 
exclusively executed by subsidiaries and the holding company repurchasing treasury shares. The 
exclusion of Sasol Limited from the population of the present study would have altered the 
proportions attributable to each repurchasing entity substantially. 
4.8.5 Repurchase types (sub-question 1.4) 
In the present study it was found (based on the 2010–2017 figures as reported in Table 4.6) that 
general repurchases made up 38 per cent of gross repurchase value. Specific repurchases were thus 
the preferred type of repurchase during 2010 to 2017. Specific repurchases (making up 62% of the 
gross repurchase value) consisted of: holding company repurchasing treasury shares (54% of specific 
repurchases), pro rata repurchases (1% of specific repurchases) and other specific repurchases (45% 
of specific repurchases). 
Regarding the 2000–2009 period, Wesson (2015) also found that specific repurchases were the most 
popular repurchase type. The constituents of specific repurchases, however, were different in 2000–
2009 than they were after the global financial crisis. During 2000–2009, 13 per cent of the value of 
specific repurchases was made up of pro rata repurchases, while only 33 per cent was made up of 
other specific repurchases (repurchasing of treasury shares by the holding company constituted the 
remainder of 55%). It would seem that after the global financial crisis, pro rata repurchases decreased 
in prominence as other specific repurchases increased. 
4.8.6 Transparency (sub-question 1.5) 
Rating the transparency of share repurchases is done by considering the percentage of share 
repurchases that were announced via SENS. Wesson (2015) found that 78 per cent of gross repurchase 
value was announced via SENS, during 2000 to 2009. The non-announcement was mostly attributable 
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to general repurchases (under the 3% threshold) – only 59 per cent of general repurchases were 
announced in the 2000–2009 period. 
After the global financial crisis, fewer share repurchases were announced than during 2000–2009. 
During the 2010–2017 period only 55 per cent of share repurchase value (21% of general repurchases) 
was announced on SENS (calculated on the 2010–2017 values as provided in Table 4.7). One can also 
see this decreasing trend of announcements in Figure 4.12. Thus, the transparency around share 
repurchases has decreased severely in the post financial crisis period, which hampers proper 
monitoring of share repurchases (and of their possible effect of increasing the value of executive 
share-based remuneration and thereby decreasing internal investment by companies). 
4.9 COMPARISON BETWEEN SHARE REPURCHASE VALUE OF THE PRESENT STUDY AND IRESS 
To reach the research aim of the present study, it was necessary to have complete information 
regarding share repurchase value in South Africa. This information was collected through a complex 
process of reconciliations based on annual financial statement information (as detailed in Section 3.3) 
and the data were then included in a share repurchase database (one of the contributions of the 
present study). In this section the share repurchase value as contained in this database is compared 
to the share repurchase value as contained in the IRESS financial database, as confirmation that the 
research method employed by the present study was warranted to obtain complete data on share 
repurchase value, to be utilised in Chapter 6. 
IRESS collects financial information based on the disclosures in annual financial statements. Line items 
dealing with share repurchases are found in two sections in IRESS, namely the statement of changes 
in equity and the supplementary information to the statement of financial position. The following line 
items were available in the statement of changes in equity section: line 911 labelled ‘Treasury 
Shares/Issued Capital and Share Premium’, line 913 labelled ‘Cancelling of Shares/Issued Capital and 
Share Premium’, and line 952 labelled ‘Treasury Shares/Non-distrib Reserve’. In the supplementary 
information to the statement of financial position, the following line items related to share 
repurchases: line 232 labelled ‘Treasury Shares (Number ‘000)’, line 232 labelled ‘Treasury Shares 
(Value R’000)’, line 274 labelled ‘Share Buyback (Number 000)’, and line 275 labelled ‘Share Buyback 
(Value R’000)’.  
As IRESS was not clear on the exact demarcation for each of the line items, the data for all line items 
were downloaded from IRESS. The share repurchase value information contained in the statement of 
changes in equity section was compared to that contained in the statement of financial position 
section. Line 232 ‘Treasury shares’ seemed to be the cumulative value of shares held as treasury while 
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Line 275 ‘Share Buyback’ seemed to capture the value of shares repurchased during the specific period 
(it sometimes corresponded to Line 913 ‘Cancelling of Shares’). Overall, it seemed as if the statement 
of changes in equity data were substantially more comprehensive than that available in the statement 
of financial position section. Therefore, it was decided to compare the share repurchase value in the 
share repurchase database of the present study to the cumulative total of all three statement of 
changes in equity line items available in IRESS (lines 911, 913 and 952). It was decided to combine the 
three statement of changes in equity line items in IRESS to obtain the most comprehensive picture of 
share repurchases from IRESS and because certain companies had data in one of the line items, while 
other companies had data in other line items.  
The total of line items 911, 913 and 952 was R62.9 billion for the companies included in the present 
study during the 2002–2017 period, while it was R30.3 billion for the 2010–2017 period. The share 
repurchase value according to IRESS thus only equated to 55 per cent of the net repurchases of R114.9 
billion and 40 per cent of the gross repurchases of R158.4 billion reported in present study for the 
2002–2017 period (66% of the net repurchases of R45.7 billion and 44% of the gross repurchases of 
R68.5 billion for the 2010–2017 period). These percentages confirm that the IRESS financial database 
could not have been employed in the present study to obtain complete data on share repurchase 
value in South Africa, and that the data had to be collected by performing time-consuming 
reconciliations based on annual financial statement information and SENS announcements. 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
Research question 1 considered the extent of share repurchase activity in South Africa during the 
2002–2017 period. Several sub-questions were designed to address Research question 1 
comprehensively. The answers to the sub-questions were reported in this chapter.  
Before the present study, little was known regarding share repurchase activity during the 2010–2017 
period. Knowledge of comprehensive share repurchase activity can be useful to stakeholders in 
assessing the relationship between share repurchases and other aspects important to a company’s 
financial health (e.g. internal investment). For instance, the present study determines the relationship 
between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration – to assess whether share 
repurchases are related to rent extraction by executives using share-based remuneration. The testing 
of this relationship would not be possible if comprehensive share repurchase data were not available.  
Sub-question 1.1 related to the number of companies that engaged in share repurchases. During 2007 
and 2013, when changes in the tax regime relating to share repurchases occurred, a smaller 
percentage of companies engaged in share repurchases. However, during 2016/2017 a substantially 
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higher percentage of companies engaged in share repurchases – mainly attributable to Small and 
Fledgling companies. Overall, a higher percentage of companies engaged in share repurchases after 
the global financial crisis than pre-2010. It appears that share repurchase activity became more 
widespread after the financial crisis. Furthermore, companies started repurchasing more regularly 
after the crisis. 
Sub-question 1.2 centered on the quantum of share repurchases. A generally upward trend was 
noticed from 2002 to 2009 in both the number of shares repurchases and the rand value spent on 
repurchases. From 2010 onwards share repurchases seem to have stabilised at a lower quantum – 
similar to the trend noticed in Western Europe. Share repurchase value as a percentage of both profit 
and cash flow was less than that of the US, but comparable to that of many Western European 
countries. 
During the 2010–2017 period, the preference for subsidiary repurchases decreased when compared 
to the 2000–2009 period, possibly owing to changed tax regulations (sub-question 1.3). After the 
global financial crisis, the preferred repurchase type was still specific repurchases (sub-question 1.4). 
During 2010–2017 fewer share repurchases were announced via SENS than during 2000–2009, which 
indicates that the transparency of share repurchases decreased after the global financial crisis (only 
55% of share repurchase value was announced after the crisis). The lack of transparency relating to 
share repurchases could hamper effective monitoring of share repurchases by stakeholders, and could 
lead to the abuse of share repurchases by executives in order to manipulate the share price and EPS, 
and enhance the value of their own share-based remuneration. It is recommended that improved 
regulations be drafted by the JSE to ensure that stakeholders are aware of all share repurchases 




CHAPTER 5: CHARACTERISTICS OF EXECUTIVE SHARE-BASED REMUNERATION  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Share-based incentives are used increasingly to remunerate executives of listed companies – both 
globally and in South Africa. Share-based remuneration originated from agency theory, and is an 
attempt to align the interests of executives and shareholders. However, nowadays more and more 
people are concerned – in line with the managerial power theory – that executives might be unduly 
enriching themselves through share-based remuneration. Chapter 6 addresses the relationship 
between share repurchases and share-based remuneration from a South African context (Research 
question 3). But, in order to effectively assess the relationship between share repurchases and share-
based remuneration, the characteristics of South African executive share-based remuneration need 
to be known (Research question 2).  
Institutional theory proposes that the characteristics of share-based remuneration might vary 
between different countries. No in depth, longitudinal study has yet been performed on the 
characteristics of South African executive share-based remuneration. This chapter seeks to address 
this knowledge gap. Thus, to address Research question 2, four research sub-questions were 
developed: 
• Sub-question 2.1: What value was attached to executive share-based remuneration in relation to 
the value of other executive remuneration? 
• Sub-question 2.2: What trends were noted over the 2002–2017 period in terms of the type of 
schemes being granted to executives? 
• Sub-question 2.3: What vesting conditions were attached to executive share-based 
remuneration? 
• Sub-question 2.4: How many share-based instruments were associated with executive share-
based remuneration? 
Before the research questions are addressed, this chapter describes the number of companies in the 
population for which information on executive share-based remuneration was available (Section 5.2). 
Then, the research sub-questions, bulleted in the previous paragraph, are addressed (Sections 5.3 to 
5.6). The answers to the first two sub-questions provide context to the issue of executive share-based 
remuneration and enable the development of a comprehensive database on executive share-based 
remuneration. The answers to the last two sub-questions complete the database on executive share-
based remuneration and are employed as independent variables to address Research question 3. To 
better understand the share-based remuneration variables to be employed as independent variables 
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in Chapter 6, Section 5.7 investigates whether these variables differ between companies of various 
sizes. Finally, Section 5.8 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 THE NUMBER OF COMPANIES INVOLVED 
The final population of the present study included 220 companies – and their share repurchase 
behaviour was reported in Chapter 4. For all 220 companies in the population, it was attempted to 
extract details regarding executive share-based remuneration from the IRESS financial database for 
the 2002–2017 period (or for the period that the company was listed, if shorter). For certain years for 
some companies, IRESS had no information available, as no per-director disclosures were made in the 
annual financial statement or the company did not have executive directors during that specific 
company year. These company years were therefore excluded from further analysis in Chapters 5 and 
6. The affected companies (and company years) were: 
• African Media Entertainment Limited (2005 to 2007 and 2009 to 2010) 
• Afrocentric Investment Corporation Limited (2006 to 2011) 
• Awethu Breweries Limited (2002 to 2013) 
• Business Connection Group Limited (2002) 
• Capevin Holdings Limited (2012 to 2017) 
• Capevin Investment Limited (2002 to 2011) 
• Datacentrix Holdings Limited (2017) 
• ElementOne Limited (2009) 
• Intertrading Limited (2002) 
• LA Group Limited (2006) 
• Mobile Industries Limited (2004 to 2012) 
• Nictus Limited (2002 to 2003) 
• Pals Holdings Limited (2002) 
• Pick n Pay Holdings Limited (2002 to 2016) 
• Sephaku Holdings Limited (2009) 
• Sovereign Food Investment Limited (2002 to 2003) 
• The Spar Group Limited (2004) 
• Tiger Wheels Limited (2007) 
• United Service Technologies Limited (2002 to 2004) 
• Verimark Holdings Limited (2004 to 2005) 
Although the share repurchase activity of 220 companies was described in Chapter 4, five of these 
companies had to be wholly excluded from Chapters 5 and 6, as no data on executive share-based 
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remuneration was available in any year that the companies were listed. These were: Awethu 
Breweries Limited, Capevin Holdings Limited, Capevin Investment Limited, Pick n Pay Holdings Limited, 
and United Service Technologies Limited. Chapter 5 reports only on the share-based remuneration 
behaviour of the remaining 215 companies. A total of 8 837 lines of data were captured in the ‘per-
executive database on share-based remuneration’ described in Section 3.4: each line dealing with the 
share-based remuneration data of a specific executive of one of the 215 companies, during a specific 
year.  
The number of companies included in the research population (that had both share repurchase and 
executive share-based remuneration data available) differed in each year, as companies listed and 
delisted throughout the target period of the present study. Moreover, the companies had a varying 
number of executives in the years studied. The number of companies and number of executives 









Number of executives 
Average number of 
executives per company 
2002 151 706 4.7 
2003 156 691 4.4 
2004 156 672 4.3 
2005 145 605 4.2 
2006 137 582 4.2 
2007 146 578 4.0 
2008 154 586 3.8 
2009 151 592 3.9 
2010 148 554 3.7 
2011 149 544 3.7 
2012 148 526 3.6 
2013 143 490 3.4 
2014 136 460 3.4 
2015 133 430 3.2 
2016 132 421 3.2 
2017 127 400 3.1 
Total for 2002–2017 
period 2 312 8 837 3.8 
The number of companies was relatively constant over the period, with only 2006 and the period 
2014–2017 showing slightly lower numbers of companies being studied (following a spate of delistings 
before these dates). However, the number of executives employed showed an obvious decreasing 
trend over the period (the average number of executives per company decreased from 4.7 per 
company in 2002 to 3.1 per company in 2017).  
Given that the fact that share-based remuneration was compared to share repurchases, captured per 
company year in Chapter 6, Chapter 5 mostly discusses the share-based remuneration paid by a 
specific company (and not the share-based remuneration received by individual executives). Thus, the 
discussion concentrates on the share-based remuneration of the 2 312 company years, referred to as 
the ‘per-company year database on share-based remuneration’ in Section 3.4. However, in certain 
cases the reporting in Chapter 5 reverts to the remuneration received per executive (i.e. it focuses on 
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the 8 837 ‘per-executive’ data lines). Reverting to the ‘per-executive’ data is done when discussing the 
value of share-based remuneration per executive in Section 5.3 as well as the detailed vesting 
conditions employed per executive in Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2.  
5.3 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 2.1: VALUE OF EXECUTIVE SHARE-BASED REMUNERATION 
To enable a comparison between the value of share-based remuneration and the value of other 
remuneration received by executives, the salary and other short-term benefits received by executives 
were collected from the IRESS financial database. The trends relating to each component of the total 
remuneration (salary, other short-term remuneration, and share-based remuneration) are discussed 
(Section 5.3.1) and then compared to the trends noted in previous research (Section 5.3.2). The value 
of executive share-based remuneration, discussed in Section 5.3, was not employed as independent 
variable in Chapter 6, owing to possible measurement problems relating to the disclosure of executive 
share-based remuneration in the South African regulatory environment. However, the value attached 
to share-based remuneration does provide some context to Research question 2. 
5.3.1 Findings of the present study 
It was decided to discuss the value of components of executive remuneration based on the per-
executive figures (8 837 data line items) rather than the per-company year figures (2 312 data line 
items). This enabled an understanding of the average remuneration received per executive, rather 
than the average remuneration paid per company. As companies employed differing numbers of 
executives, and the number of executives employed per company seemed to decrease over time 
(Table 5.1), the per-executive figure would be more easily understood. 
Figure 5.1 shows the salary, other short-term remuneration and share-based remuneration received 
by the average executive in the population during each of the respective years. The value attached to 
salary, other short-term remuneration, and share-based remuneration was collected from the IRESS 
financial database, as described in Section 3.4. Other short-term remuneration consisted of company 
contributions to pension and medical aid funds, and bonuses and other once-off payments. Share-
based remuneration was the ‘gain on shares’ line reported by the IRESS financial database (see 
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.4.1.1). As described in Section 3.2.1, the ‘gain on shares’ line in IRESS did not 
comprehensively capture share-based remuneration. Furthermore, IRESS captured different values 
(grant date fair value, IFRS 2 expense, or gain realised on exercise), depending on which value was 
disclosed in a company’s annual financial statement. Thus, the value of share-based remuneration 
reported in the present study might not be accurate or complete; however, it does provide an 
indication of the minimum value of executive share-based remuneration. 
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For a limited number of executives (116 of 8 837 line items), the values (e.g. salary) were denominated 
in a currency other than South African rands. This usually occurred when a company employed foreign 
executives, and still remunerated them in their home currency (while remunerating the local 
executives in South African rands). These 116 line items were excluded from the analysis in Section 
5.3, as South African rands and other foreign currencies were not comparable when focusing on values 
(as in Section 5.3). From Section 5.4 onwards, when considering the scheme types, performance 
conditions and number of instruments involved, the 116 line items were again included, as the 
measurement of these variables was not affected by the value of the salary or other components of 
remuneration being denominated in a foreign currency. 
As remuneration is usually heavily dependent on inflation, the rand values collected were deflated to 
equal the June 2002 equivalents base (using the CPI indexes received from the Bureau for Economic 
Research) before inclusion in Figure 5.1. The index as at 30 June in every year was used, as the 
companies’ year ends varied over the calendar year and 30 June was seen as the middle of the 
calendar year.  
 
Figure 5.1. Average rand value that an executive earned from salary, other short-term 
remuneration and share-based remuneration 
Even after the salary figure was adjusted for inflation, an increasing trend was still noticed over the 
2002–2017 period. This means that, on average, executives received salary increases that were higher 






 1 000 000
 1 200 000
 1 400 000
 1 600 000
 1 800 000


















Salary Other short-term remuneration Share-based remuneration
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
170 
paid per company might not have increased by as large a margin, as the average number of executives 
employed by companies decreased over the period (Table 5.1).  
Although salaries showed a relatively smooth (above inflation) increase over the period, other short-
term remuneration was more volatile. This volatility was probably attributable to bonuses – which are 
(in essence) variable as they are based on executive and company performance. In periods of 
economic downturn, bonuses are expected to fall. During the 2002–2006 period the other short-term 
remuneration figure increased at a higher rate than salaries. The 2002–2006 period saw relatively high 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth in South Africa (with GDP growth rates of up to 7%). Share prices 
on the JSE were also rising (Figure 4.3). These factors probably culminated in large bonuses being paid. 
During 2007–2008, other short-term remuneration was relatively stable – only growing with inflation. 
The large increase in bonuses experienced during 2002–2006 was probably halted by the uncertainty 
brought about by the onset of the global financial crisis. However, during 2009 other short-term 
remuneration visibly dipped to a lower value. One would expect lower bonuses to be paid during 2009 
owing to the decrease in share prices on the JSE over this time. South Africa’s GDP also showed 
negative growth rates during 2009 – probably causing companies to reduce bonus payments as 
company performance sagged. 
During 2010–2012 other short-term remuneration showed a higher rate of growth than salaries, 
probably owing to increased bonuses as the economy recovered after the global financial crisis 
(positive GDP growth was experienced over the period). The inflation-adjusted value of other short-
term remuneration decreased during 2013 and 2014; a large increase was observed in 2015; and the 
value decreased again in 2016 and 2017. Short-term remuneration is volatile owing to bonuses being 
dependant on company performance, which is strongly influenced by economic patterns. 
The value of share-based remuneration is even more volatile than other short-term remuneration. In 
the initial years covered by the present study, the value of share-based remuneration reported by 
IRESS probably captured the gain realised from the exercise of share options (as required by the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 and King II, from 2002 onwards) (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b). Low levels 
of share-based remuneration were observed in 2002 and 2003, but this might be due to companies 
not yet complying with the newly promulgated per-executive disclosures of King II (and therefore 
underreporting share option gains).  
Share-based remuneration value increased sharply over the 2002–2006 period. In 2006, the value of 
share-based remuneration exceeded the value of both salaries and other short-term remuneration. 
Three reasons might explain this increase: the prevalence of share options, rising share prices on the 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
171 
JSE, and improved annual financial statement disclosure. During the 2002–2006 period, share options 
were the predominant type of share-based incentive employed (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a) and 
realised large gains owing to rising share prices on the JSE (Figure 4.3). Furthermore, as the 
requirement to disclose individual executives’ gains on exercising share options became well-
established, more companies would be likely to provide this disclosure (for inclusion in IRESS ‘gain on 
shares’ line item). 
During the global financial crisis, the value realised from share-based remuneration decreased 
(relative to the year 2006). Several factors might have played a role in this decrease:  
• From June 2008 to June 2009 the share prices on the JSE decreased, leading to smaller gains on 
those share options and SARs that were exercised (Figure 4.3). 
• Owing to the global financial crisis and the resultant decrease in share prices, executives might 
have been less apt to exercise options. Furthermore, they might have felt it inappropriate to 
exercise options during a period of uncertainty for the companies they worked for. 
• After the effective date of IFRS 2 (30 December 2005), companies were less likely to grant share 
options, and more likely to grant SARs (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018a). While the Companies Act 
61 of 1973 explicitly required the disclosure of the gain realised from the exercise of share options, 
the gain realised from the exercise of SARs was not explicitly required (the Companies Act 61 of 
1973 was still effective until 2011). This might mean that the gains on exercise reported in the 
annual financial statements would not include the gains realised from SARs and other incentives 
(Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b). The effect of this would be that the share-based remuneration 
value captured by IRESS underreported the actual gains realised from all share-based incentives. 
In 2010, after the global financial crisis, the value of share-based remuneration returned to a higher 
level. This was to be expected as share prices on the JSE started to recover at this time (Figure 4.3). 
From 2010 onwards, share-based remuneration value oscillated around a relatively stable mean. 
However, over the 2010–2017 period full quantum schemes had become more prominent, and it is 
doubted whether companies’ financial statements accurately and completely disclosed the value of 
all types of share incentives (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b). From 2011 onwards, the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 and King III explicitly required the value of all share-based remuneration to be disclosed in 
annual financial statements. However, the interpretation of how and when this value should be 
measured differed between companies (Steenkamp et al., 2019). As such, a possible measurement 
problem existed during the 2010–2017 period. With this as background, the actual value of executive 
share-based remuneration (disclosed in financial statements and captured by the IRESS financial 
database) during 2010–2017 might be greater than depicted in Figure 5.1. 
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5.3.2 Comparison of findings with previous research 
Figure 5.2 provides the percentage of total remuneration that is share-based (based on the values 
extracted from the IRESS database and then deflated to the June 2002 equivalents base) during the 
2002–2017 period in South Africa, as found by the present study. The percentage was calculated by 
dividing (annually) the average share-based remuneration value (as depicted in Figure 5.1) by the total 
of all three elements depicted in Figure 5.1 (i.e. dividing by average total remuneration). 
 
Figure 5.2. Share-based remuneration as a percentage of total executive remuneration 
The trend in Figure 5.2 can be compared to global trends. Share-based remuneration constituted more 
than 40 per cent of total executive remuneration value in the US and the UK by 2006, around 50 per 
cent by 2010, and more than 60 per cent by 2014/2015 (Hopkins & Lazonick, 2016; Kotnik et al., 2018; 
Pepper & Gore, 2014). However, other developed countries at that time did not rely as heavily on 
share-based remuneration as the US and the UK (in 2015 Germany’s share-based remuneration value 
equated to 29% of total, while Italy’s figure came to only 14%) (Kotnik et al., 2018).  
The present study found that the percentage of share-based remuneration to total executive 
remuneration value grew from a low percentage in 2002 to 35 per cent in 2006. This 35 per cent in 
2006 was less than the 40 per cent of the UK and the 45 per cent of the US at the same point in time, 
but still relatively large. During 2007–2009 a decrease in percentage was experienced in South Africa, 
but it resurged to 32 per cent in 2010 (Figure 5.2). The 32 per cent reported in the present study in 
2010 is substantially smaller than the almost 50 per cent experienced in the UK and US in 2010. From 







































per cent – substantially lower than percentages experienced in the UK and US, but comparable to that 
of Germany and Italy.  
However, the South African percentage could be understated because not all the value of share-based 
incentives was disclosed in annual financial statements and captured in IRESS. Specifically, Steenkamp 
and Wesson (2018b) found that IRESS underreported the value of share-based remuneration to a 
greater extent from 2011 onwards (the actual value available per annual financial statement was 
double or triple the value reported by IRESS between 2011 and 2015). If the values reported by IRESS 
(as collected during the present study) between 2011 and 2017 were doubled, then the percentage 
of share-based remuneration to total remuneration value would range between 30 per cent and 42 
per cent over the 2011–2017 period.  
Furthermore, the trends in Figure 5.2 can be compared to the South African results reported by Steyn 
and Cairney (2016), who found that 38 per cent of total remuneration was share-based during the 
2011–2013 period (they used hand-collected values for share-based remuneration, using the grant 
date fair value). The present study found that only 20 per cent of total remuneration was share-based 
over the same period, when collecting the share-based remuneration values from IRESS. The most 
plausible explanation for the smaller percentage identified during this study, is that IRESS 
underreports the value of share-based remuneration (ignoring the complexity of when and how the 
value of executive share-based remuneration should be measured). 
From 1 April 2017 onwards (i.e. for year ends from 30 March 2018 onwards), King IV has required the 
grant date fair value of share-based remuneration as well as the value realised upon exercise to be 
disclosed per executive. It has not yet been established whether companies fully comply with this 
requirement (no study has been done since the publication of King IV). However, it is in the interest 
of shareholders (and the general public) that the full extent of the value realised from share-based 
remuneration be disclosed in annual financial statements, and captured accurately in financial 
databases (including IRESS). 
5.4 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 2.2: SCHEME TYPES GRANTED 
The discussion now moves away from the value of the different components of executive 
remuneration and focuses on the type of share-based remuneration scheme that was provided by 
companies (share options, SARs, contingent shares, etc). Many share-based incentives have long 
vesting (and exercise) periods. With this as background, it is more appropriate to evaluate the scheme 
types being granted – rather than those in use – when seeking to understand the trends regarding the 
type of share-based remuneration provided by companies. This section therefore discusses the types 
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of scheme granted by companies over the 2002–2017 period. The ‘per-company year database on 
share-based remuneration’ of 2 312 company years was employed to concentrate on the granting 
behaviour of individual companies. In addition, the findings of the present study are compared to 
previous research on this matter.  
The scheme types granted, discussed in Section 5.4, are not employed as independent variables in 
Chapter 6, but provide a background to the variables that are employed (discussed in Sections 5.5 and 
5.6). Additionally, knowledge on the dominant scheme types is important when comparing the results 
of the present study (in Chapter 6) to earlier studies that were conducted during certain time periods 
(when certain scheme types were dominant). 
5.4.1 Findings of the present study 
As described in Section 3.4, data were gathered on whether a specific company granted each of the 
following types of incentive in a specific year: share options, SARs, share purchase plan shares, 
restricted shares, performance shares, phantom shares, and deferred bonus scheme shares. Grants 
that could not be classified into the listed scheme types were placed in a category labelled ‘other 
schemes’.  
As multiple scheme types make trends more difficult to understand, it was decided to combine 
scheme types that were similar in substance. As a share purchase plan is essentially a modified version 
of the share option scheme, these two schemes were combined (the combination was labelled ‘share 
options’). Restricted shares and performance shares were combined as they are both full quantum 
schemes, and are sometimes presented as a single scheme by companies (the combination was 
labelled ‘contingent shares’). Deferred bonus plans were added to ‘other’ schemes as fewer 
companies employed such schemes and deferred bonus plans were usually an auxiliary scheme in 
addition to SARs or contingent shares (the combination of other schemes and deferred bonus schemes 
was labelled ‘other schemes’). Only one company employed a phantom share scheme and 
consequently this was also included in ‘other schemes’.  
In this way, for each company year studied, it was recorded whether a company granted share options, 
SARs, contingent shares or other schemes (attaching a binary variable of ‘1’ if the company did grant 
the specific type of incentive or ‘0’ if the company did not). Company years during which no share-
based remuneration was granted was also labelled as such (during 727 of the 2 312 company years no 
grants were made). The number of companies which did not grant any share-based instruments in a 
specific year was excluded from the total number of companies forming part of the population in that 
year when calculating the number of companies which granted incentives under one or multiple 
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schemes (‘granting companies’). Table 5.2 shows, per annum, the percentage of granting companies 
which granted a certain type of scheme. As granting companies might grant incentives using multiple 
schemes, the total column does not add to 100 per cent. However, the total column does provide an 
indication of how popular the granting of incentives using multiple schemes were (the higher the 
percentage of the total column, the more companies granted incentives using multiple schemes).  
Table 5.2 
Percentage of granting companies who granted a certain scheme type 
 






2002 100% 0% 0% 1% 101% 
2003 100% 1% 0% 1% 102% 
2004 100% 1% 0% 1% 102% 
2005 100% 4% 2% 2% 108% 
2006 99% 14% 6% 1% 120% 
2007 97% 27% 10% 4% 138% 
2008 95% 33% 11% 7% 146% 
2009 87% 39% 17% 10% 153% 
2010 81% 40% 23% 16% 160% 
2011 75% 44% 24% 15% 158% 
2012 74% 47% 26% 17% 164% 
2013 70% 47% 32% 16% 165% 
2014 63% 46% 39% 16% 164% 
2015 52% 46% 46% 20% 164% 
2016 44% 49% 52% 20% 165% 
2017 42% 46% 57% 15% 160% 
Average for  
2002–2017 
period  79% 31% 22% 10% 142% 
Looking at the bottom row in Table 5.2, one can see that share options were the most commonly 
granted type of scheme in the entire 2002–2017 period (granted during 79% of the company years 
that instruments were granted), followed by SARs and contingent shares. During the early years 
(2002–2004), before the effective date of IFRS 2, all granting companies were employing share option 
schemes. Only MTN and Shoprite Holdings Limited were utilising another type of scheme in addition 
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to share options during 2002–2004. From the literature review, it was expected that the effective date 
of IFRS 2 (31 December 2005 year ends and onwards) would cause a shift in the type of incentives 
being granted. A few companies in the population had 31 December year ends and would already 
have applied IFRS 2 in their 2005 annual financial statements. However, the majority of the companies 
would only have applied IFRS 2 from 2006 onwards. As such, a minor change in trend was expected in 
2005, while a more explicit change was expected in 2006.  
During both 2005 and 2006 the percentage of granting companies granting share options decreased, 
while the percentage of granting companies using SARs and contingent shares increased. In the year 
2005, three new companies granting SARs and contingent shares were noticed for the first time (two 
companies granted contingent shares). Three of the five companies granting the new SARs and 
contingent shares had 31 December 2005 year ends, which seems to confirm that the slight change in 
trend (away from share options towards SARs and full quantum schemes) was caused by the 
implementation of IFRS 2. The trend was confirmed in 2006 – when an additional 10 companies 
granted SARs and an additional four companies granted contingent shares. It seems that the 
implementation of IFRS 2 caused a decrease in share option grants and an increase in SARs and 
contingent shares (although most companies seemed to have switched to SARs). 
An ongoing decrease in the percentage of companies that granted share options, seemingly sparked 
by the implementation of IFRS 2, was noted throughout the 2005–2017 period. However, although 
share option grants decreased, share options remained more popular than SARs and contingent 
shares until relatively recently – only falling behind both SARs and contingent share grants by 2016. 
During the period 2005–2009 a steep increase in the percentage of SARs grants was noticed. The 
increase in SARs grants during 2005–2009 was probably related to the implementation of IFRS 2. From 
2009 to 2012 a slight increasing trend in SARs occurred, after which the percentage of companies 
granting SARs schemes stayed relatively constant.  
Contingent shares showed a slight increase in grants between 2005 and 2008, after the effective date 
of IFRS 2 (although SARs increased at a much faster rate during this period). In 2009 and 2010 a 
relatively large increase in the percentage of granting companies which granted contingent shares 
became apparent. The accelerated granting of contingent shares during the 2009–2010 period might 
have been triggered by the falling share prices on the JSE from June 2008 to June 2009, which 
decreased the incentive provided by appreciation schemes.  
From 2011 onwards, the percentage of granting companies choosing contingent shares increased 
annually. Full quantum schemes were touted as more efficient in aligning the interests of shareholders 
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and executives, and thus corporate governance improvements advocated by King III (effective from 
year ends on or after 28 February 2011) might have played a role in the increased usage of contingent 
shares. 
The other schemes (including deferred bonus schemes) were rarely used prior to 2007. From 2007 to 
2010 a relatively sharp increase in the percentage of companies granting other schemes were noticed, 
after which the percentage was relatively stable (except during the 2015–2016 period when a slightly 
higher percentage of companies granted other schemes).  
The final total column in Table 5.2 is the numerical total of the columns preceding it. The higher the 
percentage, the more likely it was for companies to grant incentives under multiple schemes. The total 
percentage was essentially equal to 100 per cent in 2002–2004, indicating that companies were 
primarily only granting one type of incentive (share options) during this period. The percentage rose 
sharply between 2005 and 2010, as companies became more likely to grant incentives under multiple 
schemes. From 2010 onwards, the percentage seemed to stabilise. 
5.4.2 Comparison of findings to previous research 
In the US, share option grants decreased after the effective date of FAS123R (US version of IFRS 2), 
while the granting of contingent shares increased (Murphy, 2013). SARs were less popular in the US 
(PwC, 2006) than elsewhere in the world. In Europe, contingent shares were more popular than share 
options by 2015 (Kotnik et al., 2018). Avallone et al. (2014) studied Italian companies and found that 
share option usage decreased during the global financial crisis (rather than after the effective date of 
IFRS 2). In general, a global trend away from appreciation schemes towards full quantum schemes 
occurred. 
The trends reported in the present study, relating to the type of scheme granted, were mostly similar 
to the global picture. Share options were the dominant scheme type before the implementation of 
IFRS 2 (in South Africa and globally). Share option grants seemed to decrease after the effective date 
of IFRS 2 – similar to the US findings of Murphy (2013) – and during the global financial crisis (similar 
to the Italian findings of Avallone et al. (2014)). What is unique regarding the South African picture is 
the increased usage of SARs after the effective date of IFRS 2. SARs were not as popular elsewhere in 
the world. The widespread usage of SARs might have delayed the onset of full quantum schemes (full 
quantum schemes became popular earlier in other jurisdictions). Only in 2009 did the use of full 
quantum schemes substantially increase in South Africa, probably initiated by the falling share prices 
on the JSE. It would, however, seem that South Africa is moving away from appreciation schemes and 
increasingly employs full quantum schemes – similar to the global trend.  
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The findings of previous South African research will now be compared to the findings of the present 
study. Pretorius and De Villiers (2013) previously proposed than the effective date of IFRS 2 (31 
December 2005) would lead to changes in the type of share-based incentives being offered (reducing 
the prominence of share options). Steenkamp and Wesson (2018a), based on a limited sample of 
companies, pinpointed the effective date of IFRS 2 as the point in time when share option grants 
started to decrease, while SARs grants started to increase. The results of the present study seem to 
corroborate the findings of previous research, as share option grants started to decrease from 2005 
onwards, while SARs (and a limited number of contingent share grants) were noticed for the first time 
in 2005 and increased substantially in 2006.  
By 2012, Mavrodinov (2012) reported that share options were less popular than SARs and contingent 
shares in terms of number of companies granting them. On the contrary, the present study found that 
a higher percentage of companies still granted share options than SARs and contingent shares until 
2015. Only from 2016 onwards were share option grants surpassed by SARs and contingent share 
grants, according to the findings of this study. Mavrodinov (2012) only studied the JSE-listed 
companies categorised as Top40 and another 10 MidCap companies. It might be that Top40 and 
MidCap companies were more likely to employ SARs and contingent shares than smaller companies 
were likely to do. This would explain the difference in findings between Mavrodinov (2012) and the 
present study (which included Top40, MidCap, Small and Fledgling companies). This idea was explored 
further in Section 5.7.1 – dealing with the share-based remuneration trends of companies of various 
sizes. 
5.5 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 2.3: VESTING CONDITIONS 
Different types of scheme (discussed in Section 5.4) tend to have different vesting conditions attached 
to them. Longer vesting periods incentivise executives to concentrate on the long-term success of the 
company – improving the alignment between the interests of executives and shareholders. Corporate 
governance regulations, such as King III and King IV, advise that the minimum vesting period applied 
should be three years. Furthermore, the use of appropriate performance conditions, which focus the 
attention of executives on the long-term health of the company and include non-financial metrics, are 
also encouraged by King III and IV. However, previous studies have noted that performance conditions 
in South Africa are often based on EPS, TSR and share price (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b). This 
prevalence indicates the absence of importance attached to non-financial metrics. Furthermore, EPS, 
TSR and the share price could be artificially enhanced by share repurchases – a fact not often 
considered in the design of share-based remuneration.  
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Section 5.5 examines the service and performance conditions attached to each of the scheme types. 
In addition, the time trends relating to the use of performance conditions are examined – firstly in 
general, and secondly by considering specifically those conditions that are based on metrics easily 
enhanced by share repurchases (share price, TSR and/or EPS). In Section 5.5 all schemes in operation 
are considered, and not only those granted during specific years. For Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, the per-
executive data (8 837 line items) were employed to provide additional depth and accuracy, while the 
per-company year data (2 312 company years) were employed in Section 5.5.3 to prepare the data to 
be employed as independent variable in Chapter 6, and to examine the way that companies employ 
performance conditions. 
5.5.1 Service vesting conditions of the various types of scheme 
It is important to evaluate whether the service vesting conditions (also referred to as vesting period 
or service period) attached to executive share-based remuneration provided evidence of alignment 
between the interests of shareholders and executives. King III required that a vesting period of at least 
three years be attached to executive share-based remuneration for it to function effectively as a long-
term incentive. The longer the vesting period, the greater is the alignment between the interests of 
shareholders and executives (Catuogno, Saggese, & Sarto, 2016).  
The service vesting conditions of the different scheme types in operation can be viewed in Table 5.3. 
These were calculated by considering the 8 837 line items (per executive, per company year), to 
provide the maximum level of detail regarding the service vesting conditions of each scheme type. 
Additionally, different executives might be awarded vesting periods of differing length and, as such, 
the usage of the per-executive data were more appropriate. Schemes where the vesting period was 
unknown were excluded from Table 5.3. It was found that the vesting period was unknown for almost 
10% of share option plans and approximately 26% of share purchase plans (which were the schemes 
commonly employed prior to the effective date of IFRS 2, when disclosures on the schemes were 





Service vesting period of the different types of schemes (2002–2017) 
Scheme type 
Service vesting period 
Range Mean Median 
Share options 0 to 10 years 4.76 years 5 years 
Share purchase plans 0 to 6 years 4.15 years 5 years 
SARs 0 to 6 years 4.05 years 5 years 
Restricted shares 0 to 7 years 4.05 years 5 years 
Performance shares 2 to 6 years 3.39 years 3 years 
Deferred bonus plans 3 to 7 years 3.04 years 3 years 
Looking at the mean, share options had a longer vesting period than the other scheme types, while 
performance shares and deferred bonus plans had shorter vesting periods. However, the median 
service vesting periods were either three or five years. When looking at both the mean and median 
vesting periods applied by the companies in the population, it seems that the average South African 
company was complying with the service period requirement contained in the King Reports – that 
share-based remuneration should have a long-term vesting period (i.e. 3 years or more). However, 
individual companies did apply shorter vesting periods (if one considers the minimum values of 0 and 
2 years shown in Table 5.3 for some scheme types). 
5.5.2 Performance conditions of the various types of scheme 
The performance conditions applied to the share options, SARs, performance shares, and deferred 
bonus plans in operation are shown in Table 5.4. Similar to the service vesting conditions in Section 
5.5.1, the percentages attached to those vesting conditions were calculated on the per-executive data 
(8 837 data line items). As companies sometimes employed multiple schemes and also differing 
performance conditions for different scheme types and executives, it was deemed more appropriate 
to not combine the data per company as yet, but rather to discuss the per-executive data. The 
percentages below refer to the percentage of times that a specific performance condition was used, 
given that the specific scheme type was in operation.  
Profit metrics included revenue, profit, earnings, earnings before interest and tax, gross margin, and 
metrics measuring the return on (net) assets, return on equity, return on invested capital and return 
on capital employed. When ‘and other conditions’ are added to a specific category in Table 5.4, the 
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conditions included profit metrics, conditions related to cash flow, net asset value per share, debtors’ 
quality, the gearing ratio, and non-financial conditions, but did not include share price, TSR and EPS as 
these were always indicated separately in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4 
Percentage of times that a certain performance condition was attached to each of the different types 









None 92% 42% 96% 1% 
Unknown 1% 10% 0% 20% 
Profit metrics 1% 3% 0% 11% 
Share price or TSR 4% 1% 0% 14% 
Share price or TSR, and other 
conditions 0% 0% 0% 15% 
EPS 1% 32% 4% 8% 
EPS and other conditions 0% 9% 0% 3% 
EPS and share price or TSR 1% 3% 0% 15% 
EPS, share price or TSR, and other 
conditions 0% 0% 0% 13% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Share options usually did not have performance conditions attached (92% of the time). Most SARs, 
however, did have performance conditions attached – most commonly based on EPS. Performance 
conditions were usually not employed for deferred bonus plans (96% of the time). 
In contrast, performance share plans almost always had performance conditions attached (hence the 
name of the type of scheme). Only in two companies, Aveng Limited and RCL Foods Limited, did the 
early years of a specific full quantum scheme have no performance conditions, whereas the latter 
years had unspecified performance conditions. However, the number of shares relating to the scheme 
without performance conditions could not be split from those having performance conditions. In these 
two cases, the combined scheme (initial years without performance conditions and later years with 
performance conditions) was classified as a performance share scheme. As such, a limited number of 
performance share entries (1%) had no performance conditions, but this was not the norm. The 
conditions attached to performance shares were quite varied, although both TSR and EPS were 
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commonly employed. The conditions of a substantial portion (20%) of performance share plans were 
not disclosed – leading to insufficient shareholder information. 
5.5.3 Trends relating to performance conditions 
Globally, performance conditions are increasingly attached to share-based remuneration. The time 
trends relating to the usage of performance conditions by South African listed companies, and 
specifically those based on share price, TSR and/or EPS, are examined in this section. Firstly, an 
examination was done of whether the percentage of companies that employ performance conditions 
had increased over time. Secondly, the percentage of companies using share price, TSR and/or EPS as 
performance conditions were calculated (as these metrics were at increased risk of being artificially 
enhanced by share repurchases). 
To enable an effective time trends analysis examining company behaviour, the per-company year data 
(2 312 company years) was employed. This also enabled the inclusion of this variable as an 
independent variable in Chapter 6 (where the relationship between share repurchases and executive 
share-based remuneration was studied per company year).  
It was decided to classify a company into one of four categories in a specific year: (1) having no 
scheme; (2) employing a scheme without performance conditions; (3) using a scheme with share price, 
TSR and/or EPS conditions; and (4) using a scheme with other performance conditions. This 
classification was based on all schemes in operation and not just those granted in a specific year. When 
some executives of a company had no scheme in a certain year, but others had a scheme, then the 
company was categorised as having a scheme (as some executives did have a scheme). If some 
executives had no performance conditions attached to their scheme, while others had performance 
conditions, then the company was judged to have performance conditions. If some executives had 
share price, TSR and/or EPS related performance conditions, while others did not, then the company 
was classified as having share price, TSR and/or EPS related conditions.  
In Table 5.5 the trends relating to the percentage of companies falling into each category are shown. 






Percentage of companies employing no scheme, schemes without performance conditions or 
schemes with specific performance conditions 
 
No scheme (1) Scheme without 
performance 
conditions (2) 
Scheme with share 
price, TSR and/or 
EPS performance 
conditions (3) 
Scheme with other 
performance 
conditions (4) 
2002 36% 63% 1% 0% 
2003 31% 68% 1% 0% 
2004 30% 68% 1% 1% 
2005 28% 69% 2% 1% 
2006 27% 64% 8% 1% 
2007 37% 51% 10% 3% 
2008 32% 48% 14% 6% 
2009 27% 48% 17% 7% 
2010 24% 48% 18% 10% 
2011 25% 46% 19% 11% 
2012 26% 45% 21% 9% 
2013 27% 42% 22% 10% 
2014 27% 38% 24% 12% 
2015 23% 36% 30% 11% 
2016 23% 34% 33% 10% 
2017 22% 31% 35% 12% 
Average for 
2002–2017 
period 28% 50% 15% 6% 
Over the entire 2002–2017 period, it was common to employ a scheme without performance 
conditions. This probably relates back to the finding that share option schemes were the most 
common type of scheme in the entire target period (Section 5.4), as share options mostly did not have 
performance conditions attached (Table 5.4).  
During the 2002–2004 period (just prior to the effective date of IFRS 2), the percentage of companies 
employing no scheme decreased, while the percentage of companies employing a scheme without 
performance conditions increased (the increase and decrease were an approximate match). The 
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movement was probably due to companies starting to implement share option plans without 
performance conditions during this period. During the 2002–2004 period, the percentage of 
companies which had schemes with performance conditions was negligible.  
From 31 December 2005 year ends onwards, IFRS 2 was effective. In 2006, the year subsequent to the 
effective date of IFRS 2, the percentage of companies which employed schemes without performance 
conditions decreased, while the percentage of companies with schemes hinging on share price, TSR 
and/or EPS increased. Thus, after the effective date of IFRS 2, companies were more likely to employ 
additional schemes with performance conditions. The schemes added were probably SARs and 
contingent share plans. In addition, more than 10 million instruments lapsed or were forfeited during 
2006, while the comparative figure for 2005 was 226 126 instruments. This is an indication of 
companies cancelling their existing schemes without performance conditions (probably share option 
schemes) during the 2006 year to ensure that the incentives did not have to be accounted for under 
IFRS 2.  
In 2007, at the start of the global financial crisis and the second year after the effective date of IFRS 2, 
the percentage of companies employing no scheme increased drastically, probably because 
companies which had cancelled their schemes (without performance conditions) during 2006 did not 
replace them. The percentage of companies employing schemes without performance conditions 
decreased further in 2007, and more than 3.6 million instruments lapsed or were forfeited. The 
percentage of companies employing schemes with performance conditions (share price, TSR and/or 
EPS conditions, and other conditions) increased during this period. It seems that, after the effective 
date of IFRS 2, one group of companies terminated their existing schemes (without performance 
conditions) and did not replace them with any other share-based remuneration, while another group 
of companies added schemes with performance conditions to their remuneration strategy. 
During the 2008–2010 period there was a steady decrease in the percentage of companies which had 
no scheme, while the percentage of companies which employed performance conditions (both those 
based on share price, TSR and/or EPS and those based on other metrics) increased. It seems that the 
implementation IFRS 2 halted the granting of share-based remuneration for some companies, but by 
2008–2010 more companies were again settling into a rhythm of granting share-based remuneration 
(now with performance conditions). 
From 2011 to 2017 the percentage of companies with no scheme remained relatively constant, as did 
the percentage of companies which employed schemes with performance conditions other than share 
price, TSR and/or EPS. However, over the 2011–2017 period the percentage of companies employing 
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schemes without performance conditions decreased as the percentage of companies employing 
schemes with share price, TSR and/or EPS conditions increased. This is a further indication of 
companies transitioning from having no performance conditions to employing them. The increase 
might have been prompted or sustained by King III (effective date 1 March 2010, thus year ends from 
28 February 2011 onwards), which encourages the use of performance conditions that encapsulate 
shareholder value and company performance. Share price, TSR and EPS are often viewed as such 
metrics. 
In Section 3.5 it was indicated that one of the independent variables (capturing executive share-based 
remuneration) to be employed in answering Research question 3 was a binary variable indicating 
whether or not a company employed performance conditions based on share price, TSR and/or EPS. 
To create this binary variable, the company years in which a scheme with share price, TSR and/or EPS 
conditions was employed (the second to last column in Table 5.5) was coded as ‘1’ (357 of 2 312 
company years, or 15% of company years), while the remainder of the company years (the remainder 
of the columns in Table 5.5) were coded as ‘0’. A code of ‘1’ indicated the usage of performance 
conditions related to share price, TSR and/or EPS, while a ‘0’ indicated the absence of such conditions. 
5.5.4 Comparison with previous research 
Mavrodinov (2012) noted that, in South Africa, appreciation schemes tend to have longer service 
vesting periods (often 5 years and more), while full quantum schemes typically vest over a three-year 
period. The findings of the present study, if one considers the median service vesting periods of the 
scheme types in Section 5.5.1), agree with those of Mavrodinov (2012). 
Bettis et al. (2018) found that the use of performance conditions in the US increased over time, 
especially after the effective date of FAS123R; most often TSR and EPS were used (Meridian 
Compensation Partners, 2018). The findings of the present study confirmed that the effective date of 
IFRS 2 seemed to have increased the usage of performance conditions (Section 5.5.3). The percentage 
of companies employing performance conditions increased from that point onward, throughout the 
period studied. 
By 2012, Mavrodinov (2012) reported that performance conditions were employed extensively in 
South Africa, and that TSR, EPS and return on equity were most commonly used. The findings of the 
present investigation confirmed that performance conditions based on share price, TSR and EPS 
remained the most common performance conditions (Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3).  
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5.6 RESEARCH SUB-QUESTION 2.4: NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS 
The JSE Listing Requirements stipulate that companies should disclose – per executive, per scheme – 
the number of share-based instruments (e.g. the number of share options, or the number of SARs, or 
the number of contingent shares) held at the start of the year, granted during the year, exercised 
during the year, and held at year end. IRESS captures this information per executive, per scheme. In 
Section 3.4 it was explained that this data on the number of share-based instruments involved were 
exported from IRESS to the ‘per-executive database on share-based remuneration’. For every 
company year, the per-executive data were then combined to create the ‘per-company year database 
on share-based remuneration’. In the per-company year database additional columns were created 
that displayed the total number of instruments for all scheme types granted during the year, exercised 
during the year and held by executives at year end.  
The average number of executive share-based instruments employed by the companies in the 
population are shown in Figure 5.3. This includes the instruments relating to all types of share-based 
schemes. The number of instruments provides a measure of how extensively a specific company 
employs share-based remuneration during a specific year. The number of share-based instruments 
granted, exercised and held by executives at year end has often been used to proxy executive share-
based remuneration in earlier studies that considered the relationship between share repurchases 
and executive share-based remuneration (see Section 3.5).  
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Figure 5.3 shows a large peak at 2014 in the number of instruments granted and held at year end. On 
scrutinising the individual data entries for 2014, it was found that a single company, namely Morvest 
Group Limited (Morvest), caused the large peak. Morvest formed part of the population from 2002 to 
2014.  
Morvest employed no share-based incentives from 2002 to 2006. From 2007 to 2009 a modest 
number of share options were granted (and exercised) although the vesting periods were unusually 
short (3-month and 1-year vesting periods were applied, while the median was 5 years, as reported in 
Table 5.3). In 2010 no share-based incentives were employed by Morvest. From 2011 to 2014 
unusually large numbers of share options were granted, with longer vesting periods (5 to 7 years) than 
before. The large number of share options granted was included in the number held at year end from 
2011 to 2014, and inflated the average number of instruments held at year end during the 2011 to 
2014 period. The average number of shares held at year end (shown in Figure 5.3) dropped again in 
2015, as Morvest delisted before its 2015 year end and was thus excluded from the population from 
2015 onwards.  
The average number of share options granted by Morvest during the 2011–2014 period was 21.5 
million share options per executive, per annum; while Morvest granted, on average, less than 2 million 
share options per executive, per annum during the 2007–2009 period. The average number of share 
options granted by the other companies in the population (excluding Morvest) was less than 200 000 
share options per executive, per year, for the entire 2002–2017 period. Thus, it seems that Morvest 
employed an exceptionally large number of share options, especially during the 2011–2014 period 
(the reason for this is unknown). It was therefore deemed more appropriate to investigate trends 
relating to the number of instruments employed, with Morvest excluded. The trends relating to the 





Figure 5.4. Average number of share-based instruments granted, exercised and held at year end, 
per company (excluding Morvest) 
From 2002 to 2003 the average number of instruments held as closing balance increased, after which 
a slight decreasing trend was observed between 2003 and 2006. In 2007 a sharp drop occurred in the 
average number of instruments held at year end. The decrease during the 2003–2007 period was 
probably attributable to fewer instruments granted during 2005 and larger numbers exercised over 
the 2004–2007 period (evident from Figure 5.4). Moreover, 13.6 million instruments were forfeited 
or had lapsed during 2006 and 2007, leading to lower closing balances. 
Between 2007 and 2011, the average number of instruments held at year end increased again – 
probably owing to companies starting to grant SARs (the increased number of instruments granted 
during 2006 to 2010 can also be verified in Figure 5.4), while legacy share option instruments were 
still outstanding. From 2012 onwards, the average number of instruments held at year end has 
generally shown a downward trend. This decrease in the closing balance number of instruments 
between 2012 and 2017 could be attributed to a number of factors. As full quantum schemes became 
more popular during this period, fewer shares needed to be granted to provide incentives of similar 
value to the appreciation schemes being phased out. The fact that fewer instruments were granted 
during 2012–2017 than during 2008–2011 can be verified in Figure 5.4. A second possible explanation 
for the decreasing number of instruments held at year end was that performance conditions became 
more popular during this period. The existence of the performance conditions led to a larger 
probability of instruments being forfeited (if conditions were not met), which would lead to a lower 
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The average number of instruments granted increased steadily over the 2002–2010 period, except for 
a slight dip in 2005. The dip in 2005 might relate to uncertainty regarding the effect of IFRS 2, that led 
to companies granting fewer instruments. From 2011 onwards the number on instruments granted 
has been more volatile, not exhibiting any fixed pattern.  
From 2002 to 2005 the average number of instruments exercised increased steadily, and remained at 
a relatively high level throughout the 2005–2007 period. As appreciation schemes (and specifically 
share options) were the most common type of scheme employed during this period, the rising share 
prices on the JSE probably led to large-scale exercises over this period. Fewer instruments were 
exercised from 2008 to2009, during the latter part of the global financial crisis and when share prices 
on the JSE fell sharply. It may have been that executives did not want to exercise share-based 
instruments during a period of uncertainty for their companies. Moreover, lower share prices could 
have led to the share options and SARs being ‘out of the money'. In 2010 slightly more instruments 
were exercised, but exercises were at a lower level during the period after the financial crisis than 
before. As mentioned, when discussing the fact that fewer shares were held at year end from 2012 
onwards, the lower numbers exercised might have been the result of the full quantum schemes being 
employed more regularly or more instruments being forfeited. 
5.7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TO BE EMPLOYED 
The following share-based remuneration variables, selected on the grounds of earlier research in 
other countries, will be employed as independent variables in Chapter 6: 
• Whether or not performance conditions based on share price, TSR and/or EPS were employed (as 
described in Section 5.5.3) 
• The number of share-based instruments exercised during the year (as described in Section 5.6)  
• The number of share-based instruments held by executives at year end (as described in Section 
5.6) 
For the share-based remuneration variables mentioned in the prior paragraph, differences between 
companies of various sizes are investigated in Section 5.7. As described in Section 4.8.1, the companies 
were classified as either Top40/MidCap, Small or Fledgling in a specific company year (based on the 
JSE indexes). Of the 2 312 company years being studied in Chapter 5, 2 021 (87%) could not be 
classified into one of the size groups (Top40/MidCap, Small and Fledgling), as certain criteria had to 
be met for a company to be included in the indexes (see Section 4.8.1). Of the company years that 
could be classified based on size, 671 company years (33%) were labelled as Top40/MidCap, while 
Small companies made up 23 per cent of the population (461 company years). The majority group 
(44% of population that could be classified) was Fledgling companies with 889 company years.  
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5.7.1 Performance conditions applied per size classification 
In Section 5.5.3, the performance conditions applied by companies in the research population were 
discussed. Table 5.6 expands on this matter by showing, for the period 2002–2017, the percentage of 
Top40, MidCap, Small and Fledgling companies that was categorised as having (1) no scheme; (2) a 
scheme without performance conditions; (3) a scheme with conditions based on share price, TSR 
and/or EPS; and (4) a scheme with conditions other than those based on share price, TSR and/or EPS. 
The same classification was employed in Section 5.5.3 (Table 5.5). As explained in Section 5.5.3, a 
binary variable (to be employed as independent variable in Chapter 6) was created by coding ‘1’ for 
company years in which a scheme with conditions based on share price, TSR and/or EPS was employed 
(column numbered (3)) and otherwise coding ‘0’ (for the remaining columns). The percentages in 
Table 5.6 are rounded and therefore the total might equal 99 per cent or 101 per cent in some cases. 
Table 5.6  
Performance conditions applied by companies of different sizes 













Top40/MidCap 8% 52% 31% 9% 
Small 14% 56% 19% 10% 
Fledgling 41% 51% 5% 3% 
Average for 2002–2017 
period 
(as reported in Table 5.5) 28% 50% 15% 6% 
Only a small percentage of the Top40/MidCap and Small companies did not employ any share-based 
scheme. However, in more than 40 per cent of the Fledgling company years no share-based 
remuneration was provided to executives. It seems that size classification definitely played a role in 
the likelihood of share-based remuneration being employed or not. 
In the entire population, during half the company years, a scheme without performance conditions 
was employed. This percentage was relatively constant throughout all the size groups. Thus, although 
Fledgling companies were less likely to employ share-based remuneration (had a higher percentage 
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of ‘no scheme’), such companies were not less likely to employ schemes without performance 
conditions.  
Performance conditions other than those based on share price, TSR and/or EPS were used more often 
by Top40/MidCap and Small companies, and less often by Fledgling companies. Similarly, employing 
performance conditions linked to the share price, TSR and/or EPS was very common for 
Top40/MidCap companies. It was less common in Small companies, and relatively uncommon for 
Fledgling companies. The fact that Fledgling companies were less likely to employ share-based 
remuneration seemed to lessen their usage of performance conditions (but did not make Fledgling 
companies less likely to employ schemes without performance conditions). 
5.7.2 Number of instruments per size classification 
In Section 5.6 the number of share-based instruments employed per company was discussed, and it 
was pointed out that Morvest skewed the number of instruments held at year end. Thus, Morvest (a 
Fledgling company) was excluded from the analysis in this section. Table 5.7 now shows the average 
number of share-based instruments in use for each of the size groups.  
Table 5.7  
Number of share-based instruments exercised and held at year end by companies of different sizes 
Size classification 
Average number of 
instruments exercised 
Average number of 
instruments held at year 
end 
Top40/MidCap 504 908 2 896 903 
Small 521 247 2 427 428 
Fledgling 207 163 1 951 021 
Average for 2002–2017 period (on which 
Figure 5.4 is based) 364 916 2 270 698 
Top40/MidCap and Small companies, on average, employed larger numbers of share-based 
instruments (both in respect of the number of instruments exercised during the year and held at year 
end), while the number of instruments employed by Fledgling companies was substantially smaller.  
5.7.3 Conclusion on size classification 
No major differences were noted between Top40/MidCap and Small companies. However, Fledgling 
companies were less likely to attach performance conditions based on share price, TSR and/or EPS. 
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When excluding Morvest, Fledgling companies also employed fewer share-based instruments. The 
findings of this study agree with those of previous research that larger companies were more likely to 
employ share-based remuneration (Gabaix et al., 2014; Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b) and to attach 
performance conditions to share-incentives (Bettis et al., 2018). In the South African context, the 
present study adds to this knowledge by showing that Fledgling companies, specifically, were less 
likely to attach performance conditions linked to share price, TSR and/or EPS to share-based incentives 
and generally employed a smaller number of share-based instruments. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the characteristics of the share-based 
remuneration paid by companies in the population during 2002–2017. It addressed the value of share-
based remuneration, the type of schemes employed, the vesting conditions employed by companies, 
and the number of instruments involved. Furthermore, differences between companies of different 
sizes were identified. 
The proportion of share-based remuneration value (as measured by the line item ‘gain on shares’ 
captured by the IRESS financial database) in comparison to total executive remuneration value 
seemed to be smaller in South Africa than in the UK and the US, especially from 2010 onwards. The 
seemingly smaller value, however, could be due to measurement error. It might be that disclosure in 
annual financial statements (and correspondingly the IRESS financial database) does not accurately 
and completely reflect the value of all types of share-based remuneration provided by JSE-listed 
companies. 
Before the effective date of IFRS 2, share options were the most common share incentive employed 
in South Africa. In 2005 and 2006 share option usage started to decrease while SARs increased. The 
use of SARs were unique to the South African experience – SARs were not as popular elsewhere in the 
world. In the US, companies changed from share options to contingent shares after the introduction 
of the new accounting regulations requiring share options to be expensed. Only from 2009 onwards 
(later than in the US), the use of contingent shares increased in South Africa. In 2009 appreciation 
schemes were less likely to be an effective incentive owing to the falling share prices on the JSE, and 
companies might have sought alternatives. At this time, the use of full quantum schemes had been 
endorsed by King III, and companies could have implemented contingent share plans to improve their 
corporate governance. 
The median service vesting periods employed were either three or five years, and thus complied with 
the requirements of the King Reports. The use of performance conditions increased over time – as 
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SARs and contingent shares became more popular. The most common performance conditions 
employed were share price, TSR and EPS. 
Certain trends were noticed when studying the number of executive share-based instruments 
employed per company. The number of instruments exercised was high during the 2002–2007 period 
(owing appreciation schemes being popular and rising share prices on the JSE). During 2008–2009, 
fewer instruments were exercised (probably caused by lower share prices on the JSE, leading to 
appreciation schemes providing a smaller payout at this point). Executives could also have felt it 
inappropriate to exercise share-based incentives during the global financial crisis. After the crisis, the 
numbers exercised increased again, but fewer instruments were exercised than before the financial 
crisis (this might be attributable to the increased use of full quantum schemes or the presence of 
performance conditions). 
The number of share-based instruments held at year end decreased during the 2002–2007 period, as 
large numbers of instruments were exercised. In addition, during 2006 and 2007 numerous 
instruments were forfeited or had lapsed. From 2007 to 2011 the number of instruments in closing 
balance increased again – as new schemes were being granted, while legacy schemes were allowed 
to run their course. Between 2012 and 2017 the closing balance number of instruments decreased, 
probably owing to the same reasons mentioned for the decreasing number of instruments exercised. 
Fledgling companies were less likely than other companies to employ performance conditions based 
on share price, TSR and/or EPS. Furthermore, Fledgling companies generally employed fewer share-





CHAPTER 6: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHARE REPURCHASES AND EXECUTIVE 
SHARE-BASED REMUNERATION  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 20 years, more and more researchers have been pointing out that share repurchases 
could be employed by executives to artificially increase company share price and EPS – thus increasing 
the value of share-based remuneration earned by the executives themselves (Gao & Kronlund, 2020; 
Geiler & Renneboog, 2016; Jolls, 1998; Young & Yang, 2011). The possibility that such rent extraction 
by executives could be occurring has been studied globally, but no study has been done in South Africa 
owing to the lack of readily available comprehensive data on both share repurchases and share-based 
remuneration.  
In Chapters 4 and 5 the data collected on both share repurchases and share-based remuneration, for 
the period 2002 to 2017, has been discussed. Having this data available, it is now possible to study the 
relationship between these two variables. Based on the findings of previous studies (see Section 
2.4.1), it was postulated that a positive relationship between share repurchases and the number of 
share-based instruments exercised will be found. However, previous research points to a positive 
relationship between share repurchases and the number of share-based instruments held by 
executives only during the early years of the present study (prior to 2010). Similarly, a positive 
relationship between share repurchases and the use of performance vesting conditions related to the 
share price, TSR and/or EPS was only reported in previous studies based on data from before 2010. 
The positive relationships mentioned in the three preceding sentences (formulated based on previous 
research) were employed as expectations to guide the present research, and to enable a comparison 
between the findings of the present research and earlier studies addressing the same issue (see also 
Section 2.4.2).  
If a positive (statistically significant) relationship could be established between share repurchases 
(dependent variable) and share-based remuneration (independent variable), this would point to the 
possibility of executives extracting rents from the companies they work for – using share repurchases. 
If this link between the two variables can be established, it would strengthen the argument that 
additional regulation regarding share repurchases is required in South Africa. Such regulation could 
include the real-time announcement of all share repurchases on SENS (as required by many stock 
exchanges worldwide); improved disclosure in annual financial statements; and accurate record-
keeping by financial databases (such as IRESS and Bloomberg). 
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In Section 6.2 descriptive (univariate) statistics on the dependent, independent and control variables 
to be studied, are provided (the choice of variables was discussed in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). As all 
regression models have certain assumptions that need to be complied with, these assumptions and 
how they were addressed are discussed in Section 6.3. Lastly, the results from the regression analyses 
examining the relationship between share repurchases and share-based remuneration are reported 
(Sections 6.4 onwards). The choice of regression techniques was discussed in Section 3.5.3. A 
significance level of 10 per cent was employed, and all results that were significant at either the one 
per cent, five per cent or 10 per cent level of significance were seen as statistically significant and 
reported as such. Lastly, alternative interpretations relating to the results are discussed (Section 6.8) 
and a conclusion is provided (Section 6.9). 
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON VARIABLES EMPLOYED 
In this section further details are provided about the variables employed as dependent, independent 
and control variables; the abbreviations used for the variables; and descriptive statistics on the 
variables (Table 6.1). Besides the variables shown in Table 6.1, the company name, year, and industry 
were also collected, to be used to control for possible fixed effects in the data. It must, however, be 
noted that the industry dummy, based on the new JSE classification system, was only available from 
2006 onwards. A small number of companies were initially listed in the Basic Materials or Financial 
industries, but amended their listing to an industry that fell within the scope of this study. Such 
companies were included in the present study for the entire 2002–2017 period, but the industry 
indication was left blank in years when they were listed in the Basic Materials or Financial industries.  
As explained in Section 3.5.1.1, two types of dependent variables were employed in Chapter 6. The 
first was a binary variable capturing a company’s decision to repurchase (or not) in a specific year. The 
second group of dependent variables were ratio-scale and measured the rand value spent on share 
repurchases in a specific year. The first ratio-scale dependent variable was the net repurchase value 
(i.e. the holding company repurchasing from third parties plus repurchases executed by subsidiaries) 
– which could be contrasted to gross repurchase value (which included, additionally, the intragroup 
transaction where the holding company repurchases treasury shares). Secondly, the ratio-scale 
dependent variables focused on certain subsets of net repurchase value, namely the repurchase value 
attributable to certain repurchasing entities (the holding company repurchasing from third parties; 
and subsidiaries repurchasing); the repurchase value associated with certain repurchase types 
(general repurchases and other specific repurchases); and the transparency of share repurchases (the 
announced and unannounced general repurchases). 
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In relation to the repurchasing entities in the previous paragraph, it must be noted that only two of 
the three repurchasing entities (identified in Chapter 2 and reported on in Chapter 4) are considered 
in Chapter 6. The reason for excluding the holding company repurchasing treasury shares is that such 
repurchases are intragroup transactions (their net effect on the group is zero). This corresponds with 
the notion of examining the net repurchase value rather than the gross repurchase value. When 
considering the repurchase types in the previous paragraph, it can be noted that only two of the four 
repurchase types (identified in Chapter 2 and reported on in Chapter 4) are studied in Chapter 6. The 
holding company repurchasing treasury shares (a type of specific repurchase) is excluded, as already 
mentioned. However, pro rata specific repurchases are also excluded in Chapter 6, since very few such 
repurchases took place during the target period. Furthermore, pro rata share repurchases are not 
known to lead to an increase in the share price (no long-term cumulative abnormal returns were noted 




Descriptive statistics on variables employed in regression analyses 
Variable name Description Abbreviation  Obser-
vations 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
deviation 
Dependent variables 
Decision to repurchase Binary variable taking on the value ‘one’ if a repurchase did 
occur, and ‘zero’ if no repurchase occurred 
Y_Yesno 2 312 0 1 0.27 0.44 
Total (net) repurchases Rand value spent on repurchases (excluding treasury shares 
repurchased by holding company) scaled by lagged market 
capitalisation 




Rand value spent on repurchases by holding company 
(excluding repurchases of treasury shares by holding 
company) scaled by lagged market capitalisation 
Y_Cpy 2 246 0 0.76 0.00 0.03 
Subsidiary repurchases Rand value spent on repurchases by subsidiaries, scaled by 
lagged market capitalisation 
Y_Sub 2 246 0 1 0.01 0.03 
General repurchases Rand value spent on general repurchases, scaled by lagged 
market capitalisation 
Y_Gen 2 246 0 1 0.01 0.03 
Other specific 
repurchases 
Rand value spent on specific repurchases (excluding 
repurchase of treasury shares by holding company and pro 
rata repurchases) scaled by lagged market capitalisation 
Y_Specother 2 246 0 0.93 0.00 0.03 
Announced general 
repurchases 
Rand value spent on announced general repurchases, 
scaled by lagged market capitalisation 
Y_Anngen 2 246 0 0.21 0.00 0.01 
Unannounced general 
repurchases 
Rand value spent on unannounced general repurchases, 
scaled by lagged market capitalisation 




Variable name Description Abbreviation  Obser-
vations 






Number of share-based instruments exercised by 
executives during the year, scaled by the number of holding 
company shares outstanding at year end 
X_Exercised 2 312 0 0.11 0.00 0.01 
Share-based 
instruments held at 
year end by executives 
Number of share-based instruments held by executives at 
year end, scaled by the number of holding company shares 
outstanding at year end 
X_Closing 2 312 0 0.42 0.01 0.02 
Performance 
conditions linked to 
share price, TSR and/or 
EPS 
Binary variable taking on the value ‘one’ if a company 
employed performance vesting conditions linked to share 
price, TSR and/or EPS, or ‘zero’ if not 




Prior-year change in share price, expressed as percentage 
increase or decrease based in opening share price in prior 
period 
XL_Returnshare 2 114 -0.99 119.2 0.32 2.79 
Market-to-book Market-to-book ratio (lagged) XL_Marketbook 2 181 0.00 120.18 2.35 3.72 
Dividend yield Dividend yield X_Divyield 2 251 0.00 3520.00 4.87 74.93 
Market capitalisation Logged market capitalisation of the company (lagged) XL_Lmarketcap 2 246 6.14 11.97 9.07 0.96 
Shares owned by 
directors 
Number of holding company shares owned by directors, 
scaled by the number of holding company shares 
outstanding at year end 
X_Directshare 2 312 0.00 0.96 0.14 0.18 
Debt-to-assets  Debt-to-assets ratio (lagged) XL_Debtassets 2.243 0.00 2.33 0.53 0.24 
Return on assets Return on assets ratio X_ROA 2 305 -198.08 205.56 12.89 16.81 
Cash flow Available cash flow, scaled by assets X_Cash flow 2 301 -2.00 1.67 0.10 0.12 
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The data were examined prior to the calculation of the descriptive statistics in Table 6.1, and certain 
amendments were made to minimise measurement error. These amendments included (for an 
explanation of the abbreviations, refer to Table 6.1): 
• Y_Net, Y_Sub, Y_Gen and Y_Unanngen: Two instances (two company years) were noted where 
the dependent variable (a fraction) marginally exceeded one. This is probably a result of the 
market capitalisation on IRESS being incorrectly captured (captured in thousands of rands rather 
than rands). As the dependent variable could not exceed one, the observations of the dependent 
variable Y_Net, Y_Sub, Y_Gen and Y_Unanngen were capped at one in these two cases. 
• X_Closing: The number of share-based instruments held at year end was scaled by the number of 
holding company shares outstanding. After scaling, the variable was expected to be a fraction, 
ranging between zero and one. For Cashbuild Limited, in the year 2017, IRESS had inaccurately 
captured the number of share-based instruments held by executives (adding three zeros to the 
number of instruments), causing the fraction to exceed one. This was corrected based on the 
information contained in the annual financial statement. 
• X_Directshare: The number of beneficial shares held by directors was extracted from IRESS and 
scaled by the number of holding company shares outstanding. After scaling, the variable should 
be a fraction, ranging between zero and one. However, for Cargo Carriers Limited, in the years 
2016 and 2017, the variable exceeded one. On examination, it was found that IRESS had 
miscaptured the number of shares disclosed in the annual financial statement, and the variable 
was corrected based on the information contained in the financial statement. 
• XL_Marketbook: The market-to-book ratio was not expected to be zero or negative. A total of 67 
instances where IRESS reported zero, or negative, market-to-book ratios were deleted. Owing to 
missing market-to-book ratios, the related company years were automatically excluded from the 
regressions to follow in Chapter 6.  
A total of 2 312 line items (company years) were included in the present study, and for this reason the 
number of observations for the Y_Yesno variable equalled 2 312. However, the ratio-scale dependent 
variables (Y_Net etc.) only had 2 246 observations each. The reason for this was that the lagged market 
capitalisation was not available for 66 company years (for example, in the company’s first year of 
listing) and, as such, share repurchase value as a percentage of market capitalisation could not be 
calculated for 66 observations (leaving only 2 246 observations). All 2 312 company years had 
observations for the variable of interest (executive share-based remuneration), as lagged data were 
not employed. For the control variables, the number of company years for which observations were 
available ranged between 2 114 and 2 312. 
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In the research methodology (see Section 3.5.3.2) it was expected that the dependent variable’s 
observations would cluster at the zero point. For both the Y_Yesno and the Y_Net variables, 73 per 
cent of the observations were zero (no repurchase), while very few dependent variable observations 
near or at the upper boundary were noticed when examining the data set. It would therefore seem 
that a two-limit tobit regression might be inappropriate and lead to illogical, biased results (Gallani et 
al., 2015) – which strengthens the argument rather to employ the FRM as primary model when 
studying the ratio-scale dependent variables. 
When one considers the minimum and maximum values, as well as the standard deviations, of the 
individual variables in Table 6.1, it would seem that some of the variables may contain outliers. 
Specifically, the maximum values of X_Divyield, XL_Marketbook and XL_Returnshare seem extremely 
large and could be a possible measurement error (i.e. inaccurate capturing by IRESS Expert). It was 
therefore decided to winsorise these three variables to reduce the effect of the outliers. 
6.3 REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS 
All regression models have certain assumptions, and if these assumptions are violated, the estimated 
coefficients could be biased or statistical significance cannot be inferred. Different assumptions are 
applicable to each of the models employed, but in this section the assumptions of OLS are listed and 
then discussed. The OLS assumptions are stricter than the assumptions of the primary models 
employed (the logit and the FRM) and would be applicable for the tobit and the LPM employed as 
robustness checks. As such, the OLS assumptions provide a good idea of how the assumptions were 
complied with and addressed to minimise bias and issues with statistical significance in these cases. 
The OLS assumptions are as follows (Wooldridge, 2014, p. 93): 
• A correct functional form (specification) modelling the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables (a linear relationship in the case of OLS) 
• Random sampling 
• No perfect collinearity (and no extreme multicollinearity) 
• Zero conditional mean 
• Homoskedasticity  
The second assumption refers to a random sample to be selected. No sampling occurred in the present 
study as the entire population was studied. Therefore, the second assumption did not pose a problem. 
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6.3.1 Correct functional form to model the relationship 
The LPM (OLS with a binary dependent variable) and tobit assume a linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables (Wooldridge, 2014, p. 71, 472). On the other hand, both the 
logit and FRM (which is modelled on the logit) assume a logistical relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable (in effect an S-shaped line, or non-linear function form, 
modelling the relationship between dependent and independent variable) (Papke & Wooldridge, 
1996; Wooldridge, 2014, p. 461). As the dependent variable is either binary (0 or 1) or bounded 
between zero and one, it is to be expected that a non-linear functional form assumed by both the logit 
and the FRM would be more appropriate (Gallani et al., 2015). Thus, the LPM and tobit are merely 
employed as robustness checks. 
6.3.2 Multicollinearity 
If the independent and control variables are highly correlated with each other (multicollinearity), the 
estimates produced by the regression model could be biased. To test for multicollinearity in the 
present study, a basic OLS regression was done with Y_Yesno as dependent variable, employing all the 
independent and control variables listed in Table 6.1. After the test, the variance inflation factor for 
all independent and control variables were calculated (Wooldridge, 2014, p. 86). The variance inflation 
factors ranged between 1.06 and 1.58, which indicated that multicollinearity was not a problem. No 
similar test exists for the logit or FRM models, but the OLS variance inflation factor test would have 
indicated if the independent and control variables seemed highly correlated. 
Initially, it was thought to execute separate regressions for Top40/MidCap, Small and Fledgling 
companies (as different share repurchase activity and executive share-based remuneration 
characteristics were noted for the different groups). But, as the logarithm of market capitalisation was 
already employed as control variable, it was expected that multicollinearity issues would arise in such 
a case, and therefore such regressions were not executed. 
6.3.3 Zero conditional mean 
If the zero conditional mean assumption is violated then omitted variable bias exists (also referred to 
as endogenous variables) (Wooldridge, 2014, pp. 74–75). Several measures were applied to minimise 
the risk of omitted variable bias in the present study. Firstly, the control variables used in the majority 
of earlier studies (Table 2.4) were employed as control variables in the present study (see Section 
3.5.2). Although a large number of control variables were employed, the risk remains that other 
aspects (such as the corporate governance practices and ownership structure of the company) could 
also influence share repurchase activity. If these omitted variables are permanent, then employing 
the fixed effects (Mundlak) approach would remove the bias (relating to these omitted variables) from 
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the coefficients produced by the regression model (De Jager, 2008, p. 62). This strengthens the 
argument to employ the Mundlak approach throughout. 
Reverse causality (when the dependent variable also influences the independent variable) could pose 
an additional endogeneity problem (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010, p. 1088). In the 
present study, if one measured the independent variable(s) in rands, then a reverse causality concern 
could have arisen (the share repurchases executed could have increased the share price, which in turn 
increased the rand value of executive share-based remuneration). To avoid reverse causality, the 
independent variables were rather measured as the number of share-based instruments employed 
(which cannot be influenced by share repurchases). 
6.3.4 Heteroskedasticity 
Homoskedasticity of the error term is important for statistical inference when applying the OLS and 
LPM models (Wooldridge, 2014, p. 93) and the tobit model (Gallani et al., 2015, p. 13). However, when 
the dependent variable is binary (or highly clustered at zero), it is not expected that the 
homoscedasticity assumption will be met (Gallani et al., 2015, p. 10). As such, this was compensated 
for by applying robust standard errors when estimating the LPM and tobit models in the present study. 
The logit (and by extension the FRM) automatically assumes heteroskedasticy and calculates robust 
standard errors by default (Wooldridge, 2014, p. 463). 
6.4 REGRESSIONS OF DECISION TO REPURCHASE 
In this section, the results from the regressions executed on the binary dependent variable Y_Yesno 
are discussed. As explained in the research methodology section, most previous studies employed a 
logit model (non-linear model) to test the binary ‘decision to repurchase’ variable. However, some of 
the more recent studies employed a linear probability model (OLS with binary dependent variable). In 
the present study it was decided to employ the logit model as primary model, but to employ the results 
of the linear probability model (LPM) as a robustness check. The results of logit regressions can be 
seen in Table 6.2.  
The logit did not allow for the clustering of standard errors by company, although the logit assumes 
heteroscedasticity by default (Wooldridge, 2014, p. 463). The coefficients produced by the logit model 
for each independent variable are expressed as the change in the logarithm of the odds of a 
repurchase occurring, given a one-unit change in the independent variable. However, the change in 
the logarithm of the odds is not easy to understand, and therefore marginal effects (also referred to 
as partial effects) can be calculated to produce a version of the coefficient that is easier to understand 
and comparable to the coefficient produced by the OLS model (Wooldridge, 2014, p. 468). The 
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marginal effect of the logit model, in the case of the binary dependent variable of the present study, 
can be interpreted as the change in the probability of a repurchase occurring, given a one-unit change 
in the independent variable.  
In Table 6.2, the following regression results are shown: panel model with fixed effects accounted for 
using the Mundlak approach for the period 2002-2017 (Model (1)); a similar model for only the period 
2006–2017 (Model (2)); and, finally, a similar model for the 2006–2017 period with industry dummies 
added (Model (3)). In Table 6.2 the coefficients (Coef), the marginal effects (Marg) and the significance 
level of the coefficient (Sig) are reported. 
Model (3) in Table 6.2 controls for industry fixed effects (industry dummies are added). However, 
industry classifications, based on the JSE’s new classification system, were only available from 2006 
onwards, and thus a comparable regression model for the 2006–2017 period was added to Table 6.2 
(Model (2)). The differences between Model (2) and Model (3) (in Table 6.2) are therefore attributable 
solely to industry fixed effects. Although the Mundlak approach would already have catered for the 
fixed effects pertaining to a certain company, and thus have made industry dummies unnecessary, a 
few companies did move between industries during the period. Owing to the additional variation in 
the data because some companies moved between industries, it was possible, and considered as 
conservative, to estimate an additional model with industry dummies (Model (3)). 





Regression results on the decision to repurchase using the logit model 
Independent / 
control variable 
2002–2017 (1) 2006–2017 (2) 2006–2017, industry 
dummies (3) 
Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig 
X_Exercised 24.82 3.18 ** 31.94 3.86 * 31.88 3.90 * 
X_Closing 9.63 1.23 * 2.85 0.34  3.13 0.38  
X_TSREPS 0.21 0.03  0.03 0.00  0.03 0.00  
XL_Returnshare^ -0.27 -0.04 ** -0.13 -0.02  -0.14 -0.01  
XL_Marketbook^ -0.01 -0.00  -0.06 -0.01  -0.05 -0.01  
X_Divyield^ 0.08 0.01 *** 0.08 0.01 * 0.08 0.01 * 
XL_Lmarketcap 0.25 0.03  0.13 0.02  0.06 0.01  
X_Directshares 1.48 0.19 * 4.08 0.49 *** 4.11 0.50 *** 
XL_Debtassets -2.55 -0.33 *** -3.41 -0.41 *** -3.46 -0.42 *** 
X_ROA 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
X_Cash flow 2.82 0.36 *** 1.60 0.19  1.55 0.19  
Constant -7.08 n/a *** -7.10 n/a *** -9.11 n/a *** 
Company fixed 
effects 
Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No Yes 
Robust standard 
error clustered by 
company 
Robust, not clustered Robust, not clustered Robust, not clustered 
Observations 2 077 1 411 1 411 
Chi-squared 109.884 77.084 83.098 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. All data were collected from IRESS and annual financial statements. The dependent variable is the 
decision to repurchase, while the independent variables of interest are the number of share-based 
instruments exercised scaled by number of shares outstanding (X_Exercised), the number of share-based 
instruments held by executives at year end scaled by the number of shares outstanding (X_Closing) and 
whether or not performance vesting conditions related to share price, TSR and/or EPS were applied 
(X_TSREPS). Control variables are described in Table 6.1, and ^ indicates that such control variables were 
winsorised.  




6.4.1 Interpretation of regression results relating to independent variables 
On considering the regression results pertaining to the X_Exercised variable in Table 6.2, it could be 
ascertained that the number of share-based instruments exercised in a year (expressed as a 
percentage of the holding company shares outstanding) was positively correlated to the decision to 
repurchase in all regressions executed. The marginal effect ranged between three and four, implying 
that the probability of a repurchase increased by between three and four percentage points when the 
number of instruments exercised by executives (as a percentage of shares outstanding) increased by 
one percentage point. The results of the OLS regressions (given in Appendix B1) show similar results 
regarding the number of instruments exercised, which provides robust evidence that the likelihood of 
a repurchase increases when executives exercise more share-based instruments in a given year.  
The finding that the number of share-based instruments exercised by executives increases the 
likelihood of a company executing a share repurchase in a given year is in line with expectations 
(formulated based on the findings of previous research) and agrees with the findings of recent studies 
in other countries. Edmans et al. (2018) and Moore (2018) both found that the vesting of executive 
share-based incentives led to a higher likelihood of the company repurchasing shares. The increased 
likelihood of share repurchases was associated with short-term behaviour by executives (Edmans et 
al., 2018; Moore, 2018). 
In respect of the X_Closing variable (Table 6.2), the number of share-based instruments held by 
executives at year end (expressed as a percentage of shares outstanding) was positively correlated to 
the likelihood of a repurchase in Model (1) (which considered the 2002–2017 period). However, as 
seen in Model (2), when only the 2006–2017 period was considered, no statistically significant 
relationship was found. This may be an indication of a relationship that was stronger in the pre-2006 
period. On considering the results of the OLS model (Appendix B1), no statistically significant 
relationship was found between the likelihood of a repurchase and the number of share-based 
instruments held at year end. It was expected that there would only be a relationship between the 
decision to repurchase and the number of share-based instruments held by executives during the early 
years covered by the present study. The findings in Table 6.2 seem to agree with this expectation, and 
this idea is explored further in Section 6.7.1. 
Jolls (1998) and Kahle (2002) showed that large numbers of share options held by executives increase 
the likelihood of a share repurchase, as executives holding unexercised share options prefer share 
repurchases over increasing dividends. These studies were performed pre-2000 or during the early 
2000s and only included share options as share-based instrument type, as this was the dominant 
scheme type during that period of time. Less global evidence is available on whether a positive 
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relationship exists between the decision to repurchase and all types of share-based incentives (not 
only share options). Edmans et al. (2018), for instance, considered the relationship between the 
decision to repurchase and all share-based instruments held by executives (including both full 
quantum and appreciation scheme instruments). They found a positive relationship between the 
decision to repurchase and the instruments that were still to vest, while no significant relationship 
was identified between the already vested instruments and the decision to repurchase – once 
company fixed effects were controlled for (Edmans et al., 2018, p. 36).  
No statistically significant relationships were noted between the likelihood of a share repurchase 
being executed and whether a company employed performance vesting conditions linked to share 
price, TSR and/or EPS (the X_TSREPS variable in Table 6.2). The lack of a significant relationship agrees 
with the recent findings of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2019), but 
disagrees with the earlier findings of Young and Yang (2011), who only considered EPS-related 
conditions. 
The final model (Model (3)) in Table 6.2 controlled for industry fixed effects. However, if one compares 
Model (2) and Model (3) in the table, then no substantial differences are noted between the models. 
Therefore, the effect of industry dummies (industry fixed effects) seem negligible.  
6.4.2 Interpretation of regression results relating to control variables 
In this section, the findings of Wesson et al. (2018) and earlier studies undertaken in other countries 
(Table 2.4) are compared to the findings of the present study relating to control variables. Although 
the relationship between the decision to repurchase and the control variables was not the focus of 
the present study, it was deemed important to consider whether these control variables were indeed 
related to share repurchase behaviour in the South African context. Limited research on this matter 
exists locally (Wesson et al., 2018). Wesson et al. (2018) considered South African companies’ 
decisions between executing general share repurchases and declaring a special dividend. Their study, 
however, did not control for the number of share-based instruments held by executives as this 
information was not available.  
Earlier studies found that a company’s market-to-book ratio (Edmans et al., 2018; Moore, 2018; Young 
& Yang, 2011) and prior-period share price performance (Edmans et al., 2018; Moore, 2018) were 
negatively correlated with the decision to repurchase, which indicates that undervaluation does 
provide some incentive to engage in share repurchase activity. However, some previous studies also 
found that a company’s market-to-book ratio was not related to the decision to repurchase shares (De 
Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Geiler & Renneboog, 2016), which might be an indication of prior-period share 
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performance being a better indication of undervaluation, especially in the context of the decision to 
repurchase.  
A lower (or negative) prior-period share price performance was significantly correlated to a higher 
likelihood of executing a share repurchase in the present study (XL_Returnshare variable in Table 6.2). 
This relationship was found in Model (1) in Table 6.2 which considered the 2002–2017 period, but not 
when the regressions excluded the 2002–2005 period (models (2) and (3)). This probably indicates 
that a negative relationship between prior-period share performance and the decision to repurchase 
existed primarily in the 2002–2005 period. This finding does, however, point to the fact that 
undervaluation, as modelled by prior-period share price performance, provides a company with a 
motive to execute a share repurchase (especially before 2006). Undervaluation as modelled by a 
company’s lagged market-to-book ratio was, however, not found to be related to the decision to 
repurchase in the present study (XL_Marketbook variable in Table 6.2). 
Wesson et al. (2018), investigating South African data between 2000 and 2009, found no statistically 
significant relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns earned in the 50 days prior to a 
general repurchase and the choice between executing a general repurchase or paying a special 
dividend. It might be that the 50-day window period applied by Wesson et al. (2018) was too short to 
capture the prior share price performance adequately (the present study considered the entire 12-
month period prior to the year in which the repurchase was executed). However, Wesson et al. (2018) 
did find a statistically significant relationship between having a higher market-to-book ratio and the 
choice of a special dividend over a general share repurchase. 
A statistically significant positive relationship was found between a company’s (current year) dividend 
yield and the decision to repurchase shares (X_Divyield in Table 6.2). It would seem that share 
repurchases were not replacing dividends (in which case one would expect a negative relationship 
between dividend yield and the decision to repurchase shares). Rather, share repurchases seemed to 
be an additional compensation method employed by companies which were already paying dividends. 
Companies’ prior-period dividend yield was not found to be statistically significant in the decision 
between general share repurchases and special dividends in an earlier local study (Wesson et al., 
2018). Possibly the current year’s dividend yield is more appropriate to use (as used in the present 
study) or the dividend yield only becomes statistically significant when including all types of share 
repurchases (not only general repurchases). Burns et al. (2015) also found some evidence of a 
significant positive relationship between dividends and share repurchases.  
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Wesson et al. (2018) found that larger companies preferred special dividends over general 
repurchases. In the present study, however, company size was not significantly related to the decision 
to repurchase shares (XL_Lmarketcap variable in Table 6.2). Many earlier studies found that larger 
companies were more likely to execute a share repurchase (Burns et al., 2015; De Cesari & Ozkan, 
2015; Geiler & Renneboog, 2016; Kahle, 2002). However, these studies did not control for company 
fixed effects, and this might have influenced their results (endogeneity problems might have existed). 
Moore (2018) controlled for company fixed effects and found no significant relationship between 
company size and the likelihood of a share repurchase (as did the findings of the present study). This 
therefore emphasises the importance of controlling for company fixed effects. Larger companies may 
have specific characteristics that make it more likely that such companies will repurchase shares. 
Controlling for company fixed effects reduces the influence of such omitted variable biases 
(endogeneity problems).  
Directors’ shareholding was positively and significantly related to the decision to repurchase shares in 
the present study (X_Directshares in Table 6.2). This would mean that companies where directors own 
a larger percentage of the company’s shares were more inclined to repurchase shares. This effect 
became more pronounced (highly significant) in the 2006–2017 period. Wesson et al. (2018) and 
Geiler and Renneboog (2016) did not find a statistically significant relationship between directors’ 
ownership and the decision to execute a general repurchase of shares (but they also did not control 
for company fixed effects). However, like the findings of the present study, De Cesari and Ozkan (2015) 
found a positive and significant relationship between the number of shares owned by executives and 
the likelihood of a share repurchase.  
Wesson et al. (2018) did not find the debt–asset ratio to have a significant impact on the decision 
between paying a special dividend and executing a general repurchase. However, in the present study, 
a lower debt-to-assets ratio was related to a higher propensity to repurchase shares (XL_Debtassets 
variable in Table 6.2). Most earlier studies have also found a negative relationship between debt or 
leverage and the propensity for executing a share repurchase (Burns et al., 2015; De Cesari & Ozkan, 
2015; Moore, 2018; Young & Yang, 2011). 
Some earlier studies have found a significant positive relationship between profitability and the 
decision to repurchase (Geiler & Renneboog, 2016), but more recent studies did not find such a 
relationship when controlling for company fixed effects (Edmans et al., 2018). No significant 
relationship was found between profitability (measured as the X_ROA variable in Table 6.2) and the 
decision to repurchase shares in the present study (company fixed effects were controlled for). 
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In the present study, it was found that companies with higher cash flows were more likely to 
repurchase shares (X_Cash flow variable in Table 6.2). However, this relationship was not statistically 
significant when the 2002–2005 data were excluded. Most earlier studies also found a significant 
positive relationship between the availability of cash and the likelihood of a share repurchase being 
executed (Burns et al., 2015; De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Geiler & Renneboog, 2016; Moore, 2018; Young 
& Yang, 2011). 
6.5 REGRESSIONS OF SHARE REPURCHASE VALUE 
In this section, the results from the regressions executed on the ratio-scale dependent variable Y_Net 
(net rand value spent on repurchases, excluding repurchase of treasury shares by holding company, 
scaled by the company’s lagged market capitalisation) are discussed. Based on the discussion in 
Section 3.5, the FRM was applied with fixed effects accounted for using the Mundlak approach. Table 
6.3 provides the results relating to the entire 2002–2017 period (Model (1)), only the 2006–2017 
period (Model (2)) and only the 2006–2017 period with industry dummies added (Model (3)). Industry 
classifications, based on the JSE’s new classification system, were only available from 2006 onwards. 
Model (2) is thus provided to enable comparison with Model (3), to identify only the effect of adding 
industry fixed effects (industry dummies). Models (1), (2) and (3) are indicated using the numbers (1), 
(2) and (3) in the headings of Table 6.3. 
Both the coefficients and the marginal effects are reported in Table 6.3, with the significance level of 
the coefficients indicated by employing asterisks. The marginal effect of the FRM, in the case of the 
ratio-scale dependent variable of the present study, can be interpreted as the unit of change in share 
repurchase value (as a percentage of market capitalisation), given a one unit change in the 
independent variable. In Table 6.3, the marginal effects are provided by indicating three decimal 
places, otherwise some of the statistically significant marginal effects would be rounded to 0.00. 
As the majority of previous studies employed a tobit regression model to study the relationship 
between share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration, the tobit model was 
employed as a robustness check for the FRM in the present study. It was, however, expected that the 
large number of observations of the independent variable clustering at zero would skew the results of 
the tobit regression, making it less reliable. The results of the tobit model regressions are provided in 






Regression results on repurchase value using the fractional regression model 
Independent / 
control variable 
2002–2017 (1) 2006–2017(2) 2006–2017, industry 
dummies (3) 
Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig 
X_Exercised 12.47 0.121  29.14 0.192 * 27.85 0.184 * 
X_Closing 4.55 0.044  -0.63 -0.004  -0.08 -0.001  
X_TSREPS 0.11 0.001  -0.02 -0.000  -0.07 -0.000  
XL_Returnshare^ -0.15 -0.001  0.19 0.001  0.19 0.001  
XL_Marketbook^ -0.11 -0.001  -0.26 -0.002 *** -0.26 -0.002 *** 
X_Divyield^ 0.03 0.000  0.08 0.001 ** 0.08 0.001 * 
XL_Lmarketcap -0.66 -0.006 * -0.24 -0.002  -0.23 -0.001  
X_Directshares -1.94 -0.019 * -0.08 -0.000  0.04 0.000  
XL_Debtassets -2.89 -0.028 *** -2.14 -0.014 *** -2.22 -0.015 *** 
X_ROA 0.00 0.000  0.00 0.000  0.00 0.000  
X_Cash flow 1.42 0.014 ** 3.86 0.025 *** 3.81 0.025 *** 
Constant -4.95 n/a *** -6.22 n/a *** -7.00 n/a *** 
Company fixed 
effects 
Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes 
Robust standard 
errors, clustered by 
company 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2 077 1 411 1 411 
Chi-square 462.90 154.37 197.29 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note. All data were collected from IRESS and annual financial statements. The dependent variable is the 
rand value spent on share repurchases scaled by market capitalisation, while the independent variables of 
interest are the number of share-based instruments exercised scaled by number of shares outstanding 
(X_Exercised), the number of share-based instruments held by executives at year end scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding (X_Closing) and whether or not performance vesting conditions related to share 
price, TSR and/or EPS were applied (X_TSREPS). Control variables are described in Table 6.1, and ̂  indicates 
that such control variables were winsorised.  




6.5.1 Interpretation of regression results relating to independent variables  
When one considers the entire period under review (2002–2017), no significant relationship is 
identified between share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration using the FRM 
(Model (1) in Table 6.3). The tobit model (Appendix B2) finds a significant positive relationship 
between share repurchase value and both the number of executive share-based instruments 
exercised (X_Exercised) and held at year end (X_Closing). Some caution must, however, be exercised 
when interpreting the results of the tobit model, as its results may be skewed owing to the clustering 
of dependent variable observations at zero. To test whether the results of the tobit-regression indeed 
seem inappropriate, an OLS regression was conducted (but not tabled, for the sake of brevity). The 
OLS regression did not find any significant relationship between share repurchase value and executive 
share-based remuneration. It was therefore concluded that no significant relationship between share 
repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration existed in South Africa, when one 
considered the entire 2002–2017 period (based on the results of the most reliable model – the FRM).  
The lack of a significant relationship needs to be compared to expectations (based on the findings of 
previous research). It was expected that share repurchases would be related to the number of 
instruments exercised (during the entire 2002–2017 period) and to the number of instruments held 
(prior to 2010). However, it did not seem that the expectations had been realised in the South African 
environment. 
Furthermore, the lack of a significant relationship needs to be compared to the findings of earlier 
studies. When examining the pre-2000 period in the US, Fenn and Liang (2001) found a significant 
positive relationship between share repurchase value and number of share options held by executives. 
De Cesari and Ozkan (2015), however, studied the 2002–2009 period in Europe and did not find a 
significant relationship between share repurchase value and the number of share options held by 
executives. In Chapter 4 it was mentioned that South African share repurchase activity (in terms of 
the value spent) is more like that of Europe than that of the US. The fact that the present study did 
not find a significant relationship between share repurchase value and executive share-based 
remuneration might be attributable to the fact that the effect of share repurchase value in the South 
African environment is more similar to that of Europe than that of the US.  
A second reason for the present study not finding a significant relationship between share repurchase 
value and executive share-based remuneration (although many earlier studies undertaken in other 
countries did find such a relationship) could lie in the fact that a long period of time was examined 
(2002–2017). Most of the earlier studies (Table 3.1) researched shorter periods than the present 
study. Two major events, which may have influenced (and changed) the relationship between share 
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repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration occurred during the 2002–2017 period. 
The first major event was the effective date of IFRS 2 and the second was the global financial crisis. 
From 31 December 2005 onwards, IFRS 2 required that share options be expensed in a company’s 
annual financial statements. This resulted in many companies changing from share option plans to 
SARs and full quantum schemes. This change in incentive type may have had an impacted on the 
relationship between share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration. The 2006–
2017 period (the actual post-IFRS 2 period) was studied to examine the effects of industry fixed effects 
(as industry classifications, based on the JSE’s new classification system, were only available from 2006 
onwards) (Models (2) and (3) in Table 6.3). When one considers only the 2006–2017 period, a 
significant positive relationship between share repurchase value and the number of share-based 
instruments exercised is observed (Table 6.3, model (2)). This relationship was also found when 
employing the tobit model for the 2006–2017 period (Model (2) in Appendix B2). In a recent study, 
Edmans et al. (2018) considered the 2006–2016 period in the US and reported that share repurchase 
value was higher in periods when share-based instruments vested. Similarly, the present study 
provides evidence of a positive relationship between share repurchase value and the number of 
instruments exercised in South Africa after the effective date of IFRS 2. 
The period studied included the global financial crisis, and it was expected that the relationship might 
be different before (2002–2006), during (2007–2009) and after the financial crisis (2010–2017). This 
effect of the global financial crisis is examined in Section 6.7.2.  
A third possible rationale for the fact that the present study did not find a significant relationship 
between share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration in South Africa during the 
entire 2002–2017 period (while many earlier studies undertaken in other countries did) could relate 
to the uniqueness of the South African repurchase environment. In South Africa, repurchases of 
holding company shares can be executed by both the holding company and subsidiaries (globally, it is 
generally only the holding company itself which may repurchase holding company shares). 
Additionally, both specific and general repurchases are widely employed by South African companies, 
while open market (general) repurchases are the most dominant form globally. The relationship 
between share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration reported in earlier studies 
might relate specifically to open market (general) repurchases. Therefore it is important to examine 
the relationship between share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration split 
between repurchasing entity (the holding company versus subsidiaries), repurchase type (general 
versus specific) and whether or not the repurchase was announced via SENS. Regressions relating to 
these aspects can be found in Section 6.6. 
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A fourth, and final, reason for the fact that this study did not find a relationship between share 
repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration (while some earlier studies undertaken in 
other countries did) can be found in the econometric model employed. Many earlier studies employed 
the tobit model (Burns et al., 2015; De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Fenn & Liang, 2001; Young & Yang, 2011), 
but this model is probably not appropriate when the data are clustered at the zero-point (Gallani et 
al., 2015). In the present study, the tobit model also found significant relationships between share 
repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration (Appendix B2). However, it was decided 
that these results were not reliable owing to the large number of observations at the zero-boundary 
and the fact that both the FRM (Table 6.3) and the OLS models (not tabled) found no significant 
relationships when considering the entire period (2002–2017). 
The final model (Model (3)) in Table 6.3 added industry dummies for the period 2006–2017. Most 
previous studies (Table 3.2) added dummy variables to the data to control for possible fixed effects 
attributed to companies falling in a certain industry. However, as explained previously, industry 
classifications were only added from 2006 onwards, and therefore it was decided to evaluate the 
existence of possible fixed effects related to specific industries separately from the main analysis on 
share repurchase value. A comparison between Model (2) in Table 6.3 (2006–2017 without industry 
dummies) and Model (3) (which covers the same period, but adds industry dummies) showed that 
adding industry fixed effects produced no substantial changes to the model. This seems to point out 
that the industry in which a company is listed does not play a significant role in the determination of 
the relationship between share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration. The 
Mundlak approach would probably also have controlled for the majority of the industry fixed effects.  
6.5.2 Interpretation of regression results relating to control variables 
The significant relationships found between the dependent variable (share repurchase value) and the 
control variables are now discussed and then compared to the findings of previous research. When 
looking at the 2006–2017 period (Model (2) in Table 6.3) a significant negative relationship was noted 
between share repurchase value and a company’s lagged market-to-book ratio (the XL_Marketbook 
variable in Table 6.3) in the present study. This relationship was also negative when considering the 
entire 2002–2017 period, but not significant. This finding supports undervaluation as a motive for 
engaging in share repurchases, especially in the 2006–2017 period. A number of previous studies have 
reported a significant negative relationship between share repurchase value and a company’s market-
to-book ratio (Edmans et al., 2018; Fenn & Liang, 2001; Young & Yang, 2011).  
The relationship between share repurchase value and the market-to-book ratio in the 2006–2017 
period is noteworthy since, in Section 6.4.2, a significant negative relationship was found between the 
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decision to repurchase and prior-period share price performance (XL_Returnshare variable) seemingly 
rooted in the pre-2006 period. No significant relationship was noted between share repurchase value 
and prior-period share price performance. It could be that in the South African environment the 
decision to repurchase is triggered by a low prior-period share price performance (Table 6.2), while 
growing share repurchase value is induced by a low market-to-book ratio (Table 6.3). In contrast, the 
results regarding undervaluation could also indicate that prior-period share price performance is the 
best proxy for undervaluation in the South African environment prior to 2006 (Table 6.2), while from 
2006 onwards the market-to-book ratio provided a better indication of undervaluation than prior-
period share price performance (Table 6.3). 
As found in Section 6.4.2 relating to the decision to repurchase, a positive relationship between share 
repurchase value and dividend yield (the X_Divyield variable in Table 6.3) was noted in the present 
study, if one considered only the 2006–2017 period. Young and Yang (2011) also noted a positive 
relationship, although non-significant. 
When considering the entire 2002–2017 period, the logarithm of market capitalisation 
(XL_Lmarketcap variable in Table 6.3) was negatively related to share repurchase value. This means 
that large companies’ share repurchases equated to a smaller percentage of their market 
capitalisation than that of small companies. This appears to be an illogical finding, as Section 4.8.3.2 
showed that Top40/MidCap companies were responsible for the bulk of the resources spent on share 
repurchases in South Africa. However, this effect is probably a result of the extremely large market 
capitalisations that some Top40 and MidCap companies have on the JSE, which reduced the 
percentage of market capitalisation repurchased to a small percentage, rather than the actual (non-
scaled) rand value spent on share repurchases by large companies (as employed in Section 4.8.3.2).  
Recently, Moore (2018) also reported a negative relationship between share repurchases and 
company size (measured as the logarithm of market capitalisation), but many earlier studies reported 
a positive relationship between the value spent on share repurchases and company size (measured as 
log of sales or assets) (Burns et al., 2015; De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Edmans et al., 2018; Fenn & Liang, 
2001). Young and Yang (2011) employed the logarithm of market capitalisation and found a significant 
positive relationship between share repurchase value and company size, but the coefficient was 
virtually zero. It seems that the expected relationship between share repurchase value and company 
size depends on the measure employed for company size, as market capitalisation could be much 
larger than assets or sales. 
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The percentage of directors’ ownership (X_Directshares variable in Table 6.3) was negatively related 
to the value of share repurchases, indicating that companies which had a higher percentage of 
directors’ ownership were less inclined to spend large amounts on share repurchases. Share 
ownership by directors therefore seemed to have a curbing effect on the resources spent on share 
repurchases in South Africa. This finding related to the entire 2002–2017 period, but was not 
significant when one considered only the 2006–2017 period (although still negative). Once industry 
controls were included (Model (3)), however, the relationship changed into a positive one, indicating 
that the negative relationship might have been limited to certain industries. Little is known about this 
relationship globally, as few studies have dealt with it. De Cesari and Ozkan (2015) found a positive 
relationship between executive share ownership and share repurchase value. In Section 6.4.2 a 
positive relationship was reported between the decision to repurchase and the percentage of shares 
owned by directors. 
The present study found that a smaller debt-to-assets ratio (X_Debtassets variable in Table 6.3) was 
related to larger share repurchases. Companies with less debt were less constrained by financing costs 
and therefore more apt to repurchase shares (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015). Burns et al. (2015), De Cesari 
and Ozkan (2015), Edmans et al. (2018), Fenn and Liang (2001) and Young and Yang (2011) also found 
a negative relationship between share repurchase value and either the debt-to-assets ratio or 
leverage.  
No significant relationship was noted between share repurchase value and profitability (X_ROA in 
Table 6.3), but share repurchase value was positively related to having more available cash (X_Cash 
flow variable in Table 6.3). Companies with more cash flow were more inclined to expend this ‘free’ 
cash by executing share repurchases, in line with agency theory (Fenn & Liang, 2001). Earlier studies 
also found a positive relationship between share repurchase value and cash flow (Burns et al., 2015; 
De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Fenn & Liang, 2001; Young & Yang, 2011). 
6.6 REPURCHASING ENTITY, REPURCHASE TYPE AND SENS ANNOUNCEMENTS  
The resources spent on share repurchases did not seem to be related to executive share-based 
remuneration when one considered the entire 2002–2017 period in South Africa, although earlier 
studies (undertaken in other countries) mostly found that such a relationship existed. One of the 
possible reasons mentioned for not finding a significant relationship in South Africa is the unique 
regulatory environment in this country. In South Africa, both the holding company and subsidiaries 
may repurchase the holding company’s shares; both general and specific repurchases are common; 
and a large portion of general repurchases are not announced via SENS.  
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It is therefore possible that a relationship between share repurchase value and executive share-based 
remuneration might only exist for certain categories of the net share repurchase activity. To examine 
whether the aforementioned was true, further regressions of share repurchase value were executed 
per repurchasing entity and per repurchase type, and based on whether the general repurchase was 
announced on SENS or not (reported in Sections 6.6.1, 6.6.2 and 6.6.3). In Section 6.6, the effects of 
industry dummies were ignored to ensure that the entire period (2002–2017) was included. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of industry dummies did not substantially alter the regression coefficients 
and p-values of the independent variables in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. Company fixed effects were 
assumed to be significant and thus compensated for by employing the Mundlak approach in all 
regressions executed in this section. Year fixed effects were assumed to be significant and thus 
included. 
6.6.1 Repurchasing entity: Subsidiaries versus the holding company 
In this section, the regressions executed on the ratio-scale dependent variables Y_Sub (rand value 
spent on share repurchases by subsidiaries as a percentage of market capitalisation) and Y_Cpy (rand 
value spent on share repurchases by the holding company, excluding the repurchase of treasury 
shares, as a percentage of market capitalisation) are compared. Table 6.4 shows the results of the 
FRM for both subsidiaries and the holding company. The coefficients and marginal effects are 
reported, with the significance level of the coefficients indicated by asterisks. In Table 6.4, the marginal 
effects are provided by indicating three decimal places otherwise some of the statistically significant 





Regression results on repurchase value: Subsidiaries versus the holding company 
Independent / control variable 
Subsidiaries Holding company 
Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig 
X_Exercised 29.08 0.138 *** -0.10 -0.001  
X_Closing 4.97 0.024  3.78 0.019  
X_TSREPS -0.01 -0.000  0.34 0.002  
XL_Returnshare^ 0.08 0.000  -0.38 -0.002 * 
XL_Marketbook^ -0.14 -0.001 ** -0.01 -0.000  
X_Divyield^ 0.04 0.000  0.04 0.000  
XL_Lmarketcap -0.31 -0.001  -0.99 -0.005 ** 
X_Directshares -0.82 -0.004  -2.84 -0.015 ** 
XL_Debtassets -2.48 -0.012 *** -3.23 -0.017 *** 
X_ROA -0.00 -0.000  -0.00 -0.000  
X_Cash flow 0.51 0.002  1.92 0.010 *** 
Constant -6.57 n/a *** -4.08 n/a ** 
Company fixed effects Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No 
Robust standard errors, clustered 
by company 
Yes Yes 
Observations 2 077 2 077 
Wald chi / Chi-square 490.52 261.79 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
Note. All data were collected from IRESS and annual financial statements. The dependent variable is the 
rand value spent on share repurchases scaled by market capitalisation, while the independent variables of 
interest are the number of share-based instruments exercised scaled by number of shares outstanding 
(X_Exercised), the number of share-based instruments held by executives at year end scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding (X_Closing) and whether or not performance vesting conditions related to share 
price, TSR and/or EPS were applied (X_TSREPS). Control variables are described in Table 6.1, and ̂  indicates 
that such control variables were winsorised. 




Table 6.4 reports a significant positive relationship between subsidiary repurchases and the number 
of share-based instruments exercised by executives (X_Exercised). Furthermore, the coefficient 
attached to this relationship was (by far) the largest coefficient reported for any independent or 
control variable in Table 6.4. It appears that the exercise of executive share-based instruments was 
the factor most strongly related to subsidiary repurchases. The only other control variables 
significantly related to subsidiary repurchases were lower market-to-book and debt-to-assets ratios. 
A lower debt-to-assets ratio was, however, related to both the holding company repurchasing from 
third parties and subsidiaries as repurchasing entity.  
No significant relationships were found between those share repurchases executed by the holding 
company and executive share-based remuneration (E_Exercised, X_Closing and X_TSREPS). Rather, it 
would appear that holding company repurchases were linked to undervaluation (lower prior-period 
share performance), company size, shares owned by directors, debt-to-assets ratio and the cash flow 
available. 
In conclusion, it would seem that different factors were associated with subsidiary repurchases than 
with holding company repurchases. Subsidiary repurchases were strongly associated with the number 
of executive share-based instruments exercised. When a subsidiary repurchases shares of the holding 
company, this increases the demand for the holding company’s shares and possibly causes an increase 
in share price. In addition, when the repurchase is announced, an increase in the share price is 
expected owing to signalling theory. This announcement could be before the execution of the share 
repurchase (if it was a specific repurchase) or after the execution of the share repurchase (if it was a 
general repurchase). Earlier results from the present study (Section 4.6.1) showed that subsidiary 
repurchases usually represented general repurchases. The aforementioned increase in the share price 
would enhance the value realised upon exercise of share-based remuneration. 
The preference for subsidiary repurchases over holding company repurchases could be attributed to 
the flexibility provided by using a subsidiary as repurchasing entity. Shares repurchased by subsidiaries 
are not cancelled, but kept in treasury (in contrast, in South Africa, shares repurchased by the holding 
company are cancelled). Such shares could then in future be utilised to affect a business combination; 
be used to settle the share-based remuneration owing to all employees; or resold. Subsidiary 
repurchases could be seen as similar to treasury share repurchases that occur in other jurisdictions 
(where the holding company repurchases but the shares are not cancelled). Moreover, if subsidiary 
repurchases are normally executed as a general repurchase, this could further enhance their flexibility, 




6.6.2 Repurchase type: General versus specific repurchases 
In this section, the regressions run on the ratio-scale dependent variables Y_Gen (rand value spent on 
general repurchases, as a percentage of market capitalisation) and Y_Specother (rand value spent on 
specific repurchases, excluding pro rata repurchases and the repurchase of treasury shares by the 
holding company, as a percentage of market capitalisation) are compared. Table 6.5 shows the results 
of the FRM for both general and specific repurchases. The coefficients and marginal effects are 
reported, with the significance level of the coefficient indicated by asterisks. In Table 6.5, the marginal 
effects are provided by indicating three decimal places otherwise some of the statistically significant 
marginal effects would be rounded to zero (0.00). For X_ROA, even when adding three decimal places 
(the maximum provided by the Stata output) the marginal effect remains 0.000 (but statistically 





Regression results on repurchase value: General versus specific repurchases 
Independent / control variable 
General repurchases Specific repurchases 
Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig 
X_Exercised 17.23 0.089 *** -0.77 -0.003  
X_Closing 0.25 0.001  7.17 0.023  
X_TSREPS 0.10 0.000  -0.84 -0.003  
XL_Returnshare^ -0.07 -0.000  -0.30 -0.001  
XL_Marketbook^ -0.21 -0.001 *** -0.15 -0.000  
X_Divyield^ 0.02 0.000  -0.06 -0.000  
XL_Lmarketcap -0.46 -0.002  -1.35 -0.004 *** 
X_Directshares -0.11 -0.001  -0.93 -0.003  
XL_Debtassets -2.76 -0.014 *** -4.33 -0.014 *** 
X_ROA 0.01 0.000 ** 0.03 0.000 *** 
X_Cash flow 0.95 0.025  2.99 0.010 *** 
Constant -4.99 n/a *** -7.05 n/a *** 
Company fixed effects Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No 
Robust standard errors, clustered by 
company 
Yes Yes 
Observations 2 077 2 077 
Wald chi / Chi-square 729.72 479.35 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.000 
Note. All data were collected from IRESS and annual financial statements. The dependent variable is the 
rand value spent on share repurchases scaled by market capitalisation, while the independent variables of 
interest are the number of share-based instruments exercised scaled by number of shares outstanding 
(X_Exercised), the number of share-based instruments held by executives at year end scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding (X_Closing) and whether or not performance vesting conditions related to share 
price, TSR and/or EPS were applied (X_TSREPS). Control variables are described in Table 6.1, and ̂  indicates 
that such control variables were winsorised. 




The FRM reported a highly significant positive relationship between the value of general repurchases 
and the number of share-based instruments exercised by executives (X_Exercised). The marginal 
effect attached is not overly large (0.09), indicating that if the number of share-based instruments 
exercised as a percentage of holding company shares outstanding increases by one percentage point, 
then a 0.09 percentage point increase in the value of general share repurchases (expressed as a 
percentage of market capitalisation) is expected. However, the marginal effect associated with the 
number of share-based instruments exercised is the largest marginal effect of any of the predictor 
variables in Table 6.5, showing that general repurchases are strongly associated with the exercise of 
executive share-based remuneration. However, no statistically significant relationship was noted 
between specific share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration (E_Exercised, X_Closing 
and X_TSREPS), which may indicate that specific share repurchases occur for other reasons. 
Globally, most of the share repurchases that occur are general (open market) share repurchases 
(Wesson et al., 2014). Thus, the finding that general share repurchases are associated with executive 
share-based remuneration is in line with the findings of earlier research in other countries. In the 
South African regulatory environment, specifically, general repurchases are much easier for executives 
to execute. Most often directors are annually authorised by the shareholders (at the AGM) to execute 
general share repurchases. After receiving this blanket approval, executives could execute general 
share repurchases when they saw fit. In contrast, specific share repurchases are much more 
cumbersome to execute, as each specific share repurchase must be individually authorised by 
shareholders before it can be executed.  
As such, executives could easily execute general share repurchases in the period when their share-
based instruments are due to vest or when they plan to exercise their share-based instruments, in an 
attempt to increase the share price and EPS figure and thus increase the value realised from their own 
share-based remuneration. The increase in the share price could occur through one or both of the 
following mechanisms: the repurchase could create a demand for the company’s shares, increasing 
the share price owing to supply and demand forces, or the repurchase could be announced via SENS, 
increasing the share price because of the signalling effect. Subdividing the general repurchases 
between those that were announced and not announced will enable a further understanding of 
whether both or only one of these factors seem to be at work. The relationship between share-based 
remuneration and the general repurchases that were announced (or not) can be found in the next 
section (Section 6.6.3). 
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6.6.3 Announced versus unannounced general repurchases 
The South African regulatory environment as regards the announcement of general share repurchases 
differs from the global norm. Globally, most sophisticated stock exchanges require that all executed 
open market (general) share repurchases be announced either immediately or within a short period 
of time (within a week, month or quarter). However, companies listed on the JSE only need to 
announce executed general repurchases once a three per cent threshold is reached. Some companies 
interpret this as an annual threshold and, as such, many general share repurchases are never 
announced. 
In this section, the regressions executed on the ratio-scale dependent variables Y_Anngen (rand value 
spent on announced general repurchases, as a percentage of market capitalisation) and Y_Unanngen 
(rand value spent on unannounced general repurchases, as a percentage of market capitalisation) are 
compared. Table 6.6 reports the results of the FRM for both announced and unannounced general 
repurchases. The coefficients and the marginal effects are reported, with the significance level of the 
coefficients indicated using asterisks. In Table 6.6, the marginal effects are provided by indicating 
three decimal places, otherwise some of the statistically significant marginal effects would be rounded 
to 0.00. For X_ROA and X_Divyield, even when adding three decimal places (the maximum provided 
by the Stata output) the marginal effect remains 0.000 (but statistically significant). However, the 





Regression results on repurchase value: (Un)announced general repurchases 





Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig 
X_Exercised 25.08 0.072 *** 1.36 0.003  
X_Closing -0.38 -0.001  1.78 0.004  
X_TSREPS -0.34 -0.001  0.32 0.001  
XL_Returnshare^ -0.18 -0.001  0.08 0.000  
XL_Marketbook^ -0.35 -0.001 ** -0.12 -0.000  
X_Divyield^ 0.00 0.000  0.06 0.000 ** 
XL_Lmarketcap -0.55 -0.002  -0.32 -0.001  
X_Directshares -1.39 -0.004  1.09 0.003  
XL_Debtassets -3.45 -0.010 *** -2.08 -0.005 *** 
X_ROA 0.01 0.000 ** 0.01 0.000  
X_Cash flow 1.02 0.003  0.96 0.002 ** 
Constant -4.23 n/a ** -7.87 n/a *** 
Company fixed effects Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No 
Robust standard errors, clustered by 
company 
Yes Yes 
Observations 2 077 2 077 
Wald chi / Chi-square 597.74 177.08 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
Note. All data were collected from IRESS and annual financial statements. The dependent variable is the 
rand value spent on share repurchases scaled by market capitalisation, while the independent variables of 
interest are the number of share-based instruments exercised scaled by number of shares outstanding 
(X_Exercised), the number of share-based instruments held by executives at year end scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding (X_Closing) and whether or not performance vesting conditions related to share 
price, TSR and/or EPS were applied (X_TSREPS). Control variables are described in Table 6.1, and ̂  indicates 
that such control variables were winsorised. 




The results in Table 6.6 seem to indicate that announced general repurchases, rather than the 
unannounced general repurchases, are associated with executive share-based remuneration. The 
FRM showed a significant positive relationship between announced general share repurchases and 
the number of share-based instruments exercised (X_Exercised). The marginal effect was only 0.07 (a 
0.07% increase in share repurchases value as a percentage of market capitalisation when a one 
percentage point increase in the number of instruments exercised occurs), but was the largest 
marginal effect of all the predictor variables in Table 6.6. 
As previously mentioned, announced general share repurchases could increase the share price in two 
ways: increasing demand for the company’s shares on the open market and through the signalling 
effect of the announcement. Unannounced general share repurchases can only increase the share 
price as a result of supply and demand forces. The fact that specifically announced general 
repurchases are associated with executive share-based remuneration seems to point to executives 
rather executing announced general share repurchases when they are due to exercise share-based 
instruments – to obtain both the benefits of increased demand and signalling effect.  
In summary (looking at the results of both Sections 6.6.2 and 6.6.3) the possibility exists that 
executives who are due to exercise share-based instruments will execute general share repurchases 
(owing to the ease of execution – no specific shareholder authorisation required) and then announce 
such repurchases. By announcing the share repurchase, the executives obtain the positive effect of 
signalling information on the share price, in addition to the beneficial effect that increased demand 
already had on the share price. However, it must be noted that announcements of general share 
repurchases sometimes occur in the year subsequent to the repurchase (or maybe several years later) 
so the signalling effect would not always be the major driver. 
6.7 REGRESSIONS FOR SPECIFIC TIME PERIODS 
In this section, the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration 
is examined in specific time periods (namely before, during and after the global financial crisis). This 
is necessary as the global financial crisis could possibly have caused a structural break in the 
relationship.  
6.7.1 Decision to repurchase 
In Section 6.4.1 it was postulated that a positive relationship between the number of share-based 
instruments held at year end and the decision to repurchase might have existed in the early years 
covered by the study – i.e. before the global financial crisis, when share options were the primary 
share-based incentive type employed by companies. To test whether this was true, and further to 
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specifically examine the relationship between the decision to repurchase and executive share-based 
remuneration in the periods before, during and after the global financial crisis, a logit regression was 
run on the companies listed in the each of the periods: 2002–2006 (before the crisis ); 2007–2009 





Regression results on the decision to repurchase: Effect of the global financial crisis  
Independent / 
control variable 
Before the crisis 
(2000–2006) 
During the crisis  
(2007–2009) 
After the crisis  
(2010–2017) 
Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig 
X_Exercised 2.00 0.21  -18.56 -1.90  42.23 4.86 * 
X_Closing 12.10 1.29  12.33 1.26  -3.55 -0.41  
X_TSREPS 2.44 0.26 ** -0.11 -0.01  -0.07 -0.01  
XL_Returnshare^ -0.31 -0.03  -0.70 -0.07  -0.09 -0.01  
XL_Marketbook^ -0.41 -0.04 * -0.02 -0.00  -0.01 -0.00  
X_Divyield^ 0.06 0.01  0.16 0.02  0.10 0.01 * 
XL_Lmarketcap 1.08 0.12  -0.17 -0.02  -0.46 -0.05  
X_Directshares -0.68 -0.07  2.95 0.30  2.71 0.31  
XL_Debtassets -3.01 -0.32 ** -3.84 -0.39 * -2.70 -0.31 *** 
X_ROA -0.01 -0.00  0.00 0.00  0.02 0.00 * 
X_Cash flow 5.68 0.61 *** -0.50 -0.05  3.46 0.40 * 
Constant -12.28 n/a  -14.37 n/a  -5.10 n/a  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No 
Robust standard 
error clustered by 
company 
Robust, not clustered by 
company 
Robust, not clustered by 
company 




668 367 1042 
Chi-square 47.24 23.918 49.38 
Prob > chi2 0.01 0.47 0.01 
Note. All data were collected from IRESS and annual financial statements. The dependent variable is the 
decision to repurchase, while the independent variables of interest are the number of share-based 
instruments exercised scaled by number of shares outstanding (X_Exercised), the number of share-based 
instruments held by executives at year end scaled by the number of shares outstanding (X_Closing) and 
whether or not performance vesting conditions related to share price, TSR and/or EPS were applied 
(X_TSREPS). Control variables are described in Table 6.1, and ^ indicates that such control variables were 
winsorised. 




Contrary to expectations based on previous research (see Sections 2.4.2 and 6.1), the decision to 
repurchase shares prior to the global financial crisis was not related to the number of share-based 
instruments held by executives (X_Closing). The fact that Jolls (1998) and Kahle (2002) found such a 
relationship might be the result of their not controlling for company fixed effects. Edmans et al. (2018) 
controlled for company fixed effects and did not find a significant relationship between the decision 
to repurchase and the number of share-based instruments held by executives. It is quite possible that 
certain fixed effects (such as the quality of corporate governance) would influence both the likelihood 
of repurchasing shares and the number of share-based instruments granted to and held by executives. 
The binary independent variable indicating whether (or not) a company employed performance 
vesting conditions related to share price, TSR and/or EPS has not been significant in any model 
reported up to this point. However, in the pre-financial crisis period, companies employing 
performance conditions related to share price, TSR and/or EPS (the X_TSREPS variable in Table 6.7) 
were more likely to repurchase shares. When interpreting the marginal effect, it was found that a 
company that went from not employing such performance conditions to employing such performance 
conditions increased its probability of a share repurchase by 0.26 per cent. This increase in percentage 
is small, and furthermore, the number of companies that employed performance vesting conditions 
related to share price, TSR and/or EPS during the pre-financial crisis period was limited (only 3% of 
company years). However, the finding of a relationship between the decision to repurchase and the 
use of performance conditions based on share price, TSR and/or EPS in the early years of the study is 
in line with expectations based on previous research (see Sections 2.4.2 and 6.1) and the findings of 
Young and Yang (2011). 
During the global financial crisis, no significant relationship was found between the decision to 
repurchase and executive share-based remuneration (E_Exercised, X_Closing and X_TSREPS). The 
period of the global financial crisis was relatively short (3 years) and thus allowed for a relatively small 
number of observations (n=367), making it difficult to draw any statistically significant conclusions. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis was a period of financial distress for many companies and their 
behaviour might have been unusual or erratic.  
After the global financial crisis, a significant positive relationship existed between the decision to 
repurchase and the number of share-based instruments exercised by executives (E_Exercised). When 
executives exercised one percentage point more share-based instruments, their companies were 
almost five per cent more likely to execute a share repurchase. Since the post-financial crisis period 
(2010–2017) made up half of the period included in the present study (2002–2017), it would seem as 
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if the post-financial crisis data drove the overall conclusion of the present study relating to the decision 
to repurchase. This finding is in line with expectations based on previous research.  
6.7.2 Repurchase value 
Continuing from the binary dependent variable (decision to repurchase), the relationship between 
share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration is now examined in the different 
time periods. The results of this, using the FRM, are provided in Table 6.8. In Table 6.8, the marginal 
effects are provided by indicating three decimal places otherwise some of the statistically significant 
marginal effects would be rounded to 0.00. For X_ROA, even when adding three decimal places (the 
maximum provided by the Stata output) the marginal effect remains 0.000 in the post-financial crisis 





Regression results on repurchase value: Effect of the global financial crisis 
Independent / 
control variable 
Before the crisis 
(2002–2006) 
During the crisis 
(2007–2009) 
After the crisis 
(2010–2017) 
Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig Coef Marg Sig 
X_Exercised 11.31 0.175  82.13 0.675 ** 37.66 0.232 *** 
X_Closing 17.50 0.270 *** -22.08 -0.182  -10.78 -0.066  
X_TSREPS -0.00 -0.000  -0.66 -0.005  -0.02 -0.000  
XL_Returnshare^ -0.25 -0.004  0.15 0.001  0.03 0.000  
XL_Marketbook^ -0.22 -0.003  -0.39 -0.003  0.11 0.001  
X_Divyield^ 0.02 0.000  0.11 0.001 ** 0.05 0.000  
XL_Lmarketcap -0.68 -0.010  -1.87 -0.015 ** -1.62 -0.010 *** 
X_Directshares -1.46 -0.023  -3.59 -0.030  -2.56 -0.016  
XL_Debtassets -3.77 -0.058 *** -1.63 -0.013  -2.44 -0.015 ** 
X_ROA -0.01 -0.000  -0.00 -0.000  0.02 0.000 ** 
X_Cash flow 1.63 0.025 ** 7.54 0.062 *** 3.11 0.019 ** 
Constant -8.18 n/a  -8.25 n/a  -3.28 n/a  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No 
Robust standard error 
clustered by company 
Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
668 367 1 042 
Chi-square 544.49 61.66 142.11 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note. All data were collected from IRESS and annual financial statements. The dependent variable is the 
rand value spent on share repurchases scaled by market capitalisation, while the independent variables of 
interest are the number of share-based instruments exercised scaled by number of shares outstanding 
(X_Exercised), the number of share-based instruments held by executives at year end scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding (X_Closing) and whether or not performance vesting conditions related to share 
price, TSR and/or EPS were applied (X_TSREPS). Control variables are described in Table 6.1, and ̂  indicates 
that such control variables were winsorised. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
230 
In Section 6.5.1 it was mentioned that no significant relationship could be found between share 
repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration (E_Exercised, X_Closing and X_TSREPS), 
when considering the entire period 2002–2017. However, it was postulated that one of the possible 
reasons for not finding any significant relationship (while a significant positive relationship was found 
in several earlier studies) was the lengthy period examined (previous studies rarely exceeded a 10-
year period). Several events (including the global financial crisis and the effective date of IFRS 2) 
occurred during the time period under review, which might have caused a change (structural break) 
in the relationship between share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration. When 
one subdivides the period under review, as done in Table 6.8, clear differences in the relationship 
between share repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration are noted in the different 
periods. 
Before the onset of the global financial crisis (2002–2006), a significant positive relationship existed 
between share repurchase value and the number of executive share-based instruments held at year 
end (X_Closing). However, during the period of the financial crisis (2007–2009) and after the crisis, a 
significant positive relationship was found between share repurchase value and the number of 
executive share-based instruments exercised (X_Exercised). This provided evidence of a possible 
structural break in the relationship between share repurchase value and executive share-based 
remuneration: before the global financial crisis there was a link between share repurchase value and 
the number of share-based instruments held by executives, while during and after the crisis the 
relationship shifted to the instruments exercised. These findings are in line with the expectation that 
there would be a relationship between share repurchase value and the number of share-based 
instruments held during the early years of the study. Although it was expected that a relationship 
between share repurchase value and the number of share-based instruments exercised would exist in 
the entire period studied, it was only found to exist from 2007 onwards. 
This break in the relationship could have been caused by two factors (probably a combination of the 
two factors): the effective date of IFRS 2 (31 December 2005) and the global financial crisis. Before the 
effective date of IFRS 2, the dominant type of share-based incentive employed was share options 
(Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b). Executives holding large numbers of share options would be more 
inclined to execute share repurchases than to increase dividends, as increasing dividends would have 
decreased the value of their unexercised share options (Fenn & Liang, 2001). After the effective date 
of IFRS 2, companies decreased their use of share options and increased their use of SARs and full 
quantum schemes (Steenkamp & Wesson, 2018b). Thus, the relationship between increased share 
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repurchases (in comparison to dividends) and executives holding share options would have started to 
dilute as share option usage decreased.  
Furthermore, during the global financial crisis (as company share prices started to fall) many share 
options (and SARs) were ‘out of the money’ and did not offer much incentive value. This could have 
led to executives concentrating on the short-term value realised on the exercise from incentives, 
rather than on the long-term value encompassed by the incentives held at year end (which might only 
vest in 5 or 6 years). After the global financial crisis, this focus on the short-term may have persisted. 
Edmans et al. (2018) also reported this link between a short-term perspective (the vesting of executive 
share-based remuneration) and share repurchase value. 
6.8  ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RESULTS 
Although the results reported in Chapter 6 seem to provide evidence of a positive relationship 
between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration in South Africa during the 2002–
2017 period, it was considered prudent to also consider alternative explanations for the results. 
Various aspects may have impacted the regression results, and these are discussed below. 
6.8.1 The effect of outliers 
Regression results are highly sensitive to outliers. The possibility that outliers in the share repurchase 
and executive share-based remuneration data might have influenced the regression results reported 
should be considered. In Chapter 4 it was reported that MTN executed a large specific repurchase in 
2009, for which it paid by issuing its own shares. Most of the repurchase value seemed contrived, if 
one nets off the number of shares repurchased and those issued as consideration. It was mentioned 
that this repurchase caused a large spike in the trend relating to repurchase activity and must, at least, 
be considered an outlier (if not contrived). In Chapter 5 it was also mentioned that Morvest granted 
an abnormally large number of share options. Consequently, at year end the executives held an 
abnormally large number of share options, which also caused a spike in the trends relating to the 
number of share-based instruments held at year end. It is worth considering whether the results 
reported up to this point would have been significantly different if MTN and Morvest had been 
excluded from the population, owing to the fact that they possibly cause outliers in the data. 
As such, all observations relating to MTN and Morvest were deleted from the population. After this, 
the regressions were re-executed. It must be noted that excluding Morvest increased the coefficient 
relating to the independent variable X_Closing in almost all the models. As such, only changes in the 
level of significance of independent variables are discussed in the rest of the section. 
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Relating to the binary dependent variable ‘decision to repurchase’ no substantial changes were noted 
after the exclusion of the two companies, when considering the entire population (original results in 
Table 6.2, model (1)). The level of significance of X_Closing increased from 10 per cent to five per cent 
(i.e. both X_Exercised and X_Closing were now significant at 5%). When the data were sub-divided 
between the different periods (original results in Table 6.7), no changes were noted except that the 
significance level of the independent variable X_Exercised increased from 10 per cent to five per cent 
in the period after the global financial crisis. 
When considering the effect of the exclusion of MTN and Morvest on the dependent variable ‘share 
repurchase value’ in the entire population, the significance level of X_Closing increased from 
insignificant to significant at the five per cent level (original results in Table 6.3, model (1)). Thus, when 
excluding MTN and Morvest the number of share-based instruments held by executives at year end 
was positively related to share repurchase value in the entire population. This provides further 
evidence of a positive relationship between share repurchase value and executive share-based 
remuneration, as found by prior global studies. 
One must also consider the effect on the repurchase entity (original results in Table 6.4). When 
excluding MTN and Morvest, share repurchase value by subsidiaries was significantly (p-value smaller 
than 0.01) and positively related to both X_Exercised and X_Closing (in the original results only 
X_Exercised was significantly related to share repurchase value by subsidiaries). This strengthens the 
argument that a relationship existed between the share repurchases executed by subsidiaries and 
executive share-based remuneration (measured as both the number of instruments exercised and 
held at year end). Even when MTN and Morvest were excluded no significant relationships existed 
between share repurchases executed by the holding company and executive share-based 
remuneration. 
The effect of excluding MTN and Morvest was considered in respect of the results relating to the 
repurchase type (original results in Table 6.5). No change was noted in relation to general repurchases 
(it still showed a significant positive relationship with X_Exercised). In relation to the specific 
repurchases, however, removing MTN and Morvest led to a significant positive relationship with 
X_Closing. It would seem, if one removed MTN and Morvest, as if general repurchases (which are less 
cumbersome to execute) were related the short-term incentives provided by executive share-based 
remuneration (those which are exercised or due to vest in the current year). Specific repurchases, 
which have a much more cumbersome authorisation process, were related to the long-term incentives 
provided by executive share-based remuneration (the cumulative value represented by the 
instruments held at year end). 
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No change was noted in relation to announced general repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration, if one removes MTN and Morvest (originally shown in Table 6.6). Announced general 
repurchases were still significantly and positively related to X_Exercised. However, excluding MTN and 
Morvest, produced a significant positive relationship (at the 5% level) between unannounced general 
share repurchases and X_Closing (originally no significant relationship had been reported between 
unannounced general repurchases and executive share-based remuneration). This finding associated 
unannounced share repurchases with the long-term incentive provided to executives by the 
unexercised share-based instruments held at year end. 
Finally, one needs to consider the removal of MTN and Morvest on the relationship between share 
repurchase value and executive share-based remuneration in the different periods (original results 
reported in Table 6.8). No change is noted in the period before the global financial crisis (X_Closing is 
still significantly and positively related to share repurchase value), but removing MTN and Morvest 
leads to no significant relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration during the financial crisis (which is to be expected during a period of financial distress). 
After the crisis, no change is noted when MTN and Morvest were removed (X_Exercised is still 
significantly and positively related to share repurchase value). 
Overall, it can be concluded that excluding MTN and Morvest, the two companies who most obviously 
led to outliers in the share repurchase and executive share-based remuneration data, did not 
significantly alter the results produces by the regressions. It is, however, possible that excluding, or 
winsorising, other outliers might have significantly impacted the results. But, it was decided not to 
investigate outliers further, as this was not done in previous studies in other countries studying the 
relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration and the standard 
deviations relating to the dependent and independent variables did not seem extremely large. The 
fact that a large number of share repurchase observations are zero (no repurchase) would also reduce 
the effect of possible outliers. Furthermore, allowing the data to vary naturally facilitates the 
identification of important relationships. 
6.8.2 Other alternative explanations 
Since regressions apply the concept of statistical significance, the chance of a Type I statistical error 
remains. Especially when regressions are executed on smaller datasets within the population, as in 
Sections 6.6 and 6.7, the probability increases that a regression would produce a significant result 
purely by chance. Thus, in Sections 6.6 and 6.7 where the data were sub-divided, results that are only 
significant at the 10 per cent level should probably be treated with some scepticism. This pertains 
specifically to the result in Table 6.7 reporting a positive relationship between the decision to 
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repurchase and the number of instruments exercised, in the 2010–2017 period, which was significant 
only at a 10 per cent level of significance. All other relationships reported in Sections 6.6 and 6.7 were 
either significant at a five per cent or a one per cent level of significance, which reduces the chance of 
a Type I error. 
When executing regressions, there is always the risk of omitted variable bias. If a certain variable was 
not included as control variable, but actually does influence share repurchases behaviour, and this 
omitted variable is also correlated to executive share-based remuneration, then the coefficients 
produced by the regressions might be biased as a result. Specifically, two such variables exist: 
institutional ownership and the number of shares issued to all employees during the year to settle 
share-based schemes. These variables were discussed in Section 3.5.2 but will be mentioned here 
again for the sake of completeness.  
Institutional ownership was not included as control variable in the present study as it is not readily 
available from financial databases in South Africa. Institutional ownership can influence payouts 
(dividends plus share repurchases) as well as executive remuneration (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Geiler 
& Renneboog, 2016). As such, not controlling for institutional ownership might have led to omitted 
variable bias and the possibility exists that the significant results noted in the present study are a result 
of not including institutional ownership as control variable. However, as the institutional ownership 
percentage of a specific company is expected to be relatively constant, the present study indirectly 
compensated for institutional ownership by including company fixed effects. Furthermore, the risk 
relating to the omitted variable is not considered to be substantial as previous studies failed to find a 
significant correlation between share repurchases, which is a specific portion of payout, and 
institutional ownership (De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Geiler & Renneboog, 2016; Moore, 2019).  
In Section 2.2.3.4, it was mentioned that share repurchases could occur when companies want to 
offset the dilution in EPS caused by issuing shares to employees during the year, to settle share-based 
remuneration schemes. In earlier studies in other countries it was debated whether share repurchases 
seemed to be linked to executive share-based remuneration, or rather to the shares issued to all 
employees during the year. Some of these earlier studies included the number of shares issued to 
employees during the year as control variable in their regressions. Later studies in other countries did 
not normally do so. As a result, and because the number of instruments issued to employees during 
the year is not readily available from annual financial statement disclosure nor the IRESS financial 
database, it was decided to not include this as control variable in the present study. It is also not 
expected that the number of instruments issued to all employees and the number exercised and held 
by executives, will be correlated. The risk of omitted variable bias was therefore considered minimal, 
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but there remains the possibility that the results reported in the present study were influenced by not 
including this control variable.  
Finally, the population employed in the present study could have driven the results. It was decided to 
only include companies that have primary listings on the JSE in the population (and to exclude 
companies with secondary listings) as such companies must comply with the JSE Listing Requirements’ 
announcement rules on share repurchases. It was specifically these announcement requirements, 
which are less strict than those in other countries, that made it crucial to study the relationship 
between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration in South Africa. However, the 
possibility remains that the exclusion of the larger dual-listed companies may have influenced the 
results.  
6.9  CONCLUSION 
Around the turn of the century it was found that executives that held large numbers of unexercised 
share options preferred share repurchases over dividends (Fenn & Liang, 2001; Jolls, 1998; Kahle, 
2002). More recently, researchers have been linking increased share repurchase activity to rent 
extraction and short-term behaviour by executives in a bid to enhance the value that they realise from 
share-based remuneration in general (Edmans et al., 2018; Gao & Kronlund, 2020; Lazonick, 2014). 
The aim of the present study was to determine the relationship between share repurchases and 
executive share-based remuneration in the South African context. The period 2002–2017 was studied. 
It was expected that a positive relationship would be found between share repurchases and the 
number of share-based instruments exercised (during the entire 2002–2017 period), while a 
relationship between share repurchases and the number of share-based instruments held would only 
exist in the early years of the study (when share options were the dominant scheme type employed). 
Furthermore, it was expected that a positive relationship between share repurchases and the usage 
of performance vesting conditions linked to share price, TSR and/or EPS would be found during the 
early years of the study, when fewer companies were employing such conditions. 
As expected, a positive relationship between the decision to repurchase and the number of share-
based instruments exercised was found for the entire period studied. In addition, a positive 
relationship was found between the decision to repurchase and the number of instruments held at 
year end, which seemed to be more strongly rooted in the pre-2006 period. However, when only 
considering the pre-financial crisis period, no significant relationship was found.  
Contrary to expectations, no relationship was found between share repurchase value and executive 
share-based remuneration, when considering the entire period of study. However, a positive 
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relationship was found between both share repurchases executed by subsidiaries and (announced) 
general share repurchases and the number of share-based instruments exercised by executives. 
Additionally, positive relationships were found between share repurchase value and the number of 
share-based instruments during specific periods. Prior to the global financial crisis, a positive 
relationship existed between share repurchase value and the number of instruments held at year end, 
while during and after the crisis a positive relationship was found between share repurchase value 
and the number of instruments exercised during the year. 
Finally, no relationship was found between share repurchases and the use of performance vesting 
conditions based on share price, TSR and/or EPS when considering the entire 2002–2017 period. 
However, prior to the global financial crisis a positive relationship was found between the decision to 
repurchase and the use of such conditions, as was expected. 
The aforementioned results suggest that South African executives could be abusing share repurchases 
to increase the value realised from share-based remuneration. Based on this possibility, it would be 
prudent if the JSE took the precaution of improving its regulations regarding share repurchases. 
Improved regulation should include the real-time announcement of all share repurchases on SENS 
(such announcements are required by many stock exchanges worldwide). Moreover, corporate 
governance regulations (such as the King Report) could require improved disclosure of share 
repurchases (and specifically the effect they had on executive share-based remuneration) in the 
annual financial statement or the integrated report. Furthermore, accurate recordkeeping by financial 
databases (such as IRESS and Bloomberg) is essential for future monitoring of share repurchases as a 
financial tool in the hands of companies.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 RECONCILIATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Share repurchases have habitually been associated with undervaluation and the availability of free 
cash flow. In addition, share repurchases are viewed as a flexible alternative to increasing dividends. 
However, in the last few years more and more researchers have been linking increased share 
repurchase activity (especially in the US and Western Europe) to the fact that executives can employ 
these repurchases to increase their companies’ share price and EPS figure. As large portions of 
executive remuneration (share-based remuneration in particular) are linked to the performance of 
the share price (and also the EPS figure), share repurchases could be employed by executives to 
artificially increase the value of their own remuneration. 
Although a number of recent studies have investigated the relationship between share repurchases 
and executive share-based remuneration, this relationship has not been studied in the South African 
environment. It is especially important to conduct such a study in South Africa, as share repurchase 
activity is less transparent here, owing to the fact that general repurchases need to be announced on 
the stock exchange only once three per cent of outstanding shares have been repurchased. 
Furthermore, South Africa has extreme levels of pay inequality (so much so that the King Report now 
requires disclosures on this issue at company level). Self-enrichment by executives could exacerbate 
pay inequality in South Africa, making the findings of the present study all the more relevant in the 
current context of this country.  
Based on earlier studies undertaken in other countries, it was expected that a positive statistical 
relationship would exist between share repurchase and executive share-based remuneration variables 
in South Africa. To test whether this expectation was valid, three main research questions were 
developed and then tested by employing data from 2002 to 2017. Research question 1 centred on the 
extent of share repurchase activity in South Africa, while Research question 2 focused on the 
characteristics of executive share-based remuneration. Comprehensive data on share repurchases 
and executive share-based remuneration had to be gathered by way of annual financial statements 
and the IRESS financial database. This led to the creation of databases on both share repurchases and 
executive share-based remuneration – which can be employed in future research projects. With this 
data available, it was possible to address Research question 3, which sought to establish the 
relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration. 
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In Section 7.2 a summary of the main findings pertaining to the three research questions is provided. 
The research contribution and contribution to practice and policy follows in Sections 7.3 and 7.4, after 
which recommendations are made in Section 7.5. Chapter 7 closes with the limitations of the present 
study and recommendations for future research (Section 7.6), as well as concluding comments 
(Section 7.7). 
7.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
7.2.1 Research question 1: Extent of share repurchase activity 
When considering the 2002–2017 period, it was found that share repurchase activity, measured as 
the rand value invested in share repurchases, increased over the 2002–2009 period, after which it 
seemed to stabilise at a lower level. In general, South African share repurchase activity in the post-
financial crisis period seemed to resemble that experienced in Western European countries more 
closely than that in the US, where an increasing trend was noticed after the global financial crisis.  
The number of companies engaging in share repurchases increased after the global financial crisis 
(showing that share repurchases had become widely accepted), but the value spent by each company 
has decreased, leading to a relatively stable trend in share repurchase quantum (measured as total 
rand value invested in share repurchases). The transparency of share repurchases (the percentage 
announced on the JSE’s SENS) decreased over the period of the study, making it difficult for 
stakeholders to monitor share repurchase activity in real time. 
7.2.2 Research question 2: Characteristics of executive share-based remuneration 
During the 2002–2017 period, the rand value associated with executive share-based remuneration 
was not consistently disclosed in the annual financial statements of companies. However, based on 
the incomplete picture provided by these financial statement disclosures, share-based remuneration 
made up a substantial portion of executive remuneration. It is expected that the annual financial 
statement disclosures relating to the value of executive share-based remuneration will improve 
should companies comply with the requirements of King IV (effective from 2018 onwards).  
During the early years of the present study, share options were most commonly granted by 
companies. After the effective date of IFRS 2 and during the global financial crisis there was a gradual 
shift first to SARs and then to full quantum schemes. Full quantum schemes provide improved 
alignment of executive and shareholder interest (in line with agency theory). Over the target period 
of the present study, the usage of performance conditions increased, with share price, TSR and EPS 
commonly being employed in the latter years of the present study. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
239 
7.2.3 Research question 3: Relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based 
remuneration 
After controlling for other variables associated with share repurchases, a positive relationship was 
found between the decision to repurchase and both the number of share-based instruments exercised 
and the number of instruments held at year end. However, the relationship between the decision to 
repurchases and the number of instruments held at year end only existed during the early years of the 
present study, when share options were the dominant type of scheme.  
When considering the entire 2002–2017 period, no statistically significant relationship was found 
between share repurchase value and the number of share-based instruments. A statistically significant 
positive relationship, however, existed when considering certain time periods or certain repurchasing 
entities or repurchase types. Prior to the global financial crisis, a positive relationship existed between 
share repurchase value and the number of instruments held at year end. During and after the global 
financial crisis, a positive relationship was found between share repurchase value and the number of 
instruments exercised during the year. Furthermore, a positive relationship existed when only 
considering the share repurchases executed by subsidiaries or when only considering (announced) 
general share repurchases.  
Finally, no relationship was found between share repurchases and the usage of performance vesting 
conditions based on share price, TSR and/or EPS when considering the entire 2002–2017 period. 
However, prior to the global financial crisis, a positive relationship was found between the decision to 
repurchase and the usage of such conditions. 
7.3  RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The first scientific contribution of the present study relates to the creation of two databases: one on 
share repurchases and one on executive share-based remuneration. Comprehensive information on 
these two matters did not exist prior to the present study, and thus could not be downloaded from 
established financial databases. The databases created during the present study can be utilised in 
future research to investigate issues relating to finance and financial management.  
The second scientific contribution that the present study makes is establishing the fact that a 
statistically significant positive relationship exists between share repurchase and executive share-
based remuneration variables in South Africa, as has been observed globally. The existence of a 
positive relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration indicates 
that South African executives could be abusing share repurchases to increase the value realised from 
share-based remuneration.  
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7.4 CONTRIBUTION TO PRACTICE AND POLICY 
The findings of the present study provide shareholders with a more comprehensive understanding of 
both the quantum of share repurchases and the characteristics of executive share-based 
remuneration in South Africa. Furthermore, this study alerts shareholders to the fact that executives 
may be enriching themselves using share repurchases. This information gives grounds for enhanced 
shareholder activism regarding share repurchases (shareholders could, for instance, demand 
comprehensive disclosure regarding the relationship between share repurchases and executive share-
based remuneration in the company’s integrated report).  
The current SENS announcement rules on share repurchases do not allow for real-time monitoring of 
all share repurchases (general repurchases are only announced once 3% of outstanding shares have 
been repurchased). Based on the evidence provided by the present study (the existence of a 
relationship between share repurchases and executive share-based remuneration), the JSE could 
amend its announcement rules to ensure that all share repurchases are announced in real time – 
which would be in line with global best practice.  
7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The finding that some executives seem to be enriching themselves through share repurchases points 
to the existence of an ethical dilemma. Executives should be acting in the best interests of the 
company, and not directing company resources in a way that financially benefits the executives. Thus, 
this finding of possible self-enrichment is important from a social justice perspective, given the high 
levels of income-inequality in South Africa. It is recommended that this matter be addressed at several 
levels and in various ways, including amending the JSE announcement rules relating to share 
repurchases, requiring improved disclosure in annual financial statements and integrated reports, and 
increasing the awareness of both shareholders and non-executives about this issue.    
It is critical that the JSE should clarify its announcement rules pertaining to share repurchases, by 
confirming that it presently requires all share repurchases to be announced on SENS. The present 
three per cent rule is not producing complete and useful information for monitoring purposes as many 
companies interpret the rule to be an annual one, while it was meant to be cumulative. Furthermore, 
the JSE could consider reducing the present threshold (3%) to a lower one, or ideally require real-time 
announcements of all share repurchases (as is required by many stock exchanges worldwide). This will 
allow stakeholders to actively monitor the interaction between share repurchases and executive 
share-based remuneration.  
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The share repurchase environment in South Africa is unique, given that both the holding company and 
subsidiaries can repurchase shares issued by the holding company, and that shares repurchased by 
the holding company are cancelled from issued share capital. Owing to this uniqueness, the annual 
financial statement disclosures required by IFRS relating to the number of shares in issuance, as well 
as the number and rand value of shares repurchased, does not produce complete and accurate 
information relating to total share repurchase activity in the South African environment. The South 
African Institute of Chartered Accountants issues accounting standards called Financial Reporting 
Guidelines, which prescribe the accounting treatment and disclosure relating to issues that are specific 
to the South African environment (for example, for BEE transactions). It is recommended that a 
Financial Reporting Guideline be created for the annual financial statement disclosure of movements 
in share capital, including share repurchase activity. Such a Financial Reporting Guideline could then 
require companies to disclose both the group number of shares and the holding company number of 
shares in issuance, and the share repurchase activity of both the holding company and subsidiaries. 
Repurchases by consolidated share trusts could also be a mandated disclosure. Some of the above-
mentioned disclosures are already required by the JSE Listing Requirements, but companies are not 
adhering to the requirements by providing these disclosures. For JSE-listed companies, the JSE and 
company auditors should be stricter in enforcing the annual financial statement disclosure 
requirements relating to share repurchases already contained in the JSE Listing Requirements.  
Shareholders should not merely provide a blanket approval for general share repurchases at the AGM, 
but rather interrogate the share repurchases actually executed by the board in the prior financial 
period before approving future share repurchases. Shareholders could also demand improved 
disclosure (in the integrated report) of the share repurchases actually executed; the reasons for 
engaging in such repurchases; and the effects that repurchases had on both the share price and EPS. 
Furthermore, corporate governance regulators (such as the King Report) could prescribe more 
comprehensive disclosure on the aforementioned.  
On scrutinising executive share-based remuneration, it was noted that the value realised by executives 
from share-based remuneration was inadequately disclosed in annual financial statements of many 
South African listed companies. Should companies adhere more fastidiously to the requirements of 
King IV, more comprehensive and consistent information regarding the value of executive share-based 
remuneration will be provided in the remuneration reports of companies. However, it is critical that 
financial databases (such as IRESS and Bloomberg) then comprehensively collect data on the per 
executive value of executive share-based remuneration – which will allow future researchers to access 
comprehensive information on the value of executive share-based remuneration. The data capturing 
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problems, relating to executive share-based remuneration, identified during the present study should 
be considered by IRESS (and other financial database operators). Training opportunities should be 
offered to data capturers and enhanced quality control procedures should be implemented. 
Furthermore, it is advised that the Employment Equity Act be amended to include the value realised 
from share-based remuneration in the definition of the remuneration that needs to be reported by 
companies. This will enable regulators to more accurately calculate and monitor the wage gap 
between executives (who are often remunerated extensively using share-based remuneration) and 
other employees. 
The remuneration committees of JSE-listed companies are charged with corporate governance 
relating to executive remuneration. Training should be provided to the non-executive directors who 
serve on remuneration committees to educate them regarding the risk that executives could be 
increasing the value of their own share-based remuneration through share repurchases. Such training 
will ensure that the non-executives are better equipped for their role. Also, the characteristics of 
executive share-based remuneration in South Africa, as described in the present study, should be 
considered by the remuneration committees of JSE-listed companies when formulating executive 
remuneration policies, and implementing these policies. Although the average vesting period 
employed is above the three-year minimum stipulated by King III, remuneration committees could 
employ staggered vesting over a longer period to foster a more long-term outlook. Remuneration 
committees should be wary of over-reliance on certain performance vesting conditions, such as share 
price, TSR and EPS, that could be manipulated by share repurchases. Furthermore, the use of non-
financial performance conditions should be increased in the design of executive share-based 
remuneration schemes.  
Business ethics educators and organisations promoting business ethics in South Africa should take 
note of the possibility that executives could increase the value of their share-based remuneration 
through share repurchase activity. The King Report should condemn such actions. Business ethics 
educators should include case studies relating to this phenomenon in their materials. 
Finally, the present study showed that the FRM (and the Mundlak approach for panel data) is an 
appropriate regression technique when the dependent variable is naturally scaled as a percentage, 
and the data clusters at the zero point. As many accounting-related studies employ dependent 
variables that are naturally scaled as a percentage (and often skewed at the zero point), researchers 
should be educated about the FRM as it could be useful in future accounting-related research.  
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7.6 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The results of the present study cannot be generalised to all companies on the JSE’s Main Board, as 
companies in the Basic Materials and Financial industries were excluded from the research population. 
Also, only companies with a primary listing on the JSE were included in the present study, and thus 
the results are not indicative of companies with a secondary listing on the JSE. Furthermore, the results 
of the present study cannot be generalised to other countries, given the country-specific regulatory 
requirements applicable to share repurchases in South Africa. Future research could expand the 
present study to the Basic Materials and Financial industries, and other emerging economies. 
The data employed in the present study were gathered from the disclosures in annual financial 
statements and the IRESS financial database. The completeness and reliability of the data collected on 
both share repurchases and share-based remuneration is thus impacted by the data source. 
Furthermore, the theoretical underpinning of the present study assumes that the identified share 
repurchase occurred before the exercise of the share-based instruments. However, date of the share 
repurchase and the exercise of the executive share-based remuneration could only be narrowed down 
to occurring in the same year, given the announcement rules relating to general repurchases and the 
inconsistent disclosures in annual financial statements pertaining to executive share-based 
remuneration. Thus, the assumption that the share repurchase preceded the exercise of executive 
share-based remuneration could not be verified. Future researchers could conduct a case study of a 
small number of companies (possibly the companies with the largest share repurchase value) and 
investigate the dates relating to share repurchases and the exercise of executive share-based 
remuneration in greater depth, possibly by using multiple data sources (including interview data). 
There remains the possibility that outliers in the data might have influenced the results, although this 
did not seem to be the case in initial tests which excluded the companies with the largest share 
repurchase value and number of executive share-based instruments held at year end. Additionally, 
two possible omitted variables exist: institutional ownership and the number of shares issued to all 
employees during the year. These variables are not readily available from financial databases. Future 
researchers could collect these variables by hand, for the companies that disclose them in their annual 
financial statements, and then include the variables in the regressions executed in Chapter 6. This 
would allow a more accurate depiction of the relationship between share repurchases and executive 
share-based remuneration. 
Given that a database on share repurchases was created during the present study, the relationship 
between share repurchases and a company’s internal investment decisions (in capital assets and 
human resources) could be evaluated by future researchers. The database on executive share-based 
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remuneration could be employed, by future researchers, to study the effect of corporate governance 
on executive share-based remuneration in South Africa. Also, the database on executive share-based 
remuneration currently contains the ‘gain on shares’ value as extracted from IRESS. Future research 
could determine the actual value realised from executive share-based remuneration, based on 
disclosures in annual financial statements, and compare this value to the ‘gain on shares’ value as 
currently included in the database (as reported by IRESS).  
7.7 CONCLUSION 
Worldwide, the growth in share repurchase activity is being questioned – increasingly researchers are 
linking share repurchases to an attempt by executives to enrich themselves by enhancing the share 
price and EPS, thereby increasing the value they realise from share-based remuneration. In South 
Africa, the value that executives realise from share-based remuneration is poorly disclosed in the 
annual financial statements of listed companies and a considerable proportion of the share 
repurchases executed are not announced on SENS – which makes it difficult to ascertain whether such 
a link exists. With this as background it was deemed important that the relationship between share 
repurchases and executive share-based remuneration should be studied in South Africa. 
The present study found a positive relationship between these two variables – indicating that 
executives could be abusing their power to execute share repurchases in an attempt to enrich 
themselves (rather than advancing the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders). It is 
recommended that the JSE require all share repurchases to be announced via SENS, and that 
shareholders become more active in monitoring the share repurchase activity of the companies in 
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APPENDIX A: REGRESSION RESULTS OF MODELS EMPLOYED AS ROBUSTNESS 
CHECK 
A1  Decision to repurchase: Linear probability model regressions 
Independent / control variable 
2002–2017 (1) 2006–2017 (2) 2006–2017, 
industry 
dummies (3) 
Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig 
X_Exercised 3.24 * 4.24 ** 4.16 ** 
X_Closing 0.95  0.18  0.22  
X_TSREPS 0.04  0.01  0.02  
XL_Returnshare^ -0.03 ** -0.02  -0.02  
XL_Marketbook^ 0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
X_Divyield^ 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 
XL_Lmarketcap 0.01  -0.01  -0.02  
X_Directshares 0.18 * 0.42 ** 0.43 ** 
XL_Debtassets -0.35 *** -0.44 *** -0.44 *** 
X_ROA 0.00  0.00  0.00  
X_Cash flow 0.31 *** 0.17  0.16  
Constant -0.12  -0.12  -0.37  
Company fixed effects Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No Yes 
Robust standard error clustered by 
company 
Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2 077 1 411 1 411 
Chi-square / F-test 143.710 Not shown 140.973 
Prob > chi2 / F 0.000 Not shown 0.000 
Note. All data were collected from IRESS and annual financial statements. The dependent variable is the 
decision to repurchase, while the independent variables of interest are the number of share-based 
instruments exercised scaled by number of shares outstanding (X_Exercised), the number of share-based 
instruments held by executives at year end scaled by the number of shares outstanding (X_Closing) and 
whether or not performance vesting conditions related to share price, TSR and/or EPS were applied 
(X_TSREPS). Control variables are described in Table 6.1, and ^ indicates that such control variables were 
winsorised. ‘Coef’ denotes the coefficient, while ‘Sig’ denotes the significance of coefficient.  




A2 Repurchase value: Tobit regressions 
Independent / control variable 
2002–2017 (1) 2006–2017 (2) 2006–2017, 
industry 
dummies (3) 
Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig 
X_Exercised 1.01 ** 0.75 ** 0.75 ** 
X_Closing 0.38 ** 0.00  0.01  
X_TSREPS 0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
XL_Returnshare^ -0.01 ** 0.00  0.00  
XL_Marketbook^ 0.00  -0.00 ** -0.00 ** 
X_Divyield^ 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 
XL_Lmarketcap -0.02 * -0.00  -0.00  
X_Directshares -0.05 * 0.03  0.03  
XL_Debtassets -0.12 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** 
X_ROA 0.00  0.00  0.00  
X_Cash flow 0.12 *** 0.10 *** 0.09 *** 
Constant -0.22 *** -0.14 *** -0.17 *** 
Company fixed effects Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak Yes, Mundlak 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes 











Observations 2 077 1 411 1 411 
Wald chi / Chi-square 133.01 95.018 98.625 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note. All data were collected from IRESS and annual financial statements. The dependent variable is the 
rand value spent on share repurchases scaled by market capitalisation, while the independent variables of 
interest are the number of share-based instruments exercised scaled by number of shares outstanding 
(X_Exercised), the number of share-based instruments held by executives at year end scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding (X_Closing) and whether or not performance vesting conditions related to share 
price, TSR and/or EPS were applied (X_TSREPS). Control variables are described in Table 6.1, and ̂  indicates 
that such control variables were winsorised. ‘Coef’ denotes the coefficient, while ‘Sig’ denotes the significance 
of coefficient.  
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